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ABSTRACT
The thesis covers the politics of the Conservative Party 
from the general election defeat of May 1 929 to the 
formation of the National Government in August 19 31. It 
relates the internal crisis in the Party to the pressures 
of the Party rank and file, and to the general political 
and economic situation, in order to analyse the process by 
which Party policy evolved. Debate centred upon two 
questions: protection and India. In the case of the
fbrmer, the role of its a d v o c a t e s  in the press is 
discussed. Overall, the thesis emphasised the power of 
the position of the Party Leader, Baldwin.
The Party crisis passed through six distinct phases. In 
the first (May-August 1929) the a u £ q£ o in policy was 
preserved; but during the second (September 1929-March
1930), the balance tilted in the direction of advance over 
protection, but was restrained by the reluctance of the 
northern regions. A truce with the press followed (March- 
June 1930), but collapsed in mid-summer, leaving the 
leaders dangerously out of touch with their followers' 
views during the fourth phase of acute crisis (July- 
Ootober 1930). At the end of the latter period the 
leaders accommodated their position, appeasing all but a 
small minority of dissidents, and isolating the press 
campaign. However, the fifth phase (October 1930-March
1931) saw a r e n e w e d  o u t b r e a k  of unease, due to the 
question of India and the leadership failures of Baldwin 
himself. In the final phase (March-August 1931) Baldwin 
re-established his position, and the Conservatives seemed 
set for electoral victory, having united around the policy 
of reducing government expenditure. The Party did not 
seek Coalition, but was diverted into joining the National 
Government by the sudden and serious financial crisis, 
believing it to be a temporary emergency expedient.
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INTRODUCTION 
(i ) Conservatism in Crisis, 192^-1931
The history of British politics since the mid- 
nineteenth century is dominated by the presence and 
influence of the party system, both in Parliament and in 
spreading party organisations locally across the nation. 
The pe r i o d s  of time during w h i c h  the f o r m a l  party 
divisions of the British political system appear to have 
achieved stability, however, have been punctuated by 
intervals of crisis which have cast the mould of political 
life back into the melting pot. These crises can be 
recognised by the hallmarks of inner party strife and 
debate, allied to u n c e r t a i n t i e s  r a n g i n g  beyond the 
apparent issues of future party policy to concern over the 
whole future and nature of British politics. The party 
categorisations passed through a period of fluidity, in 
which changes of personnel, support, and intention , of a 
fundamental or radical nature, took place. To a greater 
or lesser degree this occurred to the accompaniment of 
open factiona1 isation, and the contention of leading 
figures, either inspired by or exploiting a new rhetoric, 
for power within the wider arena of political struggle. 
These processes, these p e riods of r e a p p r a i s a l ,  are 
sometimes obscured by the fact that the parties emerged 
from them often bearing the same nomenclature, comprising 
much the same backbench and grassroots support, and 
apparently unreconstructed. It is too readily assumed
1
that if a grouping did not actually disintegrate, that the 
changes which affected it were minimal, superficial, and 
transient. There is no doubt that "party" as a concept 
has enormous survival power, and that the individual 
parties have acqu i r e d  a c l aim on l o y a l t i e s  and a 
durability achieved simply through existence over long 
periods. It has been more frequent and normal in the 
experience of the past century of British politics for 
changes to take place within the framework of a party, 
even though such changes may have strained the framework 
near to breaking point; rather than to cause a complete 
reorientation of groupings such as occurred in 1846.
This is not an attempt to elevate these general 
tendencies into a system of interpretation, but rather an 
acknowledgement of the periodic nature of crises so 
generally affecting all shades of opinion that the firmest 
landmarks on the contemporary political horizon seem to 
shift, and every question is cast into "the wi t c h e s ’ 
cauldron".^ Although the years in between such crises are 
far from uneventful, marked by bitter controversy between 
parties verging on constitutional breakdown, such as 1906 
to 1914; or indeed may be of greater historical moment, 
such as the First World War itself, nevertheless these 
periods of general reappraisal stand out clearly from a 
distanced, historical, standpoint, as would junctions on a
1. R osebery to Churchill, 7 October 1 902, in R. 
Churchill, ed., W£n£^££ ^  Church i l l , Companion 
Volume, 2 (1969), p. 166.
railway journey. Those seated in the railway carriage may 
notice t h e m s e l v e s  p a s s i n g  over some junctions, or 
alternative pathways, yet not feel the vibration or the 
consequences of others at all. They would be even more 
d i s t i n c t l y  a w a r e  of the u n c o u pling, shunting, and 
redistribution of component sections of their train; but 
from the historian’s perspective it is the choice of the 
different tracks, even more than the narrative of the 
journey itself, w h i c h  a t t r a c t s  the m o s t  s e a r c h i n g  
analysis.
To return from metaphor to reality, the periods of
reappraisal are not difficult to identify. Surveying the
course of British politics since 1846, the crisis of
Liberalism and Conservatism in 1885-18.86 stands out as one
such; the period 1900-1903 has recently and convincingly
been portrayed for both main parties as another.^ There
can be little doubt that the years 1929 to,1931 represent
the third. This is apparent not just in the coincidence
that each of the three m ajor parties was racked by
internal dissensions, but in the more significant fact
that these problems were the product of questioning
anxiety within each party concerning not only present
progress, but the seeds of future intentions that were
implicit in current responses. But reappraisal was not
limited to the parties; significantly, it linked them as
much as it distinguished them, and the air was full of
2. A. Sykes, Tariff Reform in British Politics 1903-191 3 
(1979), pp. 1-30.
i n i t i a t i v e s  for m e r g e r s  and coa l i t i o n s ,  for centre 
groupings or new parties, all of whose programmes would 
have involved shifting the basic ground of politics away 
from the shibboleths of the immediate past, into entirely 
novel matters. Another indicator of the way in which the 
politicians were plagued by doubts was the prevalent 
demand for a government of businessmen, or a non-partisan 
National Government from the best talents of all parties; 
both p r o p o s a l s  w o u l d  have n e c e s s a r i l y  e n t a i l e d  the 
submergence of those issues, such as tariffs or free 
trade, upon which the present divides were established, in 
favour of a new consensus - and, although less clearly 
perceived by the advocates of such reconstruction, new 
lines of division. Hence the talk of new combinations, 
and the f o r m a t i o n  of a New Party; hence also the 
challenges and demands of the young turks against the 
control of prominence by an old guard. The importance of 
the young men’s movement and their alienation from their 
leaders is that it claimed larger pretensions than merely 
to be the struggle of one generation to displace the 
preceding one. They claimed a fresh and novel approach, 
and affected scorn and contempt for both the methods and 
the c o n c e r n s  of the old p o l i t i c s  and the o l d e r  
politicians. In the a t t e m p t  to be as mu c h  the 
promulgators of programmes as the constructors of new 
cabinets on the backs of menu cards, the movement of the 
young men was an integral part of the process by which the
structure of party distinction had been cast into the 
m e l t i n g  pot b e t w e e n  1 929 and 1 9 32. Of c o u rse,to a 
considerable extent the chance occurrence of certain 
factors: the hung parliament; the rise to the verges of
political maturity of the generation who had served as 
junior officers in the fighting of the First World War; 
and the global economic recession, forced on all these 
anxieties and rendered them acute. It is possible to make 
a case for any period that it was a period of transition, 
and to become entrapped in cliche when struggling between 
the choice of emphasising either the "change" or the 
"continuity" in characterising any era. But to avoid such 
judgements is, in itself, no solution, but rather an 
abdication of responsibility. There is a strong case for 
suggesting that the years from 1929 to 1931 were a period 
of transition, from the politics which had characterised 
the 1 920’s and had their roots in Edwardian and 1a t e- 
Victorian Britain, to those which formed the debates of 
the 1 930’s, and in a diminishing extent, until as late as 
the period which may be categorised as the next watershed, 
that of 1 96 1-1 964.^ Though the 1 930’s were not without 
drama, it is nevertheless possible to suggest that at a 
basic level the politics of that decade had achieved an 
equipoise and stability which had been lacking from the 
1920’s. Due to the imminence and occurrence of the Second 
World War, and the fascist threat, and due also to the
consequent attention of commentators to the 1930’s as 
opposed to the neglected mid and late-1920’s, it has 
become customary to.picture the contrast in the opposite 
direction. Yet it was the 1920’s, with the political and 
economic consequences of the First World War, with the 
instability of the party system after the Coalition 
experiment and the complexities of genuine three-party 
politics, with the problems of the emergence of Labour 
governments and of the General Strike, and with their 
f requent g e n eral elections, w hich in fact have the 
character of a period preceding a cathartic restructuring, 
w hi l s t  the 1 9 3 0 ’s ex h i b i t  an e s s e n t i a l  s t r u c t u r a l  
stability which follows from such a recasting. This may 
go much of the way to e x plain the f a i l u r e  of the 
initiatives for new parties, launched in the period of 
flux, to survive or prosper in the new decade, and the 
failure also of extremist groups of the radical left or 
radical right to a c h i e v e  the d e s t r u c t i o n  of a r e ­
established two-grouping system.
The fortunes of all the parties, the careers of 
almost all the leading figures of both politically active 
generations, and their mental outlook or "world view", in 
the unconscious evolution of attitudes from one viewpoint 
to another, were significantly affected by the events and 
arguments of the span from the general election in May, 
1929 to the period when new grooves had been settled into, 
apparent sometime between 1931 and 1935. In each case 
these latter can be dated differently. For the Liberals
the choices taken during the minority second Labour 
administration, and in particular from the formation of 
the National Cabinet in August 1931 to the withdrawal of 
the Samuelites from that government in 1932, and their 
eventual symbolic return to the opposition benches, 
dictated their political significance, in terms of their 
exclusion from hope of office in peacetime until at least 
the Grimond revival of 1 96 1-1 964, if not the Alliance of 
the early 1980*s. For the Labour Party, the tensions of 
the second government, and the eventual rift of August, 
1931 and the process through which the party emerged to 
become more clearly the party of the TUC and of Attlee, 
for at least the twenty years after 1935, if not for 
longer, m a r k e d  the s h e d d i n g  of its 1 a t e - V i c t o r i a n  
background and leadership. In the Conservative Party the 
debate began and ended slightly earlier, in the months 
from defeat in the spring of 1929 until the mid-summer of 
1931, though after-effects of the decisions taken over 
India rumbled on until 1 935. For the Conservative Party 
the formation of the National government in August 1931 
was not the catalyst of the process of reappraisal that it 
became for the other two parties, but was rather something 
of a distraction from decisions already arrived at, 
perhaps unwittingly, as well as being a confirmation of 
them. The logical consequences of the options selected 
between 1 929 and 1931 did not in some areas become fully 
apparent until afterwards, when they produced internal 
protests; but this pattern should not be allowed to
obscure the fact that the important choices had been taken 
already.
The historiography of these crucial years is patchy, 
signifying as it does an area of work in progress, rather 
than of work completed. Some of the ground has been 
t o uched on in the form of b a c k g r o u n d  in the many 
biographical studies, to a greater or lesser depth, but 
always within the confines of the individual subject's 
perspective. Of the three parties. Labour has perhaps 
been best served. Apart from the comprehensive account in 
the b i o g r a p h y  of R a m s a y  M a c D o n a l d , ^  there exists 
Skidelsky's monograph on the 1929-1931 government, as well 
as his biography of Oswald Mosley. In addition, the 
crisis of the Labour cabinet in August, 1931 has been 
given considerable attention from this angle.^ The 
Liberal party has also received considerable historical 
attention, most usually within the framework of questions 
concerning that party's decline. The lessons of Michael 
Bentley's work, whilst ostensibly limited to the years 
until 1929, in fact contain the basis for understanding
4. D. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (1977).
5. R. Skidelsky, fo]^£t£C£n£ £££ the Slump; £h£ Labour
(1967); D. Carlton, MacDon a ld 
Hen d erson; th£ ££££i6.£ £££ Second
£ £ £ £ £ £  ££Y. £ £ £ £ £ £ £  (1970); R. Bassett, ££.3_lJ_Political Crisis (1958); R. Skidelsky, Oswald Mosley
(1975); H. Berkeley, The M yth that W ill not die : the
formation of the National Government, 1931 (1978).
the Liberals' preoccupations in the following three years, 
Trevor Wilson has analysed the positions of leaders and of 
party organisation, and the role of Lloyd George has 
received much attention.^ Paradoxically, it is the 
Conservative Party, the party of government during most of 
the i n t e r - w a r  years, and a r g u a b l y  the party most 
profoundly and permanently affected by the 1929-1931 
crisis, which has received minimal attention. Only. John 
Ramsden's general work of interpretation of the party's 
history from 1 902 to 1940 explores the issues beyond the 
b i o g r a p h i c a l  in any depth of c o m m e n t a r y  or source 
materials; and in such a general work space for even such 
important issues must necessarily be limited.^ As a 
number of the most important surviving collections of 
private papers relating to Conservatism in this period 
have become available only recently, it is now possible to 
attempt to redress the gap in the interpretation and 
understanding, not only of the history of the Conservative 
Party, but also of the workings of British politics during 
the i n t e r - w a r  decades. The theme of the period of
6, T. Wilson, The wri££3^^ o£ £h£ Lib e r al J?£££y 1914- 
1 935 (1966); M. Bentley, The Libera]^ Mind 1914- 1929
(1977); R. Douglas, The H££^ory ££ £he_ £££££££ Party 
1895-1970 (1971); S. Koss, "Asquith versus Lloyd
George; the last phase and beyond", in Sked and 
Cook, eds., ££i£i.£. £n_d £o.n£r £££r £ %  ( 1 976 ); J.
Campbell, Lloyd George; the 'Goat' in the Wilderness 
1922-31 (1977).
7. J. Ramsden, The Age of Balfour and Baldwin 1902-1940
(1978); A. J. P. Taylor, Beaverbrook (1972), also 
discusses these events, but is based only on the 
Beaverbrook papers.
reappraisal, and its context in the general system of 
politics, thus pervades this study and provides its 
setting,
However, this thesis can be considered also as a 
case study in the workings and history of the Conservative 
party as an institution, in the sense that examination of 
the Conservative Party's internal crisis of 1929 to 1931 
may also illuminate several themes which dominate the 
history of the party in the first half of the twentieth 
century. The most ob v i o u s  of these c o n c e r n s  the 
character, the composition, the structure and organisation 
of the Conservative Party itself. Within that, four other 
questions deserve to be specifically identified. The 
first and most important of these questions concerns the 
nature and position of the party leadership, and above all 
of the leader. His power, and the limitations of that 
power, his relationship with his followers within and 
without the Houses of Parliament, must in any study of the 
Conservative Party be a point of first departure. This is 
doubly so for the period of Baldwin's leadership, for 
there can be no gainsaying the importance of his tenure as 
party and national leader; in particular in the context of 
the decisions of the early and mid-1930's on domestic and 
international matters. The character, methods and aims of 
Stanley Baldwin will inevitably figure very largely as the 
first of the four threads interwoven throughout this 
study,
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The second question that presents itself is that of 
the politics of tariff reform in this, their final, phase. 
The importance of protectionism, as an issue in politics 
and in its impact on the party, is clearly immense, and it 
has been vividly illuminated in Alan Sykes’ study of the 
topic in the Edwardian e r a .  ^ The contrast between the 
p o l i t i c s  of i d e a l i s m  and the p o l i t i c s  of e l e c t o r a l  
pragmatism, and the struggle between these which was 
fought on the issue of the food tax aspect of tariff 
reform, thus also dominated the history of the party 
before as well as during the period under examination in 
this work.
A third area of great concern to any history of the 
Conservative Party that touches on the inter-war period 
must be the question of coalitions and coalitionism, of 
the way in which Conservatives perceived the party system 
and made judgements about the nature of government and the 
validity or danger of different governmental combinations. 
The road from the wartime coalitions of Lloyd George, and 
especially from the renouncing of that course at the 
Carlton Club in October 1 922 to the formation, by 
essentially the same group which had rebelled against 
coalition on that occasion, of a National three-party 
ministry in August, 1931 and of the Conservative Party's 
continuation in ostensibly non-party government from that 
point until 1945, obviously deserves serious historical
9. S y k e s , op. cit.
1 1
e x a m i n a t i o n . ^ ®  There can be little doubt that the 
origins of the decision of August 1931 were contained 
within the political and economic events of the period 
from spring, 1930 to autumn 1931, and the tracing of 
these events will also therefore be a major concern of the 
present study.
The fourth theme is to some extent a product of the 
concerns of the second, being the Conservative Party’s 
attitude to questions of imperial defence and foreign 
policy. The relevance of these to the world events of the 
decades from 1933 to 1963 hardly needs justification. The 
idealists of tariff reform in the Edwardian era saw their 
policy as being in part or in whole the answer to these 
problems. However, by the late 1920’s and throughout the 
1930’s these matters took on dimensions wider than those 
of imperial preference alone. These concerns may be 
loosely lumped together under the phrase "Empire policy" 
as it was in that wider sense that the rhetoric of Empire 
dominated Conservative Party politics. The essential 
issue was the primacy of domestic social and economic 
factors over p r e t e n s i o n s  to a world role, and the 
exp e n s i v e  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  e n t a i l e d  by the latter. 
Although the continued survival of the rhetoric of Empire 
has obscured this fact, it is a major contention of the 
present work that in this short period the changes in
10. This theme has been explored in the general context 
of D. Butler, ed.. Coalitions £n Br£t£sh Politics
(1978).
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attitude of the Conservative Party to the relationship of 
home and empire passed through a decisive phase, and that 
decisions were taken which consciously or unconsciously 
turned Britain on the path away from world status and 
towards insularity. To reduce the British Empire to its 
only important parts was to reduce it to the Indian 
subcontinent and the white Dominions and colonies of 
settlement: Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Eastern and
South Africa. The remainder had significance only as 
strategic points on the routes to these areas, such as 
Egypt, Aden and Singapore, rather than in their own right, 
or were simply the unimportant remainders of areas 
acquired by accident or in the wars of the remote past. 
Viewed in this light, the crucial significance to the 
imperial party of policies which affected fundamentally 
B r i t a i n ’s r e l a t i o n s  w i t h  b o t h  t h e s e  a r e a s ,  in 
constitutional reform with native India and in tariff 
reform in the question of imperial unity with the white 
colonies of settlement, is readily apparent. Connected 
with these were the related questions of imperial defence 
and communication: of the British position in Egypt, at
Singapore, and in terras of a powerful navy.
In this period crucial decisions were taken over all 
these areas. In tariff reform the policy changed from 
imperial unity to the protection of domestic industry, so 
that the ending of free trade in 1 932 did not produce the 
imperial consequences hoped for by the proponents of it 
during the previous thirty years. In parallel with this
13
the debate over the future government of India was also
subordinated to domestic concerns by the way in which it
became apparent as early as the end of August 1931 that
the Party, whatever the doubts of one section, would never
smash the National Government on the issue of India. The
excluded politicians of the settlement of August 1931
were Amery, Churchill, and Beaverbrook, for their world
view no longer synchronised with the majority of their
party, whatever the occasional emotive appeals of their
speeches. The developing primacy of home over empire is
f u n d a m e n t a l  to e x p l a i n i n g  the p r o g r e s s  of the
Conservative Party to a position of presiding relatively
painlessly over the decolonisation of the late-1950’s and
early-1960's, and to its acceptance of Indian independence
after the Second World War. It is also crucial in any
analysis of the major crises of the 1 930's , and why, as
Maurice Cowling has illuminated, it was the major area of
political discussion. It becomes evident not only over
the economy and India, but also over rearmament, the
Singapore naval base, and the League of Nations; over the
question of British responsibilities as a world power and
1 1as a European power.
11. M. Cowling, Th£ £ H P ££.£ £f ®.£_L British Politics
£ £ l i £ y  lillzlliL® ( 1 975 ) ; G. Peele, 'Revolt over India', in Peele and Cook, eds.. The 
Politics of Reappraisal 1918-1939 (1975); R. P. Shay, 
British Rearmament in the Thirties: Politics and
Profits (1977).
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In addition to these wider themes concerning the
nature of Conservatism and of Conservative Party politics,
another important historical issue is interwoven in the
narrative of these events: the question of the extent and
the i n f l u e n c e  of the p o w e r  of the press. More
specifically, perhaps, this might be categorised as the
power of the politically active proprietors of great new
papers - the press lords. Whilst playing a crucial role
in the concerns of the present work, however, the topic
has been approached not from the standpoint of an analysis
of the role of the press in British political life, though
illumination may be thrown upon that topic in passing, but
from the direction of a study of party politics. This is
more than just a question of methodology, for it has been
one of the strongest conclusions of the present study
that, notwithstanding the apprehensions and fears of
newspaper influence held by contemporaries in this period,
the power of the press p££ £ e_ was of little significance
unless it happened to vocalise or organise a substantial
body of opinion alienated from, or unrepresented by, the
existing groupings or leaders. The power of the press
lords was conditional upon this, and when they lacked
support outside their own premises in Fleet Street, their
inability to affect the larger issues was, fully revealed, 
eHowler, on such occasions as they became the focal point 
of grassroots or backbench disaffection, their strength 
was given substance. Yet to mobilise such movements, the 
establishment of a pressure group or even a party, the
15
contesting of elections, the raising of funds, and the 
enlistment of ordinary supporters, were a necessary 
feature, as can be seen in the newspaper campaigns of 
1920-1922 as well as those of 1929-1931. Once operating 
in this arena, the press lords have b e c o m e  party 
politicians, albeit of a novel kind, and t-hus their 
actions can be better analysed from that perspective.
(ii) The Character of Stanley Baldwin
The several biographies of Baldwin have all been, in 
one way or another, u l t i m a t e l y  u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  in 
illuminating his motivations and attitudes, and to a 
surprising extent his character still remains obscure. 
This is partly due to the frequently acknowledged, but as 
yet not fully analysed, complexity of his personality; and 
partly due to the fact that he left little of his personal 
thought processes in the written historical record. 
Baldwin was not a great letter writer, preferring the 
informal conversation, while in the case of his immediate 
family his separations from them, and thus the need to 
correspond, were few. He kept no diary, and his letters 
eschewed political commentary or self-revelation. The 
Baldwin papers contain little written by Baldwin himself, 
for unlike Beaverbrook he did not retain copies of his 
ordinary^correspondence. The Baldwin collection consists 
largely of letters received from others, and of official 
papers and party memoranda, together with copies of purely
16
f o r m a l  and p u b l i c  l e t t e r s  c o n c e r n i n g  o f f i c i a l  
appointments, or intended for publication in the press. 
Thus it is only possible to piece together a contemporary 
picture of Baldwin from a wide and scattered mosaic of 
documentation, in which the accounts of colleagues and 
confidants of personal meetings and discussions play a far 
greater role than anything written by the man himself. 
The weakness of the published biographies stems in part 
from their inability to integrate this range of evidence. 
The flaws of the original work by G. M. Young are well 
known as an illustration of the dangers of the biographer 
becoming alienated from his subject; but it is equally a 
weakness of such immediately posthumous works that they 
are based only on the slender resources of the family 
papers. The two rejoinders provoked by Young’s book,
although of interest, were not in that sense wider in 
base. The next study, produced at the end of the
1 9 6 0 's , fell into the trap of attempting to explain
B a l d w i n  by m e a n s  of a v e r y  d e t a i l e d  n a r r a t i v e
chronological treatment, resulting in a very long book in 
which Baldwin’s character became submerged by the flow of 
events.13 Though more material was then available, much
12. G. M. Young, Stan l ey Baldwin (1953); A. W . Baldwin,
fa.l,herj_ th^ True S^ojry (1955); D. C. Somervell, 
Stanley Baldwin (1953).
13. K. Middlemas and J. Barnes, A ® A Z
(1969).
17
was unsorted, and more still not yet open to historians.
The most recent biography, despite adding one or two
further collections to the list, essentially represented a
narrative summation of the interpretation and account
a l r e a d y  a r rived at, rather than a b r e a k i n g  of new 
1 Uground. In fact, the most illuminating treatments of 
Baldwin have come comparatively recently in the form of 
several articles.1^ These provide a starting point, but 
naturally each examines only one aspect of Baldwin's 
career, and not the whole. Yet with the range of material 
now available to the historian in the 1 980's, it is 
possible to at least commence the process of interpreting 
the character, motivations, and actions, of this important 
and fascinating figure. Although it is dangerous to rely 
entirely upon second-hand attributions of motive, the 
accumulated weight of evidence is such as to permit the 
isolation and discussion of certain themes.
Baldwin was inclined to think of politics in terras of 
a sense of duty and obligation. The sacrifice of younger 
men in the First World War had profoundly affected this 
sentiment, which found one expression in his anonymous
14. H. M. Hyde, Stanley Baldwin (1973).
15. D. Southgate, "Baldwin 1923-1932", in D. Southgate, 
ed.. The Conservative Leadership 1832-1932 (1974); J. 
Campbell, "Baldwin", in J. P. M a c k i n t o s h ,  ed., 
British i_ine M inisters AA®. 20th Century ( 1 977), 
volume 1; D. Cannadine, "Politics, Propaganda and 
Art", in M H istory , volume 4, no. 2, 1977; P.
W i l l i a m s o n ,  " S a f e t y  F i r s t " :  B a l d w i n ,  the
Conservative Party, and the General Election of 
1929", Historical Journal, volume 25, no. 2, 1982.
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gift of a substantial portion of his private wealth to the
nation for the cancellation of war debt. This view was
also based on a religious conception of the purpose of
public life. Baldwin's premise was that good works could
not come from the hands of tainted vessels, and it was
this attitude that made Baldwin reluctant to ever consider
alliance with Lloyd George. It was not just a fear of
being personally supplanted by the letter's political
skills in government, but rather a deeper fear of the
likely consequences of allowing the morally corrupt to
return to the heart of power, Baldwin felt that the
virtues of honesty and trustworthiness were the essential
foundation for any attempts at creating some lasting
achievement in political life. Thus when he considered
dealing with the^unemployment problem by introducing
tariff reform in 1 923, although he had a parliamentary
m a j o r i t y  w i l l i n g  to pass such a m e a s u r e  w i t h o u t  a
dissolution, he went out of his way to honour a promise
made by his predecessor, Bonar Law:
That pledge binds me ... and I take those words 
strictly. I am not a man to play with a pledge.... 
I am not a clever man, I know nothing of political 
tactics, but I will say this: having come to that
conclusion [that tariffs are necessary] myself, I 
felt that the only honest and right thing, as leader 
of a democratic party, was to tell them.
16
16, The Times, 26 October 1923
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It was this stance, as much as considerations of electoral 
p r a g m a t i s m ,  w h i c h  p r e v e n t e d  B a l d w i n  from a d o p t i n g  
Beaverbrook's programme of Empire Free Trade, even after 
the failure of his platform of honesty and trustworthiness 
to win the general election of 1929. He was aware of the 
barrier posed to Beaverbrook’s concept by the Dominion 
statesmen upon whose voluntary acquiescence the plan 
depended, and was thus aware of the policy’s essentially 
unreal, even fraudulent, nature:
no r e s p o n s i b l e  s t a t e s m a n  could ... tell the 
electorate that it would be introduced if he were 
returned to power. It cannot be done. The Dominions 
won't have it - they have said so in the clearest 
terras ... no political party in this country can 
honestly adopt Empire Free Trade.
17
From Baldwin's viewpoint, the emphasis on character was 
unarguably more relevant and useful than the unstable 
cleverness exhibited by the high priests of the Coalition: 
Lloyd George, Churchill, and Lord Birkenhead. He was 
always more concerned with reliability, and a certain 
solidity; not the p r o d u c t  of s t u p i d i t y  but of a 
consistency based on clear principles or standards, 
consciously or unconsciously held to. In that sense he 
often found it easier to comprehend the attitude of Labour 
politicians, while distrusting the erratic and expedient
17. Baldwin interviewed in Home and Empire, no. 1, March
1930.
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manoeuvres of the Liberals, The volatile and inconsistent 
policies of the Lloyd George coalition between 1920 and 
1922 were a complete anathema, redolent of a shiftless 
desire to remain in power regardless of purpose.
These attitudes were a part of his traditionalism, 
of his conception of what the true English character was 
and should be like, of v i r tues a s s o c i a t e d  with the 
supposed structure of society in the "shires", of the 
responsibilities more than the privileges of being a 
gentleman. All those attitudes were a successful part of 
Baldwin's public image, and as such were n a t u r a l l y  
magnified at the expense of his other traits in the public 
eye. Though not the whole, they were still genuinely a 
part of Baldwin's own personal world view, and in that 
sense were a natural if exaggerated manifestation of his 
private thoughts. It has been pointed out that such an 
evocation of the mythical side of rural England was a 
totally inapproriate diversion from the problems of an 
industrial urban society. In one sense this is clearly 
true, but it begs the issue of the demands of the public 
mood. N o s t a l g i a  for the h a l f - r e m e m b e r e d  past was 
something Baldwin reflected rather than created; and 
reflected not so much out of calculation, but because of 
the chord such feelings struck in him just as much as in 
anyone else. The crucial point about Baldwin's love of 
the countryside is precisely the fact that his family 
background, though serai-rural, was not agricultural but 
industrial: this has in fact mislead commentators into
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assuming that his emotional self-identification with the 
shires sprang from his background. In fact it did not, 
for Baldwin's love of the countryside was an example of 
that same h e a r t f e l t  lo n g i n g  so often found in the 
i n h a b i t a n t s  of B r i t i s h  cities and suburbs, all the 
stronger a force for the contrast between the idealisation 
of something largely unknown and the alienation from an 
urban e x i s t e n c e  w h i c h  s e e m e d  to be d e h u m a n i s i n g .  
Baldwin's image of the proper structure of society was 
also appropriate in another sense; in the arena of the 
Disraelian myth or tradition of one-nation Toryism, It 
was this, together with the Victorian role of the Liberal 
party as representative of the middle classes of the 
cities, hostile to the Church, which made Baldwin a 
Unionist in his early politics despite the possession of 
several s e m i - L i b e r a l  attitudes. In this sense the 
evocation of an idealised past, the rejection of class 
politics and thus in part of industrialisation itself, in 
favour of a commitment to politics as being not concerned 
with bread and butter issues but with the church and the 
c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  were har d l y  novel f e a t u r e s  in the 
Conservative Party, and certainly were not foisted either 
on it, or on the nation, by any one figure.
18. M . Jv Wiener, Erig^^i^^h £ t uir e _a icjd t h£ £ £ £ t h^ 
Industrial Spirit 1850-1980 (1981), pp. 95-111.
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Neither were other cardinal features of Baldwin's 
character. These were in fact held in common with most 
other Conservative politicians, and were a product of the 
attitudes and ideals of the public school, and to a lesser 
degree, university education through which they had all 
passed. Baldwin had absorbed these influences passively 
and unquestioningly; indeed, so completely did he find 
security in the team-game spirit of collective endeavour 
and mutual loyalty that the demands of striving for 
excellence via individual competition proved beyond him. 
So also he found no satisfaction in the adversarial side 
of politics. In this he only differed from others of 
similar background in the degree, rather than the concept. 
Many viewed the party system as a cricket match between 
two sides, and loyalty to your own team and its captain 
went hand-in-hand with respect for good bowling, or 
defensive batting, by an opponent. Again, in this system, 
there was no place for a third and unreliable team; the 
Liberal party of the 1 9 2 0's. On m a n y  occas i o n s ,  
especially during general elections, Baldwin shared this 
view. On others, in the clubbish atmosphere of the 
Commons, he sometimes saw all leading figures as part of 
the same team of 'statesmen', kept apart by p e t t y  
pre j u d i c e s ;  s o m e t i m e s  in league a g ainst their o w n  
misguided supporters, more often playing in the world 
arenas as the representatives of Britain. Though Baldwin 
did not plot or plan for the formation of a National 
Government, suspicious critics were right to detect that
23
he held no deep loyalty to the party system, and once 
c o n v i n c e d  that the team so f o r m e d  w o u l d  be of a 
t r u s t w o r t h y  kind, he had no real o b j e c t i o n  to the 
arrangement. This does not imply a reversal of his 
condemnation of coalition in 1922, for, as was shown by 
his acceptance of promotions within that Lloyd George 
coalition, Baldwin did not reject the appeals of national 
unity; but only the way in which, after his joining of 
Lloyd George's cabinet, he discovered such sentiments were 
being cynically abused as, in Baldwin's eyes, a noble 
sentiment betrayed for personal ends.
Baldwin's public reputation as the straight and 
honest man was a role thrust upon him by the events 
surrounding the fall of the coalition. It then partly 
reflected his inexperience of the centre of the political 
stage. However, the fact that between 1 922 and 1 929 his 
conduct had not lessened, but rather augumented his 
reputation in this respect - to the point where the 1929 
election strategy was largely founded upon it - is highly 
revealing of Baldwin's ni£^u^ 11 was also to
prove a resource of inestimable advantage when Baldwin 
came during the party crisis to cast himself for the 
public in the role of the honest man maligned by an 
irresponsible, and vindictively unfair, press. The part 
was all the more convincing in that to the public eye 
Baldwin personified the plain, simple, but honest man in 
politics :
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Mr. Baldwin is slow, but he is honest, I trust him 
and honour him. I do feel that apart from loving 
his country he understands the man in the street..,. 
I will not have my politics dictated to me by the 
Daily Mail or Daily Express.,..
wrote one of the self-confessed "men in the street" in 
1930.19 This reflected the fact that in the country as a 
whole Baldwin’s position was always stronger than it was 
within his own party, and much of his value as party 
leader electorally lay in that very ability to attract 
’middle opinion’ in a way in which potential successors, 
Hailshara or Neville Chamberlain, probably could not have 
done,
Despite the p o l i t i c a l  a d v a n t a g e s  it brought, 
B a l d w i n ’s m i x t u r e  of h o n e s t y  and l o y a l t y  cannot be 
dismissed as merely a politician’s public facade; even if 
it was a strong card to play against Lloyd George and his 
former coalition cronies. For Baldwin made himself 
vulnerable by defending out of loyalty two figures to whom 
he felt personally committed, Davidson and Lord Irwin, 
whose policies were anathema to a large element of the 
party he led. This tendency to adhere to pledges or 
personal loyalties led him into political danger. Not the 
least effective cry against Baldwin during the party 
crisis was the continued presence of the 'Old Gang' of ex- 
cabinet ministers as the party's dominant group. Despite
19. Fleet C"I am one of the men in the street"] to 
Hannon, 1 July 1930, Hannon MSS, 19/1.
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pressure to drop some of the less able of these, and his 
own often-announced* though rarely practised, desire to 
bring on younger talents, he proved strangely reluctant to 
appease these demands. This is partly explicable in the 
light of another aspect of Baldwin's character evident in 
this period; his preference to allow events to take a 
natural course in the hope of avoiding difficult decisions 
- a policy he adopted later in the abdication crisis. It 
may also point to a certain laziness, or hesitancy to act, 
in the sense that Baldwin was always reluctant to commit 
himself fully or fervently to any course - not least 
because of the difficulty of later pulling back. This 
attitude of caution was to prove a major disappointment to 
the advocates of tariff reform in 1930, who sought the 
fervour of the convert, not the p r a g m a t i s m  of the 
political strategist. Baldwin's failure to drop the "Old 
Gang" despite the considerable agitation onthe matter also 
reflects the personal conservatism of a shy figure, who 
has become accustomed to certain colleagues, and is not 
eager to repeat the process with a new and more remote 
generation. But more than any of these other factors, his 
attitude on this question of loyalties was of a piece with 
his political character. Despite frequent advice to 
reconstruct his cabinet before the 1929 election, Baldwin 
did not do so. It was not simply that he was not a good 
cabinet 'butcher'; the feeling that restrained him from
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carrying through such a move, despite its political 
advantages, was that it offended common loyalty.
Only one area of p o l i t i c s  c o n s i s t e n t l y  aroused 
Baldwin's close interest: those questions which broadly
came under the heading of the constitution. This was 
evident in small things as much as large, in his care over 
patronage appointments and caution over the granting of 
honours, and in his conception of the proper role of the 
Prime Minister. Though hardly a naive idealist, he 
nonetheless saw the premiership as being at least in part 
above party; hence the attention he gave to fulfilling 
non-political roles and providing leadership in fields 
outside conventional politics: many of his best speeches
were in the form of ceremonial or celebratory occasions, 
anniversary or rectorial addresses. Whilst Premier he 
devoted much time to this area of national life, prizing 
it above political debate. This theme was apparent on 
larger scales. B a l d w i n  saw the e m e r g e n c e  of class 
d i v i s i o n s  as the base of p o l i t i c s  as adanger to 
constitutional government, as he also did world war, and 
on both occasions chose to appease, using that word in the 
sense of reconciliation rather than concession. Thus the 
appeasement of the Labour Party was the other side of the 
coin of appeasement of Germany, both being pursued in the 
interests of stability, peace and tranquility. All of 
Baldwin's great p o l i t i c a l  b a t t l e s  were fought over 
constitutional issues, from the unconstitutional nature of 
Lloyd George's presidential government, through the
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g e n eral strike, the issue of Indian c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  
advance, and the question of the proper role of the press, 
to the abdication crisis at the end of his career. It can 
hardly be a coincidence that the most silent phase of 
Baldwin's House of Commons career, as a backbencher 
between 1909 and 1914, occurred during the perio.d when his 
instincts of party loyalty must have been to some extent 
in conflict with his constitutionalism.
Baldwin's speeches contain many remarks denigrating 
intellectuals and intellectualism, and It was against this 
that he continually contrasted the "simple" virtues. He 
saw many dangers in systems of political thought, and his 
anti-intellectualism was a rejection of systems rather 
than of brains as such. To Baldwin the possession of 
intelligence was a God-given talent to be used, but with 
b e c o m i n g  mode s t y ;  once again, a r e f l e c t i o n  of the 
conformist ethos of the middle years at public school 
rather than the a t m o s p h e r e  of the u n i v e r s i t y ,  A 
glorification of intellectual power was thus either a 
cover for the shallow opportunism, such as he perceived in 
Birkenhead, or for the dangers of the inhumanity and 
rigidity of the theoreticians, be they economists or 
philosophers, Keynsian or Marxist. Baldwin by education 
and by nature, like Churchill, pursued the politics of 
instinct. In this he was not much removed from many 
Labour figures, whose socialism was founded equally on 
Christianity and upon instincts and background. For
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Baldwin the background and the concerns were different, 
but not necessarily incompatible. This did not imply 
shallowness, for as Tom Jones wrote, "he felt things 
deeply, and his conscience was more active than his
intellect".20
In the period of opposition and internal bitterness 
between 1 929 and 1931 Baldwin was the creator of many of 
his own difficulties. Several of these were the product 
of defects in his own character. His weaknesses of
p e r s o n a l i t y  are a f r e q u e n t  source of c o m m e n t :  his
laziness, his complacency, and his nervous indecision. As 
Prime Minister between 1924 and 1 929 his colleague 
Bridgeman commented on "his extreme reluctance to commit
himself to one side or the other in a dispute until the
last moment, when he was obliged to do so. "21 This
extended to his m e t h o d s  of doing b u s i n e s s  with his 
colleagues on a day-to-day basis. Austen Chamberlain 
complained :
I have never known so b£un£ a spearhead as S. B., or 
a man who left so large a gap between the recognition 
that he must act and action. Whenever you have 
settled something with him one day, you must seek him 
out the next to ask if he has yet done it or even put 
it in train .... 'Too late and in the wrong way' sum 
up my criticism of his leadership.
22
20. Tom Jones' diary, quoted in R. R. James, Th£ B_riti£h
Revolution (1977), volume 2, p. 180.
21. Bridgeman Journal, volume II, p. 183.
22. A. to Ida Chamberlain, 22 June 1930, AC 5/1/506.
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Baldwin’s attitudes led also to complacency, based in part 
on an excessively optimistic appreciation of his personal 
political position. This buoyed him up through the early 
phases of the party troubles, but could not completely 
conceal his growing unpopularity. In October 1930 
Neville Chamberlain noted that
he has at last I think come to understand how low his 
stock has fallen, but the effect seems rather to cow 
and stupify him, than to inspire him with any sort of 
determination or capacity to take a decision. I feel 
very sorry for him for I am afraid he is very 
unhappy.
23
In fact he was a prey to insecurity and nervousness, which 
manifested itself in several ways, one of which was his
e
ha^it of licking the order papers whilst listening to 
colleagues’ speeches in the Commons. This nervousness led 
also to indecision, and resulted in the process by which 
it took Baldwin much time and mental effort and anguish to 
come to any major decision, a habit which on occasion had 
its own dangers, either of actions taken half-heartedly or 
too late. Equally serious was his tactlessness in the 
handling of his colleagues. In his personal relations 
Baldwin was probably a worse operator as premier even than 
Gladstone had been. Frequently he allowed his confidants 
to leave offices held at his request without any message 
of gratitude or condolence, as happened with both Davidson
23. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 11 October 1930, NC 18/1/712.
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and Neville Chamberlain on their relinquishing of the 
party Chairmanship. One explanation offered was that "he 
seems to ... distrust or actively dislike most of his 
colleagues and to be afraid of all his opponents and of 
h i m s e l f .  "2^ On the occasion of Neville C h amberlain’s 
standing-down in March 1931 his half-brother Austen wrote 
of Baldwin’s conduct that
no t hing could have been less g r a c i o u s  than the 
latter’s attitude: though .1 think this is more
inability than purpose, it does spring in part from 
his being so self-centred that he receives all we 
give him as a matter of course and takes offence at 
the least sign that we are not completely at his 
service for whatever use he likes to make of us.
25
Allowances might be made for Austen’s wounded amour propre 
as a former leader of the party, but similar evidence 
c o m e s  from too ma n y  other sources to be so eas i l y  
dismissed.
B a l d w i n  was also an erratic p e r f o r m e r  on the 
platform, and his efforts were directly related to the 
interest they aroused in himself, rather than to their 
political significance. Thus a Rectorial address received 
considerable thought and polishing, but the speech to
24. A. to Hilda Chamberlain, 14 June 1930, AC 5/1/504.
25. Ibid., 21 March 1931, AC 5/1/535.
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party conference in 1929. a critical utterance, did not. 
It contained "no argument to speak of, no building up to a 
climax. He is incorrigibly slovenly about a speech of 
that kind which doesn’t really appeal to him."2^ However, 
his ability as a public speaker on occasion was also the 
source of Baldwin’s strength. He has been categorised as 
the quintessential House of Commons man: constant
attender, possessing the ear of the House and a calm 
dominance over it, and its moods, unparalleled between the 
w a r 8.27 This may have been true of the years of his rise 
to prominence; it certainly was not true of the period of 
the party crisis. Complaints of his absenteeism from the 
H o u s e  a b o u n d ,  as do t h o s e  of his a l o o f n e s s  and 
i n a c c e s s i b i l i t y  to his b a c k b e n c h e r s ,  and his total 
disinterest in the cultivation of the younger element.28 
Hannon later wrote of the way in which Baldwin
treated me - as indeed he treated all his supporters 
- with an indifference in which his self-esteem and 
his exaggerated concept of his own importance clouded 
whatever fragments of statesmanship he made claim to 
possess.
29
26. N. Chamberlain diary, 8 December 1929, NC 2/22.
27. H. Macmillan, Memoirs, Volume 1: Winds of Change
1914-1939 (1966), p. 313.
28. H, Balfour, Wings Over Westminster (1973), P . 76.
29. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 12 September 1955, Hannon MSS
17/1. This was, it must be admitted, a comment 
between two figures with little political affection 
for Baldwin, written at the period of his lowest 
public reputation: but it conveys pithily sentiments
reciprocated widely elsewhere.
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Neither was it true to suggest that Baldwin was even 
moderately good as a House of Commons debater in any 
consistent fashion:
He has no House of Commons gifts, can’t debate or 
think or act quickly, and always addresses [Ramsay 
MacDonald] as if he were a lower schoolboy who had 
undertaken to voice the discontents of his comrades 
and knew that he would be swished before he got out 
of the room. And with it all, he is so terribly 
c o m p l a c e n t ,
whilst on another occasion he was categorised as ’’useless
in the H o u s e " . 30 In part these were the defects of being
in opposition, for, as Baldwin himself recognised, he did
not shine as an opposition leader. This was a question of 
A.tempe^ment, and a sign of Baldwin’s failure to fulfil some 
of the more partisan and adversarial roles incumbent in 
the party political system. He was, on the contrary, 
noted for "his wonderful generosity to his opponents. He 
never attacked them when they were down, and always 
treated them with a remarkable considerateness ... this 
virtue carries with it the compensating vice of not being 
very good at the attack."31
Despite these failings, Baldwin lasted for almost 
fifteen years as party leader, retiring at a moment of his 
own choice, and he succeeded in riding out the buffets of
30. A. to Hilda Chamberlain, 21 March 1931, AC 5/1/535; 
A. to Ida Chamberlain, n.d. but c. June 1931, AC 
5/1/541 .
31. Bridgeman journal, volume 2, p. 183.
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the party crisis if not unscathed, at least not unseated. 
His strengths were as considerable as his weaknesses. 
Principal amongst these was the extraordinary power he 
could on occasions summon up on a theme or issue about 
which he felt deeply, and which made some of his set-piece 
speeches so effective. This ability was exhibited on 
several occasions: in February 1923 in his evocation of
'Faith, Hope, Love and Work' for industrial peace, and on 
the same theme in his 'Give Peace in our Time, 0 Lord!' 
speech inthe Macquisten Trade Union Bill debate of 1925. 
This ability to suddenly translate himself onto some 
higher plane which was revealed on several occasions 
during the party crisis on the themes of India and the 
press, was of crucial value in an assembly where the power 
of oratory was esteemed above all else, and can hardly be 
over-emphasised. Baldwin's technique was described by one 
follower as:
e n s n a r i n g  [his a u d i e n c e ]  with plain discourse, 
apparently of great moderation, which gradually bound 
them up in a web, unwilling hot to fulfill the 
purpose of such a straight-forward leader,
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Baldwin was, in addition, often more effective a speaker
in public than in parliament, and his successes at such
gatherings, and in his radio broadcasts, was one of the
r e a s o n s  for his c o n s i s t e n t l y  higher s t a n d i n g  and
popularity outside Westminster than within.
32. Hilton Young's draft autobiography, c. 1959, Kennet 
MSS 82/1/49-50.
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There is no d o ubt also that B a l d w i n  had great 
personal charm and attractiveness, and the complimentary 
descriptions of his character, from friend and foe alike, 
are too frequent to be ignored. His admirers were not 
blinded to his defects, but rather cherished him in spite 
of them. Dawson wrote of Baldwin, "I always find myself 
agreeing with all his general views .... I still think 
that, though far from ideal as a galvanic leader, he is a 
way ahead of most possible s u c c e s s o r s . "  33 His most 
important ability was his capacity to inspire trust; Lloyd 
George and Churchill might be more fun, and respected for 
gifts of administration and skill in debate, but neither 
was ever trusted in the way in which Baldwin was. There 
seems little evidence to discount Bridgeman's assertion 
that "of his honesty and sincerity I think nobody ever had 
any d o u b t s " . 3^ The combination of these attributes 
a l l o w e d  B a l d w i n  to su r v i v e  w h i l s t  e x a s p e r a t i n g  or 
disappointing one colleague after another. Amery later 
wrote that;
Baldwin was a personality, with a breadth of outlook, 
a tolerance and a warm humanity which commanded the 
admiration, as well as the affection, of those who 
chafed under the weakness of his leadership.
35
33. Dawson to Irwin, 17 June 1930, Dawson MSS.
34. Bridgeman journal, volume 2, p. 181.
35. L. S. Amery, My Pol itical L^f£ (1953), volume II, p 
398.
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In one sense Baldwin could be seen to embody in 
his own person the traditional virtues of a gentleman. 
Thus he appeared to the backbench MP Waldron Smithers:
to ray way of thinking, Mr. Baldwin stands for all 
that is vital, fundamental, and true for the progress 
and development of Civilisation not only in the 
Empire but all over the world.
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On several occasions this gave him considerable power over 
retaining the loyalty of dissident colleagues; in the case 
of Amery, of Neville Chamberlain, and by the silent manner 
of his departure, in the resignation of Salisbury as
leader of the p arty in the House of Lords in 1931.
Because it was widely recognised, it also gave Baldwin 
that crucial appeal across party boundaries to erstwhile 
opponents and to the uncommitted electorate at large. He 
was clearly seen as the Conservative Party's greatest 
electoral asset, and, though not always the favourite of 
the p a r t y  a c t i v i s t s  of the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ,  had 
considerable appeal to the important section of 'middle 
opinion', especially in the north of England and in
Scotland. It was this appeal which the party attempted to 
exploit with its slogan of "Trust Baldwin" in the 1929 
election campaign, and defeat on that occasion did not 
undermine estimation of the value of his presence as party 
leader in the election any more than did Churchill's
defeat in 1945 undermine his.
36. Smithers to Salisbury, 19 August 1930, Salisbury MSS, 
S(4) 136/148.
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Baldwin was perhaps a better political tactician than 
has sometimes been allowed, though it has been correctly 
suggested that the excessive attribution of cunning and 
tradecraft by defeated opponents such as Beaverbrook or 
Churchill is more a reflection of their own face-saving 
than a true estimate of his abilities. However, he 
possessed one attribute sufficiently rare in a political 
leader to be worthy of comment, and that was patience. 
Together with his refusal to be pushed out of office, 
which was as much the product of his ability to ignore 
attacks from his party that were much more humiliating 
than those which had caused Balfour to decide to quit in 
1911, this combination gave his approach the character of 
the "waiting game". This was often confused, due to 
inactivity, with playing a "deep game", but was in fact 
more often the politics of drift, of "wait and see".
Baldwin's p o s i t i o n  during the p arty crisis was 
buttressed by two external factors, also sources of 
strength which he exploited to the full. The first of 
these was the problem of the lack of a suitable successor, 
or indeed of anyone who was both acceptable and willing to 
take up what appeared at that time to be a crown of 
thorns; particularly if to do so involved paying homage to 
the press lords and r e c e i v i n g  the c r o w n  from their 
tarnished hands. By the time a successor had begun to 
emerge, in the person of Neville Chamberlain, in April to 
June, 1931, the question was no longer of immediate 
significance. The sejond point is the more essential. The
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events of the party crisis of 1929-1931 are in fact a 
classic example of the powerful position, especially in 
defence, of the leader of the Conservative Party, under 
anything short of all-out revolt. The long period of 
dissension under Balfour was evidence in fact of the 
strength of the position, and both Balfour in 1911 and 
perhaps to a slightly lesser extent, Austen Chamberlain in 
1922, only retired from the leadership because they were 
not willing to continue in it, not because they were not 
able to do so. There existed no mechanism for the formal 
deposition of the party leader, and the constraints of the 
deeply ingrained tradition of veneration of the leader and 
loyalty to his person made rebellion difficult indeed. 
This was even more the case if the leader made efforts to 
divide the opposition, to appease at least some of the 
sections of it, and to give ground without losing face. A 
high-minded leader, committed unswervingly to a principle 
or policy, or obsessed with his personal honour, was more 
likely to decide for resignation. Baldwin came close to 
doing so, but chose i n s t e a d  a c a r e f u l  m i x t u r e  of 
concession and 'principled* stubborness, which saw him 
through a series of holding operations against a rising 
tide of dissatisfaction. If appeasement was one of 
Baldwin's themes, then perhaps its most successful use was 
in the appeasement of the party during this period of 
crisis.
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PART ONE; THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL
CHAPTER ONE 
The Shock of Defeat ; May to August 1929
After four and a half years in office since winning 
the general e l e c t i o n  of Oc t o b e r  1924, Baldwin's 
Conservative government went to the polls on 30 May 1929. 
The party p l a t f o r m  was based more on e x t o l l i n g  the 
achievements of the previous term in office than in any 
specific proposals for the future. Combined with this 
attitude of relying on proven worth were warnings about 
the quack nature of the remedies for u n e m p l o y m e n t , the 
issue of the day, offered by both opposing parties. These 
themes were linked by the centre-piece of the Conservative 
campaign, which concentrated on the personal virtues and 
popularity of the Prime Minister, Stanley Baldwin, with 
posters showing him smoking the famous pipe under the 
slogans "Trust B a l d w i n "  and "Safety First". Most 
Conservative politicians expected that the party would be 
returned to power, albeit with a reduced majority. In 
fact not only were they defeated in the election, but for 
the only time during the inter-war period the Conservative 
party ceased to be the largest single party in the House 
of Commons. Conservative MPs fell from the four hundred 
and nineteen elected in 1924 to the two hundred and sixty 
returned in 1929. The atmosphere was calm during the 1929 
contest; indeed, there was almost a desire for excitement 
or change for its own sake. One Conservative ex-cabinet 
minister commented afterwards:
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We fell because we were too good, and probably also, 
too boring. We had ceased to interest the Press and 
the people. It is very difficult for a Government - 
at any rate for a sober-minded one - to continue to 
be. interesting after four or five years.
1
The nature of the electoral contests in fact had proved
most crucial. In 1929 the attempt of Lloyd George to
revitalise the Liberal party during the previous three
years was one of the principal causes of the Conservative
defeat. Although Lloyd George failed in his main aim of
securing the return of a large Liberal contingent, the
high number of three-sided contests split the anti-
S o c i a l i s t  vote, u s u a l l y  to the d i s a d v a n t a g e  of the
defending Conservative MP. Of the two hundred and sixty
Conservative returns in 1929» for example, only thirty had
straight fights with only one opponent. This, together
with the fact that the Labour party was by now a less
alarming prospect for government, and the swing of the
pendulum effect often seen after a long spell in office,
produced the Conservative reverse. The election campaign,
which was without any particular crisis, confirmed rather
than distorted the prevailing picture. The result of the
election was a hung parliament, as neither Labour nor
Conservatives possessed an overall majority, with the
Liberal group holding the balance. The circumstances
differed very little from those of 1 923, except that on
this occasion Labour was the largest of the three parties.
1. W o r t h i n g t o n - E v a n s  to B i r d w o o d ,  2 4 June 1 929 , 
Worthington-Evans MSS, Eng. Hist, c. 896, ff. 203-4.
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However, they could be voted out at any time, provided 
s u f f i c i e n t  L i b e r a l s  were w i l l i n g  to go into the 
Conservative lobby for that purpose. On the other hand, 
the Conservatives alone were powerless to bring about a 
dissolution, unless they could secure such Liberal allies. 
» * * * » * * * * *
The strength of the Conservative party lay in the 
English seats. Even in defeat in 1929 the Conservatives 
still held almost half of these: two hundred and twenty-
one of a total of four hundred and eighty-five. In 
Scotland the position was less strong; Conservatives sat 
for twenty of the seventy-one divisions, or just over one 
quarter, while they possessed only one of the thirty-five 
Welsh seats, and that was the semi-English county seat of 
Monmouth. Of the remaining seats, both categories for 
their different reasons were perhaps naturally biased 
towards Conservatism: the party holding ten of the twelve
Ulster seats on the Unionist ticket, and eight of the 
University graduate elected places. The breakdown of 
Conservative strength within the English regions affords a 
revealing illustration of the geographic distribution of 
Conservatism.
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Figure 1 REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF CONSERVATIVE SEATS
BOROUGH DIVISIONS COUNTY DIVISIONS
REGION No* of No* of fo Cons, NOo of NOo of fo ConSeats Cons» Seats Held Seats Cons, Seats Held
South East England 93 40 43 53 44 83
South Neat England 20 9 45 43 33 76
Eastern Counties 7 3 43 20 12 60
Midland Counties 42 9 21 30 16 53
Welsh Marches - “ - 6 4 66
North East England 38 6 16 37 10 27
North Nest England 53 14 26 27 14 51
Border Counties 8 2 25 8 5 62
ENGLAND Total: 261 85 31 224 138 61
Scottish Lowlands 28 8 29 24 4 16
Scottish Highlands 5 1 20 14 7 50
SCOTLAND Total: 33 9 27 38 11 29
South Wales 10 0 0 17 1 6
North Wales 1 0 0 7 0 0
WALES Total: 11 0 0 24 1 4
OVERALL TOTAL: ! 305 92 30 286 150 52
For Definitions of the regions used, see Figure 2<
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Figure 2 A Note on the Regional Definitions
For the purpose of the previous table and the following 
maps and tables, mainland Britain has been divided into a 
number of regions. The basis for this division has been a 
grouping of counties; no county has been placed in more 
than one region, for reasons of simplicity. The groupings 
reflect, so far as is possible to do on a broad canvas, 
the principal economic and social characteristics of the 
region. In addition, a t t e n t i o n  has been paid to 
c o n t e m p o r a r y  o p i n i o n  r e g a r d i n g  the e x i s t e n c e  and 
composition of specific provincial areas. Two caveats 
should be borne in mind, however: first, that the number
of parliamentary seats in each region varies widely, and 
second that the economic and social character of any 
county or region has to be over-simplified for the purpose 
o f  a r r i v i n g  at b r o a d l y  ' a g r i c u l t u r a l '  or 
' i n d u s t r i a l / r e s i d e n t i a l '  areas. Thus Yorkshire and 
Leicestershire are i n c l u d e d  in 'industrial' r e g i o n s  
despite their rural areas, and several 'agricultural' 
regions contain industrial enclaves. The Border counties 
include Newcastle, for example.
Nevertheless, it is possible from these statistics to draw 
comparisons and conclusions about the political geography 
of Conservatism.
The regions fall into three types:
Industrial Midland Counties, North East England, North 
West England, South Wales, Scottish Lowlands
Residential South East England
Agricultural South West England, Eastern Counties, Welsh 
M arc h e s ,  North Wales, Border Counties, 
Scottish Highlands
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The regions are defined as the following counties:
South East England 
South West England
Eastern Counties 
Midland Counties
Welsh Marches 
North East England 
North West England 
Border Counties
Scottish Lowlands
Scottish Highlands
South Wales
North Wales
Bedfordshire, B u c k i n g h a m s h i r e  
E s s e x ,  H e r t f o r d s h i r e ,  K e n t  
London, Middlesex, Surrey, Sussex
B e r k s h i r e ,  C o r n w a l l ,  D e v o n  
D o r s e t ,  G l o u c e s t e r s h i r e  
H a m p s h i r e ,  I s l e  of W i g h t  
Oxfordshire, Somerset, Wiltshire
C a m b r idgeshire, 
Isl e  of Ely, 
Rutland, Suffolk
Huntingdonshire,
L i n c o l n s h i r e ,
Norfolk
D e r b y s h i r e ,  L e i c e s t e r s h i r e ,  
Northamptonshire, Nottinghamshire, Staffordshire, W a r w i c k s h i r e ,  
Worcestershire
Herefordshire, Shropshire
Durham, Yorkshire
Cheshire, Lancashire
C u m b e r l a n d ,  N o r t h u m b e r l a n d ,  
Westmorland
Ayrshire, Berwickshire, Dunbarton, 
D u m f r i e s s ,  Fi f e ,  G a l l o w a y ,  
Haddington, Lanark, Linlithgow, 
M i d l o t h i a n ,  Peebles, Renfrew, 
Roxburghshire, Selkirk, Stirling 
and Clackmannanshire
A b e r d e e n s h i r e ,  Argyll, Banff, 
Caithness, Forfar, Inverness, 
Kincardine, Kinross, Moray, Nairn, 
Perthshire, Orkeney, Ross and 
Cromarty, Shetland, Sutherland
Brecon, Cardigan, Carmarthenshire, 
G l a m o r g a n ,  M o n m o u t h s h i r e ,  
Pembrokeshire, Radnorshire
A n g e l s e y ,  D e n b i g h s h i r e ,  
C a e r n a r v o n s h i r e ,  F l i n t s h i r e ,  
Merionethshire, Montgomeryshire
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One striking feature was the strength of the party in
the county constituencies. In 1929 the Conservatives lost
ground heavily in the borough divisions, especially those
of Midland and Northern towns, and it was in these areas
that Labour gained its parliamentary lead. It was not,
however, the case that the Conservatives were more popular
in the countryside than in the towns. Although the De-
Rating Act. passed by the government near the end of its
life went some way to appease irate agriculturalists, many
were still profoundly disillusioned with the amount of
assistance that they had actually received from the
Baldwin administration.^ The difference in distribution
of MPs was in fact the product of electoral factors, and
in addition Conservatism in the boroughs had always had a
weaker hold than in the county seats. The urban seats can
be categorised broadly into two types: the suburban or
residential middle class areas, which were mainly a
phenomenon around the largest conurbations, in particular
in the Home Counties, and which were almost invariably
very safe Conservative seats; and the mixed urban areas,
either of inner cities or of smaller towns, and which had
either a predominance or an element of working class
population. It was in the latter seats and in the semi-
rural northern counties, that most of the casualties were
2. Many felt that what they gained on de-rating, they 
lost by Churchill's Petrol Tax: Horncastle C A ,
Exec., 22 O c t ober 1928. F u rther e x a m p l e s  of 
agricultural dissatisfaction: Stafford CA, Exec., 15
March 1929; Hitchin CA, AGM, 22 May 1928; West Dorset 
CA, Exec., 24 August 1927; Cirencester and Tewkesbury 
CA, AGM, 21 May 1 927.
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concentrated. The Conservatives also did badly in three 
other areas of England. Not surprisingly, in view of the 
1926 strike, the mining seats were barren ground for 
Conservatism.3 Equally, Labour did well in London, in the 
East End and along the river; although the middle class 
a r e a s  c o n t i n u e d  to d i s p l a y  " a l m o s t  i m m o v a b l e  
Conservatism", the party suffered defeats in the mixed 
b o r o u g h s  of London, such as Islington, Hackney, 
Hammersmith, Fulham, and above all St. Paneras where all 
three seats went to Labour.^ The final area of poor 
performance was in the most depressed rural regions, 
vulnerable to a revitalised Liberal appeal and often with 
a strong Liberal tradition in their political past: the
Co r nish seats, and a s u b s t a n t i a l  slice of the East 
Midlands.
A more significant indicator of the nature of the 
Conservative party in 1929 emerges from a regional, rather 
than typological, breakdown of the English seats into the 
three p r i n c i p a l  areas, taking b o r o u g h s  and c o u n t y  
divisions together:
3. 225.2Ê.Ê.&2L » 7 June 1929; K . Dugdale,"Conservatives, Liberals, and Labour in Yorkshire 
1918-1929", Sheffield University MA dissertation, 
1976, p. 207.
4, The Times, 26 April 1929.
46
Figure 3 REGIONAL ANALYSIS OF CONSERVATIVE STRENGTH
REGION NO, OF NO. OF SEATS
SÜ3A3X3 CX)NB. iSBATEl CCHSS. 10311)
South East England 146 84 58
South West England 63 41 65
SOUTHERN ]REGBm 209 125 60
Eastern Counties 27 15 56
Midland Counties 72 25 35
Welsh Marches 6 4 66
MIDLAND REGION 105 44 42
North East England 75 16 21
North West England 80 28 35
Border Counties 16 7 44
NORTHERN 171 51 30
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REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF
CONSERVATIVE HELD SEATS 1929 
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Figure 5 the CONSERVATIVE STRENGTH IN ENGLAND IN 1929:
CONSERVATIVE HELD SEATS AS A PERCENTAGE OF THE TOTAL SEATS
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More noticeable even than the number of County members is 
the preponderance of the Conservative MPs who sat for 
s o u t h e r n  E n g l i s h  s e a t s ;  v e r y  c l o s e  to h a l f  the 
parliamentary party. In the Midlands the Conservative 
success rate was considerably lower, and in the North it 
was even more so. Indeed, the demographic alignment of 
the Conservative party goes some way towards supporting 
the 'two nations' interpretation of English society. North 
versus South. If the Conservative constituencies can be 
categorised at all, it would be first as English and 
southern, and only second as heavily biased towards the 
rural.
Furthermore, the bias towards rural seats was not 
r e f l e c t e d  in the c o m p o s i t i o n  of the M e m b e r s  of the 
parliamentary party. On the contrary, many successful men 
from the business world sat for safer county seats, rather 
than their own urban constituencies. A local connection, 
although important and useful, especially in an area under 
the influence of a predominant socially prestigious 
family, was not e s s e n t i a l  to s e l e c t i o n  for even 
the safest of rural strongholds. The general attitudes 
and character of the candidate were equally important, and 
his ability to finance himself, his election expenses, and 
as much as half the r u n n i n g  costs of the local 
Association, were even more so. The deputy chairman of 
the party wrote in 1 930 that good seats were on sale and
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"up to the highest bidder".^ In such circumstances, and 
a8 the balance of surplus wealth in general was tipping 
from the landed to the business element in society, so the 
o c c u p a t i o n a l  b a c k g r o u n d  of the p a r l i a m e n t a r y  party 
adjusted in reflection of this. Men tended to stick to 
their own home county, though not necessarily to the 
constituency in which they made their livings. Even 
this parochialism was not completely uniform: forty
Members sitting for English counties had had no prior 
connection at all with the county before their initial 
election for the seat,^ Indeed, men with backgrounds in 
law or business were increasingly coming to predominate 
over the landed element throughout the inter-war period. 
This was in part a result of the disintegration of the 
Liberal party, which had in the past drawn much support 
from law and business. An analysis of the occupational 
background of the Conservatives returned in 1929 breaks 
down as follows :
5. Memorandum on Selection of Candidates, Bowyer to
Baldwin, 12 December 1930, Baldwin MSS, volume 48,
ff. 187-192; see also comments of Headlam on putting
in for selection for a safer seat, Headlam diary, 
1930-31, passim. These comments are underlined by 
conclusions from a survey of extant CA records, 1918- 
1945, and in particular by: Reigate CA, Exec., 25
February 1929; Chelmsford CA, Council, 26 October 
1926; Uxbridge, Exec., 17 November 1923; whilst the 
problems found by poor seats in securing a candidate 
are underlined by the example of Bradford South CA, 
Exec., 24 June 1926.
6. J. M . McEwen, "The Unionist and Conservative Members 
of Parliament 1914-1939", University of London Ph. D. 
thesis, 1959, pp. 289-290.
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Figure 6
Occupational Background of Conservative MPs 1929
Landed 14% } go* go*
Array, Navy and Diplomatic 19% }
Business; Commercial and Financial 16% } go* }
Business: Industrial 16% } } 67%
Legal and Professional 35% 35% }
' 7
To s i m p l i f y  further, w h i l s t  only o n e - t h i r d  of the 
parliamentary party came from the traditional backgrounds 
of land and services, two-thirds came into political life 
from the commercial, industrial, or professional worlds -
from the business sector. This transformation from the
landed party of the late nineteenth century was further 
underlined by the fact that only forty (fifteen per cent) 
of the MPs* parliamentary experience stretched back before 
1914.8
This is certainly not to suggest that the social 
class of C o n s e r v a t i v e  MPs was changing; rather, it 
i l l u s t r a t e s  the a b i l i t y  of the upper c l a sses to 
accommodate newer sources of wealth within themselves. 
Fifty-nine Members were related to the peerage, and of 
these no less than thirteen were heirs to seats in the 
upper house. Another indicator of social class was the 
fact that one hundred and thirty-four of the MPs had 
attended one of the better-known public schools. Equally, 
one hundred and seventeen had attended either Oxford or
7. Ibid., pp. 305-306.
8. Ibid., p. 283.
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Cambridge Universities, and many others had passed through 
the naval colleges or Sandhurst.9 Clearly the majority of 
the business element were not so much self-made men, as 
men building upon the financial and social achievements of 
previous generations of their families.
If the changes in the occupational composition of the 
party were continuing as an undercurrent throughout the 
inter-war period, the defeat of 1 929 had had a more direct 
impact in changing the political complexion of the party. 
Broadly speaking, the Diehard, or right-wing, element 
tended to sit for the safer southern seats. These by 
their nature tended to be more vigorous and insular in 
their visceral Conservatism, having no need for tactical 
compromises to other powerful groups of local opinion. 
Thus the Diehards were on the one hand insulated from the 
changing social, ideological, and political nature of the 
country, and yet on the other hand were protected from the 
direct electoral consequences of these. The majority of 
such MPs were also protectionists of varying degrees of 
commitment, and the landed element figures unusually 
largely amongst them. Protection was a policy unpopular 
in many regions, but it was not without attraction to the 
richer agricultural regions of southern England, who were 
in direct competition with continental growers of fruit 
and v e g e t ables, with A r g e n t i n e  beef, or with North 
American grain. It was also attractive to the elderly
9. Lob. cit.
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living on fixed investments in the solidly Conservative 
seaside, resorts: both were areas of strong Diehard
support. On the other hand, the left or moderate wings of 
the party, who may have tempered their convictions with 
electoral expediency, suffered especially badly in the 
reverse of the election, and many of the so-called 'YMCA' 
group were not returned to the new parliament, as they 
tended to represent the northern and marginal seats in 
which the losses were concentrated. Thus, while the 
balance of British politics moved to the left with the 
return of a popular Labour government, at the same time 
the parliamentary representation of the Conservative party 
shifted rightward, a potentially dangerous situation for 
its future prospects. It has been estimated that the 
Diehard wing, through suffering proportionately fewer 
losses, rose in composition in the House of Commons from 
one-seventh of the party to o n e - f i f t h . I n  addition, 
their views gained influence both from the absence of the 
vocal rising young moderates, and from the fact that the 
circumstances of the defeat seemed to confirm their 
o p i n i o n s .  The t r a d i t i o n  of l o c a l  a u t o n o m y  of 
constituencies from outside interference, coupled often 
with a financial dependence of the same associations upon 
the Member or his family, and the personal wealth and 
social eminence of many Diehards, prevented the imposition 
of effective party discipline. Neither the Central Office 
nor the Whips had any meaningful sanctions with which they
10. Ramsden, op. cit., p. 298.
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could threaten the safer constituencies and so prevent the
return of Diehard MPs.^^ Their opinion was only of
significance to those seeking office or honours, and it
was a part of the world view of most Diehards that they
eschewed any such ambitions. Most were concerned only to
do what they considered to be their duty as diligent
backbenchers, and were often rounding off a career ofKachievement in another spje re of life. As an alternative 
method of control to formal discipline. Conservative 
leaders had always relied upon the ingrained loyalty that 
was given by the party to the leader. However, this 
loyalty was conditional upon there existing a minimum of 
trust and confidence in the leadership, and the experience 
of Austen Chamberlain in 1922 had demonstrated that it 
could be stretched to breaking point.
However, whilst continually aware of the need to 
carry his existing party with him, Baldwin could not 
afford to simply pander to their prejudices if the party 
was to hope to return to power. Whilst he had one eye on 
the level of tolerance of the Diehards, he had to have 
the other on the political temperature of the northern and 
marginal seats lost in 1929, and which must be regained if
the Conservatives were again to win a governing majority.
Balancing these two conflicting forces produced many of 
the problems of the following two years. 
* * * * * * * * * *
11. J. Ramsden, "The Organisation of the Conservative and 
Unio n i s t  Party in Britain, 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 3 0", Oxford
University D. Phil, thesis, 1975, pp. 158-159.
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The immediate decision that faced Baldwin after the 
election returns were in was which response to make to the 
ambiguous parliamentary position. It is a measure of the 
adaptability of the active politician that the greater 
Labour successes of 1929 did not produce a parallel 
reaction to the aftermath of the 1923 election. The 
frantic searching for stunts to forestall a MacDonald 
ministry was not repeated, and the mood of incipient 
crisis was also missing. The absence of revolutionary 
peril brought about an important political consequence, in 
that it sharply reduced the attractiveness of a return to 
coalitionisra. No figure of cabinet stature in 1929 sought 
such a deal in the short term, whatever his ideas about 
co-operation in the future. Indeed, amongst backbench 
MPs and peers, hostility to any such combination was 
violent and overwhelming.^  ^  An alternative possibility 
was that of repeating the strategy of 1923. by meeting 
p a r l i a m e n t  as a g o v e r n m e n t ,  and thus r e q u i r i n g  the 
Liberals to foresake the fence and choose sides, it being 
expected that as on the previous occasion, they would opt 
for Labour, and in the process alienate the many anti- 
Socialist Liberal voters, A gloss was put on this plan by 
Neville Chamberlain and L. S. Amery, who desired to turn
12. Duke of B u c c l e u c h  to Salisbury, 2 June 1 929, 
Salisbury MSS S(4) 130/ff. 45-46; Gwynne to Baldwin,
31 May 1929; Colfox to Baldwin, 1 June 1929; Ormesby- 
Gore to Baldwin, 2 June 1929, Baldwin MSS, volume 36, 
ff. 102, 60, 218-219.
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the strategem further to advantage by deliberately riding 
for a fall on a strong protectionist platform, in order to 
raise the morale of the party at l a r g e . ^ 3
Baldwin mulled over the advice he was receiving by 
post and in person during 1 and 2 June. It appears that 
before anyone influenced him, other than perhaps his wife, 
his first instinct was for immediate resignation before 
parliament met.^^ In fact, this was not inconsistent with 
the tenor of the advice he was weighing up; for it all 
assumed that the government would leave office, only the 
method of its doing so being a matter of debate. On 2 
June Baldwin consulted two of his most valued advisors, 
Lord Salisbury, leader of the party in the House of Lords, 
and Geoffrey Dawson, editor of The Times. Salisbury, 
while taking no clear line, did not disagree with Baldwin; 
but Dawson was for holding on and meeting parliament. 
Baldwin, however, despite the doubts and nervousness the 
latter advice caused him, adhered to his original line, 
and on that afternoon aired his views to the King's 
private secretary in typical imagery:
He has been beaten, and in the true English spirit he 
accepts his defeat and, if he resigns, the Democracy 
in an equally British spirit will take off their hats
13* N. Chamberlain to Baldwin, 2 June 1929, ibid., ff. 210-211.
14. Dawson diary, 1 June 1929, in J. Wrench, Geoffrey 
Dawson and Our Times (1955), p. 275; Whitehall Diary, 
20 June 1929.
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to him as a good sportsman, who has had his run, been 
beaten, and takes his beating like a man. And, what 
is more important, this will count in his favour 
whenever the next general election takes place.
15
On 3 June two events swept away the last of Baldwin's 
hesitations over immediate resignation. The first of 
these was that, influenced by the Astors, Dawson's leader 
in The Times that morning swung towards that line.^^ The 
second was a letter from Lord Derby, who was not only a 
powerful Conservative magnate in Lancashire, but was also 
unkindly though accurately characterised as a political 
weathercock, who wrote: "I hope there will be no question
of hanging on to office, the country was appealed to and 
has given its decision ... and we must accept it and 
accept it like good sportsmen without any protest ".^7 
Thus, at the cabinet meeting summoned for 5:00 p.m. that 
day, Baldwin took the initiative by stating firmly and 
clearly his preference for immediate resignation, in which 
he was supported by Winston Churchill, his Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, and their combined weight carried the day 
against the minority who favoured the 1923 strategy.^8
15. Memo by Lord Stamfordham, 2 June 1929, Royal Archives 
RAK 2223/30, in Hyde, op. cit., pp. 305-306.
16. Whitehall diary, 20 June 1929; Daily Express, 3 June 
1929.
17. Derby to Baldwin, 3 June 1 929, Baldwin MSS, volume 
36, f. 225.
18. Amery diary, 3 June 1929.
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The Secretary of State for War, Sir Laming Worthington- 
Evans, probably voiced the feelings of the majority, not 
only in his cricketing language, but above all in his 
desire not to needlessly force a Liberal-Labour alliance:
My own view may be summed up: the Conservatives have 
I been bowled out: they have lost the match, and they
must let somebody else take to the wickets. Moreover 
... some co-operation with Liberals is desirable in 
the next election, then it would be bad policy to 
force the L i b e r a l s  now to c o - o p e r a t e  with the 
Socialists in turning out a Conservative government 
which was hanging on beyond its welcome.
19
In the summer months of 1929 Baldwin was uncertain as 
to which direction party policy should take, and was 
engaged in a lengthy process of mulling over the risks 
involved in alternative courses of action, so much so that 
to a committed and eager backbencher like Patrick Hannon, 
the result s e e m e d  to be a party at a standstill. 
Immediately after the election Baldwin, tired and probably 
glad to escape from office, seemed literally to have no 
ideas concerning the future. "He is clearly bored with 
the present situation ... and has no very clear ideas as 
to what our policy should be", noted the former Under­
secretary Cuthbert Headlam after a luncheon conversation 
in mid-July.2 1 In such a position Baldwin's character
19. Worthington-Evans to Hall, 4 June 1929, Worthington- 
Evans MSS, Eng. Hist., c.896, f. 197.
20. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 31 July 1929, Beaverbrook MSS, 
C153.
21. Headlam diary, 18 July 1929.
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naturally led him, through both caution and an odd element 
of complacency, into doing nothing at all, A close 
friend. Lord Irwin, then V i c e r o y  of India, wrote 
metaphorically: "I can well believe that his temperament
leads him ... into encouraging himself to sit in the front 
row of the stalls while the play is being p e r  f o r m e d . "22
As a politician Baldwin had always been particularly 
concerned with larger questions of political mood, of 
educating 'democracy', of constitutional issues, or of the 
appeasement of labour. Thus, in testing the air after a 
personally unexpected election defeat, he was even more 
than usually concerned with politics in the broadest sense 
of the terra. Irwin commented later on a conversation with 
Baldwin in summer 1929:
I remember him saying to me at Garrowby that it is 
not sufficiently realised that what we were at 
present f i g h t i n g  was not a p r o g r a m m e ,  but an 
atmosphere, which no amount of promulgation of 
counter-programmes could affect. This could only be 
done by the hard teaching of experience.
23
Having sensed a new atmosphere, he sought to conform with
it as far as possible, first by avoiding giving any
hostages to fortune in the form of policy definitions, and
second by deciding to let the Labour government have a
fair run. Baldwin was receptive to Ramsay MacDonald's
22. Irwin to Davidson, 25 February 1 930, in R. R. James, 
Ü£I2.£££.£ ££ — Conserv a t ive : £0.0 Davidson's Memoirs
and Papers (1969), P . 306.
23* Loc. cit.
60
appeal at the o p e n i n g  of p a r l i a m e n t  that issues be 
considered in the constructive and advisory manner of a 
Council of State, rather than in the usual adversarial 
roles of government and o p p o s i t i o n . 2^ This not only 
accorded with his own naturally unaggressive instincts, 
but also f o l l o w e d  l o g i c a l l y  from the d e c i s i o n  for 
immediate resignation taken after the election. In this 
appreciation of the popular mood Baldwin was by no means 
alone, as colleagues such as Neville Chamberlain and Sir 
S a m u e l  Hoare also s u p p o r t e d  this line.25 B aldwin, 
however, more than most had made his straightforward and 
above-board approach his catchword, and he had a vested 
interest in ensuring that this reputation was not marred 
by the pulling of the rug from under the infant Labour 
government. Baldwin tolerated Churchill's feelers in the 
direction of a deal with Lloyd George in July, not because 
he had any desire to put the government out then - an end 
not even worked for by the combative Churchill - but 
because he envisaged a repeat of the 1924 situation, and 
considered it likely before the winter he would need 
Liberal votes in the lobbies to eject the government after 
it had either blundered badly, or revealed its true 
S o c i a l i s t  co l o u r s  in d e s p o i i a t o r y  l e g i s l a t i o n ,  or
24. Baldwin's Statement on the Political Situation, 27 
September 1929, Baldwin MSS, volume 56, ff. 161-167.
25. Hoare in Chelsea CA Newsletter, July 1929, Templewood 
MSS, volume VI/1; speeches by Chamberlain and Hoare, 
Gleanings and M , November 1929, p. 445; 
speech by Baillie-Hamilton, Bath CA, AGM, 24 October 
1929.
61
preferably both. In fact it was unlikely that either 
Baldwin or his fellow anti-coalitionists of 1922 would 
have gone through with the idea of a plot with Lloyd 
George; he was merely testing the temperature of the 
waters.26 However, Baldwin accepted as much as Churchill 
did the aim that, whatever the fate of the parliamentary 
Liberal party, Liberal voters in the country must not be 
stampeded into the Labour camp by the hasty adoption of a 
tariff programme, a tactic that would have
only one result - very likely final for our lifetime 
- namely a Lib-Lab block in some form or other and a 
Conservative right excluded from power.
27
This desire not to be caught wrong-footed on fiscal 
policy was reinforced by the rise in prestige of the 
Labour government during the summer and autumn of 1929. 
This continued popularity of the government, principally 
due to successes in foreign policy but assigned also by 
jaundiced opposition politicians to the lavish praise 
showered upon the.se by the largely Conservative press, led 
to the fear that MacDonald might try to capitalise on the 
situation by calling a second general election and going 
for a Labour working majority. The political indications 
suggested that, at least until December 1929, such a
26. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 29 June 1929, NC 18/1/660.
27. Churchill to Baldwin, 23, 26, 29 June 1 929, Baldwin 
MSS, volume 51, ff. 85-86; volume 165, ff. 58-61; 
volume 164, ff. 36-37.
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tactic might well have paid d i v i d e n d s , 26 it was for this 
reason above all else that Baldwin clung to his centrist 
scheme, and the l i m i t a t i o n s  of s a f eguarding. His 
political antennae were focused on the seats he needed to 
win back to regain a p a r l i a m e n t a r y  m a j o r i t y  - the 
marginals of the North and Midlands, whereas the whole- 
hoggers were based in and encouraged by the attitudes of 
the safer southern seats. This was the essential reason 
for Baldwin's unwillingness to progress rapidly in the 
direction of tariff reform, for his political strategy was 
based on at the least raising no obstacles to the return 
of the decisive marginals to the Tory fold. Nevertheless, 
no party leader can afford to ignore for long his partisan 
stalwarts, and the need to find some formula that would 
appease the activists of the southern strongholds without 
alienation of other regions, was to remain Baldwin's major 
p r o b l e m  t h r o u g h o u t  the period in opposition. This 
ques t i o n  b e c a m e  acute in the light of the e m e r g i n g  
critique over the causes of the defeat from the lower 
levels of the party in the aftermath of the election.
The leadershp's analysis had involved remarkably 
little r e t r o s p e c t i v e  s o u l - s e a r c h i n g ,  • and indeed 
was c h a r a c t e r i s e d  by an air of c o m p l a c e n c y  more 
appropriate to electoral victors than to the vanquished.
28. Lloyd George to Churchill, 16 October 1929, Churchill 
MSSf N. to Mary Endicott Chamberlain, 1 June 1929, NC 
1/20/1/47; C. Cook and J, Ramsden, eds., By-Elections 
in British Politics (1973), pp. 75-76; Skidelsky, op. 
cit., p. 85.
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There was a clear preference for blaming the setback on 
events beyond the cabinet's control; on external factors 
as opposed to internal ones. Thus Lord Bridgeraan, Hoare, 
and Worthington-Evans all settled for the swing of the 
pendulum effect as inevitable after a lengthy period of 
quiet government, fatalistically elevating it into an 
axiomatic law of nature.29 Neville Chamberlain improved 
on this by li n k i n g  to it the i n s i d i o u s  w o r k i n g s  of 
S o c i a l i s t  p r o p a g a n d a ;  he also echoed the note of 
complacency predominant, when contemplating the post- 
election situation:
There is no conversion to Socialism. It is merely 
the present discontents showing themselves in a 
desire for change.
and he could contemplate with detached calm the prospect 
that "the new govt, may make such blunders that before the 
two years are up the country will be glad to be rid of 
t h e m . " 3 0  Looking in a similar fashion to causes beyond the 
government's control, his half-brother Austen pinned the
blame for the alienation of working class voters on the 
trade depression of the late 1 9 2 0 's. 3 1 Hoare also went out 
of his way to deny that the controversial extension of the
29. Bridgeman journal, July 1929, volume II, p. 175;
Chelsea CA N e w s l e t t e r ,  July 1929, op. cit.;
W o r t h i n g t o n - E v a n s  to Birdwood, 24 June 1929,
Worthington-Evans MSS, Eng. Hist, C896, ff. 203-204.
30. N . Chamberlain diary, 8 June 1929, NC 2/22.
31. A. to Ida Chamberlain, 7 June 1929, AC 5/1/475.
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franchise in 1928 to the "flappers”, women aged twenty-one
to thirty, had contributed to the debacle. Even the
single Cabinet Minister to lose his seat. Sir Arthur
Steel-Maitland, not only agreed with Hoare, but also found
nothing more significant to blame than his enforced
a b s ence from his c o n s t i t u e n c y  due to his duties as
Minister of L a b o u r . 3^ As an adjunct to this 'act of God'
syndrome, Baldwin and other anti-Coalitionist ministers
also b l a m e d  the a c t i v i t i e s  of Lloyd George and the
intervention of Liberal candidates, again an entirely
e xte r n a l  event. On 31 May B a l d w i n  i n f o r m e d  Lord
Stamfordhara that the cause of his defeat was
the action of the Liberal Party, who have put up
representatives in almost every constituency with no 
chance of winning, but taking away the votes which 
would have been given to the Conservatives,
33
The only slight notes of criticism were directed at two
leading ex-Coa 1 itionists. Austen Chamberlain, who had
o f f e n d e d  by a n n o u n c i n g  his c o n t i n u a t i o n  as F o r e i g n
Secretary after the election despite infirmity and the
considerable unpopularity of his policies, and Churchill
for the w h o l e  slant of his fiscal poli c y  at the
Exchequer.3^ The only member of the ousted Cabinet who
32. S t e e l - M a i t l a n d  to Collier, 3 June 1929, S t e e l -  
Maitland MSS, SRO GD193/251/4.
33* Memo of conversation by Stamfordham, RA.K 223/24, in 
Hyde, op. cit., p. 303*
34. Bridgeraan journal, July 1929, volume 2, pp. 173, 215.
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dissented from these comforting consolations was Araery, 
who had for many months prior to the election been deeply 
unhappy at the eschewal of anything hinting at tariff 
reform, such as positive proposals for wider safeguarding. 
For the moment, however, he kept his conclusions to 
himself, and at the final meeting of the Cabinet on 3 June 
"did not air any retrospective wisdom for ray colleagues 
benefit." Thus "We all parted very happily, voting 
ourselves the best government there has ever been."^^ The 
complacency of the leadership on this occasion offers an 
interesting contrast with the aftermath of the previous 
defeat under Baldwin's leadership in 1923* On that 
occasion the constituencies, on the whole favourable to 
p r otection, did not b l a m e  the policy after defeat, 
although the circumstances surrounding it produced a 
bitter debate in the upper echelons. Now, with a defeat 
on the leadership's selected moderate policy, the roles 
were reversed with a vengence.
Initially the rank and file adopted an explanation 
that mi g h t  be s u m m e d  up as pu t t i n g  defe a t  down to 
'Liberals and Lies'. This took the double-headed form of 
blaming the intervention of Liberal candidates splitting 
the anti-Socialist vote, and the accusation that not only 
the L i b e r a l s  but also Labour had won votes by foul 
tactics. It was asserted that these had consisted of 
misrepresentations of the policies and record of the
35. Amery diary, 3 June 1929.
6 6
Conservatives as well as a corrupt political auction
c o n d u c t e d  by both opponents. The latter meant, in
Labour's case, bribery through offers of remunerative
social welfare legislation, and in Lloyd George's the "We
Can Conquer Unemployment" promise, both of which in
C o n s e r v a t i v e  eyes were k n o w i n g l y  f r a u d u l e n t  due to
practical difficulties which were being ignored by their
promoters. The party clearly needed to believe at first
that it had been beaten by unfair means, rather than
through any deficiency on its own part. Thus it was
merely being more blunt that its leaders in fixing the
cause on visible opponents rather than vague trends. This
allowed the consoling view that they had preserved their
honour: political honesty operated even at the price of
defeat. In northern constituencies, where for electoral
reasons demands for a positive protectionist policy were
rare, this explanation continued to serve late into 1929.
The Chairman of the Stockton Association declared: "We
lost the election because we told the truth. We had to
fight opponents who made rash promises throughout the
length and breadth of the c o u n t r y . "3^
As the condition of shock wore off during and after
July, this initial simplistic explanation underwent a
gradual transformation into a position not only more
complex, but also radically critical of the leadership.
One contribution to the developing tendency to find fault
36. Stockton C A , December 3 1929; Cornwall Prov. Div., 
An. Report 1929; Yorkshire Prov. Area, An. Report 
1929.
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with the actions of the late administration was the 
Central Office inquisition of the local Associations. 
This had originated as a result of grumblings, originating 
from below, and heard in the demand for an inquest voiced 
by the influential Diehard backbencher Grant Morden in the 
1922 Committee, and in the unanimous resolution, mandating 
a questionnaire passed by the Council of the National 
Union on 2 J u l y . 37 The execution of this was a typical 
piece of clumsiness on the part of J. C. C. Davidson, the 
Chairman of the party, in which his evident reluctance to 
pursue the matter, and desire to sweep the results under 
the carpet, almost certainly backfired by alienating the 
influential constituency members of the National Union 
Executive, such as Sir Charles Marston, who had pushed the 
idea. In fact, despite half-heartedly chasing responses 
in late 1929, the C o m m i t t e e  set up to r e v i e w  the 
constituency replies does not seem to have produced any 
positive result. While there is no actual evidence that 
on this occasion Davidson bent the rules to take advantage 
of his office in the interests of his leader, it is not 
unlikely, for he was known to have done so on previous 
o c c a s i o n s . 38 His institutional position gave him every 
opportunity to put a spanner in the works; as Chairman of 
the Party he was also ex-officio Chairman of the National
37. P* Goodhart and U. Branston, The 1 922, (1973), p. 39: 
NU Central council, July 2 1929.
38. J. Rarasden, The A^e o £ Balfour and Baldw i n , 1 9 0 2-40
(1978), p. 301.
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Union, at both Executive and Council meetings, as well as
being on the s p e c i f i c  s u b c o m m i t t e e  in question.
Furthermore, the questionnaire was transmitted via his own
Central Office, and it is hard to believe that he could
not have received a better response if he had wished. In
fact, by the end of October only two hundred and fifty-
rive A s s o c i a t i o n s  had replied, and only a few more
responses trickled in after this. Thus when, after
the election, the interim and unpublished report was
prepared in January 1930 its credibility was undermined
by its being based on the views of only three hundred and
fifteen Associations. This represented only fifty-three
per cent of the five hundred and ninety which had run
c a n d i d a t e s  at t h e  e l e c t i o n . 3 9  N e v e r t h e l e s s ,  t h e
questionnaire produced several important results, and
d i s c u s s i o n  of the r e p l i e s  in the m e e t i n g s  of local
Associations cast light on a uniquely wide scale, into the
o p i n i o n s  of the r a n k  and file. W h i l s t  s e v e r a l
acknowledged local deficiencies, nearly all placed the
emphasis on errors of policy and tactics at the national
level, if only on the principle of shifting the blame:
It was agreed the defeat of the Conservative Party in 
the constituencies was primarily due to the mistakes 
of the Conservative Government and the Conservative 
Central Office, combined with extravagant Socialist 
promises. In the case of West Wolverhampton it was 
felt that these c o n d i t i o n s ,  and e s p e c i a l l y  the 
intervention of a Liberal third candidate, were 
responsible for our defeat and that it must not be
39. NU Exec., 16 July, 3 October, 22 October 1929, 1 4
January 1930.
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attributed in any way either to the candidate or to 
the election Agent.
40
Figure 7
Constituency Opinions on the Causes of the 1929 Defeat 
Note
F i f t y - t h r e e  per cent of C o n s t i t u e n c y  A s s o c i a t i o n s  
responded to the Central Office circular. However, as the 
original replies have been lost, and there survives no 
overall analysis of their content in the NU Minutes, local 
party o p inion can only be traced t h r o u g h  the local 
Association Minute Books. Many of the local Associations 
did not record the content of their reply; but the sample 
of surviving records was found to include a total of 
t w e n t y - f o u r  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ,  r a n d o m l y  s c a t t e r e d  
geographically and of different types, which recorded 
their reply. The following table is based upon these 
records, and c o n s i s t s  of a p e r c e n t a g e  a n a l y s i s  by 
frequency of mention of any factor listed by more than one 
constituency. There, is no apparent reason not to assume 
that this sample represents an accurate microcosm of the 
opinion of the party grassroots in general.
Sources
Accrington C A , Bath CA, Birmingham C A , Bradford CA, 
Camborne CA, Chelmsford CA, Denbighshire CA, Ealing CA, 
East Dorset CA, Glasgow CA, Gravesend CA, Guildford CA, 
Keighley CA, North Herefordshire CA, North Oxfordshire CA, 
North West Wiltshire CA, Peterborough CA, Rochester and 
Chatham CA, Rutland and Stamford CA, South East Cornwall 
CA, S t o c k t o n  CA, T o r q u a y  CA, W a r w i c k  CA, W e s t  
Wolverhampton CA.
40, West Wolverhampton CA, Management Cttee., 26 June 
1929.
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Figure 7
1 66% Criticism of the Derating Policy/Reassessment
of Rates
2 58% Intervention of a Liberal Candidate/Misrepre­
sentation or False Promises by Liberal or 
Labour opponents
3 54% Absence of any 'Postive', i.e. Protectionist,
Policy/Criticism of the Safety First Campaign 
f strategy
4 33% Criticism of having granted the 'Flapper' Vote
5 25% Attacks on the Party by a hostile Press
6 17% Failure of 1924-29 Government to economise and
reduce local and national government 
expenditure
{ 13% Apathy of Conservative supporters
7 {
{ 13% Criticism of the Home Secretary, Joynson-
Hicks, in particular in connection with the 
Defence of the Realm Act
{ 8% Failure of 1924-29 Government to reform the
House of Lords
{ 8% Absence of an Agricultural Policy
{ 8% Criticism of the Petrol Tax
8 { 8% Criticism of Pensions Acts' anomalies
{ 8% Hostility to the Local Government Act
{ 8% Effects of the 'swing of the pendulum'
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Examination of the extant responses produces a 
s t r i k i n g l y  c o h e s i v e  picture. What e m e r g e s  is an 
indictment of not only the specific acts, but also the 
basic political complexion and assumptions of Baldwin's 
government. The positive acts of social reform receive a 
unanimous thumbs-down: Derating, the Flapper Vote, Widows
Pensions, and the Local Government Act. In addition, 
grievances were noted in three areas close to the hearts 
of local activists: the failure of the Baldwin Ministry
to use its majority to grasp the nettle of House of Lords 
reconstitution; to economise on government expenditure; or 
to advance in a protectionist direction; all these points 
had b e e n  the s u b j e c t  of p r e v i o u s  c o n s t i t u e n c y  
r e s o l u t i o n s . T h e  negation on the last point in the 
general election was very unpopular, defeat confirming to 
many the folly of a lack of 'clear', i.e. Protectionist, 
policy. In general this played into the hands of those 
who asserted that Baldwin was not a true Conservative at 
all. Baldwin had taken considerable risks in his "New 
Departure" of 1924, and only success at the polls could 
have secured him invulnerability. It now seemed as if the 
chickens were coming home to roost. The North Oxfordshire 
association spoke for many in crisply replying to the 
questionnaire :
41. Yorkshire Prov. Area, Council, 10 December 1927; 
Ealing CA, Exec., 20 August, 30 N o v e m b e r  1928; 
Rotherham CA, AGM, 30 April 1928; Chichester CA, GP 
Ctte., 23 January 1928; Bath CA, Exec., 13 September 
1 927; St. George's CA, Exec., 27 April 1 928.
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That one of the primary causes of the defeat of the 
party and reduced majorities at the recent election 
was the actions of the Cabinet in riding roughshod 
over Public and Party opinion in the country, as 
expressed locally and at Conferences of the Party.
42
It was only one small step from verdicts like that above, 
to a full-scale demand for a greater say in the. policy of 
the party by the local A s s o c i a t i o n s . ^3 it speaks volumes 
for the dissatisfaction of the rank and file that such a 
demand should be openly voiced in the normally strictly 
hierarchical and authoritarian Conservative Party, The 
usual tactic for the leadership was to sidestep such 
demands and remove the original causes of the impetus 
behind them by adopting one or more of the favoured 
policies of the localities as a rallying flag. This 
facilitated the shelving of the constitutional question of 
intra-party democracy at a limited price and without 
allowing the constituencies any more power in practice. 
In one s e n s e  t h i s  had b e e n  the r e s p o n s e  of the 
'alternative* leadership who placed themselves at the head 
of constituency feeling in 1921-22. If the grumbling was 
not defused in this way, it was likely to grow rather than 
diminish with time, and to pose a serious problem for the 
leadership's control of the party. Indeed, the posibility 
of a total disintegration was not so far removed as might 
be supposed, for the appeals of loyalty could only hold
42. North Oxfordshire CA, Exec., 24 September 1929.
43. West Midlands Area, GP Ctte., 18 October 1929.
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the party together for a limited period in the face of a 
fundamental divergence of attitude, as was demonstrated 
both in 1903-6 and 1918-22. This model of the progress of 
disillusionment with the distribution of power in the 
party can be seen from a case study of Ealing Conservative 
Association's attitudes during 1929. They responded to 
the questionnaire along orthodox lines in September, 
giving the causes of defeat as:
(1) the adoption of the slogan 'Safety F irst’ (2) 
Hostile Press (3) De-Rating and Revaluation being 
misunderstood by the electors ... (4) sufficient
p r o m i n e n c e  w a s  not g i v e n  to the p o l i c y  of 
Safeguarding.
44
The lack of any clear lead from above during during the 
approach to the party conference led to the passing of two 
resolutions in October, one calling for Empire Unity and 
extension of safeguarding to be placed in the vanguard of 
the party programme, whilst the other called for "an 
assurance [that] in future the opinions of the party will 
be sought to a g r e ater exte n t  than in the past".^^ 
Conference did not resolve the problems, but rather stoked 
the flames, and by December the loss of faith in the 
leadership had progressed so far that the discussions 
included the gagging of speakers and the biased selection 
of motions at the conference, although procedure was in
44. Ealing CA, Exec., 13 September 1929.
45. Ibid., 11 October 1929.
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fact no different from any previous o c c a s i o n . H o w e v e r ,  
the high tide of this demand for popular control was 
reached in October, when the National Union Executive 
debated an even more explicit resolution sent from the 
L o w e s t o f t  A s s o c i a t i o n ,  w h i c h  asked that " i m p o r t a n t  
questions of policy, before embodiment in the party 
programme, shall be submitted to the consideration of 
Constituency Associations", In the end the Executive 
rejected the idea, holding fast to the traditionalist view 
of the power and role of the party leader.^? Rank and 
file unrest also showed itself in two other ways. The 
first, and less serious, was the attempt by one of the 
more p r o m i n e n t  MPs d e f e a t e d  in 1929 to o r g a n i s e  a 
Defeated Candidates Association, and for this to be 
i n s t i t u t i o n a l l y  r e p r e s e n t e d  g e n e r a l l y  on all party 
committees and specifically on the Committee of Enquiry 
into the defeat. However, the organiser, J, T. C. Moore- 
Brabazon, was still fully imbued with the attitudes of 
party loyalty, and felt unable to go ahead with his group 
without Baldwin's approval. Thus during the crucial 
period of July to November 1 929 Baldwin was able to 
exploit this reluctance by preserving almost sphinx-like 
silence on the question; significantly, he only thawed to 
the idea after the Party Conference, tho u g h  still
46. Ibid., 9 December 1929.
47. NU Exec., 22 October 1929; Conference Resolutions, NU 
An.Report, 1929.
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a m b i g u o u s l y . ^8 Baldwin still needed prodding to formally 
approve the idea in December, by which time the candidates 
were looking forward to the prospects of the next election 
rather than looking back in anger to the last. Thus they 
had a vested interest in moderation to regain marginal 
seats, and as a group tended thereafter to weigh in on the 
pro-Baldwin side at the party meetings of 1930. The 
second and more serious trend was the attacks on Baldwin's 
crony and nominee as Chairman, J, C. C. Davidson, both 
personally and through criticism of the constitutional 
functions and powers of his office, which were severely 
out on rank and file initiative after the election. 
Davidson had done some good work as Chairman, but he had 
also alienated many important figures in often misguided 
controversies, and the sniping at him which continued 
during 1929 reflected this as well as the natural reaction 
to the co-author of a disastrous strategy.
The r e a c t i o n  to the e l e c t i o n  d e f e a t  of the 
constituency Associations and the backbench MPs had 
several important consequences in framing the party mood 
in the period before the 1929 conference. One noticeable 
feature was the bitter hostility to the Liberals, of which 
the remarks of the defeated Headlam during the election 
were a typical expression: "each day I feel more and more
bitter against L[loyd] GCeorge]," Even more revealing of 
the attitudes of the new parliament towards any liaison
48. Moore-Brabazon to Baldwin, 28 November 1929, Moore 
Brabazon MSS.
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with that party for the purposes of an anti-Sooia 1 ist 
front was his comment a few days later on "the Liberals.
How one dislikes them: far more than one dislikes the
Socialists."^9 Above all, however, the circumstances of 
the defeat played into the hands of the tariff reformers, 
apparently affording visible proof of their frequently 
aired critique of Baldwin's moderate politics.50 if 
defeat was bound to discredit the leaders who had drawn up 
the manifesto on which it had occured it was also bound to 
strengthen the hands of those who had opposed the failed 
strategy. Even the distribution of the losses could be 
argued to reinforce these views; as protection was always 
presented as a policy for prosperity, and thus a solution 
to unemployment, a strong line on safeguarding would have 
held the Northern and Midland industrial seats. As has 
been seen, this view found a ready audience in the local 
Associations, being the third most frequently cited cause 
of defeat [see figure 7]. This produced the increasing
groundswell of resolutions from Associations demanding a J
new and stronger policy. One of the first examples of j
this also foreshadowed the developing North-South split of |
opinion: a resolution at the National Union Central |
Council asserting that |
49. Headlam Diary, 11 and 25 May 1929.
50. Page Croft, Memorandum Upon Mr. Baldwin's Changes of 
Policy, November 1930, Croft MSS.
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in order to return the Conservative Party at the next 
election an industrial policy is necessary, and that 
the only such policy is the definite adoption of 
extensive Safeguarding of all the principle trades of 
the country, particularly Iron and Steel...
was carried despite the opposition of Sir John Haslara, 
representing the perenially Labour-held Lancashire seat of 
W e s t h o u g h t o n . 5  ^ As the b a l a nce of p o w e r  in the 
parliamentary party had shifted decisively in favour of 
the s outhern areas, and the brake of the n o r t h e r n  
moderates had been removed, so it was from the south that 
the lead and pressure came, for the view that "the best 
hope of an early return of a Conservative Government lies 
in the whole-hearted advocacy of a definite policy of 
Empire development and the safeguarding of Industries".52 
This view, when linked by the Diehard wing of the party 
with criticism of the absence of vigorous attacks on the 
government from the front benches made for a popular and 
potentially dangerous combination.53 if Baldwin had been 
a more determined, more aggressive, or more effective 
leader of the opposition in the summer months of 1929, it 
is possible that these disappointments could have been 
assuaged without paying the price in terras of a change of 
policy or person. However, his weak and bipartisan stance 
served only to redouble dissatisfaction, and his failure 
to give a lead d u r i n g  the m o n t h s  of June and July
51. NU Central Council, 2 July 1929.
52. Wessex Area, Res., NU Exec., 22 October 1929.
53. N. to Anne Chamberlain, 1 October 1929, NC 1/26/408.
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under rained the confidence of his colleagues, as did the 
unsuccessful first session of the new parliament. The 
first consequence of this was a drop in his own popularity 
and p r e s t i g e . 5^ By the b e g i n n i n g  of J u l y  Lo r d  
Beaverbrook, admittedly an unfriendly source, was able to 
claim "I have seen almost every Conservative ex-Cabinet 
Minister. I do not believe the Leader has a single 
sincere s u p p o r t e r . "55 The second consequence was that 
other Conservtives, frustrated by the lack of movement, 
sought to grasp the initiative in an attempt to push 
forward party policy. Baldwin, according to Austen 
Chamberlain, "never moves of his own motion, but he can 
sometimes be set in motion by o t h e r s " , 56 while his half- 
brother Neville likened Baldwin to a spinning top: "You
must keep whipping him or he f a l l s  o v e r " , 5 7
The first two ex-Cabinet Ministers to break silence 
were Araery and Neville Chamberlain. Amery had been 
dissatisfied at the lack of a fiscal or imperial policy 
throughout the 1924-29 government, especially towards the 
end of it, and several times contemplated resignation, 
staying his hand only out of personal loyalty to and 
affection for Baldwin, Thus the defeat served only to 
confirm him in his analysis of the party's weakness:
54. N. Chamberlain Diary, 26 July 1929, NC 2/22.
55. Beaverbrook to Rotherraere, 3 July 1929, Beaverbrook 
MSS C284.
56. A. to Ida Chamberlain, 2 July 1931, AC 5/1/545.
57. N . to Hilda C h a m b e r l a i n ,  24 N o v e m b e r  1929, NC 
18/1/677.
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The industrialised masses of this country must have a 
positive political creed to influence them. In 
Empire and Protection we have a creed which will 
appeal to the majority or certainly to the best among 
them .... We have now got to get back to a real 
fighting spirit, and ... to get together a small band 
who are out and out for a complete policy of Empire 
Preference.
58
Failing any clear lead from Baldwin, Amery resolved to use 
his freedom from the restraints of Cabinet collective 
responsibility when the cause of Empire Trade was debated 
in the House of Commons at the end of July. To set the 
ball rolling, Amery provocatively acknowledged divisions 
amongst the party leadership, and openly asserted his 
belief that the election had been lost through a lack of a 
clear and bold Conservative policy. It was not that he 
attempted to suggest any particular precise line; indeed, 
his speech was deliberately vague at that level, but the 
message was quite firm that in the new parliament the 
relevant divisions were between the two sets of fiscal 
opinion, rather than particular party labels.59 This move 
paralleled that of Neville Chamberlain, who was taking the IIinitative in asserting that the party was no longer bound 1j
by the restrictive pledges of the election. On 4 July j
Chamberlain addressed the Empire Industries Association, I
and asserted that "the slate has been cleared". Amid i
58. Amery to Page Croft, 6 June 1 929, Croft MSS 1/2, f, 
AM 8.
59. House of Commons Debates, 5th Series, volume 229, 
columns 739-741, 9 July 1929.
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cheers from the audience of backbench Conservative MPs, 
He declared "Now is the time for us to produce a new 
Imperial Policy."^0
Neither Chamberlain nor Amery at this stage indicated 
in any detail what he would like to see written upon such 
a clean slate. They were only trying to p r ovoke 
discussion, not to pre-empt it. For this reason alone 
they were hostile to the fully fledged policy brought 
forward by Lord Beaverbrook with his Empire Free Trade 
campaign. Amery and Chamberlain stood aloof from this for 
three crucial reasons. The first of these was their sense 
of loyalty to Baldwin, for the extra-party nature of the 
Beaverbrook campaign was bound to cause confusion and 
problems, as was Beaverbrook's well known animus against 
Baldwin. In the second place they had considerable doubts 
about the l o n g - t e r m  p r a c t i c a b i l i t y  of Beaverbrook's 
scheme, believing, possibly correctly, that it would not 
find favour in the Dominions even if adopted by a British 
government. The third and most crucial problem was that 
Beaverbrook's plan included the tax on imports of non- 
Em p i r e  foodstuffs. This was seen by all shades of 
Conservative politicians as a potentially dangerous 
albatross indeed for the party to hang around its neck in 
the light of a possible election at any moment. There was 
little doubt in the summer of 1929 that such a policy 
would produce an upheaval on the scale of 1906.
60. Morning Post, 5 July 1929.
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Certainly neither Chamberlain nor Araery, the two most 
advanced leaders, wished to go as far as the food tax.^^ 
Indeed the actual policy advance they sought was quite 
small. What in fact they were attempting was to change 
the mood and outlook of the party at a more general level 
- an advance of rhetoric rather than substance. Both 
viewed it as urgent that the party should have a clear and 
distinctive policy, an imperial policy, and a popular 
policy with the rank and file, so far as electoral common 
sense would allow. In this sense they were taking part in 
the c o n t i n u i n g  and c o n t i n u a l  d e b a t e  w i t h i n  the 
Conservative Party on what did, in fact, constitute 
practical politics. With committed protectionists before 
them, they believed that a bold and inspiring policy fed 
on itself, and would create its own momentum by enthusing 
the party rank and file, who would then carry the banner 
triumphantly to a wider audience. It was for these 
reasons that Araery and Chamberlain both talked in strident 
and striking terms about an advance in actual policy that 
was in fact quite minor. At most they were intending an 
extension of safeguarding, perhaps to include the iron and 
steel industries, but certainly not to extend it beyond 
the manufacturing sector. Thus their declarations were 
deliberately pitched in strong, if vague, l a n g u a g e . ^2 
Other leaders were more sceptical about the connection
61. Amery to Baldwin, 25 February 1930, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 31, ff. 44-48.
62. The Times, 8 November 1929.
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b e t w e e n  the o p i n i o n s  of the party f a i t h f u l  and the 
attitudes of the floating, possibly ex-Liberal, voter. 
Baldwin in particular, having opted for a policy of 
c a u t i o n  in the e l e c t i o n  and still h a v i n g  lost, was 
unlikely to be receptive to the protectionist strategy. 
In the case of Araery in particular, his well known faddism 
on the i m p e r i a l  t h e m e  and his poor sense of t i m i n g  
undermined the impact of his actions on his c o l l e a g u e s . ^3 
The barometer of party policy responded to the debate 
between the two schools of opinion, and their changing 
perceptions of the attitudes of the ordinary voter. With 
the possible exception of Churchill, no Conservative 
leader had a p h i l o s o p h i c a l  or e c o n o m i c  a n s w e r  to 
protection as a policy, and indeed most paid it lip 
service as an ideal.- The debate was in fact entirely 
about questions of timing and electoral practicability.
The uneasy relationship between public opinion and 
the desires of party activists was continually bedevilled 
by the complicating intervention of Lord Beaverbrook's 
campaign, which had also emerged in the political vacuum 
of the aftermath of electoral defeat. Lord Beaverbrook's 
original name was Max Aitken, and he had been born and 
brought up in Canada, were in early life he acquired a 
large fortune from business ventures and mergers. Now 
living in England, Beaverbrook had built a considerable 
press empire which was his abiding interest. Centred
63. Bridgeraan Journal, volume 2, p. 199.
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around the E jc p ir e ££, his group also included the
Sunday Express and the Evening Standard. Although he did 
not receive his peerage because of his newspapers, as had 
Lords Northcliffe and Rotherraere before him, the fact that 
his power and influence were based upon his newspapers 
caused him to be grouped with them under the generic 
e p i t h e t  of the ' P r e s s  Lords'. Any a n a l y s i s  of 
Beaverbrook's position would, however, be incomplete 
without conveying his significant background of activity 
in Conservative politics, and the wide range of contacts 
and friends he had made at all levels in the party, many 
of whom respected his motives, and always looked upon him, 
even in a b e r r a n t  m o m e n t s ,  as e s s e n t i a l l y  a good 
C ons e r v a t i v e .  In fact it had been b e c a u s e  of the 
attraction of Joseph Chamberlain's campaign for imperial 
e c o n o m i c  union, a vis i o n  w h i c h  fired B e a v e r b r o o k ' s  
enthusiasm, that he had come to England in the first 
place. He soon became the intimate friend of a leading 
front bench Conservative and tariff reformer, Andrew Bonar 
Law, through whose offices he was found a parliamentary 
seat at Ashton-under-Lyne, which he represented for five 
years. Law's accession to the leadership of the party, 
and the high-level world of manoeuvre amongst the Lloyd 
George Coalition during the war, brought Beaverbrook 
further to the centre of political power, albeit as an 
observer rather than a participant. In the immediate 
post-war period of Coalition government Beaverbrook
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oscillated from his involvement and intimacy with Lloyd 
George, to, after Law's first retirement in 1921, attacks 
upon it in the constituencies. After the fall of the 
Coalition, and the s u c c e s s i o n  of B a l d w i n  to the 
premiership on Law's final retirement in 1923, Beaverbrook 
found himself excluded from the inner counsels. Baldwin 
had always viewed the influence of the press magnates as 
one of the sordid and c o r r u p t i n g  f e a t u r e s  of Lloyd 
George's regime, and a series of unfortunate incidents 
with the press during his first two governments only 
served to redouble his hostility to the popular tabloids. 
The result was that by 1929 it was well known that a 
personal and irremovable animus existed between the Press 
Lords, and in particular Lord Rotherraere, and the party 
Leader which was fully reciprocated. The bad press the 
party b e l i e v e d  it r e c e i v e d  as a result of this was 
prominent on the list of causes of the election defeat. 
Though not a participant in the debates of the House of 
Lords, Beaverbrook was active in political life, mainly 
but not entirely through his newspapers. Two earlier 
ventures into active politics foreshadowed the Empire Free 
Trade Crusade. In 1923 Beaverbrook had waged war on the 
Conservative Government over a popular imperial issue 
close to his own heart - the failure to lift an embargo on 
Canadian cattle. He used his newspapers to attack the 
g o v e r n m e n t  in the same mann e r  as the c o n t e m p o r a r y
64. West Midlands Area, Secretary's Report on the General 
Election, GP Ctte., 18 October 1929.
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Ro t h e rrae r e -1 a u n c h e d A n t i - W a s t e  League, by ru n n i n g  
independent candidates at by-elections. Beaverbrook was 
successful in defeating the Minister of Agriculture, 
Griffith-Boscawen, in his by-election at Mitcham. A 
second episode encouraged in Beaverbrook's mind the 
possibility of adding to such guerilla tactics personal 
intervention and advocacy on the platform, when he not 
only f i n a n c i a l l y  but also p e r s o n a l l y  b a c k e d  the 
independent Diehard Conservative Hall-Caine, when he 
defeated the former Liberal Coalition Chief Whip Guest.
Essentially Beaverbrook was seen as a maverick, but a 
genuine and sincere advocate of imperial unity through the 
economic programme of tariff reform, including food taxes 
in preference for Empire foodstuffs. Thus Beaverbrook was 
alienated from the Baldwin government both on personality 
and policy grounds by the time of the 1 929 election, and 
"was clearly elated at Baldwin's f a i l u r e " . He himself 
had not run imperial preference in the 1929 election in 
his papers, seeing little prospect of capturing the 
existing Conservative leadership for a programme they had 
explicitly ruled out as electorally impossible. Instead, 
he allowed his papers to drift, filling the empty space 
with a lightweight discussion of the problems of railway- 
truck haulage, and admitted to his confidant and aide R,
65. Lockhart Diary, 30 May 1 929 ; B e a v e r b r o o k  to 
Birkenhead, 7 June 1929» Beaverbrook MSS C41.
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B. Lockhart that he was merely biding his time and sitting 
on the fence.
This situation was transformed by the balance of 
power after the election, and the visible search by many 
C o n s e r v a t i v e s  for a clear line of p o l i c y  p r o v i d e d  
Beaverbrook with a tempting opportunity to urge his own 
vision of imperial unity, a policy he knew would strike a 
chord with many other Conservatives. Beaverbrook’s idea 
was simple in essence: the creation of a trading block
consisting of Britain, her Dominions and Crown Colonies, 
which would join together in an imperial free trade zone 
by reducing their tariffs against each other, whilst 
raising a high protective tariff wall in common to deter 
competition from outside and provide an assured market. 
Thus Beaverbrook’s policy would fulfill three distinct 
aims: it would encourage imperial solidarity through
economic links; it would keep alive British industry and 
provide it with markets, thus reducing unemployment and 
the challenge of Socialism at home; and finally it would 
protect the British farmer from continual dumping of cheap 
surpluses of produce. Beaverbrook adopted the slogan of 
"Empire Free Trade" to describe this trading area, and 
claimed that his policy was a new departure:
our p o l i c y  is not the s a m e  as t h a t  of Joe
C h a m b e r l a i n ,  t h o u g h  on u l t i m a t e  ideals we are
p r o b a b l y  very close. He argued for D o m i n i o n
66. Lockhart Diary, 22 May 1929
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Preferences, whereas I want to see Imperial Free 
Trade.
67
In fact this was mere hair-splitting, and Beaverbrook was 
simply refurbishing the old tariff reform banner of 1903. 
This was clear from his insistence that taxes on imported 
non-Empire foodstuffs were essential. He wanted "a tax on 
foreign wheat and meat, I hold the view that this tax is 
the keystone of any Imperial policy, and without it Empire 
Fiscal Union would be i m p o s s i b l e . "^8 During the course of 
the Empire Crusade Beaverbrook's opinions and policies 
changed occasionally and sometimes in a contradictory 
manner. However, the insistence on facing the food tax 
was the most consistent and distinguishing feature of the 
Empire Crusade, and it was non-negotiable. Typically, 
h o w e v e r ,  B e a v e r b r o o k  j u s t i f i e d  it by c i t i n g  two 
conflicting reasons. The first was the fact that the food 
tax* which would give Dominion food exporters an assured 
protected market for their produce, was essential as a 
bargaining counter to achieve a reciprocal advantage for 
British industrial exports to the Empire. Thus
ray complete familiarity with Dominion conditions 
makes it impossible for me to recede from the food
67. Beaverbrook to Caillard, 22 July 1929, Beaverbrook 
MSS', B94.
68. Beaverbrook to Melchett, 9 October 1929, ibid., C243.
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taxes. I know perfectly that it is the only thing 
we can give to Canada which is worth anything at all.
69
On the other hand, Beaverbrook wooed the disgruntled 
British agriculturalists, claiming that his policy would 
protect their depressed industry. Thus Beaverbrook 
canvassed the branches of the National Farmers Union, 
asserting that "in a sentence, this policy is that of 
P r o t e c t i o n  for the f a r m e r s . "70 Such c l a i m s  were 
incompatible at a time when many British farmers were 
s u f f e r i n g  more s e v e r e l y  from c o m p e t i t i o n  from the 
Dominions than from the Continent or South America, but 
Beaverbrook did not realise this:
The ke y n o t e  of the whole pr o j e c t  is the tax on 
foreign wheat and meat coming into England, Without 
this tax, there is little hope of winning the farmers 
to our side .... the present system of preferential 
treatment must therefore be drastically altered in 
our favour.
71
There was a second and even more fundamental flaw in the 
Empire Free Trade programme. The nature of the Dominion 
economies had developed since Joseph Chamberlain's plan of 
1903, and they possessed infant but potentially vital 
industrial bases which their tariff walls were designed to
69. Beaverbrook to Melchett, 22 November 1929, ibid., 
C243.
70. Circular from Beaverbrook to the NFU, 15 October
1929. ibid., B99.
71. Beaverbrook to Elibank, 23 November 1929, ibid., 
C126.
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nurture and protect. Many experienced Conservative 
politicans had serious doubts as to whether the Dominions 
would in fact welcome opening their home markets to the 
full heat of British industrial competition, and it went 
without saying that as the Dominions could not be coerced, 
any such r e l u c t a n c e  e f f e c t i v e l y  n e g a t e d  the idea, 
Beaverbrook never successfully confronted this problem 
h e a d - o n . I n s t e a d ,  Beaverbrook preferred to conc^^rate 
all his e n e r g i e s  on s e c u r i n g  the first part of his 
programme: winning the mother country for his policy, for
in his view "Great Britain still has the hegemony of the 
E m p i r e " . 73 This was one reason for his almost fanatical 
insistence on the food tax as the acid test of the new 
p o l i c y . 7^ In common with all other whole-hoggers, he 
believed that the "dear food" cry would in any case be 
used by opponents of the scheme, and would be easier to 
overcome if faced openly. But even here Beaverbrook often 
wished to have his cake and eat it; in this case almost 
literally by claiming that the food tax need not actually 
cost the British citizen any more:
As the Empire produces more wheat than it consumes it 
is absurd to suppose that the price of the loaf in 
this country will be raised when an import duty is 
levied on foreign wheat. The British housewife will 
not raise prices against herself by transferring her
72. Ibid.
73. Beaverbrook to Ruggles-Brise, 27 January 1930, ibid., 
B133.
74. Beaverbrook to Horne, 25 October 1929, ibid., 0178.
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purchases of loaves from one shop to another, for 
that is all the change I propose amounts to.
75
Throughout, the economic programme of the Empire Crusade 
was conducted at this crude and simplistic level. It 
should never be forgotten that the economic justifications 
were purely adjustments to a party political propaganda 
campaign, and in this campaign slogans mattered more than 
any fine points of theory. Thus the a s s e r t i o n  of 
originality and vitality was all-important:
Empire Free Trade is not Protection, or Fair Trade, 
or Tariff Reform, or Safeguarding, under a new alias. 
It is distinctly and definitely a new thing. All 
Empire products free of duty - no matter what they 
are. That has not been proposed before,
76
Beaverbrook's campaign was not without idealism, but it 
was a hardheaded idealism concerned with achieving 
practical results, and his enthusiasm and commitment 
showed itself in his pursuit of the chimera of Empire Free 
Trade. Thus, while Beaverbrook privately admitted thé 
Crusade might take years to accomplish its goal, he always 
acted as if one more effort would secure total v i c t o r y . ??
75. Beaverbrook to Bossom, 4 June 1930, ibid., B132.
76. Ibid.
77. Beaverbrook to Turton, 27 October 1929, ibid., B119
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At heart Beaverbrook was a formidable propagandist, with a 
total commitment to his slogan:
If we are to be satisfied with preferences only, we 
might just as well not undertake the campaign at all. 
The only goal that I accept is Empire Free Trade. 
Anything else is only a means to that end.
78
His r e l i g i o u s  u p b r i n g i n g  r e i n f o r c e d  his p o l i t i c a l  
instincts, and the slogan became an article of faith that 
could not be qualified. "It is as well to fail in a 
righteous cause", he wrote.79
The p r e t e x t  of an a r t i c l e  in the M *
criticising Beaverbrook for his silence on the Empire 
during the General Election, provided the stimulus to 
action. To this Beaverbrook responded with two articles 
in the Sun_d£y » the first a call to arms for an
imperial policy, the second unfolding Empire Free Trade 
for the first time. The latter article, appearing at the 
beginning of the Twickenham by-election campaign, was 
followed up by repeated articles in the Daily Express and
announcing the support of business 
figures such as Lord Melchett and Reginald M c K e n n a . At 
first Beaverbrook's plan was merely to run a propaganda
78. Beaverbrook to Elibank, 23 November 1929, ibid.,
C126.
79. Beaverbrook to Melchett, 15 October 1929, ibid.,
C24 3.
80. Sunday Express, 30 June, 7 July 1929; Daily Express,
8-16 July 1929.
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campaign, perhaps along non-party lines, designed to rouse 
Liberal as well as Conservative s u p p o r t . T h i s  quickly 
became an effort to capture the Conservative party, of 
which he was a semi-constitutional member, by traditional 
pressure-group techniques of propagandist persuasion. 
Initially, as at Twickenham, Beaverbrook sought to convert 
Members of Parliament, and before long the campaign 
changed from one of pressure by conversion to pressure by 
coercion. This transition was encouraged by the fact that 
while on the one hand the campaign failed to capture the 
parliamentary party, for despite many private assurances 
of support hardly any MPs came out publicly for Empire 
Free Trade in the face of party loyalty; on the other, it 
aroused an enthusiastic response from constituency rank 
and file members in southern England. The reaction of 
party leaders related to their political position, but 
even protectionist leaders such as Araery or the former 
Chancellor Sir Robert Horne could not swallow the food tax 
as a practical political proposition. Derby warned of 
Lancashire, "everybody is afraid of even breathing such a 
proposal in our part of the w o r l d " . others more hostile 
to Beaverbrook viewed the campaign as merely a press 
stunt, d e s i g n e d  to boost the c i r c u l a t i o n  of his
81. Beaverbrook to Garvin, 12 July 1929, Beaverbrook MSS 
C140.
82. Derby to Beaverbrook, 20 November 1929, Derby MSS, 
920 DER(17)/33.
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n e w s p a p e r  s . ^3 in addition to this, there was considerable 
suspicion, not limited entirely to the Baldwinite ant i ­
press circle, that the animus was personal hostility to
\
the party leader. Neville Chamberlain probably spoke for 
most of the party in his mixed reception of Beaverbrook*s 
policy, in acknowledging his sincerity and doubting the 
practicability: "His particular policy is obsolete,
impracticable, and raischevious."®^ The initiatives of 
Amery and Neville Chamberlain, occuring simultaneously 
with the emergence of the railitantly protectionist Empire 
Free Trade Campaign, caused considerable alarm in the 
parliamentary party, to both leaders and b a c k b e n c h e s . ^5
The already tense situation was further exacerbated 
by events surrounding the forthcoming Twickenham by- 
election. The vacancy had been caused by the elevation of 
B a l d w i n ’s Home Secretary, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, to 
the House of Lords as Viscount Brentford. The Twickenham 
constituency proved an ideal opportunity for the Empire 
Free Trade movement to illustrate its potential support at 
c o n s t i t u e n c y  l e v e l .  J o y n s o n - H i c k s  had b e e n  a 
traditionalist Tory of the old school, indeed almost a 
Diehard in outlook, and his seat was typical of the 
e x t r e m e l y  safe C o n s e r v a t i v e  London s u b u r b a n  belt.
83. Davidson to Tyrrell, 9 March 1930, in R. R. James, 
op. cit., pp. 324-325.
84. N. Chamberlain Diary, 26 July 1929, NC 2/22.
85. A. to Hilda Chamberlain, 13 July 1929, AC 5/1/478.
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Furthermore, in a period when the vitality of much of the 
provincial press militated against the influence of Fleet 
Street in the provinces, it could be accurately suggested 
that the real influence of the mass circulation London
gdailies was metropolitan rather than national. However, if 
there was any constituency in which the influence of the 
££ and were at their greatest, it
would be the middle-class Home Counties suburbia of which 
Twickenham was typical. Not surprisingly, the candidate 
chosen to s u c c e e d  J o y n s o n - H i c k s  was a r i g h t - w i n g  
Conservative of strong imperialist views, and as such 
sympathetic to Beaverbrook’s programme as well as desirous 
of his aid. Even before the formal announcement of his 
nomination. Sir John Ferguson asked Beaverbrook for 
support "because we both hold such strong v i e w s  on 
Empire."  ^6 Beaverbrook now proceeded to apply pressure 
to Ferguson in order to force him to come out as openly as
possible under the new banner, while for reasons of
electoral tactics Ferguson was reluctant to burn too many 
bridges. However, in view of the considerable support for 
Beaverbrook among the activist rank and file of local 
Conservative Associations in seats such as Twickenham, 
even more than the s u p p o s e d  i m p a c t  of his press
propaganda, Ferguson could not afford to ignore the
threat. Beaverbrook candidly informed him:
86. Ferguson to Beaverbrook, 2 July 1929, Beaverbrook 
MSS B100.
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For your private information, I may say that I 
thought somewhat of asking the local people at 
Twickenham if they would be willing to support an 
Independent candidate, not bound in allegiance to the 
Tory policy but advocating, instead, a policy of Free 
Trade within the Empire involving a tax on imports 
from elsewhere.
87
Ferguson was faced with little option but to pre-empt such 
a move by proving that he also was not bound in allegiance 
to the official policy, though he tried to hedge his bets 
and, while paying lip service to Empire Free Trade, he 
continually reiterated his loyalty to the party leader. 
He was reluctant to jump from the frying pan into the 
fire, especially in view of the fact that the swing of 
electoral opinion after the general election was still 
moving in Labour’s direction. But the pressures on him 
were too strong, and the break came when, after a series 
of lurches in Beaverbrook’s direction, Ferguson came out 
for food taxes in a speech on 16 July.38 This Baldwin, 
already under pressure from alarmed free trade colleagues 
such as Salisbury and Northern wheel horses such as Derby, 
could not afford to ignore, as he had largely ignored 
Amery’s faddist outburst. Baldwin had little alternative 
but to attempt to distance the party as much as possible 
from any identification with Ferguson’s views. This he 
did by withdrawing official recognition and the assistance 
of Central Office, and announcing this by a published
87. Beaverbrook to Ferguson, 3 July 1929, ibid.
88. Daily Express, 17 July 1929.
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letter to Ferguson, written in the tone of more in sorrow 
than in a n g e r . T h i s  move backfired, partly because the 
maladroit and clumsy Party Chairman, Davidson, was thought 
to be the m o t i v a t i n g  force behind wha t  some MPs 
considered an over-reaction to Ferguson’s offence. It 
produced considerable resentment amongst the right wing of 
the party, sympathetic by nature to Ferguson’s politics, 
and m a n y  of w h o m  had given a pledge to ass i s t  his 
campaign. The ineffectiveness of party discipline was 
r e v e a l e d  when a d e p u t a t i o n  of these men, i n c l u d i n g  
respected long-serving backbenchers George Balfour, Sir 
Henry Page Croft and Sir Basil Peto, informed the Chief 
Whip that they had no intention of breaking their word; 
in the face of this, the Whips backed down.^O
The consequence of the Twickenham campaign was thus 
to throw the party further into disarray, and the by- 
election provided a parade of Conservative disunity. 
Dissatisfaction on the back benches with Davidson’s 
handling of events in particular was considerable, so much 
so, that the Diehard ring leaders requested Baldwin to 
convene a party meeting. The Diehards were far from being 
completely alienated from Baldwin personally, however, and 
it is clear that they wished to debate the policy of the 
party, and the raangement of the Central Office, rather 
than the person of the leader. The memorial, drafted by
89. Baldwin to Ferguson, 23 July 1 929, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 36, ff. 268-269.
90, Evening Standard, 24 July 1929; presumably accurate 
as preserved as a record in the Croft MSS.
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Sir John Gretton and signed by twenty-eight other back 
benchers, asserted that
our request for a party meeting arises entirely from 
our desire that these difficulties may be composed as 
soon as possible and that we may all work together 
confidently upon a definite policy .... we make our 
request in a spirit entirely friendly to yourself,
.91
With the summer recess approaching, and büûyed up by his 
customary self-confidence, Baldwin countered by agreeing 
to see a deputation, but ruling out a party meeting. In 
the event he also succeeded in postponing the deputation 
until late October, by which time the approach of the 
Annual Conference ruled out the need for a party meeting.
In the event, the Twickenham result proved a severe 
disappointment to Beaverbrook, and confirmed the danger of 
a protectionist move by the party in the prevailing 
political climate of mid-summer 1929. Ferguson came close 
to losing this safe seat; he faced the same Liberal and 
Labour opponents as had Joynson-Hicks in May, but his 
majority plumeted from his predecessors’ six thousand to a 
mere five hundred.
91. Gretton to Baldwin, 25 July 1929, Baldwin MSS, volume 
164, ff. 66-67.
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TWICKENHAM
General Election 
30 May 1929
Joynson-Hicks CON 21087 
Mason LAB 15121
Paterson LIB 7246
Conservative
Majority
Turnout
5966
70%
By Election
8 August 1929
Ferguson CON 14705
Mason LAB 14202
Paterson LIB 1920
Conservative
Majority
Turnout
503
50%
Although the Liberal vote had undoubtedly been squeezed, 
little consolation could be drawn from this in view of the 
number of Conservative voters who had stayed at home, 
r e f u s i n g  to t u r n  out for the p r o t e c t i o n i s t s .  
Beaverbrook’s methods and policy at Twickenham, and their 
result, caused Araery and Chamberlain to back away. They 
still considered that food taxes, whilst in the long terra 
desirable and even crucial, could only be advocated 
successfully after a long, slow programme of public 
education. Furthermore, both were committed to the 
Conservative Party as the only institution through which 
they believed their ideas could come to fruition, and thus 
they recoiled from any method of propaganda that resulted 
in damage to that p a r t y ’s electoral prospects. So, with 
critical results for the future, Beaverbrook was left to 
go it alone, unrestrained and unshackled. He failed to 
secure any experienced Conservative politicians to dilute 
the leadership of his Crusade, despite repeated attempts
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to secure such a respectable figurehead, and nursed a
sense of grievance and betrayal. He was left to operate
outside the party, for the simple reason that at this
point it was felt that his politics were more dangerous to
it from within than without.
If the Twickenham result caused Cabinet-level tariff
reformers unease, it seriously alarmed both the small free
trade element, and even more important, the moderate
centre of the party, who now proceeded to mount a counter
attack. Churchill commented
The Twickenham election is a forerunner of what would 
happen in every constituency if we let ourselves be 
lured into it ... as fiscal matters may well become 
the issue of a General Election sprung at short 
notice.
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But it was at the efforts of the ex-Ministers Araery and 
Chamberlain to commit the party leadership to a change of 
policy that most of the criticism and anger was directed. 
On 13 July Lord Salisbury wrote to Baldwin in alarm at the 
"two speeches by prominent ex-ministers within the last 
few days, both having the appearance of a return of 
Conservative official policy to Protection". He reported 
receiving many protests from MPs.93 Derby also appealed 
to him to reassert his leadership by a public disavowal of 
A m e r y ’s policy. To Derby, A m e r y ’s policy invoked the 
nightmare of a repetition of the 1923 tariff election
92. Churchill to his wife, 12 August 1929, Churchill MSS.
93. Salisbury to Baldwin, 13 July 1929, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 36, ff. 261-262.
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disaster, when the party had been tricked into protection, 
on a decision taken by Baldwin, many thought, under 
A m e r y ’s influence. To quash this Derby requested a 
s t a t e m e n t  c o n f i r m i n g  that the p r e - e l e c t i o n  p o l i c y  
enshrined in B a l d w i n ’s open letter to the Chief Whip, 
E y res-Monsell, in August 1 9 2 8 ,  was still iri f o r c e . 9^ 
There is no doubt that the fear of the e l e c t o r a l  
consequences, in the light of a possible general election 
at any time, was the cause of the alarm. Thus the 
backbench MP Lord Hartington wrote:
unless the enterprising Mr. Amery is checked before 
he goes much farther I do not think that [at the next 
election] we shall come back much more than two 
hundred strong. I for one should not stand if I had 
to fight on Protection.
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Significantly, dissent spread far wider through the 
spectrum of the parliamentary party than merely the neo- 
free traders; the moderate centre also took fright. This 
sentiment was echoed by a rising ex-Cabinet minister. Sir 
Samuel Hoare, who usually took care not to deviate from a 
centrist p o s i t i o n . 9& Baldwin himself was always slow to 
change his views once he had settled into them. The 
conclusions he had arrived at in considering the electoral
94. Derby to B a ldwin, 17 July 1929, Derby MSS 920 
DER(17)/33.
95. Hartington to Salisbury, 11 July 1929, Salisbury MSS 
S(4) 130/124-126.
96. Hoare to Baldwin, 12 July 1929, Baldwin MSS, volume 
36, f. 260.
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verdict placed a premium on moderation. He had also been
swayed by the Austen Chamberlain-Churchill line on the
need not to alienate Liberal voters in the country, though
he ruled out their corollary assumption of the utility of
a deal with the parliamentary Liberals led by Lloyd
George. Above all, Baldwin was concerned to preserve
party unity. The alliance of free traders, and moderates,
together with the fears of the marginal seats, carried the
day with Baldwin. He ac c e d e d  to the d e m a n d  for a
showdown and summoned a Shadow Cabinet for the purpose.
Neville Chamberlain noted:
everyone present except myself and Leo declared their 
determination to have nothing whatever to do with 
food taxes. They refused to consider making any new 
statement about policy lest the Liberals should take 
fright ....
97
Loyalty to the leadership precluded Amery and Chamberlain 
from any further dissension, and Baldwin reassured Derby;
"The situation is clear. Until such time as we put in our
policy for the next election we stand on our [ 1 9281 
p o l i c y . "93 Thus the opening round had gone definitely to 
the preservers of the £ £ £ » the settlement arrived
at in 1924. However, insofar as their motive for doing so 
was electoral expediency and not fiscal beliefs, should 
the national mood show signs of being more receptive to
97. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 13 July 1929, NC 18/1/661.
98. B a l d w i n  to Derby, 18 July 1 929, Derby MSS, 920
DER(17)/33.
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tariffs, the protectionists* efforts to advance party j
policy were likely to find themselves pushing at an open |
door. Even in the moment of defeat at the Shadow Cabinet 
meeting, Neville Chamberlain had noted: "on the whole
they were not averse to the idea that we should make 
Empire the starting point when we did come to consider the
future".99
99. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 13 July 1929, NC 18/1/661,
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CHAPTER 2
Pressures for Advance ; September 1929 to February 1930
In mid-July 1929 the first phase of the party crisis 
had ended with what appeared to be a complete success for 
the s u p p o r t e r s  of the " fiscal policy.
However, this achievement was swiftly eroded.during the 
second half of 1929. The defenders of the moderate 
position failed to take any further action to shore up 
their position, and remained passive in the face of the 
e m e r g i n g  g r a s s r o o t s  c r i t i c i s m  of the causes of the 
election defeat.^ This inactivity was further exacerbated 
by two other factors: the hiatus in Conservative party
activity at all levels customarily brought on by the 
summer recess, and the combination of both po s t ­
election exhaustion and an apathetic outlook which was 
itself partly caused by the unattractive and undecided 
nature of the party's p o l i c i e s . ^ As a result, neither the 
national nor the local party elites were exercising their 
usual firm grip upon the development of rank and file 
opinion. Of course, it was normal for political activity 
to die down during the holiday season; what was unusual 
was that this coincided, not with a period of political 
repose, but with an important stage in the evolution of 
g r a s s r o o t s  attitudes. The absence of a l t e r n a t i v e
1. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 31 July 1929, Beaverbrook MSS 
C153.
2, Birmingham CA, Agent's Report, 11 October 1929; NW 
Wilts. CA, Exec., 14 June 1929.
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viewpoints allowed the criticisms voiced in the popular 
press to establish an ascendancy in the minds of many 
ordinary voters or members of the party. The average 
Conservative did not withdraw his attention from politics 
or the newspapers over the summer period, but rather he 
was more likely to have the leisure to absorb.his daily 
choice, and it became clear by the end of the recess that 
the empire free trade concept was attracting considerably 
increased support from the local rank and f i l e . 3
After the setback at Twickenham, Beaverbrook himself 
had withdrawn from the public eye, relying upon the 
effectiveness of his newspaper propaganda to have the 
necessary impact on Conservative and popular opinion, and 
intending to re-open his campaign in October.^ However, 
his sudden reappearance on the political stage in that 
month was not the product of any such long-term planning, 
but was the result of a sudden alarm that he was about to 
be superceded in the direction and orchestration of 
Conservative imperial sentiment - a move to which his 
absence from the country had made him vulnerable. For 
Beaverbrook was not the only prominent figure in the 
business sector of the party to be considering pressure 
for advances in its imperial economic policy at this time. 
Lord Nuffield, Sir Abe Bailey, and the influential Lord
3. N. Chamberlain diary, 4 November 1929, NC 2/22.
4. Beaverbrook to Bailey, 19 July 1929, Beaverbrook MSS 
B90.
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Melchett were also thinking along lines parallel to the 
original empire free trade proposals of July. This group, 
urged on by Araery, now looked likely not only to capture 
the public lead from Beaverbrook, but also, and even more 
seriously, to be watering down his policy. Melchett wrote
to Beaverbrook on 8 October, inviting him to a dinner on/
22 October organised by Bailey, which would appoint a 
committee to run their campaign, and enclosed a draft of 
the manifesto. At once Beaverbrook moved to outflank this 
initiative, selecting both on tactical grounds and by 
genuine conviction the acceptance of the food tax as the 
line of demarcation. In his reply he objected strongly to 
the omission of any reference to tariffs on food imports, 
declaring that "this tax is the keystone of any Imperial 
p o l i c y " . 5 During the following fortnight Beaverbrook 
p r e p a r e d  the next stage of his c a m p a i g n ,  w h i c h  was 
desi g n e d  in both style and t i m i n g  to r e c a p t u r e  the 
limelight. On 22 October Bailey held his dinner, which 
was attended by Amery, Croft, George Lloyd, and Melchett; 
Beaverbrook was a noted absentee.^ His counterblast 
appeared two days later, when he produced his pamphlet 
manifesto of the Empire Crusade, entitled simply "Empire 
Free Trade". This was to be the opening fanfare in the 
progress of the campaign from the realms of newspaper
5. Melchett to Beaverbrook, 8 October 1929; Beaverbrook 
to Melchett, 9 October 1929, ibid., C243.
6. Daily Telegraph, 23 October 1929.
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'stunt* into becoming an active propagandist organisation 
- though, not as yet, a political party. Beaverbrook was 
determined to try and capture the public in person,7 As 
the food tax was to b e c o m e  his d i s t i n c t i v e  cry, 
Beaverbrook not unnaturally opened with an appeal to the 
body of opinion most likely to be favourable - the farmers 
of the South of England.^ The first stage was the 
circulation of two proposals through the National Farmers' 
Union local branches. The first of these, dated 15 
October 1929, set out the policy as being "in a sentence" 
that of "Protection for the Farmers"; the second, of 19 
October, requested the sending of supportive resolutions 
to the NFU Executive.9 The more critical second stage was 
to take the campaign to the public platform. From now on, 
Beaverbrook would not be content with newspaper propaganda 
alone - he was out to make the news itself. His first 
public appearance set the keynote, when on 28 October he 
addressed an audience of farmers at the Sussex county town 
of Lewes, and nailed his colours to the mast on the food 
tax i s s u e . N e i t h e r  Melchett nor Amery could bring
himself to follow this lead, and thus the torch passed 
back to Be a V e r b r o o k 's hands. The latter's r e n e w e d  
activity afforded a vivid contrast with the apathy evident
7. B e a v e r b r o o k  to Rotherraere, 24 O c t o b e r  1929;
Beaverbrook to Moody, 23 October 1929, Beaverbrook
MSS C284, B U G .
8. Beaverbrook to Deeley, 20 October 1929, ibid., B97.
9. Copies in ibid., B99.
10. The Times, 29 October 1929.
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throughout the Conservative party; at the end of October 
Garvin wrote in Th£ that the party "has no real
soul and creed. It is w e a k e r  than at the Ge n e r a l  
Election", and that Beaverbrook’s campaign was "the only 
vivid, living, t hing that is now going on in the 
Conservative Party".
At the same time as Beaverbrook recommenced his 
Crusade with a new air of stridency, the settlement of 
mid-July was again challenged within the party leadership. 
At the end of the recess those who favoured advance were 
confirmed in their views by discovery of the extent of 
dissatisfaction at the lack of a ’clear’ or ’forward* 
policy in the local Associations. Sensing that the 
climate of opinion within the party was slowly beginning 
to move towards protectionism, the pro-tariff element in 
the leadership sought to give both covert encouragement 
and restraining direction to this sentiment, to as great a 
degree as they felt to be consistent with personal loyalty 
to Baldwin. These public indicators boiled down to the 
assertion that some consideration of policy advance was 
inevitable, together with hints that it would take the 
form of a p o l i c y  on i m p e r i a l  trade p a r a l l e l  to 
Beaverbrook’s, but without going beyond a vague outline 
d i s c u s s i o n .  T y p i c a l  of s u c h  m o v e s  w a s  N e v i l l e
11. The Observer, 27 October 1929.
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Chamberlain's speech at Gillingham on 23 October. 
A l t h o u g h  the c o n t e n t s  of such s p e e c h e s  were not in 
themselves remarkable, taken together with the moves of 
Beaverbrook, Melchett and Bailey, they indicated that the 
solution arrived at by the shadow cabinet in mid-July had 
been temporary rather than permanent. That consensus 
proved incapable of holding up under sustained pressure, 
and as a result the party began to divide in a pattern 
which seemed to many to be ominously similar to the events 
which followed from the initial tariff reform campaign of 
1 9 0 3 - 1 9 0 6 . ^ 3  T h e s e  p a r a l l e l s  c a u s e d  p a r t i c u l a r  
despondency to the Members and candidates in the northern 
constituencies: the MP for Lancaster glumly predicted the
"recurrence of the campaign which proved so damaging to 
the Conservative party in pre-war days".^^
By the beginning of November 1929 the assumptions 
upon which the July status quo had been based had begun to 
disappear. Most significantly, it became clear to Baldwin 
that continued adherence to the position of no advance on 
the general election policy was no longer a 2I.Ë »
p r e s e r v i n g  p arty unity, but would a c t i v e l y  p r o voke 
dissension. At the same time, one important brake on the
12. The Ti^me£, 2 4 October 1 929; see also The^ Tim e s , 2 5 
October, 13 November 1929; Lord Eustace Percy to 
B e a v e r b r o o k ,  n.d. but e a r l y  N o v e m b e r  1929» 
Beaverbrook MSS B112.
13. Cecil to Salisbury, 24 February 1930, Cecil MSS, BM 
Add. MSS 51086, f. 82.
14. R a m s b o t h a m  to B e a v e r b r o o k ,  28 O c tober 19 2 9, 
Beaverbrook MSS BII3.
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advance of policy was removed by the declining influence 
of C h u r c h i l l  d u r i n g  the s u m m e r  and a u t u m n  months. 
Churchill had carried the day in July on the grounds that 
a tariff policy would face a Liberal-Labour alliance in 
defence of free trade at the polls, but by early November 
this fear was no longer paramount. The parliamentary 
Liberals were felt to have identified clearly with the 
Labour government and against the Conservative opposition 
in the House of Commons. This not only made an anti- 
Socialist front unlikely, but also considerably reduced 
the dangerous prospect of a general election. At the same 
time the tide of po p u l a r  appro v a l  of the Labour 
administration began to ebb as the inadequacy of its 
remedies for unemployment became apparent in late 1929, 
and the danger of a bid to achieve an all-out majority by 
L a b o u r  in the C o m m o n s  r e c e d e d .  T h e s e  c h a n g i n g  
circumstances removed the force of Churchill's arguments 
for conciliating Liberal opinion, and by December 1929 
his line was overruled in the shadow c a b i n e t . L i k e  
other experienced professional politicians, Churchill was 
conscious of the changing temperature, and he determined 
to swallow the inevitable. Churchill offered no objection 
to Baldwin's statement to the Party Conference; he had 
detected the beginnings of the shift in the foundations of 
British political life away from free trade.
15. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 22 December 1929, Halifax MSS, 
India Office, Eur. C. 152/18/1/333; see chapter 6.
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T h i s  w a s  r e i n f o r c e d  by the e v i d e n c e  of the 
resolutions from Conservative constituency associations 
during October 1929. Even the party Chairman, Davidson, 
was pressed to "formulate a definite and strong policy" by 
his own local Association,^® There were dangerous signs 
of the likelihood of a lead emerging from below on the 
m odel of 1 922, if "a d e f i n i t e  p o l i c y  of E m p i r e  
development" was not placed "in the forefront of the party 
programme".17 The Kent Provincial Division typified rank 
and file unhappiness that the party had "no constructive 
programme which can be offered to the electorate as an 
a l t e r n a t i v e  to S o c i a l i s m " . 1® In a d d i t i o n  to this, 
Baldwin's leadership was being called into question on 
other grounds. A press statement which he had issued on 
27 September had fallen flat, not only in the absence of a 
fiscal policy, but also for its m u t e d  and c a u t i o u s  
criticisms of the Labour government. A crucial problem 
was Baldwin's lack of drive and assertiveness, and his 
failures as a leader in opposition. This was provoking 
criticisms not only from the lower echelons of the party, 
but also from the friendly press and rising younger
16. Herael Hempstead CA, Council, 26 October 1929.
17. Wessex Area Res., NU Exec., 22 October 1929.
18. Metropolitan Area Res., NU Exec., 20 November 1929; 
Kent Provincial Div., AGM, copy in Salisbury MSS S(4) 
131/107.
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members of the leadership.19 Baldwin's position at this 
time was further undermined by the debate provoked by the 
Irwin declaration,20 and he badly needed to recoup his 
position and refurbish his Conservative credentials. This 
he was able partly to accomplish under the cover of a 
s u c c e s s f u l  o n s l a u g h t  on the Da^  j^ l^ y M'_a £ I , w h i c h  had 
overreached itself in its criticism of Baldwin's approval 
of the Irwin declaration. Nevertheless, it was becoming 
increasingly apparent that Baldwin could only reassert his 
position by means of some advance in his fiscal policy, 
and thus hope also to restore unity. By the end of 
October 1929 the party was clearly rattled: "everywhere
and on all sides I hear of depression, distrust, and 
despair, in our party" wrote Neville Chamberlain.^1 In 
particular, the approaching annual party conference was 
likely to pr o d u c e  s e r i o u s  d i f f i c u l t i e s  unless the 
leadership responded and pre-empted the position. Failing 
some lead in the d i r e c t i o n  d e m a n d e d  by man y  of the 
resolutions sent in for the agenda from the localities, 
there might even be "a great defection among the rank and 
file" who would "follow the lead of Beaverbrook".22 g y
19. Baldwin's press statement, 27 September 1929, Baldwin 
MSS volume 56, ff. 161-167; N . to Hilda Chamberlain,
28 September, 13 October 1 929, NC 1 8/ 1//67 1-672 ;
Daily Telegraph, 29 October 1929.
20. See chapter 6.
21. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 23 October 1929, NC 18/1/673.
22. Speaker's Report on Tour of Co r n i s h  and Devon
Constituencies, to EIA headquarters, 22 October 1929,
copy in Beaverbrook MSS Cl 53; NU Annual Conference 
Handbook, 1929.
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the middle of November 1 929 pressure for a move forward 
was m o u n t i n g  from s e veral q u a r t e r s  in the party, 
propelling the leadership reluctantly f o r w a r d . 23 it was 
the combination of all these various factors: the decline
of Churchill, the r e m o v a l  of the fear of a snap 
dissolution or the need to conciliate the Liberals, the 
erosion of Baldwin's personal position through his lack of 
opposition vigour and the unpopular Irwin declaration, 
together with the pressures for advance from many sections 
of the party and the beginnings of a movement of opinion 
towards protection - all these, as much as the actual 
e m e r g e n c e  of the E m p i r e  Free Trade Crusade itself, 
destroyed the assumptions of the July consensus, and made 
it necessary for Baldwin to make a move in response before 
the party c o n f e r e n c e  s c h e d u l e d  for 21-22 November.
Baldwin was thus now ready to make a limited and 
cautious move forward, still having one eye on the seats 
he needed to win back to form another administration, of 
the kind he had ruled out in July. D i s c u s s i n g  the 
situation with Neville Chamberlain at the end of October, 
Baldwin "expressed the view that the new policy would have 
to take the form of an advance in safeguarding, but he 
didn't say in what the advance should c o n s i s t " . 24 Such a 
cautious move was not intended to completely out the 
ground from under Beaverbrook's feet, as Baldwin did not
23. EIA, Parliamentary Council, 13 November 1929.
24. N. to Hilda C h a m b e r l a i n ,  26 Oc t o b e r  1929, NC
18/1/674.
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dare to run the risk of agricultural protection. However, 
it was calculated to take the wind out of Beaverbrook's 
sails somewhat by recapturing lost ground amongst the 
party activists. The crucial point about Baldwin's new 
move was that, as with the settlement of July, it would 
once again attain a consensus. All that would be changed 
Has, to a small extent, the policy and, to a much larger, 
the form of rhetoric which surrounded it which would now, 
in mid-November, produce a new consensus. As on the 
p r e v i o u s  occasion, Bal d w i n ' s  p r e m i e r  aim was the 
preservation of unity in the collective leadership, and 
once again his line was that which gained the support of 
the largest majority of ex-Ministers, without driving the 
minority out into the wilderness. Across the spectrum of 
the leadership the picture was as follows: Amery, Neville
Chamberlain and Austen Chamberlain preferred a bolder 
advance, and Steel-Maitland and perhaps Hoare leaned 
slightly in their direction; Davidson, Cunliffe-Lister and 
Bridgeman favoured Baldwin's electoral caution; Churchill, 
Worthington-Evans and Salisbury were reluctant to move at 
all. Thus Baldwin adopted the median position, in an 
attempt to keep the leadership united behind him, and in 
the belief that any policy which achieved this would also 
be acceptable to the rank and file.
Baldwin did not wish to leave the success of his 
planned conference initiative to chance, but sought to 
pr e p a r e  the ground by pu t t i n g  out f e e l e r s  in early 
N o v e m b e r  1929 in B e a v e r b r o o k ' s  d i r e c t i o n ;  he, like
1 1 4
Neville Chamberlain, accepted that whilst not the root
problem, Beaverbrook*s campaign enormously complicated the
political situation. Aware that he could only preserve
the desired party unity by an advance that fell far short
of Beaverbrook's platform, Baldwin did not expect to be
able to n e g o t i a t e  a c e s s a t i o n  of the Crusaders'
activities. Rather, he sought, by clothing his moderate
advance in deceptively vigorous rhetoric, to induce
B e a v e r b r o o k  into a more 'constitutional' and less
dangerous mode of activity. In this respect Baldwin was
largely successful, and in response to his approaches
Beaverbrook's activities passed through a moderated phase
in the period immediately before and after the conference,
w h i c h  c o n s i d e r a b l y  eased the p r e s s u r e s  upon the
leadership. The t i m i n g  of the i n i t i a t i v e  was no
coincidence, coming as it did on 30 October, hard on the
heels of Beaverbrook's most divisive move, the open appeal
to dissatisfied agriculturalists. The intermediaries were
c a r e f u l l y  c h o s e n .  W i t h  B a l d w i n ' s  a p p r o v a l  and
encouragement the approach was made by Hoare, who was not
only a personal friend of Beaverbrook's, but was also
thought to lean towards the protectionist position.
Beaverbrook was invited by Hoare for a confidential
political discussion over dinner, with Neville Chamberlain
making a t h i r d . Beaverbrook accepted, and the three men
met on the evening of 4 November 1 929. At first it seemed
25. Hoare to Beaverbrook, 30 October 1929, Beaverbrook 
MSS 0307.
115
that the dinner had been a failure, despite hints from 
Chamberlain of "a great advance" to come in the party's 
imperial trade p o l i c y . However, after reflecting on the 
discussion, Beaverbrook opted for compromise, for he by 
temperament preferred mergers or partnerships to direct 
confrontations. The following morning he telephoned 
Hoare, and enquired if the Conservatives had "meant 
business"; if they did, "he would be prepared to do a deal 
with us".27
B e a v e r b r o o k  also r e s p o n d e d  by t r a n s l a t i n g  his 
campaign onto a more orthodox line of approach; he ceased 
his appearances upon the public platform, and assumed the 
posture of a loyal Conservative respectfully urging his 
viewpoint on his leader. Thus on 7 November he addressed 
some eighty Conservative MPs of the backbench Imperial 
Affairs Committee, where he made a "deep impression ... by 
the very moderate and carefully reasoned way you presented 
the case for Empire Free T r a d e " . ^8 Beaverbrook then
published a conciliatory article in the press on 10 
November, appealing to Baldwin to take up his policy, and 
offering to efface himself if necessary. This olive 
branch, though the product of feelers indirectly initiated 
by Baldwin some ten days previously, now gave the leader 
an opportunity to respond directly. Thus on 11 November
26. N, Chamberlain diary, 4 November 1929, NC 2/22.
27. Ibid., 5 November 1929.
28. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 8 November 1929, Hannon MSS
18/3; The Times, 8 November 1929.
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Baldwin sent a short but cordial note to Beaverbrook, 
inviting him to a meeting at Baldwin's house on the 
following day,29 at which Beaverbrook expounded his policy 
to Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain for two and a half 
hours. The m e e t i n g  s h o w e d  B a l d w i n  at his most 
successfully sphinx-like, saying
of course he was not in a position to commit himself, 
but he gave the impression that on the whole he was 
convinced, and that he was m e r e l y  c o n s i d e r i n g  
political possibilities and expediencies.
30
This meeting was followed by contacts with several other 
members of the party leadership during the vital pre- 
c o n f e r e n c e  period, all of w h i c h  a i m e d  to e n c o u r a g e  
Beaverbrook to remain on the 'constitutional* tack.^^ The 
most significant event of the pre-conference week provided 
further e v i d e n c e  that B e a v e r b r o o k  had been tamed, 
t e m p o r a r i l y  at least. He m o v e d  further into the 
conventional political arena by making a rare venture into 
the House of Lords on 19 November 1929, to initiate a 
debate on the topic of empire free t r a d e . 32 The speech he 
delivered on this occasion was one of the most considered
29. Baldwin to Beaverbrook, Beaverbrook to Baldwin, 11 
November 1929, Beaverbrook MSS C19.
30. N. Chamberlain diary, 12 November 1929, NC 2/22; N. 
to Ida Chamberlain, 17 November 1929, NC 18/1/675.
31. A. to Ida Chamberlain, 18 November 1929, AC 5/1/487; 
Lockhart diary, 23-24 November 1929.
32. Parliamentary Debates, Lords, volume 75, col. 546- 
562; Derby to B e a v e r b r o o k ,  2 0 N o v e m b e r  1929, 
Beaverbrook MSS Cl 13.
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expositions that the empire free trade proposals ever 
received, but it was the forum rather than the policy that 
attracted the approval of the Conservative leadership.
Thus had the stage been set successfully for the 
party conference, and although the gathering was not 
w i t h o u t  its t e n s i o n  b e t w e e n  the l e a d e r s  and their 
followers, the grassroots rebellion lacked effective 
leadership. The delegates directed their criticisms to 
two areas: first, the matter of intra-party democracy and
organisation; and second, the demands for a clearer and 
bolder empire policy. When the conference opened on 21 
November, the first nine resolutions on the agenda all 
dealt with complaints over organisation, and the ignoring 
of previous conference r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . 33 H owever, 
criticism here was turned aside by concessions which went 
almost all the way to meet the complaints without actually 
infringing on the leader's powers of absolute discretion 
over policy. The strategy of pre-empting initiatives from 
the floor by this device of the report from the National 
Union Executive, the parallel appeal to let bygones be 
bygones, and a determined use of the platform's tactical 
advantage of command of the microphone, resulted in
33. NU Annual Report 1929, Conference resolutions in the 
name of Woodbridge CA, Sudbury CA, and Ealing CA are 
exa^les of this, NU Annual Conference Handbook, 1929. 
An indication of the depth of hostility was the 
decision of Walsall CA to instruct its delegates to 
support "the deposition of the Leader", principally 
due to bitterness over the 'Flapper* vote issue, 
Walsall CA, Emergency Ctte., 19 November 1929.
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comparatively smooth progress.3^ The second set of 
resolutions all dealt with party policy on safeguarding, 
tariffs, and the empire. All urged s o m e  kind of 
definition of intent, but it was noticeable that those 
sent in by the northern Associations were considerably 
less precise and advanced than those from the South.35
On the evening of 21 November Baldwin addressed the 
assembled delegates at the Albert Hall. He commenced by 
blaming the election defeat on the promises made by his 
opponents, and followed this with a moderately successful 
attack on the government's record. Having reassured his 
audience on the matter of his fighting spirit, he then 
announced his acceptance of a resolution on empire trade 
and development passed that afternoon. Although this had 
been proposed by Page Croft, it was in fact a loose and 
undefined commitment well suited to Baldwin's tactical 
political purpose. This became apparent when, after 
pausing to pay a compliment to Beaverbrook, he took up the 
question of "the unity of our great Empire", and asserted: 
"to that task we must lay our hands, and to that task must 
our policy be framed"; this, however, must be "the task of 
your leaders, to w h i c h  they will f o r t h w i t h  devote 
themselves".35 Although an advance was promised, caution
34. Th 2 T^m e^ 2* 2 2 N o v e m b e r  1929; Sh^f
Telegraph, 22 November 1929.
35. NU Annual Report, 1929.
36. The Times, 22 November 1929.
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remained the keynote. The compliment to Beaverbrook and 
the acceptance of Croft's moderate and vague composite 
resolution served as a unifying gloss, a substitute for a 
policy rather than the introduction to one. In the 
following months the failure to follow through on the 
spirit of the Alb e r t  Hall speech was to c o m p l e t e l y  
undermine its achievement of party unity; but for the 
immediate moment Baldwin's oration produced - as he 
calculated - a favourable response from as wide a spectrum 
of party opinion as possible, by balancing between the 
instincts of the eager South and the cautious North.37 
* * * * * * * * * *
The essential difference between the Albert Hall 
speech and the shadow cabinet compromise of July was the 
fact that whilst the latter had attempted to neutralise a 
dangerous topic for the foreseeable future, the November 
speech was much less ambitious. Its success lay not in 
what it laid down in concrete terms, for that was next to 
nothing, but rested on the fact that the speech promised 
seriou s a t t e n t i o n  to i m p e r i a l  e c o n o m i c  policy, and 
therefore pointed to the unveiling of some such detailed 
programme in the near future. The achievement of a 
precarious unity at the party conference did not last
37. N. to Hilda C h a m b e r l a i n ,  24 N o v e m b e r  1929, NO 
18/1/677; Derby to Baldwin, 22 November 1929, Derby 
MSS 920 DER (17)/33; Moore-Brabazon to Beaverbrook, 
22 November 1929, Moore-Brabazon MSS; Yorkshire Area, 
Council, 7 December 1929; Headlam diary, 22 November 
1929; East Islington CA, Exec., 12 December 1929,
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because the pvorai^sory note at the Albert Hall was not 
redeemed with any hard cash. In spite of the keen hopes 
of the constituencies, it was neither followed up nor 
further defined as a p o l i c y . 3# Whatever good effect 
Baldwin's spe e c h  at the Albert Hall had, it h a r d l y  
outlasted the conference itself, and certainly had ebbed 
away by Christmas. With the benefit of hindsight, the 
defects of Baldwin's speech became more obvious than its 
merits, and it appeared to be lacking in any substance 
behind the rhetorical parade of imperial s e n t i m e n t . 39 
Thus by late January 1930 the same demands for a clear 
lead and for a precise definition of party policy that had 
surfaced in October were once again emerging. Towards the 
end of January Davidson was again pressurised by his local 
Association in almost exactly the same terms, dealing with 
"the complaint that the Conservative Party did not appear 
to have a poli c y  wi t h  w h i c h  to give a lead to its 
supporters", as he had been in late October 1929.^® Not 
only had the Albert Hall exercise been merely a question 
of buying time, but the breathing space acquired had been 
frittered away.
In addition, the entente with Beaverbrook proved 
shortlived, not least b e c a u s e  the e f f o r t s  of the
38. West Lewisham CA Res., NU Exec., 14 January 1930.
39. N. Chamberlain diary, 8 December 1929, NC 2/22.
40. Hemel Hempstead CA, Council, 25 January 1930.
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leadership to maintain close personal and political 
c o n t a c t  l a p s e d  a f t e r  the c o n f e r e n c e  d i s p e r s e d .  
Beaverbrook was left to his own devices, and, by nature 
restive and tempted to positive action, he came to feel 
during the m o n t h  of D e c e m b e r  that he w o u l d  have to 
promote the empire free trade policy himself once again. 
Throughout the period from November 1929 to February 
1930 Beaverbrook's conception of the Empire Crusade 
oscillated between that of a propagandist pressure group, 
and that of a fully fledged political party. However, 
when Beaverbrook talked about a party, what he meant was 
pressure group tactics taken a stage further, to the 
activation of local branches in the constituencies, and 
the classic pressure group technique of threatening 
divisive candidatures, and running such at suitable by- 
elections. His party would remain a single-issue party, 
and - despite occasional outbursts to the contrary - it 
was always his intention not to replace but to capture the 
Conservative party for his policy. This was the cause of 
his p r e o c c u p a t i o n  w i t h  the h e d g i n g s  of l e a d i n g  
Conservatives, which caused much anxiety to those of his 
allies who sought to turn his attacks away to free trade 
Liberals and Labour. This concern was not excessive 
theological hairsplitting, but sound tactics: Beaverbrook
felt that it was c r u cial to p r o p e r l y  secure the 
Conservatives first, before turning his fire from this 
bastion onto the defenders of free trade. Although the 
process was erratic and even contradictory, there lies
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through these three months a clear theme of the evolution 
of the Crusade from a propaganda committee to a mass 
political movement. Thus, on 2 December Beaverbrook 
outlined the Crusade's role as that of Conservative party 
pressure g r o u p , b u t  by February 1 930 this had evolved 
closer and closer to an organised political party; local 
membership and subscriptions were solicited, and a Crusade 
committee, including Hannon, Lord Elibank, Sir Hugo 
C u nliffe-Owen, R. D. Blumenfeld, and C. A. McCurdy, was 
formed.^2 The functions of this committee in reality were 
purely advisory; Beaverbrook remained kingpin of the 
Crusade. Furthermore, he returned to the public platform, 
and began to threaten to run candidates against the 
official line at by-elect ions.^3 At the same time, he was 
moving to a formal alliance with Lord Rothermere, an 
alliance he sought for its additional press support, but 
which carried with it the implication of an assault on the 
Conservative party. The alliance with Rothermere was to 
bring Beaverbrook many problems, but viewed as it was by 
Beaverbrook from the angle of circulation strength, the 
combined press lords' campaign which emerged at the end of
41. Beaverbrook to Cole, 2 December 1929» Beaverbrook MSS 
B138.
42. Elibank's 'Empire Free Trade' diary, November 1929- 
May 1930, Elibank MSS SRO GD 32/25/74, hereafter 
referred to as Elibank diary, f. 4; Beaverbrook to 
Melchett, 18 December 1929, Beaverbrook MSS C243Î 
Draft Constitution of the Empire Crusade, copy in 
Hannon MSS 18/1.
43. Beaverbrook to Lynn, 21 January 1930, Beaverbrook MSS 
B164.
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January 1930 was double jeopardy indeed for the party 
leaders.
The important point, however, is that the challenge 
from the Crusade was not the fundamental problem the party 
faced between December 1929 and February 1930; rather, 
it was only a symptom of the real problem, which was 
Baldwin's inaction and failure to provide effective 
leadership. This was the direct product of the dilemma 
which faced Baldwin in attempting to balance between the 
pressures upon him from different sections of the party 
for or against policy advance, pressures which were in 
fact irreconcilable.^^ The pressure to advance further 
came primarily from the constituencies, but it was echoed 
in the private urgings of Hoare and Neville Chamberlain, 
and the public utterances of Amery and C r o f t . ^5 Many 
local A s s o c i a t i o n s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  in t r a d i t i o n a l l y  
Conservative areas, were swept up by enthusiasm for the 
empire free trade policy as the most attractive option 
available, that "it might get our party out of the r u t " . ^5 
Other Associations were stirred into action through the 
negative stimulus of alarm at the prospect of a split in
44. T, Jones to E. Jones, 9 February 1930, Whitehall 
Diary.
45. N. Chamberlain diary, 8 December 1929, NC 2/22,
46. Stigant to Salisbury, 26 February 1930, Salisbury MSS
8(4) 133/183-4; Ashton CA to Beaverbrook., 27 January
1 930, Beaverbrook MSS C 12 ; Daventry CA Res., 27
January 1930, copy in ibid., B2 17; Gravesend CA,
Exec., 13 December 1929; Uxbridge CA, Council, 7 
December 1929.
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the party, and demanded a forward policy for reasons of 
self-defence, as a product of awareness of the apathy and 
low state of local m o r a l e . ^7
O p p o s i t i o n  to a d v a n c e  was the p r o d u c t  of two 
divergent schools of thought. The first of these were the 
traditional free-fooders, a declining force in. the party 
during 1930. Of the leaders of this group, Churchill and 
Salisbury, tho u g h  u n h a p p y  at the p r o spect, cl e a r l y  
a n t i c i p a t e d  as i n e v i t a b l e  s o m e  e x t e n s i o n  of
safeguarding.^5 If the resistance from this element 
wobbled under pressure, that of the second element was 
even more likely to do so. These were the politicians 
opposed not on principle but rather on pragmatic electoral 
grounds to what they conceived to be a dangerous policy, 
that "on any proposal involving food taxes no seat in the 
c o u n t r y  is safe", and that "the dear food cry is 
d e v a s t a t i n g " . W h i l s t  on the one hand their anxiety was 
much more widely representative of the majority feeling of 
MPs than was the opposition of the free-fooders, on the
47. Accrington CA, Exec., 21 January 1930; North Cornwall 
CA, Exec., 25 January 1930; Lincoln CA, Special 
Exec., 27 February 1930.
48. Salisbury's note of conversation with Baldwin, 28
January 1930 enclosed in Salisbury to Baldwin, 29
January 1 930, Baldwin MSS, volume 31, f f. 29-33;
draft memo, Salisbury to Baldwin, February 1930, 
Salisbury MSS S(4) 133/118-121; list of free trade 
MPs e n c l o s e d  in B e a v e r b r o o k  to R o t h e r m e r e ,  19
February 1930, Beaverbrook MSS C284.
49. Bayford to Baldwin, 28 January 1930, Baldwin MSS 
volume 165, f. 18; Horne to Hughes, 3 March 1930,
copy in Beaverbrook MSS B236; Cunliffe-Lister to
Davidson, 3 January 1930, Davidson MSS.
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other hand it was even more open to the pressures of 
changing circumstances, an^d sensitive to the nuances of 
public and party opinion.
Baldwin’s lethargy, and his optimism which was often 
construed as complacency, led him to rest for too long on 
the laurels of his success at the the Albert Hall.50
B a l d w i n  never found it easy to come to d e cisions, 1especially when the issues were difficult but important, I
Iand the advice and opinions on them unclear. Neville i
I
Chamberlain noted that Baldwin "wavers backwards and |
forwards on the expediency according to the last person j
who has talked to him ".5^ Typically, the only thing 
Baldwin could decide upon was inaction. On 20 December he 
instructed Central Office to tell constituency agents that 
no official discussion of the empire free trade policy I
I
should take place until further notice. However, the j
decis i o n  to take no d e c i s i o n  was in fact the mos t  j
dangerous of all. In particular, it caused the widespread 
impression that, far from going forward from the Albert 
Hall speech, Baldwin was drifting backwards from it. This 
was all the more serious when it was combined with his 
continued failure to attack the government with sufficient 
vigour or conviction.^2 The result of this situation, the
50. Gwynne to Northumberland, 18 December 1929, Gwynne 
MSS 21.
51. N. Chamberlain diary, 8 December 1929, NC 2/22; 
Bridgeman journal, volume 2, pp. 181-183.
52. Hoare to N. C h a m b e r l a i n ,  24 D e c e m b e r  1929, NC 
7/11/22/9; Daily Telegraph, 5 February 1930.
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re-eraergenoe of B e a v e r b r o o k ’s p r e s s u r e  group, the 
divisions of opinion within the leadership, and between 
leaders and followers, and the failure of Baldwin to 
provide a focal point, was a serious slump in the morale 
of the party. This was evident in the apathy commented 
on at local level, and even more so in the poor 
attendances of the Conservative Members in the House of 
Commons, a malaise consequent upon their loss of morale as 
an opposition, which in its turn provoked further alarm in 
the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . 53 This dissatisfaction with the 
p a r l i a m e n t a r y  party mad e  it all the easier for 
Beaverbrook’s campaign to make headway. The real strength 
of the Empire Crusade was always that it reflected the 
disgruntled element of the rank and file of the local 
Associations and of ordinary supporters; in periods when 
these groups were alienated from the parliamentary elite 
the Crusade b e c a m e  a s u i t a b l e  ve h i c l e  for their 
r e s e n t m e n t s ,  as m u c h  for any ge n u i n e  s u pport for 
B e a v e r b r o o k ’s fiscal policy. B e a v e r b r o o k  h i m s e l f  
recognised clearly where his strength came from; "My hold 
is on the public imagination, and not in the Commons or 
Lords", he w r o t e . However, he still tended to overrate 
the part played in this by his newspapers and his personal
53. W a r w i c k  and L e a m i n g t o n  CA, Annual Report of 
Secretary, April 1930; St. George’s CA, Exec., 19 
December 1929; Guildford CA, Exec., 20 December 1929; 
Walsall CA, Emergency Ctte., 16 December 1929; East 
Islington CA, Exec., 27 January 1930.
54. Beaverbrook to Derby, 7 March 1930, Derby MSS 920 DER 
(17)/33.
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platform oratory, and to underrate the part played by the 
negativism and weakness of Baldwin's leadership. Yet 
there was a direct relationship between the latter and the 
appeal of the Crusade, and the period of December 1929 to 
February 1 930 saw not only the emergence of the Crusade 
as a political force, but also the first serious stirrings 
of doubt about Baldwin's suitability as l e a d e r . 55
It was as a product of these circumstances that the 
party passed into a phase of incipient crisis in the last 
half of January 1930. Once again, the groundswell of 
national opinion was moving, slowly but perceptibly, away 
from orthodox free trade as unemployment continued to 
rise; in free trade Lancashire, which had long been taken 
as an indicator of the state of public opinion, the change 
was detected by Lord Derby - though the food tax proposal 
r e m a i n e d  "the g r e a t  o b s t a c l e  ".55 A l t h o u g h  t h i s  
development made the pressure on Baldwin greater, it also 
meant that it was easier for him to give ground to it, as 
soon as he accepted the need to do so. To this end he was 
urged on, not only by the call from the constituencies for 
a 'clear' lead, and by the spee c h e s  of c o m m i t t e d  
protectionists, but also by similar advice from his own 
inner circle. On New Year's Day the Chairman of the 
party, Davidson, wrote to Baldwin suggesting that a
55. Malmesbury to Salisbury, 13 January 1930, Salsibury 
MSS 5(4) 133/35-36.
56. Derby to Blumenfeld, 17 February 1930, Blumenfeld MSS 
D/Der.45.
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forthcoming address by the latter to MPs and candidates, 
to be held at the Coliseum on 5 February, would provide a 
suitable forum to "steal the thunder of both Rothermere 
and Beaverbrook in such a way as to prevent either of them 
attacking you". Whilst food taxes were still ruled out as 
politically impossible, Davidson was firm that "without 
going into too much detail the lead must be definite".5? 
This advice was reinforced by the emerging signals of a 
crisis of confidence within the Conservative party. As 
opinion evolved, so the party's public position was left 
stranded' high and dry, vulnerably exposed to Beaverbrook's 
sallies. Certainly, it was b e c o m i n g  clear that 
Beaverbrook, by giving expression to normally inarticulate 
rank and file sentiment, was making the running, and
seemed to be capturing the party from the grassroots
upwards. Gwynne told Baldwin frankly that Beaverbrook's 
stre n g t h  was the fact that "his p o l i c y  is e n d o r s e d  
secretly or openly by 85% of the Conservative party".58 
Faced with this, it can hardly be surprising that MPs and 
their local Association elites became "rattled by what was 
going on in their constituencies",59 in addition, rather 
like corks impelled on the tide of opinion, some of the 
leading party protectionists came very close to at least
57. Davidson to Baldwin, 1 January 1930, Davidson MSS.
58. Gwynne to Baldwin, 21 February 1930, Gwynne MSS 15.
59. Davidson to Tyrrell, 9 March 1930, in James, op.
cit., pp. 324-325.
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fusion with, if not actual secession to, Beaverbrook's
campaign. Croft, Hannon, and Amery advised him closely,
and Sir Robert Horne, a former Conservative Chancellor
highly respected in City circles, extended feelers to
Beaverbrook.50 An even more serious symptom was the re-
emergence of the Diehard group centred on Gretton; forty
MPs signed the letter addressed by him to Baldwin on 27
January. Aware of the danger of being outflanked by the
Crusaders, they demanded a clear statement of policy:
In the absence of such a declaration from you as 
Leader of the party, we are losing ground both in 
Parliament and in the country: many of our staunch
s u p p o r t e r s  are lo o k i n g  e l s e w h e r e  than to the 
Conservative party for the solution.
61
This was not a declaration of war on Baldwin; it did not 
seek to remove him, but rather to prod him into coming up 
to the mark. More precisely, the Diehards sought a return 
to Baldwin's own programme of insular protection of 1923» 
which they held to represent "the true Conservative 
Economic policy". Thus, by the end of January the clear 
message was that it was vital for Baldwin to take steps to 
reassert the authority of the leader, and to do so before 
the lower ranks of the party stampeded.^2 Baldwin was
60. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 12 and 13 December 1929, 
Beaverbrook to Hannon, 14 December 1929, Beaverbrook 
MSS C154.
61. G r etton M e m o r i a l ,  and list of s i g n a t o r i e s ,  to 
Baldwin, 27 January 1930, Baldwin MSS, volume 31, ff. 
13-17.
62. Gwynne to Beaverbrook, 3 February 1930, Gwynne MSS 
14; Birkenhead to Beaverbrook, 28 January 1930, 
Beaverbrook MSS C41.
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aware of the need to make a new move, but was naturally 
strongly influenced and restrained by the electoral advice 
he had also received. This had consistently been in 
favour of some advance, but struck a cautionary note over 
the electoral consequences of going beyond a tariff on 
manufactured goods to one on food imports. Even Hannon 
acknowledged that "the food tax cry is something still of 
very serious moment to those who represent or who are 
standing for industrial constituencies".53 Baldwin framed 
his speech for the Coliseum meeting in the context of 
these l i m i t a t i o n s .  Thus S a l i s b u r y  noted after a 
conversation with Baldwin in the week before the speech:
S. B. is however convinced that any suggestion that 
we will, or that we might, tax food would be fatal. 
Nevertheless the press agitation has made a definite 
fiscal p o l i c y  necessary. He is i n c l i n e d  to an 
immediate development of safeguarding - meaning 
safeguarding thereby steel and perhaps wool.
64
Baldwin's intentions were the logical product of the 
political, rather than the economic, situation: the offer
to give p r o t e c t i o n  to the m ajor steel and t e x tile 
industries was the clearest token he could give of his
63. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 7 January 1930, Hannon MSS
1/3; Gretton to Baldwin, 30 January 1930, Baldwin MSS
volume 31, f. 23; Ramsden to Baldwin, 24 January
1930, ibid., f. 39; Bayford diary, 7 February 1930; 
EIA, Exec., 18 February 1930; Salisbury CA Res., NU 
Exec., 10 December 1929.
64. Memo of conversation with Baldwin, 28 January 1930,
Salisbury MSS S(4) 133/67-71.
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desire for advance without straying into the minefield of 
foodstuffs.
Baldwin's planned initiative at his forthcoming 
Coliseum speech was also intended in another political 
context; as the first, rather than the culminating, move 
towards a renewed phase of appeasement of Beaverbrook by 
linked concessions and negotiations. The tactics of 
November 1929 were to be dusted off and re-used once 
again. Thus offers of mediation in late January 1930 
from concerned, respected Conservative figures such as 
Gwynne and John Buchan, who were extending feelers to both 
Beaverbrook and Baldwin, were now given encouragement by 
the l a t t e r . 55 A p p e a r i n g  to be t h a w e d  by t h e s e  
interventions, Baldwin invited Beaverbrook to a preview of 
his intended Coliseum address. Though at this stage there 
was no suggestion of negotiated compromise, the channels 
of communication had been r e - o p e n e d . 55 on 3 February 
1930, two days before the Coliseum meeting, Baldwin saw 
Beaverbrook and "read his speech to him, but did not ask 
for any c o m m e n t ".57 Though a hopeful indicator, the 
content of the speech could not in fact venture far 
enough to directly and immediately appease Beaverbrook and 
the whole-hogger protectionists. Indeed, given the
65. Buchan to Beaverbrook, 30 January 1930, Beaverbrook
MSS C314; Beaverbrook to Elibank, 24 January 1930,
ibid., C126.
66. Baldwin to Beaverbrook, 29 January 1930, ibid., Cl 9.
67. Lockhart diary, 3 February 1930.
132
contradictory tension between the two aims of the Coliseum 
s p e e c h  of 5 F e b r u a r y  - the c o n c i l i a t i o n  of the 
protectionists, but the avoidance of food taxes at the 
explicit demand of the pragmatists - it was unlikely to be 
a complete solution. These tensions came out clearly in 
the s u b s t a n c e  of the speech. Once again, B a l d w i n  
attempted to reassure critics of his lack of vigour as 
opposition leader by a strong attack on the government. 
On the ideal of i m p e r i a l  e c o n o m i c  union, Baldwin's 
rhetoric effectively overlaid the mild reality of his 
safeguarding policy. The latter amounted almost to the 
proposal to de-politicise the question by placing the onus 
for producing a definite plan upon the industrialists of 
the empire, rather than on the governments. However, two 
elements in the speech could not be glossed over so 
easily. B a l d w i n  d e l i b e r a t e l y  p o s t p o n e d  the tho r n y  
question of agricultural policy for another day, and gave 
a specific pledge against food taxes in any form.58 
* * * * * * * * * *
The C o l i s e u m  speech was not a s o l u t i o n  to the 
tensions evident within the party in January 1930 but was 
merely a holding operation, designed to buy time. The 
policy advance conceded was in the nature of a payment on 
account only - literally so in the case of the postponed 
agricultural policy. And it was in this light, as a first
68. The Times, 6 February 1930.
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step forward, that it was j u d g e d . 59 Certainly the short­
term aim of the speech had been achieved, by defusing the 
threatened explosion that had been building up within the 
party. The considerable relief with which the speech was 
received was not in fact so much an indicator of the real 
value of its contents, but rather reflected the relief 
from the considerable pressure now eased, though not 
removed, by the minimal move forwards. An indicator of 
its success in this context was the reaction of the 
Gretton group, who wrote to express their "satisfaction 
that the pronouncement at the Coliseum yesterday went far 
to meet the[ir] views".7^ The approach adopted by Baldwin 
in these early months of 1 930 was also intended to bring 
along, by moving in easily assimilated stages, northern 
Conservative free food sentiment, without losing the 
toleration of the protectionist lobbies. The Coliseum 
speech went some way to meeting this aim; whilst on the 
one hand a c c e p t a b l e  to and w e l c o m e d  by the E m p i r e  
Industries Association, on the other it offered an escape 
route to free traders such as the MP for Clitheroe, Sir 
William B r a s s . 71 Despite the general atmosphere of 
relieved approval, the reaction from the constituencies 
remained ambivalent. In southern agricultural areas the
69. Gwynne to Beaverbrook, 5 February 1930, Gwynne MSS 
14.
70. Gretton to Baldwin, 6 February 1930, Baldwin MSS 
volume 31, f . 25.
71. EIA, P a r l i a m e n t a r y  Council, 6 F e b r u a r y  1930; 
Clitheroe CA, AGM, 15 February 1930; Headlam diary, 5 
February 1930.
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Coliseum speech received a qualified welcome; the speech 
was of use only if it was followed up and expanded into a 
proper agricultural policy, but on its own it was not 
enough; "something much more definite, expressed in the 
simplest possible language, must be given to us".72 on 
the other hand the r e a c t i o n  from the i n d u s t r i a l  
constituencies of the Midlands and the North was approval 
containing the implicit assumption that the policy had now 
been settled, and would progress no further.73
The Empire Crusade*s initial response to the Coliseum 
speech was welcoming, but the warm and friendly letter of 
congratulations sent by Beaverbrook to Baldwin immediately 
after the speech represented not a genuine agreement, but 
a purely tactical response, decided upon by the Empire 
Crusade committee. This was designed to encourage Baldwin 
to continue further the process of conciliation.7^ It 
was in order to speed up this process of negotiation that 
Beaverbrook took the apparently contradictory step of 
restarting his public campaign; in fact, such a move was 
implicit in his letter to Baldwin of 5 F e b r u a r y . 75 The
72. Kent Agent's Union, 19 February 1930; Chelmsford CA,
Branch Res., 22 February 1930; Eastern Area, AGM, 5 
February 1930.
73. York CA, Exec., 10 F e b r u a r y  1930, Council, 27
February 1930; Rother Valley CA, Exec., 4 March 1930;
B radford South CA, Exec., 18 F e b r u a r y  1930;
Birmingham CA, Management Ctte., 14 February 1930,
74. Elibank diary, 5 February 1930, f. 6.
75. Beaverbrook to Baldwin, 5 February 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS Cl 9.
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aim was compromise via an increase of pressure, and not 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n .  T h r o u g h o u t  F e b r u a r y  1930 the most 
s i g n i f i c a n t  e l e m e n t  in p o l i t i c a l  d i s c o u r s e  was the 
language of negotiation which formed the background to the 
tactical counters designed to promote a settlement. 
Beaverbrook, correctly, had been assured that Baldwin's 
opposition was of pragmatism, not principle, and thus a 
show of empire free trade popularity in the country could 
a c t u a l l y  assist to bring the two men t o g e t h e r  by 
demonstrating that public opinion was, or could be made to 
be, ready for a fully fledged tariff programme. In short, 
as G w y n n e  c o m m e n t e d ,  "S. B. £ £ £  b e h a n d l e d ".75 
Beaverbrook made the running during the first half of 
February by returning to his public campaign in the 
agricultural constituencies, pitching his attack to the 
still u n s a t i s f i e d  farmers. In the a b s e n c e  of an 
alternative Conservative agricultural policy, "the policy 
of Empire Free Trade got on like 'wild-fire' in the 
agricultural districts".77 11 was no accident that a
large part of the success of Beaverbrook's appeal was that 
his view that the pledge against food taxes which had been 
given at the Coliseum was too blunt and final a barrier 
against any further future evolution of party policy was 
shared by a substantial element on the backbenches and in
76. Gwynne to Beaverbrook, 2 February 1930, ibid., C149.
77. Elibank diary, January 1930, f. 5; Hilton Young to 
his wife, 1 March 1930, Kennet MSS 107/3.
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the local Associations, There was no inconsistency 
between the renewal of the Crusade, and Beaverbrook's 
desire, often repeated in the private correspondence of 
this time, to come to an arrangement with Baldwin, whom he 
continued to believe sympathetic with his aims, and 
towards whom he was still well d i s p o s e d , 78
However, the area of divergence between Beaverbrook 
and Baldwin instead widened enormously into an open breach 
as a consequence of their next interview, arranged for the 
morning of 12 February, At this meeting Beaverbrook set 
out sweeping claims for permeation of the parliamentary 
party, presumably by the intimidation of MPs and local 
c o n s t i t u e n c y  p a r t i e s . 79 A s it is u n l i k e l y  that 
Beaverbrook could have expected Baldwin's agreement to 
such a proposal, the move could only have been intended as 
another stage in the p a r a l l e l  p r o c e s s  of p r e s s u r e  
r e i n f o r c i n g  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  In a t h r e a t e n i n g  m a n n e r  
Beaverbrook had made clear the potential for disruption 
that his movement could cause, but this pushed Baldwin 
towards resistance rather than concession. What was 
doubly unfortunate, however, was that the last part of the 
interview produced a serious misunderstanding between the 
two men. Beaverbrook believed that Baldwin had agreed to 
his forming a "party", but on this crucial issue the 
conversation had become confused, and Baldwin maintained
78. Beaverbrook to Amery, 9 February 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS C5.
79. Beaverbrook to Gwynne, 19 February 1930, ibid., C5.
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afterwards that Beaverbrook did not discuss a "party", but 
had used the word " l e a g u e " . T h i s  was significant 
because Baldwin was still thinking of the Crusade as a 
proagandist pressure group, and hoped to confine it to 
publicity. The difference was more than mere hair­
splitting; the misunderstanding complicated the personal 
relationship of the two men, and also, perhaps even by 
design on Baldwin's part, encouraged Beaverbrook to go out 
on a limb and, by s t a r t i n g  his own new party in 
competition with official Conservatism, to run the risk of 
t h e r e b y  a l i e n a t i n g  his s u p p o r t e r s  a m o n g s t  the 
Conservatives of all ranks.
The immediate product of the meeting of 12 February 
was the launching of Beaverbrook's party. At 3:00 p.m. on 
that day he called together the Provisional Committee of 
the Crusade, and s e cured their a g r e e m e n t  to its 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  into the new f o r m a t . 81 The public 
intimation of this was delayed for a few days during which 
Beaverbrook secured his last essential support - the 
alliance with Lord Rothermere. The Empire Crusade with 
its existing membership was thus transformed into a 
to t a l l y  d i f f e r e n t  body by a s t a t e m e n t  r e l e a s e d  by 
Beaverbrook to the press on 17 February 1930; "Here and 
now", it proclaimed, "we will form ourselves into a new
80. Elibank diary, 12 February 1930, ff. 7-8; Gwynne to 
Baldwin, 21 February 1930, Gwynne MSS 15.
81. Elibank diary, 12 February 1930, f. 7.
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party - the United Empire P a r t y , "82 Despite appearances, 
this move did not r e p r e s e n t  the t h r o w i n g  over of 
negotiation, but was merely intended to produce quicker 
results. The United Empire Party was not in fact a party 
in the genuine sense of the word, for, whatever its 
methods, its purpose remained that of a single-issue 
pressure group - as Beaverbrook himself freely admitted,^3 
Forming the party had undeniably assisted Beaverbrook in 
capturing Rotherraere's support, but this was only a 
secondary by-product and not the primary aim, which 
r e m a i n e d  c o n s i s t e n t  with B e a v e r brook's s t r a t e g y  of 
progress through a g r e e m e n t . F o u r  days after the United 
Empire Party was launched, Beaverbrook told Amery that 
"there is really no difference in my position on account 
of the formation of the United Empire Party".&5
Whilst the establishment of the new party created a 
new dimension to the political picture, paradoxically the 
immediate result was an atmosphere in which both sides 
came increasingly under pressure to find a compromise and 
close the breach. The formation, of the UEP, as the 
tightening of existing screws rather than as a radically 
novel development, certainly increased the pressures upon 
Baldwin to find some solution. Internal Conservative
82. The Times, 18 February 1930,
83. Beaverbrook to Chivers, 25 February 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS B136.
84. Beaverbrook to Grey, 18 February 1930, ibid., B152.
85. Beaverbrook to Amery, 22 February 1930, ibid., C5.
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party opinion demonstrated its desire for an end to the 
increasingly ominous internecine warfare in an unequivocal 
fashion: Amery and Horne pressed Baldwin to a further
forward move, as did two influential deputations received 
by the latter on the day the new party was announced, 18 
February, The first was a representative group of the 
Diehard wing led by Gretton, and the second a delegation 
from the Empire Industries Association; both demured at 
the rigidity of the Coliseum pledge against further 
advances in party policy. More significantly, this 
predictable chorus was reinforced by similar expressions 
from a much wider spectrum of party f e e l i n g . T h e  
pressure for accommodation was supported by the feeling in 
a number of the local Associations, and a further brake on 
progress was removed by Derby's speech at Macclesfield on 
15 February, where that political weathercock came out 
firmly for some further a d v a n c e . I n  the light of these 
manifestations of feeling, Baldwin turned down the 
confrontational tactics urged on him by Churchill of 
putting the issue to the test of a series of by-elections 
as too dangerous and too divisive, clearly preferring to
86. Leaked to the D^^l^ M a, Ü  ♦ 19 February 1930, and 
p r e s u m a b l y  a c c u r a t e  as it a p p e a r s  in the 
autobiographical collection of press cuttings in the 
Croft MSS; EIA, Exec., 18 February 1930; Clanwilliara 
to Salisbury, 25 February 1930, Salisbury MSS S(4) 
133/177.
87. Cirencester and Tewkesbury CA, Finance and Advisory 
Ctte., 28 February 1930; Lincoln CA, Special Exec. 
Meeting, 27 February 1930; The^ 17 February
1930.
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opt for the path of conciliât i o n . I n  this he may have 
been influenced by indications that failure to compromise 
might imperil the position of the entire leadership. This 
came in particular with renewed signs of the tendency of 
the grassroots to take the initiative, in the absence of a 
lead from above. Paralleling the post-election demands 
for a greater role for the rank and file and the party 
conference, the president of the Grantham Association 
publicly demanded the convening of an emergency conference 
which would lay down the party's fiscal policy. These 
pressures from below were disturbing reminders of the 
state of unrest in the Conservative party during the last 
period of the Lloyd George coalition government in 1922.
Simultaneously Beaverbrook was also coming under 
pressure to climb down from the dangerously independent 
position which he had assumed with the formation oa the 
new party. For the alarm which that had caused at all 
levels of the Conservative party produced not only the 
above-mentioned stimulus to Baldwin to seek a truce, but 
also found clear expression in a backlash of revulsion 
against the United Empire Party itself. Beaverbrook was 
startled at the universally hostile response that his 
purely tactical move provoked, all the more so for the 
fact that it contrasted strongly with the cautious general 
approval in which he had basked hitherto. In transforming 
his propagandist campaign into a party Beaverbrook came
88. Davidson to Baldwin, 26 February 1930, Davidson MSS.
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into conflict with not only short-term fears based on 
electoral expediency, but also the instinctive solidarity 
of the Conservative party. The hostile reaction which 
resulted was partly one of alarm, compounded by the normal 
condemnation of factional strife, but the degree of 
reaction was unmistakeable.®^ What must have weighed most 
heavily with Beaverbrook was the fact that this crucial 
response included even those sectors of the tariff - 
reformers and Diehards to whom he looked for support. 
When on 12 February Beaverbrook had proposed the creation 
of a new party to the Crusade Committee, the active 
Conservatives on it had been "rather staggered at this 
proposal, as we did not quite see where it was going to 
lead us, or lead the C o n s e r v a t i v e  Party", and they 
a t t e m p t e d  to act as a brake upon a " d e t e r m i n e d "  
B e a v e r b r o o k  by w a t e r i n g  dow n  his m a n i f e s t o  in an 
unsuccessful attempt to avoid it appearing as an attack on 
either B a l d w i n  or the C o n s e r v a t i v e  p a r t y . T h i s  
inauspicious start was echoed by the rejection of public 
association with Beaverbrook by even the most apparently 
dissident Conservative backbenchers such as Ferguson and 
Gretton. In addition, the mediatory figures and advisors 
such as Croft, Gwynne and Amery were unanimous in their
89. Erskine to Beaverbrook, 24 February 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS B145; Sutton CA, Exec,, 27 February 1930, report 
in Astor MSS 1416/1/1/122; Stigant to Salisbury, 
reporting opinions of Rochester and Chatham CA, 26 
February 1930. Salisbury MSS S(4) 133/183-184.
90. Elibank diary, 12 February 1930, f. 8.
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disapproval of the formation of a distinct party, and the 
move provoked them to reaffirm their loyalty to the 
Conservative party without the desired imperial programme 
in preference to the disruption of the pro-imperial 
forces.91 Beaverbrook's manifesto produced Baldwin's 
strongest counterblast yet. This took the form of an 
interview with the new party journal ^ome and E m p i r e , 
published on 25 February, which had the effect of a shot 
across the Crusaders' bow, causing him to pull back; 
Beaverbrook's aim at this stage was to capture Baldwin, 
not to drive him into open enmity.92 Beaverbrook was also 
having difficulties in keeping his new party firmly on the 
rails of his policy, as it was te n d i n g  to b e c o m e  
submerged, by Rothermere in particular, into becoming only 
one point in a full-scale Diehard programme, and he was 
increasingly worried that his movement had now been 
captured by an anti-Baldwin cave of Adullaraites, which 
m i g h t  pr o d u c e  a result he did not desire - the 
disintegration of the Conservative party,93
The immediate result of this situation was thus to 
produce an atmosphere in which both sides desired to find
91. Gwynne to Beaverbrook, 18 February 1930» Gwynne MSS 
14; A m e r y  to B e a v e r b r o o k ,  19 F e b r u a r y  
1930, Beaverbrook MSS C5; The Times, 17 February 
1930.
92. Home and Empire, March 1930.
93. Beaverbrook memorandum, 7 March 1930, Beaverbrook MSS 
C284; Beaverbrook to Gwynne, 25 February 1930, ibid.. 
Cl 49; Beaverbrook to Londonderry, 9 March 1 930, 
ibid., C224; Beaverbrook to Mar j o r i b a n k s , 6 March
1930, ibid., B167,
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a road back from extreme positions. One symptom of this 
was the resurgence of influential figures in the role of 
mediators, to the encouragement of both camps. Several 
figures, more or less in the confidence of both men, and 
from the group thought to be both loyal to the party and 
sympathetic to Beaverbrook's policy, were involved, acting 
very much in parallel: Horne, Amery, Gwynne, and Elibank.
All four of these go-betweens were pulling the same way, 
in the sense that they all expected some concessions to 
come from each side in the move to a middle g r o u n d . 9 ^  
They were also a force for commonsense and stability, 
a t t e m p t i n g  wi t h  su c c e s s  first to keep lines of 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n  open during a period of p o t e n t i a l l y  
d i s r u p t i v e  c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,  and second to defuse the 
explosive policy problem. After the misinterpretations of 
the meeting of 12 February, followed by the announcement 
of the formation of the ÜEP on 18 February, it required 
their intervention before another face-to-face meeting 
between the two principals could once again become 
practical politics.
On 19 F e b r u a r y  G w y n n e  had an i n t e r v i e w  with 
B e a v e r b r o o k ,  and t^h-^e latter set out on paper his 
irreducible minimum condition for a deal: that Baldwin 
must t h r o w  off the n e g a t i v e  pledge of the C o l i s e u m
94. L. S. Amery, My Polit ical L^f^ (1955), volume 3» pp. 
27-28.
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s p e e c h . 95 Gwynne then shuttled backwards and forwards 
between Baldwin and Beaverbrook during the period 20-24 
February, and it was during this process that the crucial 
policy content of the deal was negotiated, it being agreed 
that the Conservative leader would no longer "rule out a 
duty on foreign foodstuffs".9& Baldwin did not find this 
imprecise declaration difficult to accept, but he was 
motivated by different considerations, and interpreted his 
commitment in a contrary spirit to the positivism demanded 
by Beaverbrook. His pledge to no longer rule out a policy 
that might at some future date involve a food tax proposal 
fell far short of any undertaking to actively advocate 
it. Thus, by 25 February, when G w y n n e  i n f o r m e d  
Beaverbrook that "I think there is a chance ultimately of 
making a bridge", the essential, although artificial, 
common ground for a deal had been a s s u r e d . 9? Having 
sensed Beaverbrook's weakness, Baldwin had no difficulty 
in firmly resisting an initiative stemming from Elibank 
four days later to settle on terras far less favourable to 
himself; by the time Elibank saw Baldwin on 28 February, 
the wind was blowing from a different quarter, Elibank's 
main proposal was that the United Empire Party should have 
the right of nomination to three crucial appointments in 
the next Conservative government. Baldwin immediately
95. M e m o r a n d u m  given by B e a v e r b r o o k  to G w y n n e  at 
S t o r n o w a y  H o u s e ,  19 F e b r u a r y  1930, c o p y  in 
Beaverbrook MSS Cl 49.
96. Gwynne to Beaverbrook, 25 February 1930, ibid.
97. Loc. cit.
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played the constitutionalist card by refusing to allow any 
infringement of the Prime Minister's prerogatives. In the 
event this proposal was not only to prove a tactical 
blunder in the short term, but it also was to provide 
Baldwin with ammunition which he was in the future to use 
w i t h  d e a d l y  e f f e c t .  I r o n i c a l l y ,  the i m m e d i a t e  
and practical result of this meeting was not appeasement, 
but rather an attempt on Baldwin's part to divide the two 
Press Lords; s e t ting B e a v e r b r o o k  up in the role of 
R o t h e r m e r e ' s  keeper by i n d i c a t i n g  that he w o u l d  be 
prepared to come to an agreement with Beaverbrook alone.9& 
After these exchanges, there r e m a i n e d  only two 
considerations. The first was that suitable moves of 
public rhetoric towards conciliation would have to be made 
in order to p r e pare the rank and file for a c o m i n g  
together, and remove the atmosphere of hostility. Though 
accomplished with remarkable speed, this was inevitably a 
slower process than the private settlement. The second 
consideration was that, once the two pre-conditions of 
preliminary negotiation and public rappro chement were 
achieved, the two principals would need to meet again 
face-to-face, to hammer out the detailed mechanics of 
Baldwin's next pronouncement.
Given the desire in all quarters for a truce, it was 
not difficult to mould public and party opinion in its 
favour. This process began, appropriately enough, with a
98. Elibank's memorandum of conversation with Baldwin, 28
February 1930, Elibank MSS SRO GD 32/25/74, ff . 57-9.
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speech by Amery at Edgbaston on 21 February. He drew 
Empire Free Trade into the accepted canon of tariff reform 
sentiment, declaring that "it had been, in one sense, the 
accepted policy of the party for nearly a generation", 
and, w h i l s t  l i g h t l y  d e p r e c a t i n g  the f o r m a t i o n  of a 
separate party, acknowledged that this move was the 
product of frustration at the lagging behind of official 
policy.99 This was reinforced in a speech by Horne on 26 
February to the Constitutional Club, in which he set out a 
'broad church' definition of Conservative economic policy, 
on the common acceptance of the fallacy of free trade and 
the eventual agreed desirability of empire economic unity. 
His closely argued text thus reduced the matter for debate 
to l i m i t e d  as p e c t s  of means, not yet r e q u i r i n g  
elucidation: until negotiations with the dominions were
opened, it was premature to decide the issue in favour or 
against the matter of food taxes, and "in the meantime he 
did not see why Unionists should be divided and herded off 
in separate p e n s " . 1^0 Although studiously vague on 
practicalities, the forthright critique of the existing 
free trade system represented a genuine attempt to find a 
2_i^ B Ê.ÉAÊ.' The speech was a d e l i b e r a t e  a t t e m p t  at 
c o n c i l i a t i o n ,  for Horne had sounded B e a v e r b r o o k  in 
advance, sending him the contents of his speech.1^1
99. The Times, 22 February 1930.
100. The -Times, 27 February 1930.
101. Horne to Beaverbrook, 25 February 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS C178,
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Elibank acknowledged that:
this speech had a r e m a r k a b l e  effect on all the 
members of the Conservative Party as well as the 
United Empire Party, as they saw in it a line of 
accommodation between the two factions,
102
Beaverbrook now felt able to respond with a public gesture 
of reconciliation, and used for this a forthcoming speech 
he was to give at Gloucester on 27 February:
I beg Mr. Baldwin to believe that it is possible now 
and at once to make a b e g i n n i n g  .... I beg Mr. 
Baldwin to ignore the counsels of expediency .... I 
should welcome a return of Mr, Baldwin to 10 Downing 
Street if he goes wit h  free hands .... Let Mr. 
Baldwin withdraw the pledge at the Coliseum which 
drove me out. Withdraw it and I will go back.
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Ironically, Baldwin was far from intending to ignore the 
counsels of expediency; it was merely that the course of 
expediency now dictated a compromise, to include just 
sufficient policy advances to entice Beaverbrook,
The G l o u c e s t e r  speech opened the way to the 
possibility of another face-to-face meeting between the 
two leaders. On Sunday, 2 March, Beaverbrook had in fact 
a l r e a d y  d r a fted a note to Baldwin, r e q u e s t i n g  an 
interview, when a telephone message arrived from the 
latter, i n v i t i n g  him to attend a 10:15 m e e t i n g  the 
following morning. At this morning session on 3 March
102. Elibank diary, 26 February 1930, f. 15.
103. The Times, 28 February 1930.
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B a l d w i n  started the b i d d i n g  low by o f f e r i n g  the 
traditional double-election strategy to avoid the food tax 
bogey. This consisted of a promise that Baldwin would 
pledge h i m s e l f  to c a l l i n g  an i m p e r i a l  c o n f e r e n c e  
immediately after the next election victory, and would 
then ratify its proposals by submitting them to the nation 
in a second general election. According to the version he 
gave Elibank, B e a v e r b r o o k  d e c l i n e d  this idea, but 
indicated "that he would accept a Referendum as a 'second- 
string* instead of a second General E l e c t i o n " . 1^4 This 
was consistent with the policy advocated in Horne's speech 
of 26 February, which had met with much general approval. 
However, it also appeared to give Baldwin everything he 
wanted, by postponing into the future the pledge to fight 
on food taxes, a l t h o u g h  B e a v e r b r o o k  was p r i v a t e l y  
convinced that the practical result of such a strategy 
would be to turn the next general election i_p££ £££^£, into 
the referendum. In another sense, it was a victory for 
Beaverbrook; on the previous occasion that the idea of a 
referendum had been introduced in 1910, it had incurred 
opposition as a retreat from tariff reform, but the 
crucial point about Baldwin's adoption of the referendum 
idea was that it represented yet another stage of advance 
on his part towards a fullblooded protectionist platform. 
And it was in this sense that Beaverbrook accepted the 
idea; not as a final resting place of the party's policy,
104. Elibank diary, 3 March 1930, ff. 20-21.
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but as an umbrella under which he could run his empire 
free trade c a m p a i g n  w i t h i n  the C o n s e r v a t i v e  party, 
claiming for it that it did not contradict official policy 
and would educate the people in favour of that policy. In 
reality, it was the worst of compromises, for it contained 
within it the seeds of its own failure; essentially each 
side believed that it had achieved directly contradictory 
results by the agreement: Beaverbrook that food taxes
were now to be part of the party programme ; Baldwin that 
the r e f e r e n d u m  had s h elved the food tax for the 
foreseeable future. Certainly before long one, or both, 
would be disappointed.
The referendum idea now raised was not immediately 
decided upon, and the question was still in the air when 
Beaverbrook left Baldwin on the morning of 3 March. 
Baldwin promised to consider the matter and communicate a 
decision later that day. The final stage of negotiating 
the truce occurred after Baldwin summoned Beaverbrook to a 
second m e e t i n g  on the e v e n i n g  of 3 M a r c h  1930, and 
intimated his approval of the compromise. Aware that 
Baldwin was due to address the Council of the National 
Union at the Hotel Cecil the following morning, and that 
this would be an ideal opportunity to make public the new 
p o s i t i o n ,  B e a v e r b r o o k  h a s t e n e d  to c o m p l e t e  the 
arrangements before then. After leaving Baldwin for the 
second time that day, he discussed the strategy with 
Rothermere, Hannon and Horne. Together they drafted a
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letter, which the latter delivered personally to Baldwin 
on the morning of the 4th, before he left to deliver his 
speech. The terms outlined in this by no means suggested 
a cessation of Empire Crusade activities:
we will welcome [your] declaration as a marked 
advance in the direction of the policy we advocate. 
We will continue to organise the United Empire Party 
... we will not oppose any member of the Conservative 
Party who declares for the policy of Empire Free 
Trade subject to a referendum on food taxes.
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Nevertheless, in the tactical short terra Beaverbrook was 
clearly willing to slacken the pressure and wind up his 
separate party. To Baldwin this, even if it did not last 
long, was an advantage sufficiently desirable for him to 
swiftly overcome his constitutional reservations about the 
referendum. Baldwin's move did not come anywhere near 
either solving the question of the party's long-term 
fiscal policy, or to securing a permanent elimination of 
the press campaign, but it did buy him much-needed time 
with which to consolidate his position.
105. Beaverbrook to Baldwin, relayed via Horne, 3/4 March 
1930, Baldwin MSS, volume 57. ff. 25-26.
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CHAPTER 3
The Uneasy Truce : March to June 1930
Peace broke out with Baldwin's speech to the Central 
Council of the National Union at the Hotel Cecil on 4 
March 1930. The tone of this speech was negative and 
cautious, postponing yet again the agricultural policy to 
another occasion, and p u t t i n g  the e m p h a s i s  on the 
selective safeguarding of industries as "a more reliable 
and efficient weapon than general protection". Where the 
speech went beyond the Coliseum platform was only in the 
gloss of proclaiming that the previous pronouncement did 
not preclude "negotiating freely and fully with the 
Dominions". The key passage, however, was that in which 
the R e f e r e n d u m  was unveiled. Here the p o sture was 
entirely defensive. Baldwin portrayed the Referendum as 
the solu t i o n  to the danger of having the food tax 
millstone tied around the party's neck, not only in the 
next election but also in the case of an election fought 
on adversarial lines subsequent to any Imperial Conference 
proposals on Preference. Thus, it took the guise of a 
solution to the t a c t i c a l  difficulty. B a l d w i n  was 
unequivocal in following a line designed to appeal to the 
prejudices and needs of his northern powerbase and likely 
to secure support amongst the candidates for marginal 
seats, though his declaration was cold comfort to the 
farmers in the south; he maintained "There will be no
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food tax at the General Election, and the people of this 
country will never have to pay a food tax unless they so 
d ecide it t h e m s e l v e s " . 1 But B a l d w i n  was an adroit 
speechmaker, and quickly passed on from this to the
rousing finale of his speech, full of Imperial sentiment 
and ortho d o x  p arty cliche, and though in r e a l i t y  
signifying nothing, it served to blur the defensiveness of 
the first part of the speech into a tone acceptable to the 
forward-looking activists.
The reception of the Hotel Cecil speech was almost 
uniformly favourable, although significantly whilst all 
sections agreed on approval of it, behind that agreement 
still lay fundamental divergences about both the content 
and the tactical presentation of the p arty’s fiscal 
p r o g r a m m e  in the light of the R e f e r e n d u m  proposal. 
Beaverbrook saw it as a weapon with which to advance 
further, placing the food tax firmly in the forefront of 
the immediate political struggle, whilst Baldwin and the
north saw it as a device which removed the food tax
problem altogether from current affairs. Thus, while
Baldwin sought to avoid danger by de-politicising imperial 
issues, and deprecated dividing on party lines over them 
Beaverbrook and his allies were attempting to do the 
direct opposite. Under such circumstances, the truce was 
likely to be shortlived, and to last only so long as the 
mutual self-deception was not exposed. The essential
1. The Tiroes, 5 March 1930.
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reason for the favourable response of the Conservative 
party to the Hotel Cecil speech was not as a result of the 
Referendum policy per se, but because it secured the much- 
desired end to hostilities with Beaverbrook’s United 
Empire Party. It was a reflection of its political 
results, not its slim contribution to the evolution of the 
clear party programme being so frequently demanded by the 
backbenchers at this time, that the Hotel Cecil speech was 
taken up with approval. This process began at the meeting 
itself, after Baldwin had delivered his speech. Although 
there was nothing in it on policy to substantiate such a 
response, so great was the instinctive pressure to secure 
unity and show loyalty, that p o t e n t i a l l y  c r i t i c a l  
resolutions were withdrawn "in the light of the speech 
made by Mr. Baldwin that morning".^ For similar reasons, 
the Hotel Cecil speech found favour with a wide range of 
party opinion, including the protectionist and Diehard 
wings, and the Empire Industries Association Executive 
carried a resolution of approving congratulation.3
But it was the r e a c t i o n  of the c o n s t i t u e n c y  
Associations to the Hotel Cecil speech which was most 
revealing, both in the large volume of congratulatory
2. NU Central Council, 4 March 1930.
3. Dawson to Baldwin, 17 March 1930, Baldwin MSS, volume 
165, f. 99; Cayzer to Baldwin, 5 March 1930, ibid., 
volume 31f f . 58; EIA Exec., 11 March 1930; Page 
Croft to Beaverbrook, 5 March 1930, Beaverbrook MSS 
C101; Melchett to Beaverbrook, 25 March 1930, ibid., 
C243.
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resolutions, which were a reflection of the relief at the 
end of the period of acute tension over the United Empire 
Party, and also in the rather different emphases contained 
within that approval from the various regions. This was 
not so much a question of overt criticism, as of more 
subtle nuances of phrasing and implication. The greatest 
measure of relief and approval came, predictably enough, 
from the urban Midlands and the industrial northern seats; 
thus in Birmingham, "over 50 branches of our organisation 
passed resolutions of support for Mr. Baldwin’s policy".^ 
The attitude that lay behind this was spelled out by 
Colonel Gadie, the Chairman of the Bradford party, who 
defined Baldwin’s policy as;
Safeguarding [which] would put our Industries on 
their feet... Col. Gadie replying to the question of 
taxing food said that Mr. Stanley Baldwin had given a 
pledge that he would not put a tax on foodstuffs 
unless the country decided by referendum to accept 
same
5
The assumption was that food taxes had been cut out of 
practical politics. Though expressing similar general 
approval, this was far from the conclusion drawn by the 
s outh ern and a g r i c u l t u r a l  regions. Thus the Bath 
Conservative Association recorded its confidence in
4. Birmingham CA, Central Council, 21 March 1930; 
Wakefield CA, AGM, 6 March 1930; Stockton CA, AGM, 11 
March 1930; Rother Valley CA, Exec., 4 March 1930; 
SUA, Western Divisional Council, 5 March 1930.
5. Bradford CA, Central Ctte,, 26 March 1930; Yorkshire 
Prov. Area, AGM, 22 March 1930.
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Baldwin as leader and pledged itself "to support his 
policy of freer trade within the Empire", which of course 
would of necessity have involved a tariff on food as 
well as manufactures.6 However, temporarily obscuring 
these differences was the overall relief that the danger 
of the fratricidal war which had seemed inevitable had 
been removed.?
The long-term implications of the Hotel Cecil speech 
and the tactics that it enshrined were most clearly 
elucidated by the three principal ’neutral' Conservative- 
oriented newspapers.8 None was happy with the Referendum 
as a constitutional innovation; the Morning Post spoke for 
much backbench opinion in editorialising that "little as 
we like referenda, it is at least a great advance on the 
policy of n e g a t i o n  w h i c h  has h i t h e r t o  shack l e d  the 
Conservative Party", though they were wide of the mark in 
supposing that this marked the substitution of idealism 
for p r a g m a t i s m .  But it was Garvin, w r i t i n g  in The^ 
Observer, who most accurately categorised the basis of the 
party’s reaction; "The Unionist party exalted, chiefly 
because it was delivered from the deadly menace of cut-
6. Bath CA Exec, 11 March 1930; Basingstoke CA, Exec and 
Finance Ctte., 6 March 1930; Warwick and Leamington 
CA, Exec., 13 March 1930; West Dorset CA, AGM, 21 
March 1930; Norwich CA, Annual Report, 30 May 1 930; 
City of London CA, Exec., 6 March 1930.
7. Oxford City CA, Finance and GP Ctte., 7 March 1 930 ; 
South Kensington CA, Exec., 12 March 1930.
8. Daily Telegraph, M o r n i n g  Post, 5 M a r c h  1930; 
Observer, 9 March 1930. -
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throat candidatures all over the country", Garvin also 
pointed out that the truce had not by any means solved the 
divergences of policy and presentation:
The Unionists have saved themselves from rushing to 
destruction, but salvation is another matter ... other 
arguments than those used by Mr. Baldwin at the Hotel 
Cecil last Tuesday are very much required. He must 
sound a stronger and more ringing note.
These long-term imperatives were obscured by the short­
term relief of the party organisers that the attacks of 
the C r u s a d e r s  w o u l d  c e a s e ,  and of the c a u t i o u s  
pragmatists, like Derby, that not too much had to be 
conceded to achieve this.9
This relief r e f e r r e d  not only to the ending of 
divisions within the Conservative Party ranks, but also to 
the ending of open warfare between it and the Beaverbrook- 
led United Empire Party, for Beaverbrook had also come 
into line, as agreed, behind the Hotel Cecil speech. In 
one sense Beaverbrook was the prisoner of his own tactics; 
having urged the referendum on Baldwin, he had little 
choice but to react favourably and put his trust in 
Baldwin, despite the negative tone of the Hotel Cecil 
address. The logic of his position forced him to advise 
his followers that "All supporters of Empire Free Trade 
must welcome Mr. B a l d w i n ’s statement and accept the
9. Davidson to Beaverbrook, 5 March 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, C 111 ; Derby to Beaverbrook, 6 March 1930, ibid., 
Cl 13.
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assurance which he has given."1*^  It also led Beaverbrook 
into w i n d i n g  up the United Empire Party, and to 
reconstitute it as "the United Empire Crusade, as now the 
policy had been achieved, education and all propaganda was 
necessary throughout the country".11 To another supporter 
he explained:
although the position is somewhat changed on account 
of Mr. Baldwin's speech, we shall continue to carry 
on the c a m p a i g n  for Empire Free Trade, but in 
conjunction with the Conservatives.
12
The winding up of the United Empire Party, however, also 
provoked a break with Rothermere, Although Beaverbrook 
was convinced he needed the powerful support of the other 
press baron’s newspapers, 13 he had become increasingly 
worried by R o t h e r m e r e ’s tendency to turn the UEP into a 
party with a full-scale Diehard programme. Inevitably, 
with the withdrawal of Beaverbrook, the UEP was captured 
by R o t h e r m e r e  for his own platform. On 7 M arch 
Rothermere produced a five-point Diehard manifesto which 
he intended to publish the next day, and sent a copy to 
Beaverbrook. In it he claimed that "it was for the
10. Beaverbrook to Mr. and Mrs, Abbott, 8 March 1930, 
ibid.. B123.
11. Elibank Diary, 6 March 1930, f, 28.
12. Beaverbrook to Clyne, 5 March 1930, Beaverbrook MSS, 
B137.
13. Beaverbrook to Amery, 7 March 1930, ibid., C5.
158
fulfillment of these principles that the members of the 
United Empire Party enrolled themselves through the Daily 
M ail and its associated newspapers".1^ Beaverbrook could 
not accept the contention that the United Empire Party had 
ever been anything more than a single-issue pressure 
group; hence its supercession under the new circumstances. 
He had little choice but to counter with a press statement 
of his own, denouncing Rothermere for instituting "a 
complete departure from the agreed aims for which the 
United Empire Party was form e d ".1^ To drive the point 
home, a further announcement appeared on the same day, to 
the effect that the United Empire Party fund, having 
fulfilled its purpose, was to be returned to its donors. 
Thus the immediate impact of the truce, which had been 
deliberately negotiated by Baldwin with Beaverbrook to 
Rothermere’s exclusion, had been an open division between 
the former allies.1^
This split caused Beaverbrook more anxiety than it 
did Rothermere. Beaverbrook had always rated the power of 
newspapers highly, and thus he naturally both cherished 
and feared the influence of the Rothermere press. That 
Rothermere would continue the fight after the truce was 
arranged he had not expected, and now he began to feel 
outflanked by a potentially dangerous and disruptive
14. The Times, 8 March 1930.
15. Ibid.
16. Elibank diary, 7 March 1930, f. 30.
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rival. As a result of this, Beaverbrook came to question 
his tactical wisdom in having suggested the referendum and 
concluded the truce in the first place. In this mood he 
became increasingly obsessive over signs of caution 
amongst his Conservative allies. A part of this pattern 
was Beaverbrook’s touchiness over the way the conclusion 
of the truce had been portrayed as a victory for Baldwin 
over himself in certain other newspapers. This was only a 
straw in the wind, but it indicated the fragility of the 
agreement, Beaverbrook in any case saw the truce as a 
temporary expedient designed to further his idea, and not 
as a final consumption: "My principle is - take a trick
when you can and go on with the game. Our policy has 
gained much from recent events", he wrote.1? So long as 
Beaverbrook felt that the referendum and the truce were 
assisting, not delaying, the progress of Empire Free 
Trade, he would maintain it as a worthwhile advance.1® 
The crucial point remained the way in which Baldwin would 
operate the truce: "Everything now depends upon the
sincerity of Baldwin’s declaration about the Referendum. 
I trust him completely." 19 But Beaverbrook was aware of 
the dangers of having placed the future of his ideal in 
the hands of someone else less exclusively committed to 
it, and he oscillated between natural caution in this
17. Beaverbrook to Edwards, 8 March 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, B144.
18. Beaverbrook to Garvin, 12 March 1930, ibid,, C140.
19. Beaverbrook to Croft, 9 March 1930, ibid., C101.
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respect and his desire not to relinquish his weapons 
totally to Rothermere on the one hand, and a genuine 
desire to make the truce work if he could on the other. 
Although from day to day his course as a result appeared 
erratic and inconsistent, in fact he blew hot and cold in 
direct r e l a t i o n  to the latest m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  of 
Conservative Party opinion. Gradually throughout the 
period from the middle of March to the end of May 1930 
Beaverbrook came to the view that his trust in Baldwin had 
been misplaced, and that he would have to return to the 
tactics of open warfare.
The g e n u i n e l y  s u c c e s s f u l  phase of the truce in 
reality lasted only three weeks, from the Hotel Cecil 
speech until the publication of the Salisbury letter on 25 
March. But even in this first period, the nature of 
Beaverbrook’s dilemma, whether to work within or without 
the formal party structure, was apparent from his first 
public speech after B a l d w i n ’s statement at the Hotel 
Cecil, at Norwich on 8 March:
I welcome with all my heart the powerful support of 
the C o n s e r v a t i v e s  .... I shall c o n t i n u e  to the 
utmost of ray ability and strength to lead the Empire 
Crusade.... I do not fear the cry of the ’storaach- 
tax’. What I fear is timidity, hesitation, doubt and 
uncertainty in high places.
20
20. The Times, 10 March 1930
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From 25 March onwards, events increasingly confirmed 
Beaverbrook’s belief that the main obstacle to his success 
lay firstly in the influence of Free Traders such as 
Salisbury and Churchill, and pessimists such as Davidson, 
and finally in Baldwin himself. The progress of the truce 
towards dissolution, although erratic and obscured by 
initiatives of partnership and consultation from both 
sides, is clearly apparent from the middle of March.
The first phase, spanning the period from 4 to 25 
March, can be categorised as the attempt at genuine c o ­
operation. D a v i d s o n  made several e f f orts to dra w  
Beaverbrook into a closer formal relationship as the co­
director of the forthcoming propaganda campaign, involving 
him in the hope of both appeasing his restlessness, and 
sharing the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  as a p r o t e c t i o n  ag a i n s t  
criticism.^1 Personal interviews continued to be the 
favoured method of the party leadership in conciliating 
Beaverbrook’s restlessness: Baldwin saw him on two
occasions in this period, as also did Davidson, and 
Neville Chamberlain, who had recently returned from a long 
tour of East Africa. The clearest symbol of this genuine 
drive for fusion on the part of the leaders was the 
invitation for Beaverbrook to attend and sit on either the 
newly established Committee of Business, an informal 
Shadow Cabinet, or on a Committee to direct the Imperial 
and fiscal campaign of the Party. These invitations also
21. Davidson to Beaverbrook, 7 March 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, cm.
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symbolised the problems of the truce period; they were 
extended to Beaverbrook in a confused and equivocal 
fashion, rather than openly and formally, and they were 
declined by the latter, who continued to waver between 
support and antagonism.
This restlessness was only too apparent even in these 
early hopeful contacts. Davidson noted in a memorandum of 
his session with Beaverbrook on 12 March: "I asked him 
what he proposed to do in the future, and he said that he 
did not know, but ... In the m e a n t i m e  he would sit 
t i g h t " . T h e  confusion of his position came over in the 
second interview, held two days later. Davidson wrote 
that Beaverbrook
proposes to continue the Crusade, spending a great 
deal of money .... He proposes to raise a fund in 
small subscriptions for his Crusade .... He accepts 
absolutely Baldwin’s Cecil speech, but he is going to 
work amongst the public to convert them to food 
taxes.
The c o n c l u s i o n  D a v i d s o n  dre w  was a c o m f o r t i n g  one, 
p rov i d e d  only that there did not appear to be any 
backsliding on the part of the party leaders: "there is
no doubt that, provided we stand pat on the Cecil policy, 
we shall get his full s u p p o r t " . ^3^
22. Memo of conversation with Beaverbrook, 12 March 1930, 
Davidson MSS.
23. Memo of conversation with Beaverbrook, 14 March 1930, 
ibid.
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Beaverbrook, however, had little faith or confidence in 
Davidson, and if anything their conversations increased 
his dissatisfaction and reinforced his doubts on the 
referendum.^^ Baldwin deliberately attempted to further 
appease Beaverbrook, with a speech delivered to the Junior 
Constitutional Club on 12 M a r c h . But whilst this was a 
useful exercise in flattery, it contained no signs of the 
further advances after which Beaverbrook was beginning to 
hanker. He had already indicated the options of future 
activity open to him in conversation with Davidson:
He said he had three alternatives: (1) To revive
the Crusade with increased intensity .... This would 
require at times criticism of the Conservative Party, 
He could only re-start the Crusade, say, a month 
hence, by criticising the apathy and the lethargy of 
the Conservative Party, and probably while accepting 
the Referendum, explaining quite definitely that food 
t a x e s  w e r e  the o n l y  t h i n g  to s a v e  B r i t i s h  
agriculture. (2) To turn over the Crusade to the 
Tory Party and let us run it, and (3) to say 'I have 
finished my work. The Conservative Party has come 
into line: the raison d ’etre of the Crusade has
gone.'
26
It was in these c i r c u m s t a n c e s  that the public 
hesitancy of the unguarded pronouncements by a number of 
leading Conservatives of free-trade inclinations took on a 
significance beyond their real import. In point of fact, 
as the fate of their initiative demonstrated, the free
24. N. Chamberlain Diary, 12 March 1930, NC 2/22.
25. Elibank Diary, 10-12 March 1930, ff. 35-37.
26. Memo of conversation with Beaverbrook, 12 March 1930, 
Davidson MSS.
164
traders had now lost all power even to put a brake on the 
P a r t y ’s p r o g r e s s  t o w a r d s  p r o t e c t i o n i s m ,  never mind 
actually to recover lost ground. But Beaverbrook did not 
understand the relatively loose rein Baldwin allowed, or 
had to allow, his colleagues when in Opposition, and his 
reluctance to proscribe deviance in either direction, from 
A m e r y  to the free traders, unless it should be 
unavoidable. To some extent, this loose control was also 
a tactical decision on Baldwin’s part; it was thought that 
"he does not exercise party discipline because he intends 
to remain as vague and elusive as p o s s i b l e " . ^7 Five 
incidents in late March and early April served to feed the 
flames of B e a v e r b r o o k ’s para n o i a  about Conservative 
defeatism, and his restlessness at being a politician who 
had lost a party, but not yet found a role. The first 
three incidents may be grouped together, as they consisted 
of similar expressions of doubt or negativism on the part 
of three p r o m i n e n t  C o n s e r v a t i v e s :  two e x - C a b i n e t
Ministers, Churchill and Lord Eustace Percy, and a rising 
former junior minister, W. Orm#sby-Gore. Of these, 
Churchill’s speech to his constituents at Wanstead on 
18 March was typical, making it quite clear:
There would be no protective taxes on food unless the 
nation upon a direct vote on this definite issue 
decided that it was in the general interest. Any 
Conservative candidate was entitled to say to his
27. Outhwaite to Beaverbrook, 3 April 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, C284.
165
constituents, ’No food taxes unless you vote for them 
yourselves ’ .
28
The tone of this was bad enough in Beaverbrook’s eyes, but 
what was worse was the implication that neither Churchill 
nor the rest of the Party was going to make any real 
attempt to persuade the electorate to choose in favour of 
food taxes now or in the future. The fourth incident 
seemed symptomatic of this ^  facto dropping of the issue; 
the cautious platform of T. O ’Connor, the Conservative 
ca n d i d a t e  p r e p a r i n g  for the i m m i n e n t l y  anticipated 
Nottingham Central by-election.
The most serious incident of them all, however, was 
the publication in The on 25 March of a letter from
the leader of the Conservative Party in the House of 
Lords, Lord Salisbury. In Elibank’s words, it
upset the whole applecart. The effect of this letter 
is that whilst praising Beaverbrook and Baldwin for 
the policy ... he regards it as quite impracticable 
at the present moment.... In other words, he has 
t h r o w n  over the policy of B a l d w i n  and w h i l s t  
a s s e r t i n g  that he is no Cobden Free Trader, he 
preaches the Cobden faith in this letter.
29
The reception that met Salisbury’s initiative, and the 
defeat he suffered, served to expose the weakness of the
28. The Times, 19 March 1930,
29. Elibank diary, f. 43.
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Free Traders even when occupying powerful positions in the 
hierarchy, Beaverbrook himself was outraged, asserting 
that "there must necessarily be a crisis resulting from 
the Salisbury l e t t e r " , 30 but the real source of his 
strength was the similar reaction which it provoked in the 
ranks of the Conservative Party. Because Salisbury and 
the Free Trade group now seemed to be the ones endangering 
the fragile and p r e c i o u s  a t m o s p h e r e  of unity, they 
received absolutely no support from those quarters in 
which they might have expected to strike a chord. Yet they 
had provoked the wrath of the protectionist right, who 
could for once portray themselves in the role of defenders 
of the official party line against divisive groups. 
Elibank noted that the letter "has c r eated great 
antagonism in the minds of many of the old Unionist 
Party".3^ Considerable pressure was placed on Baldwin to 
denounce the letter, and on Salisbury to withdraw it. A 
formal letter from Gretton, signed by twenty-five Diehard 
MPs, was one aspect of this; even more serious was the 
threat from Page Croft to use the EIA as a forum for a 
meeting of the Parliamentary Party, one hundred and 
eighty-seven of whom were members of it, as a potential 
kangaroo court. The EIA executive decided on 2 April to 
inform the Chief Whip that such a meeting would be called 
the following week "unless strong action was taken to
30. B e a v e r b r o o k  to Lady Elibank, 25 M a r c h  1930, 
Beaverbrook MSS, C126.
31. Elibank diary, f. 43.
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r e p u d i a t e  Lord S a l i s b u r y ’s letter", and Page Croft 
communicated this threateningly mutinous resolve to 
Salisbury directly.32 Under this barrage, Salisbury and 
the other free traders were forced to retreat. Partly in 
order to save Baldwin from the necessity of pronouncing on 
the issue, Salisbury wrote a second letter to Th£ T^m_e^ 
which appeared on 8 April, ostensibly as a clarification, 
in fact "practically renouncing" the previous letter: 
Beaverbrook "considered that Salisbury had come right down 
and that it was a regular ’crawl’."33 in the face of this, 
and under similar pressure, crucially both from within the 
party as well as from the threat of independent Crusade 
challengers in their seats, the other Free Traders also 
compromised, announcing a facesaving adherence to the 
Hotel Cecil line.3^ But these events had considerable 
imp a c t  on B e a v e r b r o o k ,  and their c o r o l l a r y  was his 
declaration to a meeting of Empire Crusaders at the Savoy 
Hotel that
the Crusade must go on with renewed energy and 
redoubled vigour ... they retained their independence 
and their liberty of action .... They were opposed 
to those who shirked the issue.,..
35
32. Gretton et. al. to Baldwin, 3 April 1930, Baldwin 
MSS, volume 31, ff. 70-71; EIA Exec., 2 April 1 930; 
Croft to Salisbury, 3 April 1930, Salisbury MSS S(4) 
134/122-3.
33. Elibank Diary, f . 49.
34. O ’Connor, speech at Nottingham, Th_e Ti^ ra£_s, 2 2 March 
1930.
35. The Times, 26 March 1930; Davidson to N. Chamberlain, 
26 March 1930, Davidson MSS.
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This was the first stage in Beaverbrook’s progress towards 
choosing the first of the three alternatives which he had 
outlined on 12 March to Davidson; to revive the Crusade as 
an independent force. The strains which these events had 
caued in late March and early April did not produce an 
immediate breakdown of the truce. They placed it in a 
more precarious position, as a result of confirming 
Beaverbrook’s touchiness and B a l d w i n ’s apparent lack of 
decisive control, and by provoking a semi-revival of the 
C r u s a d e . 36 Beaverbrook noted the comments of Neville 
Chamberlain, who "attributed the present situation to a 
feeling of distrust in every quarter", and added for 
himself that "I am growing more and more pessimistic at 
the prospect of making any progress on present lines".3?
However, breakdown was avoided for four reasons. 
First, the obvious rout of the Free Trade counterattack 
had removed some of the tension. Second, the efforts of 
several leading figures on both sides to hold the 
precarious truce together had some effect in reconciling 
Beaverbrook. These attempts, together with the third 
cause, the superficial co-operation of both camps in 
fighting the West Fulham by-election, which took place 
between 12 April and polling on 7 May, preserved at least 
the appearance of unity throughout the month of April. 
But the fourth reason was the most important of all: the
36. Beaverbrook to Winterton, 5 April 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, C328.
37. Beaverbrook to Rothermere, 22 March 1930, ibid., 
C284.
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fact that B e a v e r b r o o k  c o n t i n u e d  to trust B a l d w i n ’s 
sincerity. Should that prop fall, then the others would 
not prove strong enough to support the truce. Hence the 
importance of Beaverbrook’s belief that "Baldwin, however, 
is faithfully adhering to the policy he laid down in his 
speech of March 4th, but there are many rebels in his own
camp."38
* * * * * * * * * *
The pattern of the mid-phase of the truce, from 
Baldwin's speech at Manchester on 7 April to his next 
public pronouncement at Sheffield on 8 May, was of the 
slow erosion of this confidence in Baldwin, despite the 
efforts of mediating figures and co-operation in the West 
Fulham by-election. The conciliators represented a strand 
of party opinion which wanted Beaverbrook’s policy, or a 
fair approximation to it, to be adopted, whilst at the 
same time they feared the possible consequences for both 
that policy and the Conservative Party of all-out warfare 
between the factions. In the sense of the greater or 
lesser degrees to which they were prepared to support an 
extra-party pressure force to achieve their political aims, 
these figures were placed along a spectrum of opinion 
ranging from the Crusade Executive to that part of the 
Conservative Party which sought an advanced Imperial 
Policy. Thus Elibank from without, and Horne, Croft, 
A m e r y  and N e v i l l e  C h a m b e r l a i n  f r o m  w i t h i n  the 
Parliamentary party, all sought for the same reasons to
38. Beaverbrook to Elliott, 9 April 1930, ibid., C129.
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make the truce work. Their initiatives certainly gave it 
some stability, and probably made it last longer than it 
otherwise might have done, but the power of decisions lay 
between the principals on either side and beyond the reach 
of these albeit powerful figures.
Neville Chamberlain deliberately set out to keep the 
truce intact as the best means of p r o g r e s s . 39 Until the 
end of April, Chamberlain remained optimistic about the 
possibility of a genuine working relationship.^® He was 
not alone in offering Beaverbrook an unofficial alliance 
in this period, with the intention half of pulling his 
teeth, and half of using him to frighten the party on: 
Amery and Page Croft also adopted similar tactics. Croft 
attempted to channel Beaverbrook’s energies into more 
constructive and controlled use by inviting him on 12 
March to take a leading part in the Empire Industries 
A ssociation.^^ A f o r t n i g h t  later he e n c o u r a g e d  
Beaverbrook deliberately to open a campaign in Cornwall, 
The point of this was that the Conservatives had lost 
every seat in C o r n w a l l  to the Liberals in the 1929 
election, and whilst such a campaign would reap great 
benefits for the party, Croft pointed out, "you will be 
raising enthusiasm without coming into any definite clash
39. N. C h a m b e r l a i n  to B e a v erbrook, 7 April 1930, 
ibid., C80.
40. Ibid., 15 April 1930.
41. Croft to Beaverbrook, 12 March 1930, ibid., C101.
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with sitting Conservative M e m b e r s , I n  this period Croft 
and Amery moved closer to an open identification with 
Beaverbrook’s campaign, a process which the flexibility of 
the truce period made compatible with party l o y a l t y , ^ 3  
The clearest examples of the nature of these mediating 
influences, however, were the unsuccessful initiatives of 
Elibank, which culminated in his arrangement for a meeting 
over dinner on 3 April, held in a private dining room at 
the Savoy Hotel, to which he invited Beaverbrook, Horne, 
Neville Chamberlain, Hailsham, Cunliffe-Lister and Amery. 
Elibank recounted:
I tried to throw oil on troubled waters by suggesting 
that all those present were the stalwarts of the 
party, and their only anxiety was to see that the 
policy was carried out and that he. Max, should trust 
them to see that this was done.
The dinner was a failure: if anything by creating a
misunderstanding between Chamberlain and Beaverbrook, it 
made matters worse rather than better.
From this points onwards the situation continued to 
drift w i t h o u t  i m p r o v e m e n t .  By the m i d d l e  of May, 
e x p e r i e n c e  was d e m o n s t r a t i n g  the lack of room for 
manoeuvre open to the loyal moderate protectionists,
who were being ground b e t w e e n  the upper and nether 
millstones of complete revolt against Baldwin, or the
42. Ibid., 24 March 1930.
4 3. Beaverbrook to Croft, 16 April 1930, ibid., C 101 ; 
Amery to Beaverbrook, 5 March, 13 and 17 April, and 
6 May 1930, ibid. , C5.
44. Elibank Diary, ff. 44-5.
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opposite position or being forced into supporting him on 
constitutional grounds against the pretensions of the 
press l o r d s . The oracks apparent in this middle phase 
of the truce, during the month of April, were papered over 
by the surface co-operation of both sides in the West 
Fulham by-election. The contest took place between the 
vacancy of the seat, on 12 April, and polling on 7 May. 
The by-election campnign seemed to exemplify the truce at 
work, with the combination of the Crusade, Beaverbrook’s 
influential London press, and Central Office, behind a 
mutually acceptably local candidate. Sir Cyril Cobb’s 
political attitudes were such that Beaverbrook, even had 
he wished, could hardly have done otherwise than throw all 
his weight behind the offical nominee. Cobb was an 
influential figure in the Navy League, and agreed with 
much of Rothermere's Diehard position. Above all, Cobb 
was a sincere supporter of Imperial Preference and Empire 
Free Trade, and k n o w n  to B e a v e r b r o o k  as such.^^ 
Beaverbrook determined to try and secure as substantial a 
victory for Cobb as possible, to prove the electoral value 
of his policy. "If we win this contest, the Conservative 
Party will be stampeded", he w r o t e . I n  fact, the
45. Comments of Horne noted in ibid., f. 53.
46. Beaverbrook to Rothermere, 24 April 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, C284.
47. Ibid., 27 April 1930.
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Crusade role in the by-election was kept to a minimum by 
the firm grip kept on the contest by Central Office, which 
controlled the direction and organisation of the fight 
through its London area agent, Edwards. Beaverbrook made 
the best of this, not wishing to rock the boat, and 
claimed that Edwards was in any case the most efficient 
man available. The c a l c u l a t e d  result was that, as 
Beaverbrook himself described, the Crusade effort was 
li m i t e d  to only those parts of its appeal that the 
Conservative party wished to exploit - Beaverbrook’s 
London daily press, and Beaverbrook’s own charisma as a 
p l a t f o r m  o r a t o r . B e a v e r b r o o k  i m m e r s e d  h i m s e l f  
completely in the by-election for three weeks, giving the 
party leadership a much-needed breathing space. He had 
been adroitly outmanoeuvred; any failure could be placed 
at the doorstep of his policy, while any success claimed 
c r e d i b l y  as the c o n t r i b u t i o n  of the offi c i a l  party 
machine,
The result, on 8 May, was a very narrow victory 
indeed; Cobb gained the seat by a margin of only 240 
votes. This result was interpreted quite differently by 
Beaverbrook and by the party leadership. During the 
course of his campaigning, Beaverbrook became aware how 
much the social character of Fulham was changing, into an 
area with a preponderance of Socialist voters. Under such 
circumstances, he wrote to Gwynne, even a narrow victory
48. Beaverbrook to Elibank, 4 May 1930, ibid., C126,
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appeared to be a considerable achievement.^® Whilst 
Beaverbrook took the by-election to be an encouraging 
signal, the party leadership, expecting a much bigger 
margin of victory, looked on a gain by only 240 votes as 
tantamount to defeat, and a negative sign of the dangers 
of a full-blown Crusade p o l i c y . 5® This dichotomy of 
i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s ,  w h i c h  was to be a feature of the 
ambiguous results of most of the by-election fights of the 
period, was to prove an important contributory factor in 
w i d e n i n g  the gulf b e t w e e n  the C r u s a d e r s  and the 
Baldwinites, encouraging each to progress a stage further 
down the road they were already travelling. Nonetheless, 
West Fulham seemed to demonstrate the success of the 
truce, with Baldwin sending after the declaration of the 
result perhaps the friendliest communication he was ever 
to pen to Beaverbrook, beginning "My dear Max", and 
offering congratulations "on your gallant conduct in the 
arena".  ^^
The excitement of the West Fulham contest held the 
alliance together during April 1930, and obscured the 
g r o w i n g  and real d i v e r g e n c e  b e t w e e n  the two sides. 
However, Baldwin's political strategy was partly unveiled 
in his only plaftform speech scheduled in April, at 
Manchester on the 7th. In this address, Baldwin dwelt at
49. Beaverbrook to Gwynne, 9 May 1930, Gwynne MSS, 14.
50. Davidson to Gwynne, 7 May 1930, ibid., 18.
51. Baldwin to Beaverbrook, 7 May 1930, Beaverbrook MSS, 
C19.
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length on the value of safeguarding as the principal 
remedy available. Inter-imperial trade was mentioned in 
the context of its future possibilities, and the function 
of the referendum in postponing the food tax issue was 
made quite c l e a r , ^2 However, the negativism of this 
portion of the speech was b a l a n c e d  by a vague, but 
inspirational, final section that sounded the trumpet for 
"those two great lines of the policy that we shall work 
[for] - safeguarding for our own people and Imperial Unity 
for our people and for the Empire." Beaverbrook's faith 
in Baldwin survived this diminished but not destroyed, 
though it was evident that if Baldwin were to continue 
speaking in this vein Beaverbrook would claim it was a 
breach of the agreement. In the meantime, coming as it 
did hard on the heels of the Free Traders’ attack, but 
before their rout, Beaverbrook ascribed the lack of fire 
in the speech to weakness under the influence of the 
caution of Davidson, Salisbury and Churchill rather than 
being a true reflection of Ba l d w i n ’s own mind. Thus j
Beaverbrook for a crucial period turned his fire against I
Ithese elements, when in fact their influence was small and II
diminishing daily.33 So long as Beaverbrook concentrated j
upon the symptoms, rather than the cause, of the failure I
of the Conservative Party to fall in line behind the !
1Empire Free Trade Policy, his course was bound to be i
I52. T ^  Times, 8 April 1930. î
53. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 20 April 1930, NC 18/1/692. iii176 I
erratic. Thus at Hertford, a d d r e s s i n g  the local 
Conservative Association in Salisbury’s own backyard on 8 
April, he said that ’he had been driven to the task of 
addressing meetings up and down the country. Their policy 
was languishing for want of exponent s’’.3^ Yet three days 
later at Nottingham, he proclaimed his faith in Baldwin 
and pinned the blame, not only for present dissent but 
also for having thrown a spanner into the protectionist 
works between 1924 and 1929, on the Conservative Free 
Traders. He affirmed that he
understood Mr. Baldwin to promise, if returned to 
power. Empire Free Trade, with a tax on foreign 
foodstuffs. He threw out safeguards for himself in 
the form of a Referendum. They agreed, but they 
u n d e r s t o o d  him to mean that he w ould plough a 
straight furrow through the General^ Election 
through a Referendum - and that he would not look 
back until he had given them their keys|tone - a tax 
on foreign foodstuffs. !
: 33
It was difficult to square this with the Manchester 
speech; it was to prove impossible to reconcile it with 
Baldwin's next public foray, at Sheffield a month later.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
B e t w e e n  these two p r o n o u n c e m e n t s  of o f f i c i a l  
Conservative policy on 7 April and 8 May, the foundations
of trust upon which the truce existed were significantly
54. The Times, 9 April 1930.
55. The Times, 12 April 1930.
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eroded by a n u m b e r  of speci f i c  i n c i d e n t s  and the 
crystallisation of two more general background themes. It 
was B a ldwin’s good fortune that only one of the specific 
i n c i d e n t s  i d e n t i f i e d  him d i r e c t l y  with a n e g a t i v e  
approach. This was the problem of the troubled candidacy 
of O’Connor in the Nottingham Central by-election, which 
inevitably involved Baldwin, as such matters as the 
g r a n t i n g  or w i t h h o l d i n g  of o fficial a p p r o v a l  to a 
candidate were prerogatives of the Party Leader alone. 
O ’Connor's attempts to square the circle of satisfying 
both the demands of Beaverbrook in London and the desires 
of his by-election audiences in Nottingham Central caused 
periodic strains. O r i g i n a l l y  O ’Connor had veered 
considerably from the official party line, but the threats 
of Beaverbrook brought him back from that exposed position 
to one of sheltering behind the shield of the Hotel Cecil 
policy, i n t e r p r e t e d  in its most d e f e n s i v e  s e n s e , 3 6  
However, the damage had been done, and Beaverbrook, 
suspiciously receiving the reports of O'Connor's speeches, 
began to claim that O'Connor had forfeited the right to 
the party label, to the approval of the leader, and to the 
support of Central O f f i c e . 37 Baldwin, however, could not 
allow Beaverbrook to become the arbiter of political
56, O'Connor to Baldwin, 3 April 1930, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 165, f. 243.
57. B e a v e r b r o o k  to N . C h a m b e r l a i n ,  8 April 1930, 
Beaverbrook MSS, C80; Beaverbrook to Davidson, 7 
April 1 930, ibid.. Cl 11.
178
acceptability, for the powers of withdrawal of Central 
Office support, and the last resort of o f f i c i a l  
excommunication, rested in part with the local Executive, 
but otherwise with the Leader of the party alone. Now 
that O ’Connor had shaped up to at least an appearance of 
orthodoxy, Baldwin determined to block Beaverbrook’s 
pretensions by resisting attacks upon him. This he did 
partly through the medium of Davidson, his party Chairman, 
and p artly by se n d i n g  O ’Connor a public letter of 
support.38 In the tactical short term this, together with 
the efforts of Amery and Neville Chamberlain to dissuade 
Beaverbrook from his threat of nominating an independent 
candidate, w h i c h  would have ended the truce, saved 
O’Connor’s bacon. Beaverbrook acknowledged this by coming 
to a private bargain with O'Connor, receiving from him 
promises concerning his future conduct in an interview on 
8 M a y . 39 But this was achieved at the price of 
identifying Baldwin himself more clearly as the main 
i m p e d i m e n t  to progress. This was not a c o n c l u s i o n  
Beaverbrook wished to draw, with its implication of a 
return to i n t e r n e c i n e  warfare, but it was b e c o m i n g  
unavoidable.
58. Davidson to Beaverbrook, 8 April 1930, ibid.; Baldwin 
to O ’Connor, 3 April 1930, Baldwin MSS, volume 165, 
f. 244 (published that day).
59. Beaverbrook to Amery, 8 May 1930, Beaverbrook MSS, 
C5.
60. Beaverbrook to Davidson, 7 April 1930, ibid., C111.
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The other incidents which directly contributed to the 
collapse of the truce were all linked to the beleaguered 
position of the party Chairman, Davidson. His situation 
was al r e a d y  prec a r i o u s ,  part l y  as a result of his 
m a n a g e m e n t  of the party before and during the 1929 
election campaign, but more seriously for two other 
causes. The first of these was the result' of the fact 
that the party Chairman was also the Chairman of the main
organ of rank and file r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  f^eeling, theI
Executive Committee of the National Union, |and was thus 
institutionally in a position to strangle dissent at 
birth, and to exploit his powers for the purposes of his 
appointer, the Leader of the party. Davidson, who was 
intensely loyal to Baldwin personally, was blatant in his 
failure adequately to represent the feelings of the party 
rank and file, and much of the clamour for intra-partyiId e m o c r a c y  was the p r o duct of this. S ^  great had 
resentment become, that the whole position of the National 
Union Executive Chairmanship had been cast into the 
melting pot, with the result that it was resolved at the 
1929 party conference to end the ex-officio position of 
the party Chairman forthwith, and Davidson’s successor as 
Chairman in mid-1930 no longer had the same powers, 
This much-resented facet of Davidson’s chairmanship of the
61. For debate on this issue, see NU Exec.; 16 July, 22 
October, 10 December 1929, 8 April 1930; and at the 
Party Conference of November 1929; for local feeling: 
Guildford C A , Exec. 2 May 1930; article in W e e k e nd 
Review, 17 May 1930.
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party organisation was exacerbated by the second cause of 
his unpopularity: his unfortunate personal manner, at
once tactless, prickly, and offensive. The examples of 
the important figures in the party hierarchy outside the 
charmed circle of Baldwinites whom Davidson alienated by 
his methods of business and his manner were so numerous as 
to provide by themselves a powerful coalition of unrest.
He had also made many enemies among the right-of-centre 
b a c k b e n c h  MPs, such as J. Remer, who wrote: "the
Conservative Party will never be a band of brothers so 
long as Mr. Davidson is Chairman of the P a r t y " . 6 3  More 
importantly, Davidson's shortcomings were beginning to be 
recognised as a liability amongst several powerful figures 
in the party leadership. Derby wrote bluntly that "we must 
get rid of Davi d s o n  - he is useless", and Neville 
C h a m b e r l a i n ,  t h i n k i n g  along s i m i l a r  lines and also 
convinced of the need to cut away the deadwood at the 
Central Office, was preparing to move to oust Davidson and 
replace him with a nominee of his own.^^
62. Correspondence quoted in James, op. cit., pp. 312- 
313; Halsbury-Davidson correspondence, March 1930, 
Davidson MSS.
63. Remer to Baldwin, 7 April 1930, copy in Beaverbrook 
MSS, B172; Courthope to Beaverbrook, 17 May 1930, 
ibid., B139; Hall-Caine to Beaverbrook, March 19 
1930, ibid., B135; Elibank Diary, f. 28; Davidson to 
Hamilton, 6 February 1930, in James, op. cit., p. 
312.
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The desire to jetison Davidson, which was in any case 
becoming acute by the end of April 1930, was confirmed by 
two f a ilures of p o l i t i c a l  m a n a g e m e n t  on his part. 
The first of these was the disastrous "Home and Empire" 
public campaign promoted by Davidson for the month of May. 
The stimulus for such a campaign had come originally in 
suggestions from some northern constituencies, and it was 
only in these urban seats of Lancashire and the West 
Midlands, and in parts of Scotland, that the campaign 
aroused any enthusiasm at a l l . ^3 On e reason for the 
failure of the "Home and Empire" campaign outside certain 
limited areas was the fact that May was not considered a 
good m o n t h  for p o l i t i c a l  p r o p a g a n d a  work, and the 
launching of an effort then was transparently a tactic of 
desperation on Davidson’s part. Another reason for n o n ­
p a r t i c i p a t i o n  was the d i s t r u s t  felt by many local 
executives at this time for any leadership from Central 
Office. However, the main reason for the failure of the 
idea to catch on outside selected cautious regions was the 
negativism of the pledge on policy, the securing of 
signatures for which was the centrepiece of the campaign. 
Despite repeated interventions by Neville Chamberlain in 
the drafting stage, the declaration of party policy
64. Elibank Diary, f. 47; Derby to Beaverbrook, 6 March
1930, Beaverbrook MSS, Cl 13; N. to Hilda Chamberlain,
29 March 1930, NC 18/1/687.
65. Resolution from Lancashire and Cheshire Prov. Div.,
NU Exec., 11 February 1 930 ; Accrington C A , Exec., 
21 January 1930.
182
contained in the pledge reeked of pragmatic n e g a t i v i s m , 66 
This cautious interpretation of party policy went down 
well in seats with a large industrial working class 
population, or where Free Trade sentiment was still 
s t r o n g . G7 Furthermore, in the procès of falling over 
backwards to satisfy the prejudices of the north, the 
south had become alienated from the campaign, indicating 
once again the socio-geographic problems of the ’two 
nations’ north-south divide which plagued Conservative 
party politics throughout the era of the tariff reform 
struggle. The refusal of the south to take up the ’’Home 
and Empire’’ campaign was clearly and unequivocally linked 
with grievances concerning the retrograde nature of party 
policy, the lack of an agricultural pledge, and hostility
6 6. Ho me^  ^nd E m p ire , volume 1, number 3, May 1930; 
Central Office Circular announcing campaign, copy in 
Beaverbrook MSS, C 111 ; N . to Hilda Chamberlain, 19 
March 1930, to Ida Chamberlain, 4 April 1930, NC 
18/1/687, 689.
67. Birmingham CA, Agents Report to Council, 5 June 1930; 
Walsall CA, Exec., 30 May 1930; Accrington CA, Exec., 
5 April 1930; North Cornwall CA, Exec., 14 April 
1930; Lincoln CA, Exec., 24 April 1930; on north-east 
Scotland, Ford to Baldwin, 26 June 1 9 3 0 , Baldwin MSS, 
v o l u m e  57, ff. 45-57. Even in the north, some 
a s s o c i a t i o n s  were d o u b t f u l  about the Pledge; 
Clitheroe CA, Council, 24 April 1930.
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to Central O f f i c e , is clear that the vocal hostility 
of a substantial number of Associations was only the tip 
of the iceberg; many others voted with their feet by 
ignoring the campaign altogether. An analysis of the 
surviving Association records suggests that at the most 
generous estimate only one quarter of local parties 
seriously participated. On any criteria such a response 
is in i t s e l f  a d i s m a l  f a i l u r e  and e v i d e n c e  of 
mismanagement by, and loss of confidence in, the party 
organisers. The party’s Principal Agent, Robert Topping, 
acknowledged this fact: "Our Home and Empire Campaign is
not going at all well... the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  are 
disinclined to follow our l e a d . "69
If the debacle of the "Home and Empire" campaign 
damaged further Davidson’s uneasy position, the second 
incident finally sealed his fate. This concerned the
' oFpublication by Central Office on his instructions^a 
publicity leaflet in which the depiction of =party policy
68, Ashford CA, Joint Standing Ctte., 3 May 1930; South 
Oxfordshire CA, Exec., 7 May 1930; East Dorset CA, 
Exec., 7 April 1930; North West Wiltshire CA, Exec,, 
1 May 1 9 3 0 ; Uxbridge CA, Exec, and Council, 26 April 
1 930; Chelmsford CA, Exec., 13 June 1 930; Ealing CA, 
Exec., 11 April 1 930; St. George’s CA, Exec., 12 and 
21 May 1930; Blackpool CA, Exec., 28 April 1930, The 
minutes of many other associations are silent on the 
subject of the campaign, which must suggest strongly 
that they did not participate; if they had, either a 
note of the result, or traces of the financial and 
administrative arrangements, would have| appeared in 
their minutes. I
69. Memo, Topping to Davidson, 2 May 1930, in James, op. 
cit., p p . 335-336. '
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seemed to be a further retreat from the Hotel Cecil 
position. This document, known by its reference number of 
leaflet 3 15 3, c o n t a i n e d  a yet fir m e r  ’no food t a x ’ 
promise, and watered the policy down further from Empire 
Free Trade to being only some exercise in limited imperial 
bartering more akin to the activities of the Empire
Marketing Board than to the grand conception of Joseph
Chamberlain.7® Once again, the breakdown in mutual 
understanding and confidence was revealed. Davidson sent 
Beaverbrook a copy of this document in its printed form 
the day before its release, for information as a courtesy; 
this hardly accorded with Beaverbrook’s belief that he 
would see such items at the drafting stage so that his
role would be that of a pa r t i c i p a n t ,  not m e r e l y  a
spectator. During the three weeks following the release 
of leaflet 3153 the chorus of disapproval grew stronger. 
Not surprisingly, several of the more advanced southern 
constituency associations reacted strongly to the leaflet; 
calling it ’’innaccurate and misleading" and demanding that 
"it should be withdrawn from publication".71
Beaverbrook’s reaction paralleled this, becoming 
progressively stronger with the passage of time. Writing
70. Leaflet 3153, in James, op. cit., p. 332,
71. Chichester CA, Finance and GP Ctte., 28 April 1930; 
Brighton CA, Res, of 17 April 1 9 30, copy in 
Beaverbrook MSS, C 111 ; Chairman of Dart ford CA to 
Beaverbrook, 26 April 1930, ibid., B165.
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to Amery he described his sense of trust betrayed: "As to
leaflet 3153, it is a startling case of bad faith...."72. 
Beaverbrook indicated his unhappiness at the course ofI
events by publicly attacking the offending publication in 
a press s t a t e m e n t  rele a s e d  on 16 April* o m i n o u s l y  
declaring that "the publication of this leaflet is one in 
a chain of events which have gradually made the present 
position extremely difficult".73 However, Beaverbrook had
not yet come to the point of a definite breach, for he
Istill desired to work with Baldwin, not agaiinst him, and
i
he still hoped Baldwin would move towards hi Is position.7^ 
Instead, Baldwin chose to take the opposite path, and from 
this point onwards the truce deteriorated, until his 
speeches of early May finally shattered it.
Two longer terra factors were also pulling the props 
out from underneath the truce. In one direction the trend 
of party opinion continued along its evolutionary path 
towards open protectionism, and thus to a rejection of the 
referendum policy in favour of the call for the immediate 
"free hand" to impose tariffs as soon as the party next 
gained power. By the beginning of June politicians were
72. Beaverbrook to Amery, 14, 20 and 25 April, 1930, 
Beaverbrook MSS, C5.
73. The Times, 16 April 1930.
74. Beaverbrook to Hall, 25 April 1930, Beaverbrook MSS, 
B153.
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beginning to sense that a further shift in public opinion 
g e n e r a l l y  had taken place, as a result of rising 
unemployment, undermining free trade opinion and causing a 
move towards tariffs: "we are not far from a landslide on
Protection", noted Austen C h a m b e r l a i n , 75 Even Davidson 
thought that in the industrial north, "there is a growing 
swing towards Empire and S a f e g u a r d i n g  ".76 But public 
opinion did not advance either quickly or uniformly, and 
thus the foundation of any definite policy upon the 
consideration of public acceptability was as likely to 
succeed as b u i l d i n g  a house on s h i f t i n g  sandbanks. 
Furthermore, as was so often the case, if public opinion 
had advanced once step, the opinions of the party rank and 
file, having sensed this, rather than narrowing the gap, 
themselves were stimulated into another leap f o r w a r d . 77 
Thus Baldwin’s dilemma of reconciling electoral pragmatism 
with the demands of his followers became if anything, for 
a short while at least, even more difficult. For it was 
quite clear that, even within the dichotomy of the north- 
south contradiction, the general trend of grassroots 
opinion was consistently moving away from the referendum 
towards the free hand. The divergence between north and 
south was one of pace: though the evolution of fiscal
opinion in the North was not static, it did not relinquish
75. A. to Hilda Chamberlain, 14 June 1930, AC 5/1/505.
76. Davidson to Beaverbrook, 11 April 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, Cl 11.
77. Croft to Beaverbrook, 6 June 1930, ibid., C101.
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the shelter of the referendum as promptly as did the
South. In part this was the consequence of the different
degree of pressure exerted by the Empire Crusaders still
in existence in local branches, and in the process of
being reactivated as a pressure group. Essentially their
impact was only upon the southern seats; in areas of
traditional agricultural Toryism, in the suburbs, and in
the seaside resort t o w n s . 78 However, in the North the
Crusade was weak to the point of non-existence, and thus
the natural d i v i s i o n  b e t w e e n  the 'two nations' was
exacerbated by unequal distributions of the pressurising
effects of the Crusade, The widening gulf that resulted
was clearly visible, and can be seen in the contrast
between the views of the prospective candidate set before
the Wakefield association in the middle of June 1930:
Dr. Hillman concluded by saying that he was pleased 
that the electorate would not be asked to approve of 
taxes or foreign food at the next election. He was 
convinced that Mr. Baldwin's policy of the Referendum 
was infinitely more preferable ,..
with the resolution passed by the South Oxfordshire
division on 31 May, which stated that
there is no desire for a referendum after another 
election: the time to appeal to the people, and to
educate them to the advantage of developing the 
resources of the British Empire is now, as advocated 
by Lord Beaverbrook,
79
78, Rothermere to Beaverbrook, 23 June 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, C284; examples of constituencies under pressure, 
correspondence on Cornwall, Baldwin MSS, volume 57, 
ff. 59-77.
79* W a k e f i e l d  CA, C o u n c i l ,  18 June 1930; S o u t h  
Oxfordshire CA, AGM, 31 May 1930.
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The political geography of party opinion is nowhere more 
apparent than in the chorus of demands emerging at this 
time from the South for a strong, clear, more advanced 
definition of policy.®®
The party leadership felt it politically suicidal to 
accede to these demands, aware as they were that the 
Labour government might collapse at any time, and bring 
about a general election in which an advanced policy could 
only be a liability and an easy target for the Socialists. 
As a result, Baldwin was forced to rely upon vagueness as 
a deliberate tactical policy, in an attempt to paper over 
the gulf between the different sections of his party, and 
the widening gap between the forward elements and the mass 
of public opinion. This was hardly a respectable or 
i ns p i r i n g  position, and it brought with it its own 
p r o b l e m s ,  for the c o n f u s i o n  ove r  p o l i c y  in the 
constituencies was considerable.®1 A number of leading 
figues in the party attempted to solve this problem by 
offering their own versions of the policy, and were 
ignored and even, in the case of Derby, t a c t l e s s l y  
snubbed, by Baldwin for their pains: the last thing he
80. Chichester CA, Finance and GP Ctte,, 28 April 1930; 
Chelmsford CA, Exec., 13 June 1930; Harborough CA, 
Exec., 26 April 1 930 ; Oxford City CA, Finance and GP 
Ctte., 25 April 1930; North West Wiltshire CA, Exec., 
 ^ April 1930; Brighton CA, Res. of 23 June 1930 in
Ü£IlILi.E8 » 24 June 1930; West Fulham CA, Res. of
27 June 1930, copy in Beaverbrook MSS B149.
81. Denbighshire CA, Southern Area AGM, 5 April 1930.
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desired was to restrict his freedom to m a n o e u v r e . B y  
the beginning of May it was becoming apparent that this 
attempt to have his cake and eat it, by preserving the 
truce without paying the price in fiscal policy, was not a 
solution. The unsettling effects prompted the Chief 
Agent to write a warning memorandum to D a v i d s o n , a n d  
Baldwin finally had to reveal his attitude more clearly in 
the series of speeches he was making between 9 May and 2 
June, typically confined to northern cities, in support of 
the flagging "Home and Empire" campaign. Thus it was that 
the first of these, at Sheffield, brought Beaverbrook 
face-to-face with Baldwin's decision to opt for caution.
This brought into the open the second important long­
term trend, the failures of Baldwin himself as party 
leader and as opposition leader. First and foremost 
amongst Baldwin's failures was his lack of grip on policy, 
which, whether deliberate or nor, was by the,end of April
having counterproductive e f f e c t s . By attempting not to
1define his position too closely and thereby give hostages 
to fortune, Baldwin had given the widespread impression of 
his backpedalling furiously, whereas it would be more 
accurate to describe his tactics as an attempt simply to 
rest on the status quo of the Hotel Cecil agreement and
82. Derby to Hoare, 23 April 1930, Derby MSS, 920
DER(17)33.
83. Memo, Topping to Davidson, 2 May 1930, in James, op.
cit., p p . 335-336.
84. Hoare to Irwin, 17 May 1 930, Halifax MSS, India
Office EUR.C. 152/19/1/61.
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resist pressure to progress further.®^ - The reason for 
this was that Baldwin had to take into account wider 
circumstances than those relevant only to appeasing the 
protectionists. Faced with the determined assaults of the 
Labour gov e r n m e n t ' s  free trade C h a n c e l l o r  of the 
Exchequer, Snowden, on the limited safeguarding duties 
already in existence, Baldwin instinctively adopted a 
defensive position with the accent on the immediate 
preservation of these tariffs rather than discussing their 
possible future expansion. Commitments to restore any 
duties removed formed the centrepiece of his Home and 
Empire campaign speeches, relegating Empire Free Trade to 
the indefinite future. This strategy, perhaps acceptable 
in the atmosphere of winter 1929 with the fear of being 
caught in a snap election with the "dear food" albatross, 
now seemed weak and inadequate. Between February and 
November 1930 Baldwin was to adopt in slow stages policies 
demanded by the protectionist section of his party, only 
to find that the latter had discarded their previous 
positions in favour of one yet futher advancement. This 
produced widespread dissatisfaction with his leadership 
because, although his views evolved, they seemed to be 
formed by outside pressure, not inner convictions. Rather 
than his leading the party to a policy of tariff reform 
and imperial preference, it seemed to have lead him, willy 
nilly, to that goal. There were, of course, strong
85. Rothermere to Beaverbrook, 6 April 1930* Beaverbrook 
MSS, C284.
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reasons for Baldwin’s reluctance: he remembered clearly
that on the previous attempts of 1906 and 1923 the food 
tax issue had cost the party the election. He was loath 
to take up such a cross again until he was convinced that 
if he did not do so, an even worse fate would befall the 
party - its fragmentation into impotent splinters. It has 
been said that the first duty of a Conservative leader is 
to preserve the unity of the party. Certainly, it was 
only when Baldwin was convinced that such an upheaval was 
the alternative would he fully countenance protection. He 
did so with extreme reluctance, for the electoral straws 
in the wind were by no means clear during 1 930, and 
despite accumulating evidence by the end of that year of a 
shift in public opinion away from free trade, Baldwin 
still believed that in a general election, when the chips 
were down, working class urban voters would vote for 
safeguarding of industries, but not for duties on food 
imports. Thus he cast the content of his "Home and 
Empire" s peeches a c c o r d i n g l y ,  and thus also did he 
disappoint his rank and file, and alienate Beaverbrook. 
Baldwin’s position during the first half of T930 was that 
of a man performing a balancing trick whilst walking on a 
tightrope, and it is thus understandable that wherever 
possible he took refuge in vagueness and confusion. On 
too many occasions, however, this tactic appeared to his 
followers and colleagues as a policy of aimless drift, and 
a failure of leadership.
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This d e t e r i o r a t i n g  level of c o n f i d e n c e  in the 
Parliamentary party with B a l d w i n ’s leadership was only 
partly caused by his failure to provide the much-demanded 
’clear lead’ on policy. It was also the result of his 
more general weakness as a Parliamentary leader of 
op p o s i t i o n . ® ^  B a l d w i n  had cut a poor figure in 
opposition, and on no occasion succeeded in throwing off 
the i m m e d i a t e  p o s t - e l e c t i o n  attitude of giving the 
government the benefit of the doubt, an impression that 
was dampening the spirits of a party which was beginning 
to sense the Labour government’s growing vulnerability.®? 
Baldwin’s inability to lead a strongly partisan assault on 
the government was a principal cause of complaint against 
him by the Diehard right wing.®® By the middle of May 
d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n  with B a l d w i n  was spreading amongst 
backbench MPs. Inskip, meeting Headlam on the 19th, told 
him
that feeling in the party was bad - antagonism 
against JCC Davidson and annoyance with Baldwin for 
not taking a stronger attitude against the government 
in the House. Everybody appears to be at sixes and 
sevens.
89
86. N. to Hilda C h a m b e r l a i n ,  13 October 1929» NO 
18/1/672.
87. Derby to N. C h a m b e r l a i n ,  25 F e b r u a r y  1931» N C 
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88. Brentford to Salisbury, 17 April 1930, Salisbury MSS, 
S(4) 134/159.
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B a l d w i n ’s failure to shine as an opposition leader was
exacerbated by his aloofness from many of the younger
MPs, and his frequent absences from the House during
1 9 3 0 ,9 ® This r e m o t e n e s s  was further e m p h a s i s e d  by
Baldwin's tactic of spending his time and energy during
much of 1930 in platform speaking campaigns stumping the
country.91 This may have been a subconscious withdrawal
from the Commons as an arena in which he was doing badly,
but in retrospect Bridgeman considered it to have been a
tactical misjudgement:
Baldwin did not realise that the centre of discontent 
was in London & the House, & spent too much of his 
time & energy in innumerable speeches & tours about 
the country, instead of occupying himself with 
conversation with, and consideration of, the more 
important members of the party outside the Old 
Cabinet, and of the rank and file of MPs. His 
s trength e x h a u s t e d  itself in these c o u n t l e s s  
speeches....
92
Baldwin’s failure as a partisan opposition leader was 
fully exposed over the question of the London Naval 
Conference and its provisions for disarmament negotiated 
by the government in May 1930. Further reductions in the 
Navy were r e g a r d e d  with m i s g i v i n g s  by much of the 
Conservative Party, and the proposals of the treaty, 
whilst arousing little criticism from the majority of
90. H. Balfour, op. cit., p. 76.
91.' A, to Hilda Chamberlain, 1 June 1930, AC 5/1/503.
92. Bridgeman journal, July 1930, volume II, pp. 221-223.
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public opinion, were an anathema to the Conservative right 
wing. Churchill in particular adopted a position of 
intransigent opposition to the treaty, and his concern was 
echoed in the critical resolutions on the treaty forwarded 
from the constituencies.93 Baldwin, sensing that on this 
issue the party was out of touch with public opinion,
efollowed a cautious and non-commijtal line, but this,
combined with the growing dissatisfaction on other fronts,
came near to causing a rebellion on the back benches.
Significantly, the opinions of the Diehard wing were
echoed across an unusually wide spectrum of party opinion,
and found expression in the form of the 1 922 Private
Members Committee, where it was decided to urge on the
leader the case for a strong party protest against the
treaty. The lack of central direction was exposed when
eighty-eight Conservative MPs put their names to a strong
motion rejecting the crucial Part III of the treaty, to
find on 26 May that their leader would only make the
milder criticism of asking for a Select Committee on the 
94issue . ^
The different strands of dissatisfaction: with
Davidson as Chairman, with Baldwin as opposition leader, 
and with the ambiguous policy expressions of both, were 
coming to a head at the same time as the uneasy truce was
93. Churchill to Baldwin, 17 May 1 930, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 117, ff. 53-54; East Wolverhampton CA, Luton 
CA, Resolutions in NU Exec., 17 June 1930.
94. Zll®. May 1930; P. Goodhart and U, Branston, 
o p . cit., p . 43.
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d i s i n t e g r a t i n g .  Neville C h a m b e r l a i n  a s s e s s e d  the 
position in the second half of May 1930:
.... our p a r t y  is in a ver y  d i s g r u n t l e d  and 
disheartened condition. SB’s speeches so far have 
been very disappointing.... I hear that Max is 
thoroughly dissatisfied and rebellious ... the fact 
is t ha t  t h e r e  is a c o n s i d e r a b l e  a m o u n t  of 
justification for his contention that the party is 
not all out for the policy. I am getting continual 
rumours of dissatisfaction with the leadership and if 
David[son] does not make his a n n o u n c e m e n t  [of 
resignation] soon I foresee an explosion.... [The 
backbenchers] are thoroughly dissatisfied with what 
they consider to be want of leadership by the leader, 
and I take rather a serious view of their action, 
which looks to me like the first beginnings of a 
revolt.
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Whilst these b a c k g r o u n d  t h e m e s  were e r o ding the 
foundations of the truce, Beaverbrook’s uneasiness had 
grown with the increasing intimations that Baldwin did not 
intend to progress beyond his present position. In 
parallel with this Beaverbrook’s frustration mounted at 
the way he a p p e a r e d  to have painted h i m s e l f  into a 
tactical corner with the suggestion of the referendum, a 
suggestion Baldwin now seemed to be using, as Beaverbrook 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  c o m p l a i n e d ,  ’’as a shield instead of a 
s w o r d ’’.9® But it took some time for the process of 
disillusionment with the Hotel Cecil concordat to mature 
in Beaverbrook, a process in any case slowed by the 
frenzied activity of West Fulham. His restlessness was at
95. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 17 May 1930, MC 18/1/695.
96. Beaverbrook to Hoare, 15 May 1930, Templewood MSS, 
VI/1 .
196
first apparent in private conversation and correspondence, 
and not made public until the end of May. For, despite 
all the hard things he occasionally said of the party 
leader, it took time for Beaverbrook to lose his faith in 
Baldwin, and to come surprisingly reluctantly to the 
conclusion that it would be necessary to attack, perhaps 
even destroy, his position to carry the spirit, as well as 
the letter, of Empire Unity.
These general themes provided the setting for the 
final phase of the truce, in May and early June 1930. The 
increasing tensions underlying this last period were 
exposed first by the Crystal Palace speech debacle. This 
illustrated Beaverbrook’s powerful appeal to the party 
grassroots, Davidson’s incompetence, and the mounting 
counter-attack to the latter’s use of leaflet 3153. 
Empire Day had become as much a party as a national 
festival, and was a common occasion for the organisation 
of political mass meetings. Baldwin was due to address 
such a rally of South London Conservatism at the Crystal 
Palace on Empire Day, 24 May 1930, and when this was being 
organised in early April, the London Associations insisted 
that Beaverbrook should be asked to chair the meeting, in 
order to give it the Empire Crusade seal of approval and 
thus personify the truce. Davidson wrote to Beaverbrook
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on 14 April, extending the invitation to preside at the 
Crystal Palace, only three days after he had forwarded 
Beaverbrook the first copies of leaflet 3153. At this 
point Neville Chamberlain learned of the planned meeting, 
and was horrified at the tactical blunder Davidson had 
made in placing Baldwin and the party in the role of 
supplicants. He sent Davidson to see Beaverbrook, and to 
ask him to decline the embarrassing honour. Beaverbrook 
so obliged, indicating he was commited to attend the EIA 
Empire Day Rally in Hyde Park.9? At this point, however, 
the question of the Crystal Palace rally became entangled 
with the controversy raging around leaflet 3153, over 
which Beaverbrook’s anger was by now becoming known. The 
South London constituencies were not only generally 
sympathetic to the empire free trade policy, but were also 
more concerned than other areas not to antagonise the 
Press Lords, for the power of the Beaverbrook-Rothermere 
press was predominantly based in London and the Home 
Counties, where the principal readership of the D£^^y 
Express and Daily Mail was reinforced by their control of 
the two London evening daily papers, the Evening Standard 
and Evening News. London, indeed, was to be Beaverbrook’s 
s t a m p i n g  ground, and c o n s i s t e n t l y  the region of 
Conservatism most responsive to the beat of his drum. At
97. Davidson to Beaverbrook, 14 April 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, C111; N. to Ida Chamberlain, 20 April 1930, NC 
18/1/692; Beaverbrook to Davidson, 16 April 1930, 
Beaverbrook MSS, C 11 1 ; Croft to Beaverbrook, 9 May 
1 930, ibid.. Cl 01.
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preliminary meeting on 23 April 1930, the London local 
Associations blamed Beaverbrook’s refusal on the Central 
Office and on leaflet 3153, and determined that they must 
secure Beaverbrook’s presence if the rally was to be worth 
staging,98 in addition, as the Diehard London MP Sir 
Philip Dawson wrote to Beaverbrook, ’’a resolution was 
passed by a large majority of those present that they 
would not support a meeting at the Crystal Palace unless 
you and Mr. Baldwin were on the platform together".99 The
I
leadership and Central Office seemed dangerously on the 
verge of losing control over the party altogether. By the 
time this request reached Beaverbrook, however, his 
opposition to leaflet 3153 had hardened to such a point 
that on this occasion he ^Z_d make it the pretext for a
second refusal,^®® When this was communicated to the
!
London Association Chairmen and MPs at their jnext meeting 
on 29 April,
there was a feeling of apprehension onj the part of 
some present that because Beaverbrook had refused to 
come to the Crystal Palace meeting, it would not be a 
success
and "a large majority" of those present decided to cancel 
it. This was more than a storm in a teacup, as the 
party’s principal agent, Robert Topping acknowledged on 2
98. Memo, Topping to Davidson, 2 May 1930, in James, op. 
cit., p p . 335-336.
99* Dawson to Beaverbrook, 24 April 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, B141.
100. Beaverbrook to Hall, 25 April 1930, ibid.i, B153*
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May in reviewing the "extremely disturbing" and "most 
serious" events within the rank and file organisations 
during April.
It is clear, however, that the final and decisive 
factor in the breakdown of the Hotel Cecil concordat was 
the content and tone of B a l d w i n ’s speeches in support of 
the "Home and Empire" c a m p a i g n . W i t h  these, the 
negativism implicit in Ba l d w i n ’s last platform address 
given at Manchester a month before, on 7 April, became 
explicit, and the truce moved into its final phase of 
disintegration. The most damaging of these was the first, 
given at Sheffield on 8 May 1930. The pitch of the 
address was wholly negative and defensive, opening with 
the very mild criticism of the g o v e r n m e n t ’s election 
promises of 1929 that "many of their promises were made in 
p e r f e c t l y  good faith, but it was the good faith of 
i g n o r a n c e " . T h e  main body of the speech consisted of a 
defence of the threatened safeguarding duties, though 
Baldwin did take one step forward in indicating that 
safeguarding would be applied to the iron and steel 
industries by a Conservative government. Baldwin paid lip 
service to the concept of Empire Free Trade, but qualified 
it in three significant ways: first, by insisting that 
extension of safeguarding at home was somehow an essential
101. Memo, Topping to Davidson, 2 May 1930, in James, op.
cit., pp. 335-336.
102. L. S. Amery, My Political Life ( 1 955), volume III, p. 
25.
103. The Times, 9 May 1930.
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first step to negotiations with the Dominions, a proposal 
which in practice would postpone such negotiations to the 
end, rather than the beginning, of a new Conservative 
g o v e r n m e n t .  Secondly, m e n t i o n  of a g r i c u l t u r e  was 
conspicuous by its absence. Baldwin's third qualification 
was to indicate that the referendum idea was not, as 
Beaverbrook had intended, a transitory phase in the 
evolution of party commitments on the road to adopting a 
position of complete freedom to impose duties when next in 
possession of a Commons majority - the so-called "free 
hand" policy. Baldwin instead spoke of the referendum as 
if it were the definitive and final stage of policy, 
promising :
I will not ask the people of this country at the 
forthcoming General Election to put any tax on 
foreign foods.
In the series of speeches which followed Baldwin gave even 
more e m p h a s i s  to s a f e g u a r d i n g ,  and less and less 
prominence to the question of Empire economic unity. At 
Reading on 14 May Baldwin declared he wanted to "begin at 
home", though he later added "when I said I w a n t e d  
Safeguarding at home I need hardly remind you that we want 
it for I m p e r i a l  p u r p o s e s  very n e a r l y  as much".^®^ 
Thereafter the Imperial side of the policy dwindled still 
further from view, r e c e i v i n g  no m e n t i o n  at all in 
B a l d w i n ’s next speech, at Middlesb rough on 19 May.^®^
104. The Times, 15 May 1930.
105. The Times, 20 May 1930.
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Sp e a k i n g  at Bury, on 2 7 May, B a l d w i n  d r essed up 
safeguarding as a weapon along the lines of Balfour’s 
’Retaliation" policy of 1903-1905, and explicitly warned 
that the e c o n o m i c  unity of the E m p i r e  "may take a 
generation or more to bring about".1®® In his final 
speech in the series, given at Leeds on 31 May 1 930, 
Baldwin not only failed to make any reference to Empire 
Trade, but also opened with a statement which revealed the 
line of thought which he had been following throughout his 
campaign :
No party can attain Power in our country today that 
cannot make an appeal to the North and to Scotland, 
It is that appeal we are making today with full 
confidence that in the victory which awaits us at no 
distant date, the North will once more play its part,
107
These speeches brought into the open the essential 
flaw of the Hotel Cecil concordat - the fact that peace 
had only been achi e v e d  through each p r i n c i p a l ’s 
misconceptions of the aims and intentions of the other. 
Baldwin believed he had satisfied Beaverbrook by his 
commitment to calling an imperial conference, and through 
the political device of the referendum, had fulfilled his 
side of the bargain by thus dropping all the negative and 
inhibiting pledges which had previously ruled out most of 
the recommendations such a conference would be likely to 
make. This was not Beaverbrook’s understanding of the 
spirit, rather than the letter, of the truce, which he had
106, The Times, May 28 1930.
107. The Tiroes, June 2 1930.
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always seen as being a first step towards a stronger and 
more definite commitment. Hence his dismay at Baldwin’s 
transformation of the referendum into yet another negative 
and inhibiting pledge.1®® Thus Beaverbrook saw Baldwin's 
’’Home and Empire’’ speeches as a betrayal of the spirit of 
the t r u c e . ^®9 After the S h e f f i e l d  speech he lost 
confidence in Baldwin, deciding that the ’’referendum has 
failed as an instrument of policy.’^^® On 19 May he 
discussed his future plans with Elibank, who noted that 
’’Beaverbrook has decided that he will not proceed with the 
Referendum, which was only a Bridge for getting his policy 
a d o p t e d T h e  conclusion that it had failed led 
Beaverbrook logically down the path his instincts had for 
some time been urging, restless at his passive role, into 
going all out for the full Crusade policy, w i t h o u t  
qu a l i f i c a t i o n s .  On 21 May he p u b l i c l y  tore up the 
referendum, and with it the truce, in a speech at Enfield:
We must have a tariff built a g ainst foreign 
foodstuffs. We cannot get on without it. When any 
man talks about Empire Free Trade and says it may not 
be necessary to tax food just dismiss him. He is
108. B e a v e r b r o o k  to N. C h a m b e r l a i n ,  20 April 1930, 
Beaverbrook MSS, C80.
109. Beaverbrook to Croft, 19 May 1930, Beaverbrook MSS, 
C101 .
110. Beaverbrook to Hoare, 15 May 1930, Templewood MSS, 
VI/1; N. to Hilda C h a m b e r l a i n ,  25 May 1930, NC 
18/1/696; Lockhart Diary, 11 May 1930.
111. Elibank diary, 19 May 1930, f. 55.
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either a fool or a liar.... Emp i r e  Free Trade 
carried with it essentially and necessarily a tax on 
foreign foodstuffs.
1 12
This i n i t i a t i v e  only served to c o n f i r m  Baldwin's 
s u s p i c i o n s  of B e a v e r b r o o k ' s  u n r e l i a b i l i t y  and 
untrustworthiness, for he perceived his own conduct as 
perfectly consistent with his pledges at the Hotel Cecil, 
and saw Beaverbrook as the wrecker of the truce and the 
aggressor in returning to open warfare.
The result of the breakdown of the truce was to set 
the two men further apart, personally and politically, 
than ever before. Beaverbrook turned away from the 
strategy of negotiation with the party leaders, to appeal 
deliberately to the party grassroots to force his policy 
on their superiors. He was aware of the popular appeal of 
his policy at that level, and the vulnerable and unpopular 
position the leaders had taken:
The Conservative Party is hopelessly divided. The 
rank and file is on the side of Empire Free Trade. 
Otherwise, the leaders, who march off in the other 
direction, would smash me at once.
113
At first he looked to the backbench MPs for support, 
writing to one at the end of April:
112. T ^  Times, 22 May 1930.
113. Beaverbrook to Bridgeman, 15 May 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, Cl 33.
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The Back-benchers and those who have experience of 
the Back-benchers could save the Conservative Party, 
but it would involve showing Mr. Baldwin the way to go.
1 14
A month later, however, he had decided to direct his 
attention to his most likely base of popular support, in 
the Constituency Associations. In this he may well have 
been encouraged by his recent platform successes in the 
West Fulham by-election. "The truth is I don't care what 
view Members of the Commons or Lords take of this issue", 
he told Horne, "it is to the Constituencies that I lift up 
mine eyes,"^^^ The logic of this plan of campaign, 
however, also included the full revival of the Crusade in 
all its m a n i f e s t a t i o n s  as a sepa r a t e  party: the
organisation of branches now went ahead, funds were 
appealed for,  ^^  ® and future by-elections were to be 
contested either by an independent Crusader, or the 
official nominee on Beaverbrook's unofficial platform. 
Thi s  p a t h  c o u l d  o n l y  l e a d  to c o n f r o n t a t i o n ,  a 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n  in wh i c h  Beaverbrook's tactics would 
eventually alienate a sizeable proportion of the party 
loyalists, whose dislike of factionalism was greater than 
their desire for the "free hand", and who would be
114. Beaverbrook to Macdonell, 28 April 1930, ibid., B165.
115. Beaverbrook to Horne, 28 May 1930, ibid., C178.
116. Beaverbrook to Cunliffe-Owen, 1 June 1930, ibid.. 
Cl 07.
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receptive to the traditional cries of loyalty to the 
leader ,
At the same time as Beaverbrook was moving towards an 
open breach, the party l e a d e r s h i p  reduced their 
vulnerability by ditching the detested Party Chairman, J, 
C. C, Davidson. The reason for this was not that Davidson 
was a proxy target for assaults on Baldwin, but the 
reverse. Davidson's unpopularity, compounded by his 
b l u n d e r s  of the p r e v i o u s  two months, was such that 
Baldwin's continued loyalty towards him was in fact in 
danger of dragging the Leader down with his Chairman. 
Indeed, Davidson's departure did not occur at Baldwin's 
i n s t i g a t i o n  at all. S i g n i f i c a n t l y ,  it was Neville 
Chamberlain who determined to take himself an initiative, 
which Baldwin might never have taken, in order to remove a 
man he considered both useless and a dangerous liability 
to all the party leadership.^^® Chamberlain was becoming 
more involved - and more interested - in the workings of 
the party's central organisations, having taken over the 
new Research Department from Lord Eustace Percy on his 
return from East Africa in March. He described it as "an
117. Headlam Diary, 5 February 1930.
118. Weekend Review, 17 May 1930, copy, in Davidson MSS
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important body" and that "through my new department I
shall have my finger upon the springs of p o l i c y  ".^^9
However, he soon became aware that Davidson's position -
and incompetence - were frustrating all his plans, and
almost immediately determined to secure his removal.
Before this could be proceeded with, the inevitable
problem of who was to succeed Davidson needed to be
solved. At first Chamberlain did not consider himself for
the position, preferring instead to secure the place for a
nominee of his own, as a front through whom he could
properly control the details of day-to-day organisation,
Chamberlain found such a figure in the person of Geoffrey
Ellis, an influential figure in the Yorkshire Provincial
Area, who had lost his seat in 1929. Chamberlain kept his
plans secret, and in the first week of April over lunch
bluntly told Davidson:
he had better go before he was forced out... the 
more I see of his work the more I am convinced that 
in his p r e sent p o s i t i o n  he is a danger to the 
Party... David[son] himself said he thought he had 
better go: the difficulty was to find a successor.
But to that I merely replied that that was S. B.'s 
job... I must keep up the drive if the change is to 
be accomplished,
120
This proved to be the case, for Davidson began to use the 
question of a s u c c e s s o r  as an excuse to delay the 
announcement of his going, and finally suggested that in
119. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 22 March 1930, NC 18/1/686.
120. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 4 April 1930, NC 18/1/689.
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the growing crisis of late May that it might be better for 
him to remain at the helm. In fact, as far as Chamberlain 
was concerned, the deteriorating situation made it all the 
more urgent for Davidson to go, and in the last week of 
May he saw Davidson again, determined to end the long 
period of indecision, and bluntly asked him
when are you going to announce your resignation... I 
did not m i n c e  words, and he p r o m i s e d  that the 
announcement would be made before the end of the 
week.
12 1
The announcement of Davidson's departure was only one side 
of the coin of the attempt to appease dissent within the 
Party. However, with the question of his successor 
unsettled, and the suspicions that any nominee would 
probably be another Baldwinite yes-man, the party was 
still in an unsettled condition. Nevertheless, the fall 
of Davidson was the first stage in the process whereby, in 
the uncertain atmosphere of June 1930, the initiative 
passed from Beaverbrook to Baldwin and the party leaders. 
As the truce disintegrated in the first three weeks of 
June, they prepared their counterattack.
121. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 25 May 1930, NC 18/1/696.
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CHAPTER 4
The Party M e e tings and the ]?££jty Cri s is:
July to October 1930
Until the Horae and Empire campaign, the Empire Free 
T r a der s had sought to coerce Baldwin, sensing his 
squeezability, by the twin-pronged strategy of an assault 
on the influence of Free Traders or 'pessimists' among his 
colleagues and confidants, and by capturing from beneath 
his feet the support of party rank and file. Yet, despite 
the success of both pincers of this strategy in the spring 
of 1930, it had nevertheless failed in its ultimate aim of 
capturing Baldwin, and thereby securing the official party 
policy-making process. The Conservtive Party was not 
organised on democratic lines in terms of decision-making, 
but rather had evolved as a deference structure, with 
policy being handed down from above, rather than made from 
below by the Party Conferences or the democratically 
elected regional Councils. Even the Executive and Council 
of the National Union were forums for the deliverance of 
party policy, not for its formulation. The decision­
making process could only be controlled from above; 
a l t h o u g h  it could be i n f l u e n c e d  on o c c a s i o n  by the 
Parliamentary party, it could not be captured from outside 
or from below without involving a complete restructuring 
of the distribution of power and a reallocation of the 
roles of leaders and led. The constituency parties held 
power, but it was a negative power; a residual power of 
the last resort to revolt and smash the party if driven
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too far. Strong pressure from below was likely to have 
some effect on the party leadership, but unless it was 
oomplete, nation-wide, consistent and representative it 
would not alone ensure success for the popular policy 
advocated by Beaverbrook. For the tradition of party 
loyalty was extremely strong, and a campaign to oust the 
leader, particularly if conducted by the press, was likely 
to alienate as many supporters as it attracted, and even 
in the end to produce a backlash in Baldwin's favour which 
would shore up his crumbling credibility. This difficult 
situation produced a period of tactical uncertainty in the 
Crusade camp, where the dilemma was all the greater in 
that they sought not to fight the Conservative Party, but 
to work with and through it. After May 1930 the press 
lords veered between hoping that Baldwin could still be 
forced to co-operate against his will, to attempts to 
destroy his position altogether. That lack of consistency 
was to prove one of the f u n d a m e n t a l  w e a k n e s s e s  of 
Baldwin's opponents, revealing as it did instinctive 
inhibitions of party loyalty that to a greater or lesser 
degree held back Amery, Croft and E l i bank from the 
unrestricted hostility of Beaverbrook and Rothermere. For 
with the end of the truce in June 1 930 the period of 
attempted conciliation on the part of both sides was not 
in fact r e p l a c e d  by al l - o u t  ho s t i l i t i e s ;  bouts of 
negotiations, though all ultimately fruitless until those 
of March 1931, indicated that the press lords had not 
resolved their tactical problems.
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The first half of June 1930 marked an "uncomfortable" 
stage in which both sides drifted yet further apart, 
having tacitly scrapped the truce but not yet having moved 
in t o  the l o g i c a l  c o r o l l a r y  of o p e n  and p u b l i c  
c o n f r o n tation.^ T y pically, it was the i m p a t i e n t  
Beaverbrook who took the initiative, a decision which in 
fact placed him in a poor tactical position. He lost much 
credit for dropping the referendum, partly because he was 
seen to be the deraolisher of the bridge of unity which the 
referendum had represented, and partly due to his apparent 
inconsistency in having been himself the initiator of the 
referendum p r o p o s a l . ^ The result was a polarisation of 
conservative opinion around the two protagonists in the 
second half of June, stimulated by three events which 
c o m b i n e d  to place B a l d w i n  for the first time in an 
a d v a n t a g e o u s  p o s i t i o n  f r o m  w h i c h  to l a u n c h  a 
counterattack. The first of these was the unveiling of 
the much-heralded o f f i c i a l  policy p r o n o u n c e m e n t  on 
agriculture, in a speech given by Baldwin to a massed 
open-air rally at Glerahara Park 9 June. Under the cover of 
a blanket statement that protection must be ruled out as a 
solution, Baldwin moved a considerable distance in the 
farmers' direction on specific matters. Once again
1, A. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 17 June 1930, Halifax MSS, 
Borthwick Institute, A2/278/6/2; Lockhart Diary, June 12 1 9 3 0.
2. Bridgeman to Irwin, 15 June 1930, Halifax MSS; India 
Office, Eur.C.152/19/1/79.
21 1
fcalling his plan "Safeguarding", he preferred a guaranteed 
price system for cereal growers, and appeased their 
principal grievance by claiming a "free hand" to stop the 
dumping of foreign subsidised foodstuffs "by prohibition 
or countervailing duty".3 The importance of this speech, 
coming at the time it did, can hardly be over-emphasised. 
In one stroke it both significantly closed the gap in the 
major area where party policy was well out of step with 
its supporters, in the agricultural seats of the south, 
southwest and East Anglia; whilst at the same time 
sidestepping the issue of Empire Free Trade and avoiding 
the appearance of a concession to Beaverbrook. This was 
underlined by the favourable reception given to Baldwin's 
pronouncement by the National Farmers Union, of whose 
response the leader writer of The Times commented, "Never, 
in short, has any declaration of agricultural policy 
been received by the farmers with such marked expressions 
of approval."^ ;
The second event was in part a product t>f Baldwin's
j
explicit disavowal of food taxes at Glemhajm Park, for
I
Beaverbrook mistakenly seized upon this as a suitable peg 
on which to hang his repudiation of the referendum, and
I
the r e c o m m e n c e m e n t  of h o s t i l i t i e s .  On 17 June he 
published a letter in the Daily Mail which announced the
3. The Times, 11 June 1930.
4. Ibid.
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renewal of the Crusade as a separate party, and aimed a 
blow at the Conservative Party as a whole by appealing for 
supporters to divert their subscriptions from their local 
Associations to the Crusade, Tactically this was a 
counterproductive move, for the assault on the party 
provoked resentment amongst moderates and waverers on the 
councils and executives of local associations, and went 
some way to arresting the gradual slide of many southern 
local parties to the Crusade camp. Beaverbrook's move 
gave a moral advantage, in the form of appeals to party 
loyalty, to the Baldwinites, and by pushing moderate 
protectionists into the official camp in this manner, 
isolated rather than assisted the whole-hoggers. This was 
very evident in the reactions of the Executive Committee 
of the National Union, which was meeting on 17 June. 
Despite the opposition of two right-wing members, who 
significantly failed to find backing, the Executive passed 
a resolution condemnatory of Beaverbrook's letter.  ^ This 
reaction from the elected body of the local associations 
indicated to Baldwin that the Crusaders might now be 
wrong-footed and vulnerable to a counter-stroke.
The third event which polarised party opinion in 
Baldwin's favour was the resolution of the problem of the 
vacant Chairmanship in a manner satisfactory to the rank 
and file. A l t h o u g h  the d i t c h i n g  of Davi d s o n  had 
c o n s i d e r a b l y  re d u c e d  the leadership's c o l l e c t i v e
5. NU Exec., 17 June 1930.
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unpopularity, the long delay in the announcement of a 
successor was itself a destabilising factor. Numerous 
names were canvassed, including Walter Elliot, Kingsley 
Wood, and the chief whip. Eyres Monsell. Even more 
alarming was the growing demand that the Diehard George 
Lloyd be appointed. By 20 June, p e t i t i o n s  were 
circulating among MPs, one in favour of Lloyd and another 
in favour of Leslie Wilson, and "both carried with them a 
c o n d e m n a t i o n  of the long delay".® It was in this 
atmosphere that Hoare suggested to Chamberlain
what I have rather been feeling myself, that Ellis 
hardly carries guns enough to stand the fire that 
will be d i r e c t e d  at him if he stands alone,.., 
[Hoare suggested] I should be Chairman for a limited 
period with Ellis as understudy. I am inclined to 
give serious consideration to this idea ... there 
would be some guarantee that the job would be done.
Baldwin, however, preferred the idea of asking Bridgeman, 
who was also of ex-Cabinet rank and respected in the party 
at large, and personally much closer to him. As the 
position was in Baldwin's gift, Chamberlain could not 
prevent this move, and consoled himself with the thought 
that "his name will be suitable and he will keep out the 
Leslie Wilson's and George Lloyd's. I shall bide my
6. N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 21 June 1930, NC 18/1/701.
7. N, to Hilda Chamberlain, addendum to letter of 25 May 
1930, NC 18/1/697.
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time."° In the event, Bridgeman refused the post, leaving 
Baldwin in a dilemma from which the acceptance of Neville 
Chamberlain himself seemed by far the lesser evil.9 
Baldwin appreciated that the appointment of Chamberlain 
would be popular with the rank and file. Indeed, the 
chief whip had described Chamberlain as the "one man who 
could really completely restore confidence and pull the 
whole thing t o g e t h e r " . T h i s  was, of course, precisely 
the effect Baldwin was looking for. Chamberlain recorded 
the resolution of the problem in his diary:
at last everyone seems to have come to the conclusion 
that 1 am the one man whose name would command 
general confidence, and rather reluctantly S. B. 
asked me to take the place.
1 1
Baldwin’s reluctance was not the product of any fear 
of Neville Chamberlain as a rival, but was merely his 
characteristic vacillation and difficulty in arriving at a 
decision on important matters. Baldwin needed a loyal 
lieutenant whom he could trust in the important position 
of Party Chairman, and Neville Chamberlain fitted this 
bill as well as anyone after Davidson and Bridgeman. 
Baldwin could not fail to be aware of the community of
8. N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 8 June 1930» NC 18/1/699»
9. Bridgeman to Baldwin, 18 June 1930, Bridgeman MSS, 
SRO 3389/94.
10. N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 21 June 1930, NC 18/1/701.
11. N. Chamberlain diary, 22 June 1930, NC 2/22.
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feeling he shared with Neville Chamberlain in the matter 
of the detested Lloyd George coalition - still a crucial 
political litmus test^^ - and also in the matter of the 
Irwin Declaration on Dominion status for India. Equally, 
Chamberlain had shown little real desire during six years 
of high office to take up his father’s mantle in the form 
of advocating the food tax. Above all, Baldwin was 
correct in his appreciation of Chamberlain’s! emotive, as 
well as merely pragmatic, loyalty to the leadier and horror 
of party intrigue, well summed-up in the fajmous analogy 
that "S, B. is ray friend as well as my Leader;, and I would 
not on any ac c o u n t  play LCloyd] GCeorge] to his 
Asquith."13 Chamberlain fitted the need to reassure the 
party, for he was not looked on, as Davidson had been, as 
a personal crony of Baldwin, but was clearly a front-rank 
figure in his own right. This appointment, together with 
the concession that under its new rules the National Union 
would select its own Executive Chairman rather than having 
the Central Office Chairman thrust upon it, went a long 
way to appease the resentments voiced since the election 
defeat.
These three events did much to produce a rally to the 
leadership during the second half of June, and they were
12. As seen by the fact that Leslie Wilson’s role in 1922 
could still determine his acceptability as Chairman; 
Bridgeman noted "the old Coalitioners hate him" - 
Bridgeman to Irwin, 15 June 1 930, India Office Eur.C 
152/19/1/79.
13. N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 26 October 1929, NC 18/1/674.
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further stimulated and supported by a swelling background 
chorus of disapproval from all ranks in the party of the 
pretensions and methods of the press barons,1^ The 
i d e n t i f i c a t i o n  of the press lords as c h a l l e n g i n g  
parliamentary power inevitably encouraged a rally to 
Baldwin who, whatever his other defects, could be trusted 
firmly to defend the constitution. The Baldwinite MP 
Waldron Smit h e r s ’ view was far from unusual; condemning 
the "unfairness and un-English methods" of the press, he 
declared;
This po w e r  of the press is a new factor in our 
national life and must be fought even if some of us 
founder in the fight .... deep down in the hearts of 
English men and women remains still the spirit of 
fair play which activated them in 1914 and in the 
General Strike of 1926. The truth will prevail in 
the end.
15
These maturing feelings, shared by Baldwin himself, 
represented the foundation on which he was to increasingly 
rest his efforts in the propaganda battle for the hearts 
and souls of the party. It enabled him to present the 
debate in much more favourable terras to his own position.
14. Middleton and Prestwich CA, AGM, 1 March 1 9 30; Res. 
from Middlesex Prov.Div., NU Exec., 16 July 1930; 
Croft to Beaverbrook, 28 June 1930, Beaverbrook MSS, 
C 101 ; Lyne ( p r o s p e c t i v e  c a n d i d a t e  for Bristol 
Central) to Beaverbrook, 27 June 1930, ibid., B164.
15. Smithers to Salisbury, 19 August 1930, Salisbury MSS, 
S(4) 136/148.
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for instead of being a disagreement over fiscal policy, it |1
was to be presented as a challenge to the very nature of j
the parliamentary constitution. Thus Baldwin deliberately i1
ignored the rank and file support for the idea of Empire i
Free Trade, and sidestepped it completely by focusing his i
attention on the press lords’ role in politics. In this i
he exploited Beaverbrook and R o t hermere’s failure to I
j
persuade any significant parliamentary figure to act as 1
1
the nominal leader of their campaign. From being a battle. 1
over political programmes, where Baldwin was of necessity !
on the defensive if he was to retain a policy acceptable ]
to northern urban electors, it now became also a battle |
over political methods, with Baldwin on the offensive. }
M  IThe events of June 1930; the Glejham Park agricultural |
policy; the miscalculation made by Beaverbrook in his !
manifesto of 17 June; and the appointment of a strong and jI
popular Chairman, together with increasing tensions in the {
attitude of the party to the popular press, formed a !I
combination of factors from which a counterattack could be j
launched. j
The fact that the initiative had now passed to the i
leadership was swiftly capitalised upon by the decision to 
call a party meeting. Sensing the opportunity provided by 
the new mood in the party, the decision was taken on 19 ;
June to s u m m o n  a party m e e t i n g  at the Caxton Hall, j
Westminster, for 24 June, Furthermore, the announcement i
of Chamberlain’s acceptance of the Chairmanship was to be
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c a r e f u l l y  t i m e d  for the eve of the m e e t i n g . 1^ The 
situation was such as to give rise to complete confidence 
that at such a g a t h e r i n g  the c r i tics could be out- 
m a n o e u v e r e d  and o u t - t r u m p e d  by the appeal to party 
loyalty, by attacks on the press per se, and by mobilising 
the anti-food tax sentiments still held by many MPs and 
almost all the prospective parliamentary candidates. To 
them indeed the r e f e r e n d u m ,  w h a t e v e r  its defects, 
represented a shield against the electoral unpopularity of 
the dear-food cry. The idea of a party meeting had been 
in the air amongst the shadow cabinet for some time, as a 
move to pre-empt Beaverbrook's rumoured plan to agitate 
for a special conference of the National Union.1? The 
party meeting was to be a much more favourable forum for 
the leadership, and by carefully deciding that it should 
consist only of MPs and candidates, and not peers, it was 
by longstanding precedent effectively limited to the 
d i s c u s s i o n  of p o l i c y  and not leadership. B a l d w i n  
explained to Salisbury that
my idea has been to call t o g e t h e r  those who 
are actively engaged in the constituencies as members 
or candidates, and not to summon a party meeting in 
the accepted sense of the term..., the question of 
leadership, according to ancient practice, is as I 
understand a matter for Lords and Commons alone.
18
16. N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 21 June 1930, NC 18/1/701.
17. Bridgeman to Baldwin, 22 June 1930, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 165, ff. 28-29.
18. Baldwin to Salisbury, 23 June 1930, Salisbury MSS, 
S(4) 135/184.
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At the Caxton Hall meeting Baldwin produced one of 
his periodic oratorical triumphs. In a devastatingly 
phrased onslaught, he switched the issue from the press 
lords message to the medium itself, and out-trumped them 
by playing the constitutional card. In this gambit he 
was, ironically, aided by the maladroit manoeuvres of 
Beaverbrook’s ally. Lord Rothermere. By focusing his 
specific criticisms on the more vulnerable and least 
popular of the press barons, Baldwin was effectively able 
to damn Beaverbrook by virtue of the association. The 
issue at stake was elevated by Baldwin to an altogether 
different plane from that of food taxes: the press lords,
he claimed, had
the desire to dictate the policy to a big party, to 
choose a leader, to impose ministers on the Crown: 
the only parallel to that was the action of the T U C 
in 1926 ... the c h a l l e n g e  has been issued ... I 
accept, as I accepted the challenge of the TUC.
Thus were the press lords effectively bracketed with the 
General Strike in their p r e t e n s i o n s  to d i ctate to 
Parliament. Having set the atmosphere, Baldwin then 
produced a letter written by Lord Rothermere to the 
protectionist MP Hannon. Although Rothermere had intended 
the letter as a semi-public statement of his position in 
any n e g o t i a t i o n s  for peace, it was t r u c u l e n t  and 
d i c t a t o r i a l  in tone, and as a result of i n c a u t i o u s  
phraseology, potentially damning in content; it gave the 
impression that Rothermere demanded not merely to know the
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names of future members of any Baldwin cabinet, but also 
implied a right of approval over policy and veto over 
personnel.19 Hannon, acting in his role of mediator 
between Rothermere and the leadership, had shown the 
letter to Davidson, who i n f o r m e d  B a l d w i n  of its 
e x i s t e n c e . B a l d w i n ,  realising its potential use, sent 
for Hannon on 21 June and asked for the l e t t e r . 21 The 
effect of this document, when read by Baldwin at the 
Caxton Hall, was dramatic, producing amongst his audience, 
"a white heat of i n d i g n a t i o n " . 22 in the l i g h t  of this, a 
rally around the leader was inevitable, and consideration 
of the problem of dropping or keeping the referendum 
policy was swept aside. A resolution proposed by Gretton 
and Page Croft to drop the referendum and go for the free 
hand, although it carefully avoided the entire issue of 
leadership, was rejected by a large majority of the 
meeting. The decisive speech against it was made by Sir 
Robert Horne, a figure who possessed much credibility 
amongst the tariff reformers. Horne dismissed the debate 
on policy as an academic irrelevance to the main issue, 
and while i n d i c a t i n g  his own desire to drop the
19. The Ti_me^, 25 June 1930; J. Green, Mr%_ Baldwin - A
Study in Post-War Conservatism (1933), P* 229.
20. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 12 September 1955, Hannon MSS
17/1 .
21. Hannon, 'Secret Memo’, dated 21 June 1930, Hannon MSS
17/1.
22. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 25 June 1 930, Halifax MSS, India 
Office Eur.C.152/19/1/87.
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referendum stated firmly that to do so or even to appear 
to do so at the d i c t a t i o n  of the press was ut t e r l y  
impossible.
In terms of personality, the result of the Caxton 
Hall was a c l e a r - c u t  t r i u m p h  for B a l d w i n  over his 
challengers. In terms of strategy it also represented a 
victory for Baldwin, for the meeting accepted the logic of 
his argument that the constitutional issue transcended the 
policy issue. However, in political terms the result of 
the meeting of 24 June was much more ambiguous. This was 
e s p e c i a l l y  the case as far as the r e f e r e n d u m  was 
concerned. It remained the official definition of party 
policy, and was still looked on as the only practical 
course in many northern local associations.23 Even in 
southern associations the growing dislike of the policy 
was counterbalanced by the appeal of loyalty to the 
leader.2^ However, the concept was increasingly viewed as 
discredited among London political circles. Amery wrote 
to Baldwin after the meeting that everyone "felt that the 
Referendum had got to be dropped when you can find a 
convenient opportunity".25 in fact, the party meeting was 
not a long-term solution to the problems facing Baldwin. 
One reason for this was that its verdict had been written
23. York CA, S p ecial Exec., 1 July 1930; N o r t h e r n  
H e r e f o r d s h i r e  CA, A d v i s o r y  Ctte., 4 July 1930; 
Wakefield CA, Council, 18 June 1930.
24. Oxford City CA, Chairman’s remarks at Finance and GP 
Ctte., 26 June 1930.
25. Amery to Baldwin, 4 July 1930, Baldwin MSS, volume 
31, ff. 133- 134.
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off in advance by his challengers who, calling it a 
"packed" and "stage-managed" affair, proclaimed that "it 
will not satisfy those who are pressing for a stronger 
fiscal policy".26 Even Austen Chamberlain commented that 
"though the party meeting was a necessary and useful 
gathering, it really settled nothing."27 Baldwin had won 
a battle, but not the war, and the meeting served only as 
a successful holding action, intended to last until the 
Imperial Conference due to convene in the autumn, which 
was widely expected to provide a suitable pretext for 
changing policy.28 However, the erosion of the limited 
success achieved by Baldwin at the Caxton Hall on 24 June 
occurred much more rapidly than this strategy allowed for, 
with the result that the nadir of the Party’s fortunes was
reached in September 1930, before the Imperial Conference
opened.
This erosion was the product of a series of factors, 
all of which tended to undermine the acceptability of the 
Caxton Hall decision. Of these, one of the most 
significant was B a l d w i n ’s continued failur^ to provide 
satisfactory leadership. After the Caxton Hall meeting 
and the burst of activity which accompanied it, he seemed 
to relapse once again into a mood where lethargy and 
complacency were mixed, a mood that lasted until his rude
26. Daily Mail, 23, 24 June 1930.
27. A. to Hilda Chamberlain, 30 June 1930, AC 5/1/508;
Observer, 29 June 1930.
28. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 25 June 1 930, Halifax MSS, India 
Office, Eur.C. 152/19/1/87.
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awakening on his return from holidaying at Aix in late 
September. The principal complaint against Baldwin 
continued to be his failure as a leader of the opposition 
in the House of Commons, Even loyal MPs were complaining 
that "he n e ither m a k e s  nor seizes p a r l i a m e n t a r y  
opportunities",29 and Lane-Fox commented that "there is a 
good deal of discontent among Conservatives who are 
certainly finding S B ’s leadership rather uninspiring."3® 
By the end of the parliamentary session in July there was 
"very grave d i s c o n t e n t  with S. B.", w r o t e  Austen 
Chamberlain; "All of us are getting fed up ".31 This 
declining morale of the parliamentary forces inevitably 
filtered down to the rank and file, and rendered the 
seemingly more vigorous approach of the Crusaders all the 
more a t t r a c t i v e  by c o m p a r i s o n .  B a l d w i n  failed to 
recognise the genuine appeal the Empire Free Trade ideal 
had for his supporters; or, if he did recognise it, failed 
to respond. Instead, bending over backwards in his 
efforts to satisfy the prejudices of the electorate in the
29. Hope to N. Chamberlain, 3 July 1930,.NC 7/11/23/6.
30. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 21 August 1930, Halifax MSS, India 
Office. Eur.C. 152/19/1/120.
31. A. to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 July 1930, AC 5/1/509.
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i n d u s t r i a l  c o u n t i e s  of the North, he s e e m e d  to be 
retreating even from the referendum policy, rather than 
preparing to advance beyond it. The ambiguities of 
Baldwin’s speeches in July and August were tactically wise 
considering the fact that "the government are very tottery 
and ... they might fall before the end of the m o n t h " , 3 2 
and that in any ensuing general election the dear food cry 
would be almost the only weapon that Labour and Liberals 
c o u l d  use to d e f e n d  the s e a t s  g a i n e d  f r o m  the 
Conservatives in 1929. But viewed from the angle of 
internal party tensions, these pronouncements were yet 
a n o t h e r  e l e m e n t  a d d i n g  fuel to the f l a m e s  of 
disenchantment. These were, in any case, being well 
stoked by the continual sniping of the Beaverbrook and 
Rothermere press, which was slowly having its effect on 
the party. One MP noted:
the course of the Conservative Party, with a Central 
Office that is just going through reconstruction, and 
a leader and a pol i c y  so buffeted, is not very 
steady.
33
Amongst the inevitable consequences of this failure of 
leadership was a tendency to factionalism in the party.
32. Amery to Beaverbrook, 10 July 1930, Beaverbrook MSS,
05.
33. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 2 July 1930, Halifax MSS, India 
Office, Eur.C. 152/19/1/90.
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Page Croft took the initiative in forming in mid-July a 
new body, the Imperial Economic Unity group, intended to 
be more assertive than the EIA, and sixty-three MPs from 
the right of the party attended the inaugural meeting .3^
That the situation did not deteriorate further or 
faster during July and August 1 930 was the result of the 
cautious approach adopted by Beaverbrook, on the urging of 
Amery and Page Croft. Beaverbrook was still torn by his 
tactical dilemma: wishing to capture Baldwin, yet fearful
of being caught by him instead; reluctant to separate 
himself from Rothermere, yet reluctant also to commence 
full-scale warfare, Beaverbrook spent the summer casting 
about from one line of approach to another, oscillating 
from c o - o p e r a t i o n  t h r o u g h  n e u t r a l i t y  to e v e n t u a l  
hostility. In the period immediately after the Caxton 
Hall meeting Beaverbrook followed the tactic of parallel 
co-operation with the party, whilst continuing to advocate 
an unrestricted food tax policy. This position was partly 
forced upon him by the circumstances of the North Norfolk 
by-election in progress during July 1930. The local 
Association attempted to preserve a precarious unity, 
declaring that their candidate "should fight on the 
official policy of the party and should loyally support 
Mr, Baldwin", but welcomed the platform co-operation of 
"Beaverbrook and the Empire Free Trade Crusade, which will
34. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 14 July 1930, Beaverbrook MSS, 
C154.
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have the whole-hearted support of [the candidate] and all 
that it i m p l i e s . "35 In practice, the candidate fought on 
"the pure gospel of Empire Free T r a d e " , 36 g  tactic to 
which the party leadership turned a blind eye. In fact. 
North Norfolk was not promising territory for the Crusade; 
the seat had never been held by a Conservative in its 
forty-five year existence. Despite the vocal support of 
the local branch of the Farmers’ Union, it could not sway 
the longstanding Radical allegiance of the farm labourers, 
and the Labour candidate, significantly, won on a platform 
of denouncing Conservative food taxes. The failure to 
capture North Norfolk was a severe blow to Beaverbrook's 
confidence. "I do not feel at all happy about North 
Norfolk", he wrote; "I went in in the expectation of 
w i n n i n g  it, but we were beaten ... I was under the 
i m p r e s s i o n  t h a t  o u r  p o l i c y  w o u l d  s w e e p  t h e
constituency."37
The immediate consequence of this setback was to 
take the wind out of the Crusaders’ sails, and encourage a 
return to the negotiating table, Neville Chamberlain, 
anxious to build on his position as party chairman, 
extended an invitation to negotiations in mid-July, which 
was accepted. In the early phase of these negotiations
35. North Norfolk CA, Res. of General Council, in The 
Times, 19 June 1930,
36. Beaverbrook to Astor, 6 July 1930, Beaverbrook MSS C1 4.
37. Beaverbrook to Amery, 12 July 1930, Beaverbrook MSS 
C5; Beaverbrook to Macmillan, 12 July 1930, ibid., 
C236,
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Beaverbrook’s attitude, that there was "a common purpose", 
although "methods differ", and "a reconciliation is 
possible", encouraged in Chamberlain high hopes of a 
satisfactory o u t c o m e . 38 The terms offered, however, 
seemed increasingly unattractive to Beaverbrook in his 
changing moods of the last week of J u l y , 39 Two related 
factors intervened to complicate the path of negotiation. 
The first of these was the advent of a by-election in the 
Bromley constituency, which was safe Conservative London 
subu r b i a  and thus ideal Cru s a d i n g  territory. The 
second was the influence exerted by Rothermere to abandon 
n e g o t i a t i o n  for an al l - o u t  trial of strength; in 
particular, to put the matter to the proof by, for the 
first time, running an independent challenger to the 
Conservative nominee in the Bromley vacancy, ' Beaverbrook 
was reluctant to follow this course, on the advice of his 
Conservative fellow-travellers, but he also believed that 
any s e t t l e m e n t  w h i c h  did not include and s a t i s f y  
Rothermere would be worthless. He sought to find some via 
m edia between these two positions, and believed he had 
found it in the suggestion of Rothermere’s son, Esmond 
Harrasworth, as official nominee for Bromley, presumably 
a d v o c a t i n g  a h i g h l y  u n o f f i c i a l  p o l i c y . U p o n
38. Beaverbrook to Londonderry, 21 July ,1 930, ibid., 
C224; N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 16 July 1930, NC 
18/1/704.
39. Beaverbrook to Bowker, 8 August 1930, Beaverbrook MSS 
B132,
40. N, to Ida Chamberlain, 26 July 1930, NC18/1/705.
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these contradictions, the negotiations foundered in an 
atmosphere of mutual suspicion. Beaverbrook could not 
u n d e r s t a n d  that to acce p t  E s m o n d  was a p o l i t i c a l  
impossiblity for the party leadership, and infuriated 
Chamberlain by his continual refusal to take no for an 
answer, and by further maladroit attempts to foist Esmond 
on him.^1 These culminated in a disastrously unsuccessful 
meeting between Rothermere and Chamberlain on 26 July. 
From this low the conversations briefly recovered, so that 
by 30 July Chamberlain believed he had reached an informal 
short-term agreement with Beaverbrook over B r o m l e y . ^ 2  
However, Beaverbrook, finding that he could not restrain 
Rothermere from running an Independent at Bromley on his 
own account, lost his nerve, deciding that he could not 
afford to separate himself from his only powerful ally. 
The manner and timing of this sudden decision left Neville 
Chamberlain bitterly resentful, convinced that Beaverbrook 
had been simply stringing him along, and had now betrayed 
the trust that Chamberlain had bestowed upon him. The 
resulting alienation of Chamberlain, who concluded that 
"the man is a crook after all", was a serious error on 
Beaverbrook’s part in the long term. In the short term, 
it provoked Chamberlain into a swift and hostile response:
41. N. Chamberlain diary, 25 and 29 July 1930, NC 2/22
42. Ibid., 27 and 30 July 1930.
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I had given ray trust and it had been abused and I was 
bitterly humiliated and outraged. However, it was a 
time for action rather than lamentation, I went 
straight back to my colleagues and told them it was 
war...
43
Chamberlain made it clear to the Bromley Association 
Executive the next day that Esmond Harmsworth would be 
totally unacceptable, and adroitly turned them against 
Beaverbrook. The nomination of a loyal candidate, E, T. 
Campbell, who was also known as almost an Empire Free 
Trader on policy, was the cornerstone of this response. 
The running of Campbell by the Bromley Conservatives 
p r o v i d e d  B e a v e r b r o o k  w i t h  an i n s o l u b l e  d i l e m m a ,  
Rothermere in reply had brought forward under the banner 
of his United Empire Party an Independent, V, Redwood, who 
was not only a stranger to the division, but also a paid 
e m p l o y e e  of Rothe r m e r e ' s ,  and of d u bious p o l i t i c a l  
background. Beaverbrook was hesitant to nail the Empire 
Crusade colours to the mast of such an unattractive 
vessel, fearing the consequences of another disappointing 
showing in the ballot boxes.
Beaverbrook was encouraged to stand aside from the 
Bromley fight by the repeated urgings of Amery, Page Croft 
and Hannon, all of whom declared that Campbell was so 
close to the desired position in both private sympathy and 
p u b l i c  p r o n o u n c e m e n t s  t h a t  he s h o u l d  not be
43. N. C h a m b e r l a i n  to his wife, 30 July 1930, NC 
1/26/433.
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o p p o s e d . B e a v e r b r o o k  r e s o l v e d  his p r o b l e m s  by 
withdrawing from any active role in the contest, and 
physically distancing himself by returning to the South of 
France,^5 His inactivity lasted into September, for on 
his return Beaverbrook fell ill, and was confined to bed 
for several weeks. Redwood fought on a wide-ranging 
Diehard platform of industrial protection, subsidies for 
farmers, economy in government spending, firm rule in 
India and Egypt, and no relations with Soviet Russia, as 
well as Empire Free Trade; though Campbell held the seat. 
Redwood was only three thousand votes behind.^6 Indeed, 
Campbell fended off his challenger only by the expedient 
of going "a good deal further” than official policy, which 
"undoubtedly gained me a great many votes".^7 This 
reflected not merely the opinions of insulated Southern 
suburbia, but an evolution of Conservative opinion running 
across the party as a whole during the late summer and 
autumn of 1930. Orrasby-Gore, analysing this process, 
detected "a general swing to the right throughout the Tory
44. Croft to Beaverbrook, 2, 4, 22, 28 August 1 930,
Beaverbrook MSS, C101; Hannon to Beaverbrook, 21 and 
29 August 1930, Hannon MSS 18/3.
45. Beaverbrook to Bowker, 31 August 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, B132.
46. Redwood's Election Address, copy ibid., B216.
47. Report on Bromley By-Election, Campbell to Bowyer, 
15 September 1930, Baldwin MSS, volume 51, ff. 13-15.
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Party, not merely in a protectionist direction, but all 
along the line.’*^®
One product of this was that the demand for dropping 
the referendum, expressed in resolutions such as that 
passed by forty-two Conservative MPs of the Imperial 
Economic Unity Group in late July, was finding increasing 
support far beyond the confines of the protectionist right 
w i n g . ^9 The referendum had never been popular in the 
South; the new factor was the advance in protectionist 
s y m p a t h y  of the i n d u s t r i a l  North - a w a y  from the 
referendum which had been designed only to meet its 
supposed prejudices. In June I930 Conservative opinion in 
the North, despite having moved a considerable distance 
away from Free Trade during the previous year, via the 
ambiguous strategy of safeguarding, still remained firmly 
against any food tax.^O The stimulus for this advance, 
and for the further large strides taken by Northern 
opinion in the months after June, was the pressure of the 
slump and its consequent steep rise in unemployment, not 
the pressure of the Crusade, which carried little weight 
north of the River Trent. As the e c o n o m i c  p i c ture 
darkened in the second half of 1930, the attractiveness of 
insular protection accordingly increased. The result was
48. Orm sby-Gore to Irwin, 3 July 1930, Halifax MSS, 
India Office Eur.C. 152/19/1/91 a .
49. Imperial Economic Unity Group, Res. of 20 July 1930, 
Hannon MSS 18/3.
50. Derby to Oliver Stanley, 26 June 1 9 30 , in R. 
Churchill, Lord Derby (1959), p. 582,
232
that by September, for perhaps the first time in the party 
crisis, the sentiments of the South were finding an echo, 
rather than a contradiction, in the North. Though still 
possessing a residual and instinctive unease over food 
taxes, the shift in opinion was marked. With this change, 
the referendum policy became politically redundant. The 
new face of the North could be seen in the resolutions 
passed by the Council of the Yorkshire Provincial Area at 
the b e g i n n i n g  of October, of the S c o t t i s h  U n i o n i s t  
Association in mid-September, and by local Associations 
s u c h  as Don V a l l e y ;  all c a l l e d  for an end to 
qualifications and reservations, and accepted "Imperial 
Preference with all its implications" which "should 
include import duties in this country on foodstuffs 
produced outside the E m p i r e " . 5 1 The transformation was 
both paralled and symbolised by Lord Derby's conversion to 
food taxes, which by October he was advocating publicly. 
The consequence of this was that a substantial and serious 
rift was o p e n i n g  b e t w e e n  the policy to w h i c h  the 
leadership was committed, and that which the party as a 
whole desired to see advocated, that "the leaders of the 
Party should drop the question of a Referendum and press 
forward a policy for a Free Hand to foster and build up
51. Don Valley CA, Res. NU Exec,, 16 July 1930; on 
Scottish opinion. Ford (President of SUA),to Baldwin, 
10 September 1 930, Baldwin MSS, volume 31, ff. 151- 
15 4; SUA Central Council Exec., 10 September 1930; 
Yorks. Prov. Area, Council, 4 October 1930. Some 
doubts still remained in Liverpool, Sir T. White 
(Chairman of Liverpool CA) to Baldwin, 1 October 
1930, Baldwin MSS, volume 51, f.91.
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Empire T r a d e ".52 This sentiment was typical of the 
insistent chorus of similar demands across the length and 
breadth of the party g r a s s r o o t s . 53 Such uniform pressure 
would be not only difficult but also very dangerous to 
resist and deny for any long period. This situation was 
not the c r e a t i o n  or the result of the e x i s t e n c e  of 
Beaverbrook’s Crusade, except in a marginal sense, but it 
was a situation which the Crusade could readily exploit. 
Beaverbrook sensed his opportunity, writing in Sepember 
that
the issue of duties on foreign foodstuffs is far past
the control of Mr. Stanley Baldwin and Mr, Neville
C h a m b e r l a i n  now. T h e y  c a n n o t  c a r r y  t h e i r  
constituencies unless they swallow the pill.
54
The tensions within the party as a consequence of 
both the serious and widening rift on policy and the more
general loss of confidence in the abilities of Baldwin
since the e l e c t i o n  defeat c o m b i n e d  to pr o d u c e  in 
S e p t e m b e r  1930 a party crisis of an e x p l o s i v e  and
52. Wells CA, Exec., 11 September 1930.
53. Horncastle CA, Finance Ctte,, 1 August 1930; City of 
London CA. AGM, 12 July 1 930; N. W. Wilts. CA, Exec., 
27 June 1930; Norwich CA, Finance and Advisory Ctte., 
29 September 1930; Cambridgeshire CA, Res. in NU 
Exec., 14 October 1930; Hendon CA, Exec., 11 July 
1 930, copy in Beaverbrook MSS, B155; West Lewisham 
CA, Council, 6 October 1930, ibid., B233; South 
Teddington CA, 23 September 1930, and Stanwell CA, 13 
October 1930, copies in Baldwin MSS, volume 165, ff. 276-290.
54. B e a v e r b r o o k  to W i l l i a m s ,  24 S e p t e m b e r  1930, 
Beaverbrook MSS, C324.
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potentially disastrous nature. This, in fact, was to be 
the lowest phase of the leadership’s fortunes, and the 
period in which its support amongst the rank and file 
slipped to its lowest ebb during the entire period in 
opposition. Despite the more superficially spectacular 
challenges mounted to Baldwin in the spring of 1931, his 
position was never to be so weak again as it was in 
September and early October 1930. In this period the 
party came to the very brink of internal cjollapse, far
more serious than the buffetings it received from the
Ipress lords in February and March 1931. jIndeed, the 
crisis of S e p t e m b e r  1930 was as t h r e a t e n i n g  as the 
r e b e l l i o n  w h i c h  o v e r t h r e w  the l e a d e r s h i p  of Austen 
Chamberlain and the Coalition in 1922, and far more so 
than the revolt over India in 1933-35. Although the 
revolt was averted, its force and the extent and range of 
feeling behind it came from a much larger proportion of 
the party than any other crisis, even that of 1 922. 
Despair affected all levels, high and low. Most serious 
of all were the signs of disintegration and collapse, on a 
scale unparalleled even with that of the Coalition period, 
in the local A s s o c i a t i o n s . 55 By the end of September 
1930 the grassroots of the party were within a hair's 
breadth of breaking out in open revolt, and the control of 
the leader and Central Office was on the brink
55. N. C h a m b e r l a i n  to B r i d g e m a n ,  5 October 1930, 
Bridgeman MSS, SRO 3389/98.
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of "complete c o l l a p s e ".56 This was exemplified by a 
lengthy debate consisting in the main of an open assault 
on the party leadership, and revealing the chaos prevalent 
amongst local Executives, in the St. Alban's Association, 
This was all the more remarkable for the fact that it 
occurred in the presence of the Association President, 
Lord Salisbury, to whom none of the usual deference was 
d i s p l a y e d . 57 E l s e w h e r e  the s o l i d a r i t y  of local 
Conservatism was falling apart. In Blackpool three local 
c o u n c i l l o r s  and the f o r m e r  Unionist MP Sir Li n d s a y  
Parkinson seceeded to set up an Empire Crusade branch, 
complaining of "the shilly-shallying methods of Mr. 
B a l d w i n " . 5 8  Official policy was "absolutely beyond [our] 
comprehension and we are rapidly losing support and 
subscriptions owing to it", complained the Whitstable 
Conservative A s s o c i a t i o n . 59 The gravity of the position 
was illustrated by the fact that some Associations went to 
the unprecedented lengths of passing resolutions openly
56. A. Chamberlain to Mary Carnegie, 9 October 1930, AC 
4/1/1302.
57. St. Alban's CA, Exec., 30 June and 25 July 1 930.
This was paralleled by extensive critical debates on
policy, a feature unique to this period, in several
other constituencies; Uxbridge CA, Council, 11 
October 1930; Wells CA, Exec., 11 September 1930.
58. Northern Daily Telegraph, 23 August 1930; Liverpool
Post, 24 September 1930.
59. Chairman, Whitstable CA, to Beaverbrook, 15 October
1930, Beaverbrook MSS, B171.
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critical of the l e a d e r , 60 Others joined the demand for
the convening of a Conference of the National Union - a
demand tantamount to asserting the right of the localities
to make policy and choose or set aside l e a d e r s , ^1 The
crisis was not confined to the seats of Diehards, or even
to the South; whole regions of the Baldwinite North were
equally close to rebellion. Derby sounded the alarm after
c h a i r i n g  a s e ssion of the L a n c a s h i r e  Area in early
October, which insisted on calling a special meeting in
the near future:
the underlying motive for this meeting is antagonism 
to Baldwin’s leadership. There is to my mind little 
doubt that there will be a resolution passed which 
will be ... a vote of censure on Baldwin.
62
In Birmingham, the Chamberlain citadel, ’’they are all 
against the present r e g i m e . ’’63
At the s a m e  t i m e ,  d i s c o n t e n t  a m o n g s t  the 
parliamentary party was at a pitch. The discontent of the 
right, which had been vocally expressed at meetings of the 
1900 Club, was now making the running on the backbenches; 
"the party is simply rotting before our eyes", wrote
60. Chelmsford CA, Exec., 26 September 1930; Cranford CA, 
Exec., 10 October 1930, copy in Baldwin MSS, volume 
165, f. 280.
61. Torquay CA, 7 July 1930; Altrincham CA, Res. in NU 
Exec., 16 July 1930; North Norfolk CA, Res. in NU 
Exec., 14 October 1930.
62. Derby to N. Chamberlain, 10 October 1930, Derby MSS, 
920 DER (17)/33.
63. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 18 September 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, C154.
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Orra^ s b y - G o r e . Page Croft, after talking to many MPs in 
the Carlton Club, told Neville Chamberlain that "all of 
every shade of opinion confirm what I told you of the 
appalling change of feeling in the country in the last two 
months."65 Several of the rising younger men, such as 
W a l t e r  Elliot and Oliver Stanley, were b e c o m i n g  
"mutinous".66 Most serious of all, this mood was matched 
a m o n g s t  the m e m b e r s  of the former cabinet. Hoare 
confessed "my fear is that things are moving so fast that 
unless something happens quickly, everything and everybody 
will collapse like a pack of cards."^7 Austen Chamberlain 
was on the verge of "undertaking to bell the cat and 
gently indicating to S. B. that it was time for him to 
g o . "68 T o this s e e t h i n g  c a u l d r o n  was added a new 
initiative by Beaverbrook, who had decided finally on a 
complete break with Baldwin.^9 The opportunity to strike 
was provided by a by-election vacancy in the metropolitan 
territory favoured by Beaverbrook, at South Paddington,
64. OrmfSby-Gore to Salisbury, 5 October 1930, Salisbury 
MSS S(4) 137/44-45,
65. Croft to N. Chamberlain, 4 October 1930, Croft MSS 
1/7/oh. 34.
66. Ormv^sby-Gore to Salisbury, 9 October 1930, Salisbury
MSS, S(4) 137/55-56; Headlam Diary, 24 September
1930.
67. Hoare to N. Chamberlain, 8 October 1930, Templewood 
MSS, VI/1.
68. A. to Ida Chamberlain, 4 October 1930, AC 5/1/516.
69. Beaverbrook to Derby, 19 September 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, Cl 13.
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and he secured Rothermere's support for bringing out, for 
the first time under the Crusade's banner, an Independent 
c a n d i d a t e . 70 Paradoxically, this attack strengthened 
Baldwin's crumbling position, for few in the party so 
desired his departure as to wish to seem to knuckle under 
to the press lords. Nevertheless, the situation facing 
Baldwin on his return from France in late September 
clearly required a major initiative from him if he was to 
hold his party together - and there were many who feared 
that it was already too late for even that to preserve his 
leadership.
Neville Chamberlain, whose position was almost as 
much at risk as Baldwin's, attempted to stem the tide in 
Baldwin's absence by revealing his advanced "Unauthorized
Programme". In speeches in mid-September he opted for the
I
"emergency tariff", a ten per cent import duty across the 
board, which he believed would "be heartily!welcomed in 
the party".71 Well placed as Party Chairman jto gauge theI
s e r i o u s n e s s  of the situation, he de v i s e d  a plan to 
announce a major advance in a protectionist 'direction as 
soon as possible. Various methods were 'considered: 
calling a Party meeting at which Baldwin would unveil the 
policy was discarded as too risky a procedure in the 
present mood of the party; eventually Chamberlain decided
70. BeaVerbrook-Rotherraere telegrams, 11-18 September 
1930. ibid., C284.
71. Speech at Crystal Palace, The 20 September 
1930; N. to H. Chamberlain, 21 September 1930, NC 
18/1/742.
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to draft an exchange of letters between himself and 
Baldwin, in which "all talk of Referendum and second 
General Election [would] be at an end", and the emergency 
tariff was to be advocated, together with a quota system, 
rather than a tax, for grain imports. This was to be 
presented to the meeting of ex-cabinet ministers, the 
Business Committee, on 7 October for a p p r o v a l , T h r e e  
stumbling blocks remained. Of these the first and least 
important was the possibility of a refusal on the part of 
the Free Trade element in the Business Committee, led by 
W i n s t o n  Churchill, to accept the new policy. This 
protest, in the light of the rest of party opinion, could 
if necessary be ignored. However, two more fundamental 
structural problems posed an acute dilemma. On the one 
hand there was a considerable anxiety that with Baldwin 
still ensconced as leader, casting "a wet blanket" over 
morale, the new policy would fall f l a t . O n  the other 
hand, any move to axe Baldwin and replace him with a more 
acceptable leader could not be countenanced whilst he was 
under the press lords’ onslaught at South Paddington. Not 
only would such a mov e  be "hailed as a t r i u m p h  for 
themselves by Rotherraere and Beaverbrook and would be 
thought by many people to be so", which would be "in
72. N. Chamberlain diary, 11 October 1930, NC 2/22; N. to 
I. Chamberlain, 28 September 1930, NC 18/1/711; N. 
C h a m b e r l a i n  to B r i d g e m a n ,  8 October 1930, NC 
8/10/1 3d.
73. A, to N. Chamberlain, 9 October 1 930, AC 39/2/40; N. 
Chamberlain to Bridgeman, 5 October 1930, Bridgeman 
MSS, SRO 3389/98.
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itself sufficiently revolting and it is besides a real 
danger for the future", but it would also be likely to 
cause a split in the P a r t y . T h e  Business Çoramittee met 
on 7 October, and considered Neville Chamberlain's drafted 
letters, but failed to resolve the problem. The mood of 
the meeting was "profoundly uneasy" and "all of us were 
racking our brains to find some method of escape from a 
dangerous s i t u a t i o n " . Eventually, partly as a result of 
Churchill's objections to the policy, it was decided to 
adjourn the d i s c u s s i o n  until 14 October. What was 
desperately required, as the leadership were stuck with
Baldwin and all his defects, was some ^ ££ m achina
I
which could revitalise the political situaticjjn.
In the interval between the two meetings a solution 
to the dilemma was provided, as had been hoped, by events 
at the I m p e r i a l  Conference. Of these, the most 
significant was a declaration on 8 October from R. B. 
Bennett, the Canadian Prime Minister, suggesting a system 
of preferential tariffs throughout the Empire if only the 
Home Government would meet him half way. To this the 
Labour G o v e r n m e n t ,  c o m m i t t e d  to free trade, had no 
response to offer; but to Neville Chamberlain, it offered 
"a truly Heaven-sent o p p o r t u n i t y " . I t  provided a bridge
74. A. to N. Chamberlain, 9 October 1930, AC 39/2/40; 
Bridgeman Journal, volume II, p. 225.
75. N. Chamberlain to Bridgeman, 8 October 1930, NC 
8/10/13d.
76. N. C h a m b e r l a i n  to Salisbury, 11 October 1930, 
Salisbury MSS, S(4) 137/60-62.
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1
by which party policy could be leapfrogged forward over 
all objections in a manner best fitting the Conservative 
Party's imperialist tradition. Furthermore, it avoided 
any appearance of being a result of, or surrender to, the 
pressure of the press attacks, and restored Baldwin's 
prestige by appearing as a great stroke of constructive 
leadership :
It is an opportunity better than we could have hoped 
for or d r e a m e d  of, to a d v a n c e  our p o l i c y .  
Incidentally, it seems to provide us with a happy 
issue out of all our Party afflictions.
77
In the latter sense the r e s p o n s e  to the Be n n e t t
declaration by the party leader was crucial not only for
the actual advance in c o m m i t m e n t , but also for the very
speed and efficiency with which it was announced. This
manner restored morale, renewed confidence, and pre-empted
completely the counter strokes of Beaverbrook and his
allies. That the chance was seized so promptly was
largely the work of Neville Chamberlain, who reacted
swiftly after seeing the press reports of Bennett's offer
on the morning of 9 October.
I realised we had an unexpected opportunity of coming 
out with a lead. I spent the whole day in getting a 
statement dra(ted, and it was handed to the press in 
S. B.'s name about six o'clock. In this statement he 
... accepted the principle of Imperial Preference and 
that ... we should formulate our own proposals and 
submit them to the electors for their definite and 
final assent.
78
77. Hilton-Young to Baldwin, 9 October 1930, Kennet MSS 
4/11.
78. N. Chamberlain diary, 11 October 1930, NC 2/22.
242
The referendum was dead and buried, and this "most anxious 
week ... has ended in a real scoop for u s."^ ^  But this 
was only to be the first of two stages on the road to 
rehabilitation. The press release of 9 October contained 
a definite promise that Baldwin would announce full 
details of his response the following week, and by this 
s t r a t e g e m  C h a m b e r l a i n  e f f e c t i v e l y  p r e - e m p t e d  the 
discussions at the Business C o m m i t t e e ’s meeting of the 
14th. On this occasion Chamberlain’s prepared draft was 
rubber stamped, and the effect of this second manifesto 
was to further restore the prestige of the leadership and 
the morale of the followers. Also, it gave the latter 
everything they wanted:
This second statement means, in effect, a free hand 
to tax anything.... We have now come to this, that 
[almost] nothing remains between us and the fullest 
possible policy of protection ... the new statement 
accepts the Emergency Tariff and makes it part of our 
policy.
It was "an amazing advance.
The réponse was overwhelmingly favourable. The broad 
centre of the party were reassured, and the prospect of a 
serious party split or collapse receded even more quickly 
in mid-October than it had materialised in September. The 
t r a n s f o r m a t i o n  w a s  e s p e c i a l l y  e v i d e n t  in t h o s e  
a s s o c i a t i o n s  w h e r e  d i s s e n t  had b e e n  at b o i l i n g
79. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 11 October 11 1930, NC 18/1/712
80. N. C h a m b e r l a i n  to B r i d g e m a n ,  15 October 1930, 
Bridgeman MSS, SRO 3389/102.
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point. In all of these there was a retreat from the 
brink, and a turnover of majority opinion against the mood 
of S e p t e m b e r . O u t s p o k e n  critics on local Executives 
lapsed into silent acquiescence, or were reduced to an 
irrelevant minority. The new policy was "clear, definite, 
and acceptable".82 Most significant of all was the fact 
that this sentiment was echoed in a chorus of approval 
across the length and breadth of the nation, and from all 
types of constituency.83 Unity had been restored. The 
new move provided a bridge to reunite both extremes of the 
party. Thus the Diehard MP for East Dorset, Hall-Caine, 
and the free trade member for the Clitheroe constituency 
in Lancashire, Sir William Brass, could both express 
agreement with the new policy - which for the latter, at 
least, indicated a significant advance.8^ This favourable
81. Chelmsford CA, Exec., 17 October 1930; Uxbridge C A , 
Council, 15 November 1930.
82. Lewes CA, Exec., 27 October 1930.
83. South Kensington CA, C h a i r m a n ’s Agenda, 4 November 
1930; H a r b o r o u g h  CA, Council, 1 N o v e m b e r  1930; 
Northampton CA, Exec., October 1930; Guildford CA, 
Council, 20 N o v e m b e r  1930; Bath CA, Exec., 11 
November 1930; Torquay CA, Exec., 29 October 1930; 
Lancaster CA, Exec., 18 October 1930; Birmingham CA, 
Council, 10 October 1930; Gateshead CA, Res. in NU 
Exec., 14 October 1930; Manchester CA and Spelthorne 
CA, Res. in NU Exec., 12 November 1 930; SUA, Eastern 
Div. Council, 22 October 1930; on Scottish opinion, 
see also Gilraour to Baldwin, 12 October 1930, Baldwin 
MSS, volume 165, ff. 172-173.
84. Hall-Caine to East Dorset CA, East Dorset CA, Exec., 
27 October 1930; Sir W. Brass, speech at Clitheroe 
CA, Exec., 16 October 1930.
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response was mirrored in the loyal Conservative press, 
even in the North, and amongst the parliamentary party at 
large. The Party Chairman wrote that "all the information 
that comes to me indicates that the whole party has been 
bolstered up and feels that it has a policy once more, 
w h i l e  S B ’s p e r s o n a l  p o s i t i o n  has b e e n  g r e a t l y  
strengthened."85 Indeed, for perhaps the first time since 
the passing by his last government of the Trades Disputes 
Act of 1927, Baldwin was firmly in tune with the views of 
his followers, rather than - as had been more often than 
not the case in the previous three years - lagging behind 
or contradicting the desires of large sections.88 in the 
light of this, the normal centrifugal forces of solidarity 
and loyalty began to operate, producing a rally round the 
beleagured leader in the second half of October. In the 
first instance, the free trade element in the party 
s w a l l o w e d  the new p o l i c y  with v a r y i n g  degrees of 
acquiescence. Derby, and to a slightly lesser extent 
Salisbury, were willing to accept the new situation.87
85. N. to Hilda C h a m b e r l a i n ,  18 October 1930, NC 
18/1/713.
86. A survery of constituency records indicates that the 
last occasion to elicit such widespread grassroots 
approval was the Trades Disputes Act of 1927. Since 
that local reactions on policy had been at best 
mixed, at worst highly critical, on issues such as 
the Flapper Vote, Safety First, and the role of 
Central Office, c u l m i n a t i n g  in the surge of 
resentment of September 1930.
87. Derby to Beaverbrook, 21 October 1930, Derby MSS DER 
(17)/33; Salisbury to Wolmer, 13 September 1930, 
Selborne MSS, Eng. Hist. d. 451, f. 86; Salisbury to 
Baldwin, 14 October 1930, Baldwin MSS, volume 31» ff. 
168-1 7 0.
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Winston Churchill, despite the claims of his free food 
past, which took him almost to the verge of resignation 
from the Business Committee over the new statements, was 
p r e v a i l e d  u p o n  s u c c e s s f u l l y  to m a k e  no p u b l i c  
disclaimers.88 In the second place the tariff reformers, 
having been at perhaps the nearest point they would ever 
come to throwing in their lot with Beaverbrook in despair, 
hastened back to support the leader’s new move. Croft, 
announcing "we have achieved our main object", supported 
the official candidate at South Paddington.89 Amer y 
declared of Baldwin that "now he has come along on the 
essential point - though still with a certain fluffiness 
of language - I think it is only fair that those of us who 
be l i e v e  in the p o l i c y  should back him."9 0 S i m i l a r  
sentiments were felt by Beaverbrook’s allies in the 
Crusade, Elibank and Melchett, and generally speaking the 
effect was to take the wind out of the Crusade’s sails. 
Beaverbrook did not appreciate this, and became more and 
more unrestrained in his attacks at South Paddington.
The difference between the official policy and the 
Crusade policy was now very little, but Beaverbrook had
88. Churchill to Baldwin, 14, 16 October 1930, Churchill 
MSS 2/572, Gilbert, op. cit., volume V, part 2, pp.. 
191-194; N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 18 October 1930, NC 
18/1/713.
89. Croft to Beaverbrook, 22 October 1930, Croft MSS 1-4, 
f . BG 12.
90. Amery to Beaverbrook, 11 October 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, C5.
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lost all faith in the official leadership’s ability or 
will to actually fight for their policy, and thus refused 
to disband his Crusade. Of course, the inevitable result 
of this, cleverly pointed up in a public exchange of 
letters between Baldwin and Beaverbrook by the former, was 
to make it seem as if Beaverbrook was simply satisfying a 
p e r s o n a l  vendetta. This a p p e a r a n c e  was a t w o f o l d  
advantage for Baldwin. First, the essential justification 
for Beaverbrook’s factionalism had been removed by the 
leadership's adoption of a popular strong imperial policy, 
and thus continued hostility from Beaverbrook could be 
portrayed as a serious threat to the party's chances of 
putting that policy into operation. In the second place 
the intransigence of the press lords served to prove 
B a l d w i n ’s thesis at the previous party meeting and to 
reinforce the theme of hostility to the supposed attempts 
of press dictatorship.
In this s i t u a t i o n  the t houghts of the party 
leadership turned naturally to some method of capitalising 
on this turn-around of fortunes. Bridgeman thought 
immediately after the response to Bennett that "we are on 
better ground for battle than we have been for months. 
Empire F[ree] T[rade] is discredited ... and so I feel I 
should like to fight it out at once."91 Rumours of a 
demand from Gretton and the Diehards for another party
91. Bridgeman to N. Chamberlain, 13 October 1930, NC 
8/10/13.
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meeting to dicuss the leadership question had been in the 
air before the Bennett declaration. The leadership took 
the opportunity to turn this attack on its head, feeling 
strong enough to concede the demand, in the knowledge that 
in the changed mood of late October such a gathering would 
confirm, not destroy, Baldwin's position. Instead of 
isolating the leadership, the Diehards would isolate 
themselves. The suggestion of calling a second party 
meeting was advocated strongly by Bridgeman: "while we
are in the ascendant we ought to challenge any opposition 
in the party", for he was sure that "the policy now 
produced will be endorsed by a large m a j o r i t y ".9^ Neville 
Chamberlain was also in agreement with this strategy: "if
Gretton and his friends persist in demanding a meeting to 
discuss leadership I believe it might be granted without 
any serious danger just now", he r e p l i e d . 93 Unaware of 
the extent to which they were thus playing into the 
leader's hands, the Gretton group made two false moves. A 
memorial signed by forty-seven MPs in the last week of 
October provided a pretext for calling a party meeting, 
again to be held at the Caxton Hall, for the 30th of that 
month, a rapid response. The second tactical error made
92. B r i d g e m a n  to N. C h a m b e r l a i n ,  16 October 1930, 
Bridgeman MSS, SRO 3389/103; Bridgeman to Baldwin, 17 
October 1930, Baldwin MSS, volume 165, ff. 33-34.
93. N. C h a m b e r l a i n  to B r i d g e m a n ,  18 October 1930, 
Bridgeman MSS, SRO 3389/104.
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by the Diehards was then to convene a pre-meeting cabal of 
some forty MPs on 28 October at the St. Stephens Club, 
where a resolution critical of Baldwin was passed and 
leaked to the press. Such "U Boat Tactics", seeking to 
pre-empt the meeting by forcing Baldwin out, produced a 
further revulsion of feeling in his favour as the honest 
man under assault by devious and disreputable enemies.9^
This was carried over to the tone of the meeting 
itself. Baldwin on his entrance to the Caxton Hall on 30 
October was given an immense ovation. He followed the 
carefully planned strategy by confining his speech to an 
exposition of the new policy only, avoiding personal 
issues, and "his manner was strong and his final words 
i m p r e s s i v e " . 95 Inevitably the motion approving the policy 
secured unanimous assent. Baldwin then withdrew from the 
hall, having made his point, and the meeting turned to 
discuss the leadership question under the chairmanship of 
Salisbury. The only really effective speech made during 
this debate was that by Hailsham, which again decisively 
exploited the vulnerability of the role of the press to 
secure support for Baldwin:
Hailsham scored a great success, being the only one 
who po i n t e d  out that if Gretton won, not only 
Baldwin, but every future leader, would have to dance
94. Morning Post, 30 October 1930; Lane-Fox to Irwin, 29
October 1930, India Office Eur. C. 152/19/1/154a; 
Derby to N. Chamberlain, 31 October 1 930, Derby MSS 
920 DER (17)/33; Freemantle to Baldwin, 29 October 
1930, Baldwin MSS, volume 48. f. 183.
95. A. to Ida Chamberlain, 2 November 1930, AC 5/1/519.
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to the tune of the Press Plutocrats. This was really 
the trump card.
96
The speeches made against Baldwin were of very poor 
duality, and it was evident that, deprived of a clear 
justification over policy matters, the irreconcilable 
e l e m e n t  was i n c a p a b l e  of m a k i n g  an e f f e c t i v e  case. 
Although the result of the final vote, with four hundred 
and sixty-two votes for Baldwin and one hundred and 
sixteen against, showed a larger hostile element than had 
been expected, even this was to some extent discounted due 
to the personal and political impossibility of most of the 
minority :
It included of course the so-called Diehards of the 
Gretton type, who would pursue a reactionary policy 
that the country would not stand. It included the 
group habitually described as the Forty Thieves, 
hangers-on of business, not of the best type, and I 
suspect a good many old and disgruntled peers.
97
In fact the meeting proved an even greater success for the 
leadership's point of view, for the mos t  p r o m i n e n t  
figures in minority groups openly accepted the verdict of 
the meeting as final, swinging into line for reasons of 
party solidarity.
96. Bridgeman to Davidson, 2 November 1930, James, op. 
cit., pp. 352-353.
97. A. to Ida Chamberlain, 2 November 1930, AC 5/1/519; 
on the speeches at the meeting see; Headlara diary, 
30 October 1930; N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 2 November 
1930, NC 18/1/715.
250
Baldwin is often described as having been compelled 
to call both party meetings by the strength and force of 
the opposition to h i m . 98 in fact, the contrary is the 
case. When in November 1929 Gretton and the Diehards had 
previously demanded a meeting, their request was fobbed 
off. In reality, the party meetings were called by 
Baldwin to impose his will on the party, and to bring 
dissent out into the open at a time when it was at a 
temporarily low e b b , 99 The tactic was to force the hard 
core of irreconcilables to reveal their limited support in 
the party at large, and to appear as the witting or 
unwitting dupes of the press lords. They were forced by 
the order and selection of motions to present themselves 
in a factious light, by appearing to be separated from the 
rest of the party on the dubious grounds of the leader's 
personal characteristics, not the respectable grounds of 
p o l i c y .  100 Once the meetings are seen as the chosen 
weapon of the leadership, taking place on their timing, it 
is not surprising on the one hand that Baldwin triumphed
98. For example, as in the recent work of synthesis by R, 
Rhodes James, Th£ Br^i^ti^^h Revolu t ion (1977), volume
2, p. 220.
99. Bridgeman to Baldwin, 22 and 25 June 1 930, Baldwin 
MSS, volume 165, ff. 28-30.
100. Bridgeman to Davidson, 22 October 1930, in James 
(ed.) M£rao3^ir£ o£ £ Conservative, pp. 350-351; N. to 
Ida Chamberlain, 26 October 1930, NC 18/1/714; N. 
Chamberlain diary, 26 October 1930, NC 2/22; Forster 
to Baldwin, 29 October 1930, Baldwin MSS, volume 165, 
f. 138.
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at them, and on the other hand such victories had little 
lasting value. The meetings were an artificial forum, and 
they failed to have a long-term impact because they were 
only effective in disguising the extent of anxiety in the 
party. The voting figures did not show the large element 
of unsettled but not yet disloyal Conservatives, who felt 
exposed to the pressure of the Crusade and uneasy about 
Baldwin's c a p a c i t y  as leader. Many such MPs or 
candidates, including some of the rising younger men, 
voted for Baldwin at the party meetings despite serious 
misgivings.1^ 1 After each party meeting the mood of 
c o n f i d e n c e  and c o n s e n s u s  proved shor t l i v e d ,  not 
principally because of the activities of Beaverbrook, but 
be c ause B a l d w i n  failed to sustain the m o m e n t u m  of 
improvement by being more partisan and forceful in either 
the Commons or the country. Thus the misgivings dutifully 
s u p p r e s s e d  in the face of the u n a c c e p t a b l e  press 
o n s l a u g h t s  cited at the m e e t i n g s  were a f t e r w a r d s  
confirmed. On both occasions within a few months the 
situation reverted to being almost as dismal as it had 
been before. This factor was the reason why even the 
second Caxton Hall meeting was not the conclusive affair 
that the leadership had looked for, though it was the more 
successful of the two meetings in achieving some permanent 
reduction in the range and quantity of criticism.
101. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 29 October 1930, Halifax MSS, 
India Office Eur.C. 152/19/1 /154a .
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The first Caxton Hall m e e t i n g  had been a less
complete victory, partly because on that occasion the 
official policy afforded little lasting satisfaction south 
of the River Trent, and partly because the meeting itself 
was turned by a m u c h  more t e m p o r a r y  appeal to the
a u d i e n c e ’s emo t i o n s .  B a l d w i n ’s trick of tarring 
Beaverbrook with R o t h e r m e r e ’s brush, and finessing with 
the constitutional card, succeeded in the heat of the 
momentary anger over Rotherraere’s letter. However, it was 
not as effective in the long terra as his own detestation 
of the press magnates may have led him to believe. Unlike 
Baldwin, many Conservatives made a distinction between the 
two men. Rothermere was loathed on grounds of personality
and policy by a l m o s t  all; but m a n y  C o n s e r v a t i v e s
sympathised with Beaverbrook, and even until the South 
Paddington election, hoped to work with him. Furthermore, 
the first meeting was perhaps kept too much under the 
leadership's thumb, and failed to convince the dissidents 
that the result was a genuine index of party feeling; thus 
they refused to accept its verdict as final.
In this sense the second Caxton Hall meeting was much 
more successful from the leadership's point of view. 
Baldwin was aided by Beaverbrook's unrestrained antics in 
the South Paddington campaign, which provoked figures such 
as Hailsham, who was held in particular respect on the
102. N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 21 June 1 930, NC 18/1/701; 
Evening News, 23 June 1930; Daily Mail, 24 June 1930.
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right, to d e n o u n c e  the press lords with u n usual 
vehemence.103 The direct effect of the press attacks was 
to shore up B a l d w i n ’s position and make it all the more 
difficult for figures such as Derby to desert hira.I®^ The 
crucial achievement of the second Caxton Hall meeting lay 
in convincing the most influential dissident leaders, such 
as Croft and Elibank, that they should accept the decision 
of the meeting as binding upon the minority to accede to 
the majority verdict.105 This was secured by an appeal to 
the spirit of public school fair play, and by allowing the 
contest to take place to the dissidents’ own rules. They 
were assured a fair opportnity to make their case, and 
they were to be allowed all the procedural advantages in 
terms of speaking order, and secret ballot, that could 
reasonably be claimed.108 However, the leadership did 
cover their bets on both occasions by including the 
prospective candidates in the groups entitled to attend. 
These people, mainly from the marginal seats of the 
Midlands, from the industrial areas in the North, and from 
the Celtic fringe, had a greater vested interest in 
avoiding electorally extreme positions, and the areas
103. Lockhart diary, 7 October 1930.
104. Derby to Beaverbrook, 21 October 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, Cl 13.
105. Elibank to Beaverbrook, 30 October 1930, ibid., C126.
106. Baldwin to Mrs. Davidson, 2 November 1930, in James, 
op. cit., p. 354; Halsbury to Salisbury, 30 October 
1930, Salisbury MSS S(4) 137/94.
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they hoped to represent were those where both the appeal 
of Baldwin personally and the instinctive dislike of food 
taxes were much g r e a t e r . 1^7
Baldwin was also on firmer ground on the second 
occasion in securing acceptance of the policy first, 
seeming to concede that the question of leadership was a 
separate matter and not bound up in the policy decision. 
Of course, by divorcing the objection to his policy from 
that to his person, Baldwin actually made the task of his 
critics much more d i f f i c u l t . 1^8 %t became impossible
because of the choice of timing of the meeting, which was 
fixed for the day before the poll at South Paddington. 
This was not because of any analogy with the effects of 
the Newport by-election on the Carlton Club meeting of 
1922, but in order to drive home the point that to remove 
Baldwin whilst he was actually under the height of press 
attack would be to lay the party open to the charge of 
being subservient to the p r e s s . 189 was this appeal to
their communal self-respect, even more than sympathy with 
the sympathetic character of Baldwin the man, which 
produced the marked reaction of hostility to Beaverbrook 
h i m s e l f  f r o m  the f l o o r  of the m e e t i n g . 118 a s
107. Headlam diary, 25-29 October 1930 inclusive.
108. Bridgeman journal, volume II, p. 225.
109. Daily Telegraph, 30 October 1930.
110. Beaverbrook to Mildmay, 31 October 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS,B167.
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the decision of the second Caxton Hall meeting was a
f o r e g o n e  c o n c l u s i o n  under these c i r c u m s t a n c e s ,  the
manoeuvre of calling it involved few risks and offered
significant gains. Beaverbrook himself had no doubts
before the meeting that Baldwin would get his vote of
confidenoe.111 B a l d w i n ’s procedural concessions at the
second party meeting did not reflect any weakness in his
position; on the contrary, they reflected its strength and
0.his confidence in the aftermath of the favou^ble reaction 
to his having finally grasped the ’free hand’.
The verdict of the party meetings also settled 
another issue in dispute - the very distribution of power 
in the party. On several occasions during the party 
crisis between the defeat in the 1929 election and the 
second Caxton Hall gathering the dissatisfaction at the 
grassroots with party policy past, present and future, had 
lead inevitably to demands for a voice in the policy 
formulation process. These were moving from the implicit 
to the dangerously explicit, and if unsatisfied might have 
lead either to serious revolt along the lines of 1922, or 
open demands for executive power to rest in the National 
Union and not the parliamentary front benches, or even 
both. The decisiveness of the response to the Bennett 
offer in October 1 930 defused this danger at one and the 
same time as it satisfied the rank and file on fiscal 
policy. There is no doubt that the leaders conceded a
111. Beaverbrook to James, 26 October 1930, ibid., B158.
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great deal to retain control, but at the end of the day 
their position was preserved. Neville Chamberlain was 
relieved that the October party meeting
showed no disposition to question the view that 
decisions on policy are made by the Leader, after 
taking such advice as he chooses; and that they 
require no endorsement from any body representing the 
Party in any way before becoming binding on the 
Members.
1 1 2
A u t o c r a t i c  o l i g a r c h i c  co n t r o l  r e m a i n e d ,  and was 
deferentially responded to, a factor of considerable 
importance in the very different problems faced by Baldwin 
in 1931 - first in defeating the final assault on his
position in the spring, second in forming the National 
Government in the autumn.
The events of S e p t e m b e r  and October 1930 also
underlined the rise of Neville Chamberlain himself. The
period of opposition during the second Labour Government
was a vital phase of his career, for it transformed him
from being merely one of several promising cabinet
m i n i s t e r s  to the p o s i t i o n  of crown prince and heir
a p p a r e n t  to B a l d w i n  and thus, even t u a l l y ,  to the
Premiership, Chamberlain had been one of the successes of
the 1924-1929 Government, but in a minor department on a
112. N. Chamberlain to Bridgeman, 1 November 1 9 3 0 ,  NC 
8 / 1 0 / 1 6 C .
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politically dull programme of measures. This spell at the
M i n i s t r y  of H e a l t h  had d e m o n s t r a t e d  t a l e n t  as an
administrator and drafter of legislation, but it was by no
means clear that he had demonstrated leadership qualities
as a politician. He was "more at home in the frozen
regions of politics", and thought by Bridgeman to be "too
b u r e a u c r a t i c " ,  1 18 indeed, his political wisdom was open
to doubt after having been, together with Churchill,
responsible for the unpopular derating measures. Neither
this, nor other expensive or remedial social legislation
were particularly popular with the rank and file in the
light of the 1929 e l e c t i o n  results. A w a r e  of the
limitations of the Ministry of Health, Chamberlain had
sought transference to the Colonial Secretaryship, where
his assumption of his fat h e r ’s mantle might mend his
bridges with the grassroots. The election defeat removed
this opportunity from his grasp. Political reputations
are far more variable than history often depicts, and in
the closed circles of Westminster the index of political
standing fluctuates as frequently as the prices on the
Stock Exchange, In May 1929 Chamberlain was in a down
phase, and he s o u g h t  for the r e m a i n d e r  of the year
opportunities to restore his influence. He remained
unclear as to which course to follow, adopting a low
profile throughout the summer of 1929, and following this
with a lengthy winter absence in East Africa,
113. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 15 August 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS 0154; Bridgeman journal, volume II, p, 207.
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On his return he resolved to use the Chairmanship of 
the newly created Conservative Research Department, which 
he had been given control of, to direct and influence 
party policy.11^ However, such a back-room position 
remained essentially unsatisfactory. It could only be a 
first small stage in rehabilitation. The usefulness of 
the D e p a r t m e n t  was n o n e t h e l e s s  a r e v e l a t i o n  to 
Chamberlain, and led his thoughts to the possibility of 
combining with it the Party Chairmanship, Baldwin was 
manoeuvred by Chamberlain, who exploited the growing 
hostility to Davidson, and by using his own initiative in 
pushing the latter out, created a position in which his 
own control of Central Office, either th r o u g h  an 
intermediary or directly, would be assured. In May 1930 
Chamberlain’s position in the party hierarchy was still 
open to question, and he desired the Chairmanship as a 
means of asserting his centrality to all party issues. In 
this sense his vision of the Central Office as the 
directing force of the party, as literally the Central 
Organ, rather than an administrative workhouse such as the 
Research Department, explains his desire for the position; 
Chamberlain was always happier in a defined institutional 
role in which he possessed executive power. His position 
at the Reasearch Department had been dependent upon 
Central Office without clear powers over it; but now 
Chamberlain could emerge from those shadows,
114. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 22 March 1930. NC 18/1/686.
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The appointment to the Party Chairmanship in June 
1930 marked the beginning of Neville C hamberlain’s rise. 
This fell into three phases between June 1 930 and August 
1931, by which point his pre-eminence was completely 
assured. The Chairmanship filled a crucial role in the 
first two of these phases. It was a position of unique 
importance in the party during periods of opposition. 
Indeed, below the leader himself there was no other e x ­
officio p o s i t i o n  w h i c h  secured a voice in every 
significant decision; certainly membership of either the 
ex-cabinet or of the Business Committee did not ensure 
such i n f l u e n c e . 1 18 it was this position which Chamberlain 
exploited during the first phase of his rise, from June to 
October 1930. In this period Chamberlain slowly built his 
reputation, endeavouring to conciliate Beaverbrook and 
secure the dropping of the referendum for the free hand. 
His n e w - f o u n d  p o l i t i c a l  m a t u r i t y  e m e r g e d  in the 
initiatives he took in September and October 1930, first 
in the ’Unauthorised P r o g r a m m e ’ speeches, and second in 
his m a s t e r m i n d i n g  of the r e s p o n s e  to the Be n n e t t  
declaration. Chamberlain avoided many of the pitfalls of 
his office by simply not doing the same job as Davidson 
had done. The latter had been a l o n g - t e r m  w o r k i n g  
organiser; before his appointment Chamberlain was careful 
to have it made public this his own tenure was to be 
temporary for the current emergency. This he did for two
115. Bridgeman to Salisbury, 5 November 1930, Salisbury 
MSS, S(4) 138/14-15.
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reasons. First, to emphasise his role as a new broom with 
a mandate to reform the Central Office from above, not cut 
from the normal pattern of Chairmen, but limiting himself 
to grand policy rather than the grind of detail. Second, 
it was intended to assert that his Chairmanship did not 
rule him out from relinquishing it for cabinet office 
should the Labour government be replaced by a Conservative 
administration in the near future. Essentially, Davidson 
had been a glorified clerk for Baldwin, attending to the 
minutiae of organisational details and fund-raising. 
Chamberlain’s reforms of Central Office reflected his 
style of Chairmanship. They were designed to liberate the 
Chairman from such work so that he might take on a more 
overt political role. Chamberlain also saw the role of 
Chairman vis-a-vis the leader in a different light. 
Davidson had seemed too much still the personal secretary. 
Chamberlain intended to be chief counsellor and to use his 
institutional access to the leader to shape his outlook in 
the direction Chamberlain wished the party to move. In 
short, he intended to be an active, interventionist, power 
in his own right - as no Chairman previously had been. 
Thus he maintained a high profile, distancing'himself from 
details except where, as in the case of the crucial by- 
election contests or the control of the party publicity 
machine, such powers brought solid advantages. The coup 
which marked the successful end of this first phase of 
Neville Chamberlain’s emergence, the swift response to
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Bennett’s offer and the restoration of the leadership’s 
position in October 1930 provided the pay off he had been 
hoping for when he had invested his political capital in 
the Chairmanship. He told his sister that "as we thought 
the Chairmanship of the Party does enable one to direct 
the policy though nominally he has nothing to do with 
it".118
During the second phase of Neville Chamberlain’s rise 
to the position of heir apparent, which comprised the 
remaining period he spent as Party Chairman between 
November 1930 and April 1931» his position was still 
vulnerable to the changing tides of fortune. The position 
of Chairman inevitably attracted blame and involved 
conflicts and disputes with some members of the Party.117 
Furthermore, Chamberlain was still in danger of being too 
closely identified with Baldwin, and of being dragged down 
with him should his position once again collapse. Most 
important of all, Neville Chamberlain, although since his 
achievements of 1930 now increasingly spoken of as a 
candidate for the succession, was still only one figure 
among several possible contenders. The significance of 
the second phase of C hamberlain’s rise was the gradual
manner in which he positioned himself to outpace these j
116. N. to Hilda C h a m b e r l a i n ,  18 October 1930, NC 
18/1/713; N. Chamberlain to Bridgeman, 15 October 
1930, NC 8/10/15.
117. A. to Ida Chamberlain, 16 November 1930, AC 5/1/520.
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rivals in the period up to April 1931. The third and most 
crucial phase of all was his c a p i t a l i s a t i o n  on his 
successes in the period after stepping down from the 
Chairmanship, between April and August 1931, during which 
he consolidated his position as the single and uncontested 
heir apparent to Baldwin. He was, perhaps, the only 
figure in the party actually to gain prestige and credit 
from the tangled and unhappy events of the 1929-1931 party 
crisis.
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CHAPTER 5
Beaverbrook Beyond the Pale : November 19 30 to
March 1931
The ve r d i c t  of the second Caxton Hall m e e t i n g
isolated Beaverbrook from his Conservative allies, and
placed him beyond the pale of respectable Conservative
politics. Baldwin's policy concession of October 1930
had proved sufficient to detach from Beaverbrook all his
s i g n i f i c a n t  C o n s e r v a t i v e  s y m p a t h i s e r s  and f e l l o w -
travellers, leaving him only the alliance with Rotherraere.
A m e r y  w a s  the f i r s t  to r e s p o n d ,  but B a l d w i n ' s
clarification of his policy in the week after the Bennett
declaration also met the requirements of both Elibank and
Melchett.1 The latter wrote that "it seems to me that we
have won a really great victory as Baldwin has accepted
practically the whole programme", and suggested calling
off the Crusade challenger at South Paddington.2 Elibank
was quite clear that any minor differences should now be
discussed within the Conservative umbrella; it was the
policy, not the leadership, that was the issue at stake:
I am for going for the policy and nailing that to the 
mast and letting the question of leadership look 
after itself. The more [Beaverbrook and Rothermere] 
attack S. B. the more firmly he is being established 
in the saddle.
Furthermore, to continue warfare in the new mood of party
1. Amery to Beaverbrook, 11 October 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS C 5 ; Elibank to Beaverbrook, 22 October 1 930, 
ibid.. Cl 26.
2. Melchett to Beaverbrook, 22 October 1930, ibid., 
C243.
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unity would only raise "all the worst p a s s i o n s  and 
feelings of enmity even amongst people who have hitherto 
supported [Beaverbrook] Distancing themselves publicly 
from Beaverbrook, Melchett and Elibank issued a press 
statement accepting the new policy. Croft also joined the 
chorus of appeals from the protectionist right wing to 
Beaverbrook requesting his moderation, and urging him to 
work now within the party for the success of its new 
policy.^ Even Hannon wavered, suggesting in a long 
m e m o r a n d u m  on the p o l i t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  p r e p a r e d  for 
Beaverbrook, that the Crusade adopt the Baldwin policy but 
retain its separate political machine with which to 
campaign for it.5 In the context of this uncertainty, the 
decision of the meeting held at the Caxton Hall provided a 
way out of the dilemma. The Conservative dissidents 
responded to the party traditions of loyalty, and accepted 
publicly the verdict of the meeting. The divisions 
a m o n g s t  the p r o t e c t i o n i s t s  were made a b s o l u t e  by 
BeaVerbrook*s decision not to be bound by the result of 
the Caxton Hall vote, despite attending the meeting. The 
only result of this was to add further credence to 
B a l d w i n ’s d e n u n c i a t i o n  of B e a v e r b r o o k ’s p o l i t i c a l  
impossibility. The links between Beaverbrook and his
3. Elibank to Garvin, 26 October 1930, Elibank MSS, SRO, 
GD 32/25/69, ff. 96-97.
4. Croft to Beaverbrook, 5 November 1 930, Croft MSS, 
CRFT 1-4/BG 14.
5. Memo by Hannon, 3 November 1930, Beaverbrook MSS 
C154.
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allies, Elibank, Amery, Croft and Melchett, were severed 
after October 1930, This is a marked feature in the 
v o l u m i n o u s l y  c o m p r e h e n s i v e  B e a v e r b r o o k  p a p e r s ;  
correspondence with his Conservative allies does not just 
fade away, it ceases abruptly in November 1930. Personal 
contacts also dwindled, with Amery breaking silence at 
Christmas to write, "I have not seen you for the best part 
of three m o n t h s " .  ^ In tactical terms, Beaverbrook was 
from now on beyond the pale, paying the price of rejecting 
the irksome, moderating advice of the Conservative fellow- 
travellers in favour of the intransigent admonitions of 
Rotherraere.
Placed against this serious d e t e r i o r a t i o n  in 
Beaverbrook’s power base, not only amongst the leaders of 
C o n s e r v a t i v e  i m p e r i a l  s e n t i m e n t ,  but also in the 
constituencies which were in the process of rallying 
around the official position in late October 1930?, the 
victory of his candidate over the official nominee at the 
South Paddington on 31 October by-election was hardly a 
consolation. Contemporary political opinion was quite 
clear that the by-election result did not signify compared 
to the Caxton Hall meeting of the previous day; "the 
result can do very little harm to the Conservative Party",
6, Amery to Beaverbrook, 22 December 1930, ibid., C5; 
see also files C126, C243, C101, and C307.
7, Birmingham Post, 1 November 1930.
8, 1 November 1930; M o £ i i g 1
November 1930.
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de c l a r e d  the Daily Telegraph.® Neville Chamberlain 
attached little importance to it, putting it down mainly 
to the poor quality of the official candidate.9 In fact, 
the South Paddington election did not herald some new 
phase in the struggle, but was rather the last 
manifestation of the unrest visible throughout the party 
in September 1 930. This was, by the time when the South 
Paddington result was announced on 31 October, largely a 
thing of the past.
Indeed, Baldwin’s position in November and December 
1930 was probably stronger and more firmly based than it 
had been at any time since the 1929 general election. In 
the constituencies "the general feeling was that the risk 
of division in the Conservative ranks was appreciably 
less", and approval continued to be manifested across the 
board for B a l d w i n ’s p o s i t i o n . This was echoed by 
opinion in the lobby of the House of C o m m o n s ,  the 
backbenchers’ 1922 Committee recording in late November 
"the general impression that ... the party was rallying 
towards u n i t y . T h e  extent of this new mood was visibly
9 . N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 2 November 1930; to Ida 
Chamberlain, 8 November 1930, NC 18/1/715-716.
10. Cirencester and Tewkesbury CA, Finance and Advisory 
Ctte., 10 N o v e m b e r  1930; Lincoln CA, Exec., 21 
N o v e m b e r  1930; S o m e r s e t  Prov. Div., Council, 3 
November 1 930; Metropolitan Area Res., NU Exec., 12 
November 1930; Lancashire and Cheshire Area Res., 
Northern Counties Area Rea., Greenwich CA Res., 
Uxbridge CA Res., in NU Exec., 9 December 1 930.
11. 1922 Committee Minutes, 24 November 1 930, in P. 
G o o d h a r t  and U. Branston, op. cit., pp. 4 0-4 1; 
Bayford diary, 22 March 1931.
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underlined by two representative gatherings of the party 
rank and file: the meeting of the Central Council of the
National Union on 25 November, and the Annual Conference 
of the Scottish Unionist Association on 12 December. The 
tenor of both these meetings indicated the extent to which 
the tide of party opinion was now flowing in B a l d w i n ’s 
directon.^^ Beaverbrook’s power base had been seriously 
diminished, but his campaign had not yet been completely 
destroyed.
Beaverbrook’s response to the atmosphere of November
and December 1930 was to markedly slacken his activities,
and to return once again to the path of negotiations. On
this occasion the intermediary was the City financier Sir
Abe Bailey, who approached Neville Chamberlain on 4
November at Beaverbrook’s suggestion, and arranged a
meeting. Chamberlain was still resentful and distrustful
over the break up of the last bout of negotiations due to
the Bromley by-election, and, with the situation on this
occasion so strongly in his favour, had little need to
unbend, feeling no particular urgency in clinching terras.
Once again, the problem of the Rothermere connection
proved the s t u m b l i n g  block to any i m m e d i a t e  deal.
Beaverbrook again raised the topic of a seat for Esmond
Harmsworth as the bait to bring in the letter’s father,
Rothermere, This Chamberlain could not and would not
consider as a preliminary to a settlement, although he
12. Bridgeraan, Political Journal, December 1930, volume 
II, p. 227.
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did not rule out a seat for Esmond as the eventual product 
of peace. "Anything which looked like a surrender to [the 
press lords] in the present state of feeling would be 
howled out of court", declared Chamberlain. The press 
barons must make the first moves, "by l o w e r i n g  the 
temperature in their papers". Thus the lessening of 
hostilities would itself lead to an arrangement, rather 
than the other way around. Although it proved impossible 
to come formally to such a settlement so soon after the 
bitter atmosphere of South Paddington, the informal 
arrangement for neutrality operated successfully during 
November and December 1930. In further negotiations at 
the beginning of December, Beaverbrook and Chamberlain 
explored the possibility of drafting some agreed exchange 
of letters, but at that stage it proved impossible to find 
a formula satisfactory to both and humiliating to neither; 
accordingly, the decision was taken on Beaver brook's 
suggestion just to "let matters d r i f t " . T h i s  was 
acceptable to Chamberlain, for throughout this period the 
level of criticism in the Beaverbrook press had indeed 
been reduced; thus he had already gained almost all he 
could look for from a formal agreement.
Ironically, the cause of the b r e a k d o w n  of this 
promising trend was once again to be the constituency of 
South Paddington. The local troubles here between the 
Crusader MP, Taylor, and the official local Conservative
13. N. Chamberlain diary, 6 November 1930, 5 December
1930, NC 2/22.
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Association gradually embroiled the principals on both 
sides, Beaverbrook and Neville Chamberlain, in another 
c o n f r o n t a t i o n .  The c r u n c h  c a m e  w h e n  the l o c a l  
Conservatives insisted in mid-December in selecting a new 
official candidate, H. G, Williams, to contest the seat 
against Taylor at the next election. In his position as 
Party Chairman Neville Chamberlain had no option but to 
support the right of the local association to do so, 
hoping n o n e t h e l e s s  that this would not d e stroy the 
e n t e n t e . H o w e v e r ,  by Christmas 1930 the mood created by 
the second Caxton Hall m e e t i n g  was dissipating. 
Beaverbrook, sensing renewed opportunities, and restless 
in his inactivity, seized on the affair of the Williams 
candidature to revert once again to an openly hostile 
path.15 But South Paddington was merely the final straw 
in the series of factors which had been undermining 
Beaverbrook's inclination to compromise.
The most important of these remained his doubts over 
policy, which were two-pronged. Of these the first 
concerned his continued suspicion of Baldwin's reliability 
as being "by virtue of his titular position as head of the 
Conservative Party" potentially still the greatest danger. 
The logical result of this suspicion, seemingly confirmed 
by Baldwin's failure to put his policy across forcefully
14. Ibid., 1 February 1931.
15. Lockhart diary, 15 December 1930,
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in December, was the conclusion that "in order to achieve 
Empire Free Trade, we have got to defeat Baldwin".1® The 
second area of policy difference concerned the thorny 
topic of a g r i c u l t u r a l  p r o t e c t i o n . F r o m  the very 
beginnings of the Crusade at Lewes in 1929 it had been 
pitched to the farmers, and this trend increased in the 
winter of 1930-1931 » when they remained the only section 
of Conservative sentiment not completely appeased by the 
advances in p a rty policy. B e a v e r b r o o k  * s g r o w i n g  
identification with the farmers evolved throughout 1931. 
and was eventually to lead him to disband the Crusade and 
to form and back an open and avowed Agricultural Party, 
This was still in the future, but in January 1931 he 
opened his campaign again w,ith a manifesto to farmers 
which offered a simple policy of protection for the home 
producer,1® In this policy, and in his general mood of 
intransigent hostility adopted in January 1931 Beaverbrook 
was encouraged and supported by his only remaining ally, 
Rothermere, who was urging all-out assault on Baldwin.19 
Thus, by mid-January 1931» the prospect of a truce, 
instead of drifting closer, had been washed away out of
16. Beaverbrook to Horne, 23 January 1931» Beaverbrook 
MSS, C178.
17. Beaverbrook to Melchett, 11 November 1930, ibid., 
C243.
18. Beaverbrook to Fitzalan, 24 March 1931. ibid., Cl 34; 
Beaverbrook to Lush, 24 January 1931» ibid., B200; 
Beaverbrook to Gray, 19 March 1931» ibid., B197.
19. Rothermere to Beaverbrook, 14 January 1931» ibid., 
C285.
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sight by changes in the political currents. The press 
lords were once again on the lookout for a suitable 
constituency, preferably metropolitan, in which to declare 
war on B a l d w i n i s m . ^ O  This threat from without would, 
however, have been of little significance, considering the 
vastly stronger and more secure position of the party 
leadership compared to that during the previous such 
assa u l t s  in S e p t e m b e r  1930, had not the c o n f i d e n c e  
manifested so noticeably throughout the party in November 
since been significantly diminished. This erosion of 
confidence in Baldwin was a far more serious danger than 
that provided by Beaverbrook, who was not merely isolated 
from his party allies, but beyond the pale as a 
consequence first of his political methods, and second of 
his alliance with the detested Rothermere.
The decline in B a l d w i n ’s position was a matter of 
internal Conservative politics and had little to do with 
the spectacular but largely irrelevant fulminations of 
Beaverbrook, whose campaign, despite its agricultural 
protectionism, seemed almost entirely to be the product of 
personal animosity. The dangers to Baldwin’s position in 
the winter and spring months of 1931 were very largely of 
his own making, and they provoked a crisis of confidence 
within the party leadership over his suitability as leader 
that had a l m o s t  n o t h i n g  to do with the C r u s a d e r s ’ 
activities. Indeed, at the height of the internal crisis 
of confidence in February and March 1931 it was the
20. Beaverbrook to Amery, 14 January 1931. ibid., C5.
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distractions caused by the press lords’ interventions in 
two London by-elections which, ironically, enabled Baldwin 
to buy sufficient time to yet again restore his crumbling 
position.
The universal satisfaction of Conservatives with the 
position attained in November 1930 was undermined in the 
first instance by failures on Baldwin’s part in two areas. 
Of these, the first was in explaining and advocating the 
fiscal policy of the party, and the second his weakness as 
leader of the opposition in the House of Commons. These 
were, of course, exactly the same problems that had 
undermined each previous re-imposition of control, in 
November 1929 and in March and June 1930. On the previous 
occasions the dissatisfaction of many of his followers 
with the official policy had been a third factor, which at 
least now no longer applied. But the continued existence 
of the other two problems was sufficient to cause the 
newly gained morale of the parliamentary party to dwindle 
away. Baldwin was no longer so vulnerable to the attacks 
of the Crusaders, having squared his policy, but his 
continued failure to provide an acceptable style of 
leadership in parliament was by the spring of 1931 making 
him increasingly appear to his immediate frontbench 
colleagues as a dangerous liability. It was this anxiety, 
rather than any plots or intrigues, which produced the 
incipient leadership crisis of February and March 1931. 
For this reason Baldwin’s cautious line in expounding his 
policy to the country was perhaps the less serious of the
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two factors undermining his authority. However, it was a 
weakness which provoked renewed doubts amongst the barely 
reconciled right wing, national and local, and which 
played into B e a v e r b r o o k ’s hands. A m e r y  noted at 
Christmas, 1930 that "the real thing that worries me now 
is not the official policy, but whether we are getting up 
enough steam in the electorate".^1 The principal critic 
isms of Baldwin were first, his cautious approach, for 
having refused to rule out food taxes he still did not 
want to a d v o c a t e  them, at least in the north; "he 
apologises for them, and attaches a great many ’ifs’ to 
any statement he makes regarding such d u t i e s " . ^2 The 
second problem was Baldwin’s relapse once again to a mood 
of lethargy and inactivity, which Dawson described as "a 
sort of comfortable winter quarters", hardly the hallmark 
of vigorous and inspiring leadership.^®
This disappointment of the expectations raised at the 
second Caxton Hall meeting was carried over into the 
parliamentary party, where there was by Christmas "nothing 
but grouse[ing] all the time".^^ In particular, two 
debacles of parliamentary mismanagement in November and 
December, 1930 underlined the general dissatisfaction.
21. Amery to Beaverbrook, 2 4 December 1930, ibid., C5.
22. Beaverbrook to Frusher, 22 December 1930, ibid. B149.
23. Dawson to Willingdon, 16 December 1930, Dawson MSS.
24. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 23 December 1930, NC 18/1/721.
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The first of these was a thoroughly unsuccessful speech by 
Baldwin in a vote of censure debate on 27 November against 
the Government's refusal to consider Bennett's imperial 
preference proposals - all the more serious for the fact 
that Baldwin's dismal showing was in the very area of 
politics in which he most needed to look like a new man. 
The vote of censure debate was a rushed and bungled job, 
in which Baldwin tripped over his own feet in his efforts 
to restore his position, and instead of raising his stock 
in the eyes of colleagues and MPs, the result was a 
serious slump in c o n f i d e n c e . ^5 %t was "one of his most
futile speeches ... he sawed at his tough material with a 
blunt knife ... this speech was flabby and pointless 
throughout".26 The consequence of the decline in morale 
of C o n s e r v a t i v e  MPs was a si m i l a r  p h e n o n m e n o n  of 
absenteeism and apathy on their part - a reflection of 
their leader's own conduct - similar to that noticed in 
December 1929 and January 1930. It was this feature which 
led to the second humiliating debacle, when on 10 December 
a Conservative motion criticising the Government on over­
spending and failures in economy was counted out in the 
House due to lack of support; a serious failure of 
organisation on the part of the whips and the front bench. 
As the issue of economy was coming to be placed before
25. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 3 December 1930, Halifax MSS, 
India Office, Eur.C 152/19/1/180.
26. A. to Ida Chamberlain, 30 November 1930, AC 5/1/522.
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all else by the party at large, this fiasco produced howls 
of outrage and anger in the National Union.2? At the same 
time, Baldwin's personal aloofness from many of the 
younger backbenchers was becoming a serious bone of 
contention among the parliamentary party. The result was 
that by January 1931 even staunchly loyal Baldwinite MPs 
were becoming worried over the general slump in the 
leader's personal position. There was "a great deal of 
criticism of the leader by solid men because a stronger 
and more fighting lead is not being given to our party", 
wrote Smithers, whilst Lane-Fox privately warned Irwin 
that "many think that SB is weak and woolly, and is 
letting the party down".28 This loss of confidence in 
Baldwin as leader was echoed to a greater degree than ever 
before a m o n g s t  the inner circle of party leaders. 
Cunli f f e-Li ster described the position as " i m  p  o s s i b  1 e "2 9 
and Austen Chamberlain declared in February 1931 that "S. 
B. is not a leader and nothing will ever make him one .... 
I think that a crisis is rapidly approaching and that it 
would be a mistake to do anything to defer it."®® The 
seriousness of the position was echoed by such loyal 
figures as L i n l i t h g o w ,  Amery, Hoare, and Neville
27. NU Exec., 13 January 1931; South Kensington CA, 
Exec., 13 December 1930.
28. Smithers to Fry, 1 January 1931» Baldwin MSS, volume 
166, ff. 275-278; Lane-Fox to Irwin, 28 January 1931, 
Halifax MSS, India Office, Eur.C 152/19/1/221.
29. Bayford diary, 22 March 1931.
30. A. to Ida Chamberlain, 28 February 1931, AC 5/1/532.
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Chamberlain, and reached an acute stage in the second half 
of February.®1 Baldwin's colleagues did not wish to see 
him go, but were being inexorably forced towards viewing 
that as the least d a m a g i n g  solu t i o n  to the party's 
difficulties. However, none of them was a clear candidate 
for the succession, none of them desired the leadership at 
a time when it was such a crown of thorns, and none wished 
to take the initiative in suggesting to Baldwin that he 
should, in the interests of the party, stand d o w n . ® 2
There were four possible contenders for the lead, 
should Baldwin retire: Churchill, Horne, Hailsham and
Neville Chamberlain, Of these, Churchill had ruled 
himself out by resigning on 27 January from the shadow 
cabinet over India, and by the fact that he had almost no 
personal following among Conservative MPs. Though on 
India he echoed the views of the Diehard right, he was not 
a favoured candidate with any section of the party, not 
least for his known free-trade inclinations. Sir Robert 
Horne was a far more serious contender, popular and 
acceptable to the tariff reformers and the business 
element on the back benches. However, he was not keen to 
return to a fully active political life, and furthermore 
had increasingly supported Baldwin since June 1930 as the 
best available leader, breaking with Beaverbrook in the
31. A m e r y  diary, 24 February, 6 M a rch 1931, in My
» volume III (1955), pp. 38-39; N . to 
Ida Chamberlain, 21 February 1931, NC 18/1/727.
32. Dawson to Irwin, 5 March 1931, Dawson MSS,
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process. Horne's attitude remained in January 1931 one of 
loyalty to Baldwin, illustrated by his publicly moving a 
motion of confidence and support at the Glasgow Unionist 
Association annual meeting,®® Horne might have accepted 
the l e a d e r s h i p  if thrust upon him, but there is no 
indication that he sought preferment. The most likely 
candidate in the event of a vacancy was Hailsham, whose 
credentials with the right of the party were strong, but 
who had also the trust of the moderates after his defence 
of Baldwin at the second Caxton Hall meeting, and who was, 
moreover, currently acting leader in the House of Lords 
during Salisbury's illness. Hailsham was also a reluctant 
candidate: "I have never coveted leadership. I shouldn't
be in the Lords now if I had", he wrote in February
1931.®^ Indeed, Hailsham had also taken Baldwin's side
'  I
s t r o n g l y  in the recent stages of the strfuggle with 
Beaverbrook, despite the fact that he thought that to so 
identify himself with Baldwin damaged whatever prospects 
he may have had. N o n e t h e l e s s ,  Neville C h a m b e r l a i n  
accurately surmised that "if therefore SB does disappear 
there is a strongish possibility that the two Houses would 
unite in choosing Hailsham as leader."®®
33. Glasgow CA, AGM, 26 January 1931.
34. Hailsham to Elibank, 21 February 1931, Elibank MSS, 
SRO GD 32/25/76, ff. 12-14.
35. N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 1 March 1931, NC 18/1/728.
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Neville Chamberlain was also a possible contender for 
the position. H owever, both he and H a i l s h a m  were 
principally motivated by a concern for party unity, a 
unity endangered by Baldwin, not by them. Without such 
party unity, the overriding aims of getting the Labour 
government out - all the more urgent as the economic 
position declined - and winning the next election were 
unlikely to be attained. Yet on the other hand, both 
appreciated that the divisions caused by the aftermath of 
Baldwin's resignation could be as damaging as those 
already existing. This concern resulted in the first 
instance in the two men reaching a tacit agreement to 
stand together, each offering to serve under the other if 
chosen by the party. This concession in fact revealed 
that neither was principally motivated by coveting the 
leadership; they were much more concerned to prevent 
either a party split or the victory of some maverick 
figure should Baldwin retire. There is no doubt that the 
combination of Hailsham and Chamberlain was widely 
favoured in the party, for the very reason that it was 
believed it would bring peace and security, with the 
minimum of fundamental c h a n g e . T h e  concordat of Neville 
Chamberlain and Hailsham, reached in the last week of 
February 1931 was not the prelude to a plot to force out 
Baldwin, but was the sensible precaution of pragmatic 
politicians preparing their contingency plans for possible
36. Ibid.; Bayford diary, 22 March 1931.
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eventualities. It was a reflection of the crisis of 
confidence in Baldwin's leadership in the spring of 1931, 
and not a contributory cause. However, there remained 
grave doubts over the pros and cons of Baldwin's 
withdrawal. For all his defects, he still seemed to be
the figure who di v i d e d  the party least 'of all the
p o t e n t i a l  leaders - none of w h o m  had the c o m p l e t e  
confidence of the party either. Churchill was strongly 
su s p ected of i n s t a b i l i t y ,  intrigue, and for his 
association with Lloyd George. Horne also was tarred with 
the brush of coalitionism, and was in any case in semi- 
retirement. Hailsham was thought to be too impetuous, and
although his position in the House of Lords id id not rule
!
him out, his lack of co n t a c t  with many; MPs was a
considerable practical barrier. For Neville 'Chamberlain,
occupancy of Central Office had proved a mixed blessing,
for whilst it had enhanced his prominence considerably, he
had also in the process inevitably made enemies. In
addition, his unapproachabi1 ity was a serious problem;
Headlam, describing him as "a cold fishy creature who puts
your back up in five minutes", was far from alone in his
view.®? Thus to change horses in mid-stream seemed to
offer little advantage, especially as none of the jockeys
was keen on the attempt. A further reason for avoiding
change was the very torrent of the metaphorical stream; in
the face of the renewed attack on Baldwin by the press
37. Headlam diary, 3 December 1930, 10 March 1931; Dawson 
to Irwin, 28 September 1930, Dawson MSS.
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lords In by-elections in February and March, there was 
both a rally of sympathy to him and the perennial problem 
of not appearing to bow the knee to press dictation. 
Furthermore, no real differences of policy or approach 
divided Baldwin from his colleagues, for they did not 
disagree with his political strategy, but merely despaired 
of his personal ability to carry it through. The crisis 
of spring 1931 was a matter of manner and style, of 
c o n f i d e n c e  and not of substance. The s i t u a t i o n  in 
February 1931 was one of extreme uncertainty. "I have 
never known such confusion in party politics" admitted 
Robert Cecil.®® The party leaders were caught on the 
horns of a dilemma, and whilst increasingly looking upon 
B a l d w i n ' s  r e t i r e m e n t  as the l e s s e r  e v i l  of the 
alternatives available, were so little attracted by the 
prospect that they continually shrank from taking any 
practical action.®9
It was in this atmosphere that the party's Principal 
Agent, Topping, informed Chamberlain, as party Chairman, 
that the situation was becoming so serious that he felt 
bound to set down the facts in a memorandum for his formal
attention. This document set out from the premise that |i
since the [second] Caxton Hall meeting there has not 
been so much support for Beaverbrook, but there has 
been a very definite feeling that the leader is not 
strong enough to carry the party to victory.
38. Cecil to Irwin, 9 March 1931, Halifax MSS, India
Office, Eur.C 152/19/1/262.
39. A, to Ida Chamberlain, 7 March 1931, AC 5/1/533. !
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The tone of most of the memorandum was studiously vague, 
and its principal concern was not so much that Baldwin 
should go, but the fear that if he did so the resulting 
confusion might result in the choice of Churchill because 
of his Diehard line on India, Topping's conclusion, 
however, was definite enough: Baldwin
does not hold a strong position in the party at the 
present mo m e n t .  There has, of course, been 
dissatisfaction with the leadership ever since the 
Beaverbrook and Rothermere campaign started, but for 
a long time it was confined to a comparatively small 
section. Today, however, the feeling that he is not 
a strong leader is widely felt and cannot, in my 
opinion, be ignored,
40
Such an expression of opinion from the party's principal 
official forced a decision on Chamberlain - as there can 
be little doubt that To p p i n g  i n t e n d e d  it to do. 
Chamberlain grasped at the memorandum as the solution to 
his conflict of loyalty versus his loss of confidence in 
his leader, writing to his sister that "Topping has been 
the deus ex machina".^1 The Topping memorandum was not 
the spearhead of a plot, except in the possible sense that 
Topping may have deliberately painted an over-dismal 
picture, but was rather the final straw, convincing most 
of Baldwin's colleagues that he would have to withdraw 
from an untenable position. Far from rushing to exploit
40. Memo, Topping to Chamberlain, 25 February 1931, 
quoted in full in I. Macleod, Ne J®h^m_b2r.l£i.£ 
(1961), pp. 139-14 1.
41. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 1 March 1931, NC 18/1/728.
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this opportunity, Chamberlain continued to hesitate 
over the best course to take, and, making no secret of the 
memorandum, consulted a wide range of his colleagues, all 
of whom agreed that the memorandum should be shown to 
Baldwin, Such discussion was far from intrigue, for 
Chamberlain consulted not only his brother Austen, Hoare, 
Cunliffe-Lister, and Hailsham, but also the chief whip 
Ey r e s - Monsell, and Bridgeman, the latter being perhaps 
Baldwin's most trusted and loyal associate. Hailsham, 
moreover, wanted Baldwin to be given a further opportunity 
to redeem himself in his forthcoming speech at Newton 
Abbot, and suggested holding the document back for ten 
days.
Neville Chamberlain was unhappy over this, fearing 
the greater damage that might result from delay, but 
agreed at first for fear that his haste m i g h t  be 
misinterpreted as the cloak for ambition. Over the 
w e e k e n d  of 28 F e b r u a r y - 1 M arch he w a v e r e d  b e t w e e n  
forwarding the memorandum or holding it back, finally 
deciding on Sunday, 1 March, to send it to Baldwin at 
once. The final incident, in many ways the least 
significant of them all, which removed his doubts over 
making Baldwin aware of the situation was renewed evidence 
of the collapsing morale of the parliamentary backbenchers 
and e x - j u n i o r  mi n i s t e r s .  With the sudden death of 
Worthington-Evans in mid-February a by-election was to be 
held in March in his constituency of Westminster St,
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George's, one of the safest Conservative seats in the 
country. Moore-B r a b a z o n , a former junior minister, had 
s e e m e d  most likely to be selected by the local 
Conservative Association to fill the vacancy, but when an 
independent Conservative challenger, Sir Ernest Better, 
came forward with the backing of the press lords and 
announced he would fight the official nominee purely on 
the leadership issue from an anti-Baldwin platform, Moore- 
Brabazon announced in the evening papers of 28 February 
that he withdrew as he was unwilling to support Baldwin; 
the local association found itself embarrassingly unable 
to find a candidate willing to champion the official party 
leader. Faced with the fact that the crisis of 
confidence, not in fact of the constituencies, but of 
parliamentarians of the Moore-Brabazon type, was now 
c l e a r l y  both acute and public, Neville C h a m b e r l a i n  
realised that he could withhold Topping's memorandum no 
longer. On the morning of Sunday, 1 March, he had it 
delivered to Baldwin's London residence by messenger, 
together with a covering letter. After relating his 
actions and hesitations over the memorandum since Topping 
had handed it to him, he enclosed it without further 
comment other than an apology for adding in any way to 
Baldwin's anxieties at a difficult moment, but "the 
situation is evidently one of extreme difficulty and will 
need most careful handling". There was no suggestion that 
Baldwin should retire - indeed, a passage that might have 
given that impression was deliberately struck out of the
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draft - only the comment that Baldwin would no doubt wish 
"to consult several of your f r i e n d s ".^2
In fact the Topping memorandum was sent to Baldwin 
not necessarily to force his retirement, though that was 
thought a probable response, but rather in the hope that,
one way or another, he would respond to the gravity of the
p o s i t i o n  and thus re s o l v e  a c onfused and un h a p p y  
predicament for all concerned. Thus, once the memorandum 
was delivered, the decision was left entirely to Baldwin, 
w i t h o u t  any a t t e m p t s  to p r e s s u r i s e  him t o w a r d s
resignation. In fact, a close examination of the events 
of late February and early March 1931 provides no real 
evidence for any consiracy theory of a plot to oust
Baldwin, and loyalty played a greater part than ambition 
in the actions of B a l d w i n ’s colleagues. At the end of 
March Baldwin's trusted friend Bridgeman assured him that 
Neville Chamberlain "has I am sure been thoroughly loyal 
to you in a very difficult position".^® Given the St. 
George's situation, where the intrusion of the press lords 
had complicated the issue, Chamberlain in fact thought 
"that that would make things too difficult for S. B. to go 
and I did not anticipate that he would make up his mind to 
do so when he read the M e m o r a n d u m . I t  was, however, a
42. Chamberlain to Baldwin, 1 March 1931, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 166, ff. 47-9; original draft, NC 8/10/24.
43. Bridgeman to Baldwin, 29 March 1931, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 166, f, 37.
44. N, to Ida Chamberlain, 7 March 1931, NC 18/1/729.
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feature of Baldwin’s character that periods of complacency 
could swiftly change to a mood of deep despair at his 
position if confronted with a black picture from a trusted 
colleague - and his reaction to the Topping memorandum was 
in p a r a l l e l  wi t h  his r e a c t i o n  in S e p t e m b e r  1930 to 
B r i d geman’s account of the position then - his spirits 
deflated to an apathetic low. He responded on 1 March to 
the Topping m e m o r a n d u m  in the same way: g l o o m i l y
convinced that he had fatally lost the confidence of his 
party, he resolved to quit at once. In the grip of this 
mood, he summoned Neville Chamberlain by telephone, and at 
three o’clock on 1 March 1931 told him of his intention to 
announce his retirement from the leadership forthwith.^® 
That evening Baldwin discussed his plans for his future 
with his wife, considering retiring from the Commons also 
at the next election, w h i l s t  The^ T ^ m £ £  n e w s p a p e r ,  
unofficially informed of the day’s events, was setting its 
first leader for the following day, ready to announce that 
"Mr, Baldwin Withdraws",^®
As a consequence of Baldwin’s dispirited reaction to 
these events, and decision of 1 March actually to quit,
45. Ibid; N. Chamberlain diary, 1 March 1931» NC 2/22,
46. Tom Jones diary, 11 March 1931.
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it has been too readily assumed that his position was in 
fact in r eal, r a t h e r  t h a n  a p p a r e n t ,  d a n g e r .  
Paradoxically, despite the evidence of his resolve to 
retire, his position was far from impossible. Baldwin 
could have ceased to struggle with the dissident elements 
in his party as a result of losing his personal morale and 
becoming depressed at any stage; this does not prove that 
this necessarily coincided with the period of his greatest 
peril. Baldwin had passed through the most serious phase 
of the party crisis in September-October 1930. The 
decision to withdraw taken on 1 March 1931 was the product 
first of low spirits, and second of misinformation and 
m i s c o n c e p t i o n s  of the r e a l i t y  of the situation. 
Naturally, when both these conditions ceased to apply, as 
they had by 2 March, the decision to resign quickly became 
a thing of the past. In appreciating B a l d w i n ’s apparent 
decision for retirement, the emphasis should be placed on 
the impact of events on Baldwin’s mood and morale, rather 
than on any i n t r i n s i c  s i g n i f i c a n c e  in the events 
themselves as being of such gravity that they would 
inexorably lead to the fall of a politician of B a l d w i n ’s 
stature. Baldwin’s resignation proved shortlived indeed, 
for the mood was bro k e n  that very same evening by 
Bridgeman and Davidson, who, by frankly presenting the 
other side of the picture, and deriding the necessity of 
resignation, dispelled such sentiments from Baldwin’s mind 
like the mists before the dawn.
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Davidson had been present at Baldwin’s house when he 
had received the Topping memorandum on the morning of 1 
March, and recounted events that evening to Bridgeman, 
with whom he happened to be dining, "saying he supposed it 
was all up."^? Bridgeman had never thought the position 
w a r r a n t e d  r e s i g n a t i o n ,  a l t h o u g h  he had agreed when 
Chamberlain had consulted him that Baldwin should see the 
document. Bridgeman had kept his finger on the pulse of 
the rank and file - his wife was also prominent in the 
National Union Executive on the W o m e n ’s side - and was 
"astounded" at the idea that after the victory at the 
second Caxton Hall meeting Baldwin "could possibly retire 
merely because Sir E, Fetter had come out as a candidate 
for St. George’s in order to challenge his leadership". 
After dining he and Davidson went at ten o ’clock to 
Baldwin’s house, finding "that Baldwin was contemplating 
immediate resignation".^® Bridgeman rolled in "like an 
old A d m i r a l " , ^9 and pooh-poohed the idea; if Baldwin had 
to go, he should at least go out fighting on some great 
issue, either in favour of his liberal policy on India, or 
in defence of the constitution against press dictatorship. 
In line with the latter idea, Bridgeman also offered a 
p r a c t i c a l  s uggestion: B a l d w i n  should resign his
Worcestershire seat in order to fight in person the
47. Bridgeman journal, volume II, pp. 229-231.
48. Loo. cit.
49. Baldwin’s own description to Tom Jones, Jones diary, 
11 March 19 31.
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vacancy at St. George’s, "to challenge the right of the 
Press Millionaires to dictate procedure to the Party’’.®® 
Such a proposal was entirely in line with B a l d w i n ’s own 
instincts, and within an hour Baldwin’s mood changed, and 
he agreed not to go, but to fight. Th£ went to
press without any announcement of B a l d w i n ’s shortlived 
resignation, and Neville Chamberlain was summoned for 2 
March, not to discuss the details of the succession 
problem, but the details of contesting St. George’s. 
Bridgeman was correct in his analysis; the tide had turned 
in Baldwin’s favour in the last week of February 1931 and 
the opportunity of playing the constitutional card against 
Petter at St. George’s would accelerate the process. 
Ba l d w i n ’s position was not without difficulties in the 
spring of 1931, but they were difficulties which could be 
overcome, and he now had solid advantages which he had not 
held in September 1930.
It will be appropriate here to analyse that turn of 
the tide, and consider the real nature of the threats to 
Baldwin’s position in March 1931. The loss of confidence 
amongst the leadership and in the House of Commons, which 
has already been illustrated, was the principal danger to 
his position, but the tide of opinion within the party had 
begun to change within the previous fortnight, though it 
had not yet filtered through to the shadow cabinet. The 
principal reason for this was the East Islington b y-
50. Bridgeman journal, volume II, pp. 231-233.
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election. Though this took place from the last week of 
January to polling on 19 February, the impact of the 
campaign and of the result, felt afterwards, superceded 
those s e n t i m e n t s  w hich had given rise to T o p p i n g ’s 
decision to prepare his memorandum. When the vacancy had 
occurred at East Islington, the Conservatives were already 
prepared with an able and popular young candidate, Thelma 
Cazalet, who looked poised to win the seat from Labour and 
strike a blow at the tottering Labour government. The 
intervention of the press lords, despite the fact that 
Cazalet’s policy differed hardly at all from theirs on 
fiscal matters, complicated the issue, Beaverbrook’s 
first candidate was a respected local figure called 
S p r i n g m a n ,  who, se n s i n g  the h o s t i l i t y  of local 
Conservatism to his nomination, rejected Beaverbrook and 
instead after only a few days in the field withdrew in 
Cazalet's favour; later he spoke for her at meetings. 
It was a blow for Beaverbrook, who seemed to have run into 
the s a n d .5 1 Beaverbrook’s response was swift but in the 
end c o u n t e r p r o d u c t i v e ;  finding another and much 
less r e p u t a b l e  c a n d i d a t e  and b r i n g i n g  him into the 
constituency as the Crusade standard-bearer, . The result 
was a bitter, and on occasion, violent campaign. Feelings 
and passion ran high over the election in the Conservative 
Party, both nationally and locally, and "the bitterness is
51. Lockhart diary, 5 February 1931.
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far worse than during South Paddington."52 Meetings were 
broken up, with fights breaking out between Crusade 
s t e w a r d s  and C o n s e r v a t i v e  hecklers, and on several 
occasions disorder spread into the streets in affrays and 
small riots,53 The disorder on the evening before the 
poll was described as "sensational street scenes" by one 
national newspaper, with "running fights".5^ One cause of 
this violent reaction, shared in verbal onslaughts from 
party leaders such as Hailsham, was B e a v e r b r o o k ’s 
misguided statement at one meeting that if he could not 
force his policy on the Conservative Party, then he would 
set out to destroy it. Such sentiments naturally caused 
the party to rally together in opposition to the disunity 
caused by Beaverbrook’s wrecking interventions.55
The most serious consequence of East Islington was 
not the manner in which the conduct of the campaign placed 
Beaverbrook even further beyond the pale of respectable 
political tactics, but the result itself. Before the poll 
Neville Chamberlain had though that if the party should 
lose the seat due to Beaverbrook, "it may not be a bad 
thing, as it will certainly unite our people against 
[ B e a v erbrook], who has come out very badly on this
52. Ibid., 10 February 1931.
53. Morning Post ; News Chronicle, 6 February 1931.
54. News Chronicle, 19 February 1931.
55. Templeraore to Salisbury, 10 February 1931, Salisbury 
MSS, S(4) 139/83-84.
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o c c a s i o n . "56 This was exactly what occurred; due to the 
split in the Conservative vote the Labour candidate held 
on to the seat at a time when C o n s e r v a t i v e s  were 
i n c r e a s i n g l y  d e s p e r a t e  to chip a w a y  at the Labour 
gover n m e n t ’s majority and morale. In the words of the 
Z ® l e a d e r  writer, "What will go down ... is 
the Empire Cause. What will go up is the Socialist flag, 
and the worst Government with which this country has ever 
been afflicted will be encourged to believe that it is 
doing well."57 The result of East Islington was two-fold; 
it destroyed the appeal of the Crusade, and it produced a 
reaction in favour of the traditional Tory cry of party 
unity, which in effect meant a rally round Baldwin. It is 
perhaps not fully appreciated that it was the conduct and 
c o n s e q u e n c e  of the C r u s a d e r s ’ i n t e r v e n t i o n  at East 
Islington that led to their final decline. Support for 
the Crusade at a local level amongst Conservatives - 
support which had always been the real powerhouse of 
Beaverbrook’s movement - had ebbed away continuously since 
October 1930. The East Islington fiasco put the Crusade 
in its coffin and the result nailed down the lid. The 
signifiance of the St. George’s by-election a few weeks 
later was not that the latter brought about the defeat of 
the Crusade, but rather that it exposed and exhibited
56. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 8 February 1931, NC 18/1/725.
57. Daily Telegraph, 19 February 1931.
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publicly the reaction against it caused by East Islington 
in the m o n t h  b e f o r e . 5^ The r e action of g r a s s r o o t s  
Conservatism was a clear sign of the desire for unity 
above all other matters. In the wake of East Islington, 
right wing MPs such as Sir Robert Gower, announced their 
view that "there must be no division in their ranks".59 
The position in the constituencies was markedly different 
in tenor from that after the previous by-election split at 
South Paddington in September 1930.50 Opinions that the 
March 1931 crisis was more serious for Baldwin than that 
of September 1930 are in fact the erroneous product of 
v i e w i n g  events too muc h  from the p a r l i a m e n t a r y  
perspective. There was in fact a flow of supportive 
resolutions for Baldwin in February 1931, which even
Topping acknowledged in his memorandum. These increased 
to a flood after the Islington result, and with the issue 
of press dictatorship coming once again to the forefront 
of p o l i t i c s  in both the East Islington and the St. 
George’s campaigns.51
58. A similar pattern can be seen in two by-elections 
during the period of Conservative disunity over
India, when due to the intervention of an independent 
Conservative, Labour gained Liverpool Wavertree in 
February 1935. A similar knock-on effect occurred at 
the by-election at Lambeth Norwood in March 1935, 
eroding the support of the independent challenger.
59. Report of a meeting of Gillingham C A , 21 February
1931, Gower MSS.
60. Eye C A , Res., N U Exec., 12 May 1931; City of London 
CA, AGM, 14 February 1931.
61. East Midlands Area, Res. NU Exec, 10 February 1931;
York CA Exec, 9 March 1931; South Kensington CA,
Exec., 22 January 1931.
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It is in the light of this that the validity of the 
picture of party fe e l i n g  p o r t r a y e d  in the Topping 
memorandum must be called into question. In parliament 
there was in February 1931 growing dissatisfaction with 
Baldwin’s ability to lead, which was finding an avenue of 
expression in the complaints of the Diehard section over 
the bipartisan approach to Indian devolution. In this 
area there is no doubt that Ba l d w i n ’s position was weak, 
though far from hopeless, as he was to demonstrate in 
M arch 1931. Howe v e r ,  in other areas the Topping 
memorandum is open to serious doubts. It has already been 
illustrated that the mood of the local associations was 
generally pro-Baldwin, and was far from the desperate 
picture painted by Topping. The party had not slipped 
back to the nadir of September 1 930, and even if it did 
not enthuse about Baldwin, it preferred him to any other 
available c a n d i d a t e . 52 The clearest indication of the 
cal m e r  mood of 1931 can be found in the tone and 
resolutions of the meeting of the grassroots delegates at 
the National Union Central Council on 24 February - the 
day before Topping passed his memorandum to the Party 
Chairman.
Topping had been much influenced by an apparent 
falling-off of local association subscribers, which was 
being attributed to local supporters’ disgust with the 
leadership. In fact, this was only the real cause in a
62. Denbighshire CA, Southern Area AGM, 21 March 1931.
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minority of cases. The party continually faced the 
problem of a fall-off in support in the mid-terra of 
parliaments, in or out of office; and to that extent the 
financial alarms paralleled those of 1927-28 and 1932-33. 
On this occasion the problem was exacerbated by the 
economic slump which hit party subscriptions, rather than 
any political disillusion. In one region the explanation 
for the loss of revenue as dissatisfaction with the 
leadership was mooted, only to be dismissed;
In the discussion which followed it was suggested 
that this was merely being made an excuse, the real 
reason being that owing to the commerical depression, 
people were cutting down expenses, and made the first 
cut in their political subscriptions.
63
There were two further factors which may have caused 
Topping to exaggerate the disaffection in the lower ranks 
of the party. The first of these was the fact that he 
naturally was most familiar with sentiment in the region 
where he had f o r m e r l y  for ma n y  years been an agent 
himself, Lancashire, and with opinion in London and the 
suburbs, his immediate political environment. However, 
these two were the very areas where, for particular 
business reasons, anxiety about the party policy on India 
was a much more live issue than was the case elsewhere, 
where the issues of unemployment and protection and the 
related topic of government ’e c o n o m y ’ were the vital
63. SUA, Eastern Div. Council, Treasurers Ctte., 12 
February 1931.
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i s s u e s  of the. day. The s e c o n d  r e a s o n  for the 
darker picture painted by Topping was the fact that much 
of his information was received at second-hand from local 
agents, of whom it was often said that they tended to give 
too muc h  w e i g h t  to the vocal d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s  of a 
minority whilst forgetting the loyal attitude of the 
silent majority of a local A s s o c i a t i o n . 5^ Thus the 
evidence for a serious party crisis at all levels in 
February 1931 is far from convincing.
The real extent of the problem facing Baldwin was a 
loss of confidence by almost all his colleagues on the 
opposition front bench, by the officials of the party 
machine, and amongst a section of the parliamentary party. 
The e x t e n t  of the d i s q u i e t  on the C o n s e r v a t i v e  
backbenches is by its nature difficult to quantify, but 
the dissatisfaction with the leader’s recent parliamentary 
and p u b l i c  p e r f o r m a n c e s ,  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  s e r i o u s  
misconceptions over Baldwin’s precise line on India, had 
clearly affected a much wider spectrum of opinion than the 
predictably dissatisfied right wing. However, this 
backbench mood was largely inarticulate, existing in a 
precarious position where it could be swayed one way or 
the other by the nature and effectiveness of the lead from 
above that it was given. For this reason, the attitude of 
the front-benchers was the crucial factor.
64. R. R. James, ed., op. cit., p. 357.
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Once Baldwin decided not to quit, but to fight and to 
fight the supposed danger of Beaverbrook’s threat from 
without, they had no option but to rally around the 
symbol, if not the persona, of the leader. In this sense, 
the Moore-Brabazon withdrawal gave Baldwin the tactical 
key to the situation. Moore-Brabazon’s action did not, of 
course, represent a press attack, but was rather a further 
manifestation in public of the private disaffection of the 
parliamentarians. However, by switching the question at 
stake to that of press power, Balwin forced his colleagues 
to take their sides on the basis of that issue instead. 
Here there could be no s i t t i n g  on the fence; in a 
polarisation between Beaverbrook and Baldwin after the 
events of winter and spring 1930-1931 there could be no 
middle ground for frontbench Conservative politicians, for 
the inevitable logic of the position meant that in defying 
the press lords they must, as their only path of action, 
support Baldwin. This was the significance of Baldwin's 
willingness to stand in person for St. George’s; with 
B e a v e r b r o o k  c o m p l e t e l y  beyond the pale after East 
Islington, there was no surer device for rallying the 
C o n s e r v a t i v e  Party around h i m s e l f  on a congenial, 
constitutional, i s s u e . 55
65. Bridgeman journal, volume II, p. 233.
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The situation by the morning of 2 March was thus 
transformed from the shortlived mood of resignation of 
mid-afternoon on the previous day. With the sanctity of 
the constitution to be invoked, and the trumpet call of 
loyalty to be sounded, under a banner of 'pure* politics, 
the tactical balance had swung once more to Baldwin. The 
suggestion that he himself should fight St. George’s in 
person as well as in spirit did not need to be put into 
practice to produce the desired effect. The suggestion 
alone had forced a redrawing of battle lines in which his 
colleagues, whatever their private opinions, must publicly 
support him. When on 2 March Baldwin informed Neville 
Chamberlain of his idea, the latter received it very 
u n e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y ,  but the product of it was that 
B a l d w i n ’s ’late colleagues got a bad attack of second 
thoughts and cold feet, and begged him not to fight, and 
stated that it was impossible for him to go until after 
St. G e o r g e ' s . ’’55 Neville Chamberlain and other leaders 
still believed that Baldwin's departure was only delayed, 
and would be inevitable in the near future, and it was in 
view of this consideration that Hailsham and Neville 
Chamberlain, in the light not of Ba l d w i n ’s moves but of 
the ’’l o b b y i n g  going on for W i n s t o n  and Horne as 
successors’’, formally agreed to pre-empt the claims of the 
other two possible leaders by agreeing on 5 March to
66. Davidson to Irwin, 6 March 1931, Halifax MSS, India 
Office, Eur.C. 152/19/1/254.
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stand together.57 in fact, the moment had passed, for in 
effect the intervention of the St. George’s campaign gave 
Baldwin a breathing space to resolve his difficulties, now 
that his mood had changed to one where he was determined 
"not to go unless he was kicked out."58 gy standing the 
leadership question over until after St. George’s, the 
issue was actually settled in B a l d w i n ’s favour quite 
regardless of the outcome of the by-election campaign. If 
he, or his candidate, should win, then the matter of his 
going would after such a triumph be a dead letter. But 
what his colleagues overlooked was that it would be 
equally impossible to drop Baldwin as leader should the 
o ffi c i a l  s t a n d a r d - b e a r e r  lose, as this would be a 
surrender to the claims of the press lords, which all 
agreed could not be considered for a moment.
The first phase of B a l d w i n ’s restoration of his 
position was to find a suitable candidate to counter 
Fetter and willing to support Baldwin’s leadership at St. 
George’s. This problem was rapidly solved. Baldwin had 
not, despite the c o m p l a i n t s  of some of the younger 
generation in the parliamentary party, lost the support of 
the majority of the rising figures of the centre and left 
of the party, several of whom having lost their seats in 
1929 w e r e  a v a i l a b l e  and k e e n  to r e - e n t e r  the
67, N, to Ida Chamberlain, 7 March 1931, NC 18/1/729.
68. N. Chamberlain diary, 11 March 1931, NC 2/22.
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House at by-elections. One of this number was Duff 
Cooper, who had little affection for the press lords 
on political or personal grounds, and who was noted in 
Ja nuar y 1931 as being "very p r o - B a l d w i n ".59 It is 
sometimes said that Cooper abandoned a safe seat he was 
nursing to take on a difficult prospect at St. George’s, 
but in fact the reverse was the case. St. George’s was an 
ideal constituency for a rising figure, and one of the 
safest seats in the country. Furthermore, given both the 
political issues that Cooper could bring into play and his 
personal appeal, victory was almost a foregone conclusion. 
S o c i a l  d e f e r e n c e  r e m a i n e d  an i n f l u e n c e  in t h i s  
constituency, with its closed-world attitude to social and 
society figures, in which man-about-town Duff, married to 
a Duke’s daughter and leader of fashion such as Lady 
Diana, h o p e l e s s l y  o u t c l a s s e d  Fetter, an obscure 
manufacturer of diesel engines from the West Country. 
Given the view that the methods of the ’gutter’ press of 
Beaverbrook and Rothermere were ungentlemanly, high 
so c iety w h i c h  m i g h t  have been th o u g h t  to favour 
Rothermere’s Diehard right wing policies proved in fact 
more concerned with image and personality, and came down 
overwhelmingly on Duff Cooper’s side.7® "The aristocratic 
houses of the ’Nobility’ in Grosvenor Square have either 
in t h e i r  w i n d o w s  or on t h e i r  p o r c h e s  ’V o t e  for
69. Lockhart diary, 25 January 1931; Spender-Clay to 
Irwin, 5 March 1931, Halifax MSS, India Office, 
Eur.C. 152/ 1 9/ 1 /25 1.
70. Lockhart diary, 10 March 1931.
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C o o p e r ’" ,71 jn this constituency the combination of Duff 
and Lady Diana proved formidable; Duff himself was a good 
speaker, had a ga l l a n t  war record, and a m o n g s t  the 
generation of junior ministers was frequently spoken of as 
a coming man. Dawson described him as "a very good
candidate", and thought that "he and the Lady Diana 
between them will succeed in pulling it off".72
With his back secured at St, George’s, Baldwin could 
thus address his energies to coping with the more serious 
problem facing him: the linked question of the confidence 
of the parliamentary party and the future of Indian 
devolution. The alarm over this had begun in the debate 
at the conclusion of the Round Table conference on 26 
January, where Churchill’s dissent had become manifest, 
Baldwin had on that occasion deviated from the agreed 
policy, and associated himself too closely with the 
Government, and his speech lamentably failed to reassure 
his followers. Baldwin attempted to restore his position 
with the party moderates, such as Hoare, though without 
compromising the spirit of his line on India, in the 
public speech fixed for 6 March. Although Baldwin's text 
at Newton Abbot raised no further alarms, and although it 
did not read well, being "a very commonplace speech", it 
improved the uneasy situation in which "the whole subject
71. Meynell to Irwin, 19 March 1931, Halifax MSS, India 
Office, Eur.C. 152/19/1/275.
72. Dawson to Irwin, 5 March 1931, Dawson MSS.
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[of India] is frightfully confused with the general anti- 
Baldwin movement", by moving some distance to appease 
party anxieties over I n d i a . 73
For some time the Diehard d i s c o n t e n t  had been 
chanelled through the pa r t y ’s Indian Affairs Committee, 
where despite the efforts of the loyalist chairman, 
Wardlaw-Milne, the right wing was gaining ground in early 
March. It was a result of a meeting of this Committee on 
9 March that Baldwin’s prestige over Indian policy sank to 
its lowest depths. Either through carelessness, or a 
failure to realise its implications, Baldwin agreed that a 
resolution passed by the Committee at Churchill’s original 
instigation be given to the press, despite the fact that 
it seemed to contain a reversal of his previous policy. 
Coming at such a time, it seemed to be a further example 
of B a l dwin’s weakness or simple incompetence; Lane-Fox 
wrote that "I was afraid that it was really the end of 
him."74 From this nadir B a l d w i n ’s position swiftly 
improved. The preliminary cause of this improvement was 
the c o n c l u s i o n  of the a g r e e m e n t  b e t w e e n  the Indian 
Nationalist leader Gandhi and the Viceroy, Irwin, which 
appeared as a triumph for the liberal policy with which 
Baldwin had associated himself and his party. This made 
B a l d w i n ’s position much stronger and cut most of the 
ground from beneath the Diehard position. However, the
73. Dawson to Irwin, 13 March 1931, Halifax MSS, India
Office, Eur.C. 152/1/1/268; see chapter 6.
74. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 4 and 12 March 1931, ibid., ff.
246, 266.
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decisive improvement in B a l d w i n ’s standing with his 
Commons followers was his triumph in the debate in the 
House on Indian policy on 12 March. Baldwin’s successful 
speech here was not only one of his best efforts, it was 
made to the very audience whom Baldwin, needed to recapture 
- not the electors in St. George’s, but the moderate 
majority of the backbench MPs. It was more than simply a 
successful exposition of Conservative policy, or even an 
accomplished demolition of Churchill - though it was both 
of these - the real value of the speech was that it showed 
fighting spirit, and exhibited B a l d w i n ’s willingness to 
assert himself: "the great thing was that he undeniably
spoke as a leader."75 This speech proved the turning 
point, rallying to B a l d w i n ’s standard all but the most 
extreme Diehard section, and restoring the faith in him of 
moderate MPs: "it seems to have made all the difference
to our own party",75 it cleared the issue of India out of 
the way in such a manner as to redraw the party divide not 
between Baldwin and the Irwinite fringe on the one hand, 
and the bulk of the party on the other, as had seemed to 
be the position after the debate of 26 January; but now so 
as to isolate Churchill and the irreconcilable minority of 
Diehards from the majority reconciled after the speech of 
12 March to Baldwin’s policy.
75. Stonehaven to Irwin, 17 March 1931» ibid., f. 27 1; 
Bridgeman journal, volume II, p. 235.
76. Freemantle to Salisbury, 14 March 1931, Salisbury 
MSS, S(4) 140/20-21; Earl of Avon, Th£ Ede^ ri 
Memoirs (1962), volume I, pp. 11-14.
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There remained no further barrier or inhibition to 
prevent the party rallying around its leader on the issue 
of the power of the press. The image of Baldwin in the 
mind of the grassroots in March 1931 was such as to place 
him in the role of a crusader "who was not afraid of doing 
his duty and who tried his best to clean politics."77 
Attack from without usually had the effect of closing the 
Conservative ranks; typical of which instinct was the 
appeal for "all C o n s e r v a t i v e s  to unite against the 
malicious attacks."78 put simply, this meant a desire "to 
make quite clear ... that they were Baldwinites and not 
Rothermereites".79 The strength of grassroots support for 
Baldwin in March 1931 is clearly evident in the chorus of 
resolutions supportive of both himself and Duff Cooper as 
candidate passed by local Associations.50 This rally to 
the leader was matched in the parliamentary party. A 
clear sign of the changed mood was the response of those
77. Chairman of Skegness CA, 25 March 1931, copy in
Haslara MSS.
78. Bradford Central CA, AGM, 12 March 1931.
79* Denbighshire CA, Southern Area AGM, 21 March 1931.
80, Ealing CA, AGM, 13 M a r c h  1931; N o r t h a m p t o n  CA,
Advisory Ctte., 16 March 1931; Re i gat e CA, AGM, 18
March 1931; York CA, Exec., 9 March 1931; Bradford 
East CA, AGM, 11 March 1931; Keighley CA, AGM, 16 
March 1931; Flintshire CA, AGM, 14 March 1931; Wells 
CA, Exec., 17 March 1931; North Cornwall CA, AGM, 13 
March 1931; SUA, Eastern Divisional Council, 13 March 
1931; Lancaster CA, AGM, 21 March 19 31.
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Conservative MPs who happened to be on the St. George’s 
electoral roll, the division being a fashionable and 
convenient location for residence during the parliamentary 
session. Forty-five such MPs signed an open letter of
support for Cooper’s stand, representative of a broad 
spectrum of opinion. Only the Diehard fringe remained 
hostile, but reduced to impotence. Six Diehards resident 
in St. George’s refused to sign the letter, of whom the 
most prominent was Gretton, though they made no public 
sign of hostility.51 Only one MP stepped so far out of 
line as to give public support for Petter, the Diehard Sir 
William Wayland, and it was a clear sign of the changed 
mood of the party that this gesture nearly led to his 
repudiation by his local Association, as well as the 
withdrawal of the party whip.52
Whilst Conservatism was in the process of rallying
around its leader, the attack on Baldwin at St. George’s
and in the c o l u m n s  of their n e w s p a p e r s  was badly 
mismanaged and misconceived. Beaverbrook was now paying 
the full price of his dependence on Rothermere, first in 
the way In which hostility to the latter tarred the former 
by virtue of the association, and second in the fact that
81. Letter and signatories of support. M o rning £ o , 1 6'
March 1931; list of those who refused to sign
enclosed in Gower to Fry, 19 March 1931, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 51, f. 119.
82. Canterbury CA, Emergency Meeting, 28 March 1931. Of 
all the local associations surveyed, there was only 
one where evidence of reluctance to support Baldwin 
larger than in a tiny and isolated minority was 
found; East Dorset, and this seems to be largely the 
influence of the Diehard local MP.
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Rothermere was diverting the campaign on to other issues. 
Empire Free Trade was pushed into the background by the 
India issue, which was heavily run by both Fetter himself 
and the Daily M ail throughout the campaign, culminating in 
the slogan "Gandhi is watching St. George’s ".53 m e  
balance of power in the alliance between the two press 
lords was swinging from Beaverbrook to Rothermere, who was 
able to insist on Beaverbrook promoting the issues of 
India and ’n a t i o n a l  e c o n o m y ’ to the f o r e f r o n t . 54 
Beaverbrook was aware that Rothermere "put more stress on 
India than on Empire Free Trade", but needed to appease 
his only remaining ally.55 India, however, was no longer 
such a good stick with w h ich to beat Baldwin, and 
Beaverbrook later felt that he had made a fatal mistake: 
"We were b a ffled by c r o s s - c u r r e n t s  all t h rough the 
campaign, and we were driven far from our course."55 He 
admitted "the defeat is due in part to my own stupidity: 
it was wrong of me to fight on India and the leadership of 
the Conservative Party. "57
The second area in which the tactics of the press
lords were misconceived lay in the social composition of
83. Da^ly M a i l , 18 March 1931.
84. Rothermere to Churchill, 31 January 1931, Churchill 
MSS 2/180.
85. B e a v e r b r o o k  to R o t h e r m e r e ,  27 F e b r u a r y  1931, 
Beaverbrook MSS, C285.
86. Beaverbrook to Parker, 23 March 1931, ibid., C267.
87. Beaverbrook to Pinckard, n.d. but c. 25 March 1931,
ibid., B203.
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the constituency. Though a metropolitan division, it was 
not ideal Crusading territory; the influence of the Daily 
H â Ü  ^ ^  was not as great here as in many
middle class constituencies of the Paddington type. In 
St. George’s the leaders of opinion in the upper class 
residential areas tended to be readers of The^ and
]l£Il£i.£8 • both of which were not only staunchly pro-
Baldwin, but also accepted his contention that the issue 
of the day was indeed the constitutional role of the 
press.58 Apart from the wealthy quarters of Mayfair, the 
constituency also contained some working class housing in 
Pimlico. Here Petter may have picked up some votes, 
though most Liberal and Labour potential supporters would 
not have been attracted either by anti-Baldwinism or a 
hard line on India. However, one product of the hostility 
shown to Beaverbrook by the aristocratic element was his 
adoption of an even more d e m a g o g i c ,  even populist, 
platform in his attempts to win over Pimlico, further 
alienating himself from the conventional and deferential 
Conservatism of respectable society,59 The greatest 
weakness of the Petter campaign was that the keynote was 
pers o n a l  rather than political. This was not only 
counterproductive in itself, but it also gave Baldwin an 
excuse for m a k i n g  a p e r s o n a l  i n t e r v e n t i o n  in the
88. Morning Post, 18-19 March 1931.
89. G. Peele, "St, George’s and the Empire Crusade", in 
C, Cook and J, Ramsden, eds., By-Elections in British 
Politics (1973), pp. 99-100.
307
constituency. Baldwin spoke at the Queens Hall on 17 
March, two days before the poll, and made the theme of his 
speech a denunciation of the press lords' methods.
The significance of the Queens Hall speech, and in 
particular the short extract from it where Baldwin 
castigated the press barons for aiming at "power without 
responsibility - the prerogative of the harlot throughout 
the ages", has, however, been consistently overrated by 
historians, amateur and professional. Baldwin did not 
crush the Empire Crusade by means of a phrase, or even a 
speech, however pungent and striking. Phrases from 
speeches in this period did not normally have that kind of 
direct impact electorally, unless hammered home repeatedly 
in the media and through other forms of propaganda. 
Baldwin's a l m o s t  vulgar s u m m a t i o n  rece i v e d  no such 
p r o m i n e n c e  at the time.^® C o n t e m p o r a r y  o b s e r v e r s  
c o n s i d e r e d  it a minor, not a major, c o n t r i b u t o r  to 
Cooper's campaign and Baldwin's re-establishment, if they 
thought even that. Hannon wrote, "I do not think 
Baldwin's speech will make a shadow of a difference to the 
battle in St. G e o r g e ' s . " 9 1  It was only one small part of 
Baldwin's strategy of raising the argument from the 
details of policy - whether it be tariffs or India - to
90. For example, as treated by the £8na£]l and 
Morning Post, 18 March 1931.
91. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 17 March 1931, Beaverbrook 
MSS, Cl 55.
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presenting it in the context of the constitution. Once he 
had succeeded in changing the nature of the controversy, 
in which the misconceived tactics of his enemies assisted 
him enormously, the latter were exposed in a politically 
untenable light. The 'harlot' passage, and indeed the 
entire Queens Hall speech, is significant rather as a 
supreme example of the defence that, by decision or 
instinct, Baldwin adopted against his critics. The impact 
of the 'harlot' phrase was not upon the election of St. 
George's, but upon posterity. In retrospect, it came to 
encapsulate, even for the politicians involved in these 
events, the keynote of the party crisis. By taking it so 
frequently out of context, due to its virtues of brevity 
and almost shocking pungency, later memoirists and 
commentators used it to sum up the events of both 1 930 and 
1931, thus giving both the speech and with it the St. 
George's by-election an irresistible impetus towards 
achieving historical importance. Yet this significance 
was far from clear at the time. The St, George's election 
was largely won in other ways: by the personality of the
candidate, not the least. In one sense, it was probably 
won for Baldwin even before it began, in the sense that it 
was the fracas at, and result of, East Islington that 
exposed the Crusade as a dangerously irrelevant political 
luxury and produced the reaction against it exhibited at 
St. George's, On these terms East Islington, and not St, 
George's was the crucial contest. To it must be largely
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awarded both the existence and the scale of Duff Cooper's 
victory on 19 March 1931.
ST, GEORGE'S Turnout - 5 3% Electorate - 54,156
A. D. Cooper Cons. 17,242 60%
Sir E. Petter Ind. 11,532 40%
Cooper's majority 5,710
In fact, if any speech added to Cooper's majority, it was 
Baldwin's successful House of Commons performance on 
India. So far as the press was concerned, it seems clear 
t h a t  t h e  p e r s o n a l  a t t a c k s  on B a l d w i n  w e r e  
counterproductive. Baldwin's true victory at St. George's 
was that a majority of the electors, and almost all his 
own party, accepted his analysis of the party crisis, its 
causes and therefore its solutions. This was a double 
victory, in that more and more as the precise details of 
the complicated sequence of events of 1929-31 receeded 
into memory, the correctness of Baldwin's reasoning and 
stand become also more and more accepted fact.
The other reason why the importance of St, George's 
is so consistenly over-rated is the fact that in the week 
immediately after it, Beaverbrook re-opened negotiations 
and made peace with the party. On this occasion, with 
both sides in a chastened mood after the result and 
reaction at East Islington, topped off and confirmed by 
St, George's, the prospects for concluding a deal on both 
sides were brighter than ever before. This was not the
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direct product of St. George's itself, but rather the 
whole trend of events since October 1930. Having removed 
the policy difference, Neville Chamberlain had long wanted 
to secure a deal, but felt no particular urgency in the 
matter until East Islington proved that Beaverbrook still 
had sufficient influence in the metropolitan and home 
counties' electorate to dangerously damage Conservative 
prospects Ê. Labour. After this, the policy of
December of letting things "drift" seemed no longer appli 
able. On Beaverbrook's side^ two successive failures, and 
the accompanying bitterness, finally convinced him that 
his strength had passed the peak of South Paddington. The 
continuous strain of running his one-man campaign was also 
telling, and his mood was at least temporarily inclined to 
seek another truce. On 22 March, at Hoare's suggestion, 
Neville Chamberlain sent Beaverbrook a note suggesting a 
talk. This was quickly responded to, and the two men met 
on the 24th at Beaverbrook’s residence, Stornoway House, 
where during the following week most of the negotiations 
took place, and which gave the agreement eventually 
concluded the name of the Stornoway Pact.
The basic agreement was drafted on 24 March, and 
hinged on Beaverbrook's developing concern over the 
position of British agriculture, by now his principal 
interest. The agreement contained nothing that was not 
already implied in the Conservative agricultural policy 
and the free hand policy on tariffs, but Beaverbrook half­
heartedly attempted during the week after the meeting of
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24 March to amend the drafted exchange of letters in such 
a way as to make it appear that he had scored a victory.
In this he was to some extent encouraged by the newly 
formed Agricultural Party, based in Norfolk; but at this 
stage the desire for a truce was greater than the desire, 
sometimes contemplated, to fight to the end by "adopting 
Sinn Fein tactics".93 Thus when Neville Chamberlain, 
aware of the strength of his position, firmly resisted 
these modifications, Beaverbrook's resistence crumbled. 
The d i f f i c u l t i e s  over Taylor's p o s i t i o n  at South 
Paddington which had proved the stumbling block on the 
last occasion were now swept aside, to be dealt with after 
a general settlement. Chamberlain secured the agreement 
of the shadow cabinet to the proposed exchange of letters 
between himself and Beaverbrook, and, after further 
meetings at Stornoway House, these were given to the press 
on 31 March. Chamberlain had moved swiftly, exploiting 
the mood he sensed in Beaverbrook, flattering and then 
bullying him into an agreement which was made public 
immediately, and from which Beaverbrook would have much 
more difficulty disengaging than the previous truce of 
March 1930.94 Neville Chamberlain himself had no doubt 
that "the pact with Max was a real victory .... Baldwin
92. Beaverbrook to, Londonderry, 25 March 1931* ibid., 
C224,
93. Lockhart diary, 24 March 1931.
94. N. Chamberlain diary, 25, 28, 31 March 1931, NC 2/22,
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has given up nothing. It is Max who has now accepted our
policy."^5
At the same time as peace was d e c l a r e d  in the 
external squabble, so it was also secured internally. 
T h e r e  had b e e n  no p l o t  a g a i n s t  B a l d w i n ,  o n l y  
dissatisfaction with him on the part of his colleagues; 
but in his f i g h t i n g  mood after 2 M a rch B a l d w i n  
misinterpreted the statements and actions of several 
colleagues, including Neville Chamberlain and Hailsham, as 
having been disloyal to himself. One reason for this was 
a sudden and u n e x p e c t e d  i n t e r v e n t i o n  from Austen 
Chamberlain at the shadow cabinet on 11 March, at the 
height of the crisis, in which he demanded to know when 
Baldwin would release his brother Neville from the 
confining position of Party Chairman. This additional 
complication was not, in fact, a stab in the back at 
Baldwin, but a spontaneous and unrelated move by Austen, 
which Neville himself did not expect, and did not entirely 
welcome.95 it was the product of Austen’s frustration at 
the general situation and of his repeated fears that 
Neville was damaging his own prospects by his tenure of 
the Chairmanship - which Austen had always thought a bad 
move - but from which he could not see how to extract his 
younger half-brother.97 B y the height of the crisis
95. N. C h a m b e r l a i n  to Derby, 10 April 1931, in R. 
Churchill, Lord Derby (1959), P . 587.
96. N. Chamberlain to Baldwin, 13 March 1931, Baldwin 
MSS, volume 166, ff. 58-61.
97. A. to Hilda Chamberlain, 7 March 1931, AC 5/1/533.
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Austen was disturbed lest Neville be dragged down with 
Baldwin, and took the first available chance, however 
maladroitly, to prevent this. There was no intrigue 
behind this move, nor was it connected to Neville's 
previous presentation of the Topping memorandum. Baldwin, 
however, felt threatened by and resentful of the attitude 
of his colleagues, and allowed his resentment to become 
open knowledge. This in turn exacerbated their feelings, 
and in particular led to a period of personal coolness 
between Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain, in which the 
latter, believing he had lost his leader's;confidence, 
indicated that, the matter having been raised, he would 
like to quit the Chairmanship. Paradoxically, it was this 
which led to a clearing of the air. After the dust had 
settled at St. George's, Neville Chamberlain, piqued at 
Ba l d w i n ’s apparent loss of confidence in him which he 
considered his loyal conduct did not deserve, had a blunt 
private talk with the latter on 24 March. Baldwin was now 
keen to avoid any rift, and when Chamberlain put his 
grievances before him, responded apologetically. This 
revision was a considerable success, Chamberlain noting 
that "we parted sh a k i n g  hands and with the clouds 
removed", to their mutual r e l i e f . ^ 5
This strategy was repeated at the shadow cabinet 
meeting of 25 March, in which Baldwin's colleagues were 
able to vent their frustrations verbally to him, a process 
which reduced the pressure of their discontent by the
98. N. Chamberlain diary, 25 March 1931, NC 2/22.
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r e l a t i v e l y  h a r m l e s s  p r o c e s s  of l e t ting off steam: 
"everyone felt better after it, except S. B."  ^^  However, 
it was Baldwin who had in real terms gained most from 
these events, both from the external settlement and the 
internal clearing of the air. He had been forced to 
concede nothing of consequence, and his position and 
powers had remained intact. The price of hearing some 
critical comments was not a high one to pay for r e ­
establishing his pre-eminence as leader and preserving the 
solidarity of the front bench. Bridgeman perceptively 
analysed the realities of the position at the end of 
March, 1931:
I think it can be assumed that they have said all
they mean to say, and will now come into line. I
noticed that they all spoke of you as their Leader 
... you are in a more secure position.
The crisis had become a thing of the past, as had talk of
Baldwin’s retirement, and there was "a general atmosphere
of r e l i e f " . I n  the face of impending national crisis,
economic and political, unity came above all else in
Conservative politics in 1931. This was the lesson taught
by East Islington, tested but accepted on the issue of
India, and confirmed at St. George’s. In such a period of
’nati o n a l  p e r i l ’, i n t e r n a l  party d i ssent was an
unnecessary luxury. It was in this mood that, after
M a r c h  1931 B a l d w i n  and his c o l l e a g e s  set about the
restoration of order in Conservative politics.
99. N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 March 1931, NC 18/1/732.
100. Bridgeman to Baldwin, 25 March 1931, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 166, f. 36.
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PART TWO: THE RESTORATION OF ORDER
CHAPTER 6
National Peril ; (i) The Imperial Dimension
The domestic implications of tariff reform, as 
discussed in the previous chapters, were the constant 
anxiety of the pragmatic element in the Conservative 
party, a group predominant amongst the leadership. In the 
domestic dimension it is accurate to portray the struggle 
for mastery of party policy as being between the economic 
appeal of protectionism, both to the agriculturalist and 
to the safeguarded industrialist, and the political 
dangers summed up by the ’dear food’ cry. Whilst there is 
little doubt that considerations of domestic politics 
governed the pace and extent of the party’s commitment to 
fiscal change, these concerns were a secondary factor for 
the committed protagonists of tariff reform. Tariff 
ref o r m  was above all a great i m p e r i a l  ideology, 
originating in concern over the future development of the 
empire, and it was in this context that it captured the 
idealism of its most fervent advocates, such as Amery, 
Page Croft, and even Beaverbrook himself. The purpose of 
such a policy, the prize for which domestic political 
risks were to be run, was imperial consolidation and 
unity, and the debate over tariff reform can only be 
integrated properly with Conservative political action by 
placing it firmly in the imperial dimension. In this 
context imperial preference through tariffs was only one 
aspect of a wider series of questions concerning the
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future of the British empire which faced Conservative 
politicians in an especially acute form during the period 
1929- 1931. Anxiety was heightened by the supposed dangers 
of Socialist control over official imperial policy, but 
quite apart from the normal frustrations of opposition was 
a growing sense that the future of the empire was at the 
crossroads by 1930. The internal crises affecting the 
empire, the external threats endangering it, and the 
degeneracy of the home country’s will to give it a lead, 
provided the imperial dimension of the peril facing the 
nation as perceived by Conservatives between 1929 and 
1931.^  The problems of empire in relation to the weakness 
of both thé economic resources and political determination 
at home were felt to be crucially apparent at this time. 
These problems concerned the question of imperial defence, 
bound up in the negotiations over the size of the navy at 
the London naval conference of 1930, and the difficulties 
facing imperial policy in East Africa, Rhodesia, Palestine 
and Egypt. Above all, the future relationship of the two 
most important constituent elements in the empire to the 
mother country were at issue in this period: in the case
of the self-governing dominions over imperial preference, 
and in the case of India over the political role of the 
native population. Given the range and significance of 
these concerns, it was possible to react in terms not of a
1. Hoare to Willingdon, 2 September 1931, India Office 
Library, Templewood MSS, Eur. E . 240.
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series of localised questions, but of a general imperial
crisis - even of conspiracy;
it is not only in India that the situation causes 
disquiet, or perhaps it is partly owing to our Indian 
difficulties that our enemies elsewhere show their 
sinister countenances, Malta, Egypt, Palestine, even 
in Cyprus or Iraq - in each the situation presents 
particular and potential dangers.
2
But of all these areas India was the real lynchpin of 
empire, and thus the debate over the political evolution 
and devolution of India assumed such cardinal importance 
in Conservative party politics, alongside the question of 
imperial preference for the dominions. 
* * * * * * * * * *
Two factors strongly influenced the attitude of
Conservatives towards the India question in 1929. The
first of these was the parallel with the question of
Ireland during the previous fifty years. Baldwin in
particular drew the lesson that for the health of the
empire such matters must not become the stuff of party
disputes. Yet from the perspective of the imperialist
wing of the party, the lessons drawn from the Irish treaty
were quite different. Here the emphasis was placed on the
importance of strength and consistency, and the purity of
a policy of not negotiating with disaffected elements:
We bought peace in Ireland by negotiations with evil 
forces of a s s a s s i n a t i o n .  We are paying now a 
long price in India and Egypt today. If we are now
2. Balcarres to Irwin, 13 May 1 930, Halifax MSS, India 
Office, Eur. C. 1 52/ 1 9/ 1/57a.
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to repeat the performance in India, where next shall 
we be called upon to pay the Bill?
From such a perspective Baldwin’s self-confessed aim "of 
trying to liberalise the Tory Party" on India^ appeared as 
stark defeatism; looking back on these events Churchill 
painted the distinction in this light:
So far as I could see, Mr, Baldwin felt that the 
times were too far gone for any robust assertion of 
British Imperial greatness, and that the hopes of the 
Conservative party lay in accommodation with Liberal 
and Labour forces.
In the sense that Baldwin prized the preservation of 
consensus at home on imperial policy this was true, 
although Baldwin expected that the other parties, equally 
aware of the need for unity, would moderate their course 
in the light of Conservative fears and requests for 
safeguards, and meet them half way.
A second factor also carried mu c h  w e i g h t  with 
Baldwin, and with the viceroy he had himself personally 
selected and sent to India, whilst still Prime Minister, 
Lord Irwin. Both felt that the implications of British 
policy in India in the past limited their freedom of
3. Lloyd to Baldwin, 5 March 1931, Baldwin MSS, volume 
104, ff. 226-227.
4. Lytton to Irwin, 20 November 1929, Halifax MSS, India 
Office, Eur. C. 152/18/1/309.
5. Churchill’s recollections, Churchill MSS 4/113, in 
Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
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manoeuvre in the present. Irwin admitted that "we very 
likely made a mistake when we gave Indian education and 
thought its western twist, but having done so the kind of 
results we now see today are inevitable".^ In particular, 
the events during the 1918-1922 coalition government were 
felt to have determined the pattern of Indian development. 
The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms "had set our feet upon the 
permanent road" of devolution, whilst the reaction to the 
Armitsar massacre had sounded the death knell of any 
relia n c e  upon pure r e p r e s s i o n  of native p o l i t i c a l  
opinion.? In the case of both precedents, it could be 
said that in the matter of India, just as over tariff 
reform, the division in the Conservative party lay between 
the pragmatists, surrounding and influencing the party 
leader, and the purists or idealists, who were normally 
kept in the position of a vocal fringe group, and that in 
both areas of the imperial dimension the leadership 
managed normally to retain the crucial confidence of the 
moderates or central mass of the party, in the Commons and 
in the constituencies.
The question of India became acute in late 1 929, with 
the first definite forward move since the Montagu- 
Chelmsford reforms. This was the decision of Irwin that, 
n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  S t a t u t o r y
6. Irwin to Hugh Cecil, 29 August 1930, Halifax MSS, 
India Office, Eur. C. 152/19/2/136e.
7. Irwin to Churchill, 26 December 1 929, ibid., Eur. C. 
152/18/2/419.
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C o m m i s s i o n  p r e s i d e d  over by Sir John Simon and 
representatives of all three parties, which had been set 
up to recommend the next stages of Indian constitutional 
reform, had not yet reported its conclusions; it had 
become necessary to pacify and reassure Indian native 
opinion of the British government’s sincerity! by making a 
formal announcement accepting that India should evolve 
t o w a r d s  d o m i n i o n  status. Irwin had come to this 
conclusion earlier in the year, and had discussed his 
ideas whilst in England in the summer of 1929.with leading 
Conservative politicians, including Salisbury!and Baldwin,
for he laid much e m p h a s i s  on the need fior secu r i n g
ft !domestic unanimity.° Baldwin was in any casé sympathetic
to I r w i n ’s proposal on two counts: to Irwi|n in person,
and to his policy. Baldwin admired Irwin, and trusted his
Q Ipurity of motives as well as his judgment.? Even before 
the election in May 1929 Baldwin foresaw tha^ India would 
be a crucial issue in the next parliamejnt, and had 
indicated privately his support for Irwin’s policy.^0
The question of Irwin’s declaration was complicated 
by the fact that the crucial decisions over, the content
and timing of the a n n o u n c e m e n t , and the precise role and
I
8. Memo of conversation with Irwin, 2Û July 1 929,
Salisbury MSS S(4) 197/103; Irwin to Baldwin, 19
September 1929, Baldwin MSS, volume 103,. ff. 58-59.
9. Baldwin to Irwin, 26 June 1927 and 10 May 1931,
Halifax MSS, B o r t h w i c k  Institute, A4/410/14/2, 
A2/278/24.
10. Baldwin to Irwin, ibid., A4/410/14/3; Dawson to
Irwin, 8 April 1929, Dawson MSS.
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attitude towards it of the Simon Commission, occurred 
during the later stages of the parliamentary recess in 
September and early October 1929 with the principal 
p o l i t i c i a n s  out of close c o n t a c t  with each other: 
MacDonald in the United States, and Baldwin as usual 
h o l i d a y i n g  at A i x - l e s - B a i n s .  W h i l s t  B a l d w i n  was 
journeying back from the south of France, he was met at 
Bourges by an emissary from the India Office, bringing a 
copy of the proposed statement, and seeking B a l d w i n ’s 
approval in his capacity as leader of the Conservative 
party. The result of this m e e t i n g  was a series of 
misunderstandings. It is apparent that while supporting 
I r wd. n , Baldwin pointed out that in the absence of his 
colleagues his approval could only be in a personal 
capacity; and that there was confusion over the extent to 
which Simon had been consulted, either officially or 
unofficially, and whether or not his attitude was hostile. 
Baldwin’s approval did not thus commit his party, and "the 
assent, such as it was which [he] gave was conditional on 
the approval of Simon and the Commission’’.^  ^ However, the 
government did not fully comprehend these reservations, 
and Baldwin either misunderstood, or was deliberately or 
accidentally misinformed of the position of the Simon 
Commission, and as a result thought that they acquiesced
11. A. Chamberlain to Peel. 30 October 1929, AC 38/3/115
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in the new initiative. As C u n 1 i f f e - Lister later 
commented, "it was all rather a muddled business
After B a l d w i n ’s return rumours of his action, based 
on the g o v e r n m e n t ’s interpretation of it, resulted in a 
stormy and unhappy session of the shadow cabinet in the 
last week of October 1929. Few amongst the Conservative 
l e a de rs were co n t e n t  either with I r w i n ’s p r o p o s e d  
statement or with the fact that the party’s hands were 
largely tied by B a l d w i n ’s Bourges c o m m i t m e n t , be it a
personal one or not. In this sense the incident is a
clear indication of the enormous personal power of the 
party leader, for B a l d w i n ’s decision gave his followers 
little room for manoeuvre by making the issue as much one 
of confidence in, or rebellion against, himself as leader, 
as a question of support for Irwin. At the same time 
Baldwin's caveat allowed him an avenue for retreat should
he be unable to carry his party, for he could fall back
on the defence that his views had been private ones only, 
and drop them for a more cautious policy. In fact, he 
executed a combination of both raanouevres. Having taken 
the temperature of his colleagues at the shadow cabinet 
meeting, he allowed Austen Chamberlain to draft a letter 
to be sent to Snowden, who was acting Prime Minister in 
Ma c Donald’s absence, which underlined and placed on the 
record the qualifications he had made at Bourges.  ^3 This
12, Cunliffe-Li Ster to Irwin, 28 December 1929, Halifax 
MSS, India Office, Eur. C. 152/18/1/344.
13. A. C h a m b e r l a i n  to Peel, 30 October 1 929 , AC 
38/3/115.
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appeased his colleagues, and preserved a thin facade of 
party unity over India, which was B a l d w i n ’s real desire. 
Although the consequence was not without considerable 
risks, and although the misunderstandings at Bourges 
undermined confidence in B a l d w i n ’s capacity,  ^^  and the 
price paid for this was a period of strain within the 
party, nevertheless Baldwin had succeeded in holding the 
Conservatives to a line of policy that would have been 
almost unthinkable six months previously, by a classic 
exploitation of his position as leader.
Thus when the declaration was made by Irwin in India 
on 31 October 1 929, although it came as a bolt from the 
blue to uninformed opinion in Britain, in the press and on 
the backbenches, the hands of the Conservative party were 
already largely tied. There can be no doubt that the 
Irwin declaration caused the greatest misgivings in 
Conservative circles. Hoare, one of the few of the front 
bench to support I r w i n ’s policy, nevertheless admitted 
that ’’scarcely anyone in the party liked it" and that 
"the Diehards were much u p s e t T h e  onslaught against 
the Irwin declaration did not, however, originate from the 
Diehard Tory MPs, but from three other quarters. The 
first of these was a group amongst the party leadership 
with some experience of Indian affairs, who were by 
coincidence the same personalities identified with the
14. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 7 November 1929, Halifax MSS,
India Office, Eur. C. 152/18/1/292.
15. Hoare to Irwin, 13 November 1929, ibid., f. 298.
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h e y - d a y  of the L l o y d  G e o r g e  c o a l i t i o n :  A u s t e n
Chamberlain, Winston Churchill, and Lord Birkenhead, The 
fact that the second source of domestic objection came 
from the Liberals, from Lloyd George and the former 
Liberal viceroy. Lord Reading, lent substance to fears of 
a coalitionist intrigue. However, the most serious attack 
of all came from the Daily M ail, which exposed the entire 
question of B a l d w i n ’s actions at Bourges, in an article 
entitled "Baldwin’s Crowning Blunder", which shook party 
confidence and morale with its specific, and presumably 
leaked, allegations that Baldwin had committed the party 
without consultations or reservations to the Irwinite 
line. In fact, the action of the Daily Mail in making the 
central issue the manner of B a l d w i n ’s commitment, more 
than the validity or otherwise of the policy he had 
supported, was a grave tactical error. At first sight it 
may have seemed his most vulnerable point, but the tactic 
failed miserably. In the first place the Da^^y M a i^ ]^ ’ s 
charges cut across and pre-empted the more serious and 
weighty criticisms of Reading, Birkenhead, and the rest of 
the Conservative p r e s s . T h u s ,  whilst on 1 November 
the leader in the M o ir in i^ n £ ® denounced "this folly of
D o m i n i o n  S t a t u s ’’, on the f o l l o w i n g  day it reacted 
against the D^^^y M a a t t a c k ,  dimissing it as "another 
proof of the malignity with which the Conservative leader
16. Balcarres to Irwin, 8 November 1929, Halifax MSS, 
India Office, Eur. C. 152/19/ 1/162a ; Daily Telegraph, 
1, 2 November 1929.
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is pursued".1? This underlined the fact that the very 
style and source of the attack from Rothermere had the 
effect of pushing the party together in a reflex reaction 
of solidarity against outsiders. Dawson, the editor of 
The Tj^rae£, commented on the Daily M^^l^ "these inept
politicians always overdo it and the result is an instant
r e a c t i o n " . A n d  indeed, this proved to be the case, for
the Daily Mail’s charges were in fact refutable by Baldwin 
- in detail, if not in spirit; thus the attack on the 
declaration was blocked at square one. Furthermore,
Baldwin exploited this tactical advantage by making his 
counterattack a part of his Commons speech on the debate 
on the Irwin declaration, and was thus able to hammer the 
newspaper without fear of a response.
The Commons debate on the Irwin declaration was a 
success for Baldwin, who produced one of his periodic 
oratorical masterpieces for the occasion, translating the 
debate to "an unusually high l e v e l " . 19 Lane-Fox wrote 
that "the outstanding speech was S. B.’s who not only rose 
to real eloquence ... but also raised his position in his 
own party very much", whilst the Daily M ail was "entirely 
demolished".^® Despite this success, however, there was
17. Morning Post, 1, 2 November 1929.
18. Dawson to Irwin, 3 November 1929, Halifax MSS, India 
Office, Eur. C. 152/18/1/290.
19. A. to Ida Chamberlain, 11 November 1929, AC 5/1/486.
20. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 13 November 1929, Halifax MSS, 
India Office, Eur. C. 152/18/1/299.
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nearly a serious party split, for the dissident former 
coalitionists looked prepared to lead the Diehards into 
the same hostile lobby as Lloyd George if a division was 
called. In the event, at the end of the debate this was 
avoided, in part because the party instinctively shrank 
back from any overt split, and in part due to the 
widespread suspicion that the manoeuvre was designed to 
bring back the old coalitionist alliance and reverse the 
verdict of 1922.^1 From this high point the crisis over 
the Irwin declaration receded, leaving the Conservative 
party committed to the principle of the go v e r n m e n t ’s 
policy of summoning a Round Table conference to discuss 
Indian devolution, yet without there being any damage or 
"any p e r m a n e n t  effect" upon the p a r t y , B a l d w i n  
succeeded in keeping discontent under control by the 
combination of four factors. The first of these was his 
exploitation of his position as leader and of the loyalty 
given to him; the second was his exploitation of the 
hostility of the party to the D^^^y M a £]L itself; the 
third was the exploitation of the fear of coalitionist 
intrigue; and the fourth and perhaps most important was 
the party’s instinctive fear of disunity in the voting 
lobbies. Underlying these facts, however, was evidence
21. Winterton to Irwin, 11 November 1929, ibid., f. 295; 
Dawson to Irwin, 31 October 1929, Daws o n  MSS; 
Davidson to Irwin, 9 November 1929, Davidson MSS.
22. Hoare to Irwin, 13 November 1929, Halifax MSS, India 
Office, Eur. C. 152/18/1/298.
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that the a n x i e t i e s  over India were both real and 
widespread, with "considerable unrest among the Diehard 
element ... and even the more moderate backbenchers were 
in a state of suspended a n i m a t i o n . Baldwin had secured 
his position, but only in the first engagement of a long 
campaign.
Ba l d w i n ’s position of maintaining public unity at 
home was not without support. It appealed to the party’s 
own self-image that it should sacrifice possible domestic 
political advantages, that it "would approach the position 
solely from the point of view of the good of the Empire as 
a whole, and in particular I n d i a " . ^4 Of course, one 
section of his party fundamentally disagreed that the 
bipartisan approach was in fact in the interests of the 
empire - but there was enough solid evidence to suggest 
that it was to convince not merely Irwinites, but the more 
crucial uncertain centre figures. Hailsham, who carried 
much weight with the party’s right-of-centre, accepted the 
need to keep public opinion at home united, and was 
realistically aware of the dangers of striking out on a 
h a r d - l i n e  policy, having few il l u s i o n s  about "the 
possibility of maintaining orderly government in India if 
we were in office and both o p p o s i t i o n  p a r ties were 
supporting the Indian extremists in refusing to obey our
23. Davidson to Irwin, 9 November 1929, Davidson MSS.
24, Memo of conversation between Davidson and Stopford,
secretary to the Simon Commission, 4 November 1929,
Davidson MSS.
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rule or co-operate in the form of Government which we 
s o u g h t  to i m p o s e . "  For H a i l s h a m ,  as for m o s t  
C o n s e r v a t i v e s ,  the crucial q u e s t i o n s  c o n c e r n e d  the 
necessary safeguards, in the field of control of foreign 
and defence policy in particular, which would have to be 
built into any Indian c o n s t i t u t i o n ,  "and that no 
constitution which does not adequately provide for these 
can be a c c e p t e d " . ^5 Thus the debates of the next five 
years centred around this matter of essential safeguards, 
leaving the objectors to any kind of advance for India at 
all as an excluded fringe.
The moderate Conservative line on India became 
synonymous with Sir Samuel Hoare. Indeed, Hoare built his 
career upon his careful treading of a median line in 
the party over India, so as to be able to carry the right 
wing with him in a policy of cautious advance. As early 
as December 1929 Hoare was determined to carve out a 
niche for himself as the future Conservative Secretary of 
State for I n d i a . ^8 in his public utterances he was 
careful to admit to "doubts and fears" over India, and 
seeking to put "a brake on demands for ill-considered 
a d v a n c e " . 2? At the same time it is clear that Hoare 
sincerely respected Irwin's viewpoint, even if he did
25. Hailsham to Salisbury, 2 April 1931, Salisbury MSS 
S(4) 140/58-61.
26. Hoare to Irwin, 24 December 1929, Halifax MSS, India 
Office, Eur. C. 152/18/1/339.
27. Hoare, "The Future of India", Chelsea CA, Newsletter, 
March 1931.
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not think it completely practical politics, and sought to 
keep in close contact with the viceroy. Between 1929 and 
1931 H o a r e  g r a d u a l l y  t o o k  over the f r o n t  b e n c h  
spokesmanship on India, a position which both enhanced and 
r e f l e c t e d  his g r o w i n g  stature w i t h i n  the party. 
Significantly he, together with other ambitious younger 
figures, chose to follow the path of promotion by adhering 
to the party orthodoxy, rather than rebelling against it. 
Hoare was
quite justifiably keeping his eye on the position 
which he is creating for himself ... in some ways 
much more advanced than [the Diehards] but in others 
not so idealistic as Mr. Baldwin himself and some of 
the younger men.
28
If in Hoare’s strategy there was a strong element of 
ambition, it was a drive that was to prove of inestimable 
assistance and value to Baldwin in maintaining his hold 
upon the party.
India was pushed from the centre of the political 
stage after the Irwin declaration by other issues - for 
the Conservatives in particular by Beaverbrook's campaign 
- until the c o n v e n i n g  in London of the Round Table 
conference almost a year later. In between there was a 
minor flurry over Gandhi’s salt campaign in March 1930 
but the c o m b i n a t i o n  of firm action by the Indian
28. Hailey to Irwin, 6 January 1931, Halifax MSS, India 
Office, Eur. C. 152/19/1/201.
330
a u t h o r i t i e s  with a c a r e f u l l y  m a n a g e d  debate in the 
Commons, in which backbench MPs were able to express 
their concern, ensured acceptance of Hoare’s argument that 
the incident should not deflect the agreed and accepted 
p r o g r a m m e .29 This incident merely underlined the trend of 
this intervening year, during which the balance of forces 
within the party tilted slowly but decisively in favour of 
the Baldwin-Irwin line. The cause of this change was the 
gradual commitment of the party, almost without its 
noticing it, to a bipartisan policy on India, which had 
the effect of largely removing the issue of India from the 
arena of party politics. So far as it could be a 
political question at all, it became perforce after 
November 1929 a question within the Conservative party, 
in which a numerically small and poorly led Diehard group 
c h a l l e n g e d  the w i s d o m  of the f r o n t  b e n c h .  The 
consequence of this was to press the party centre into 
support for B a l d w i n ’s line. This crucial support he 
maintained during the following six years of party debate 
over India, although on occasion.he came close to losing 
it. D e c i sions over India policy were taken in an 
atmosphere of co-operation between the front benches:
The main reality is that the decision about Indian 
Government will be taken here in England; and that 
the real s o v e r e i g n t y  of India lies here .... I 
suppose if ten p e r s o n s  or t h e r e a b o u t s  on Front
29. Hoare to Irwin, 31 May 1930, ibid., f. 71
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Benches come to any d e c i s i o n  about India, that 
decision will in fact operate.
wrote Hugh Cecil, although he added one crucial proviso:
No doubt public opinion on some questions greatly 
influences and sometimes overbears Front Benchdom: 
but at present, at any rate, public opinion is not 
excited [about India]
30
No major politician questioned this analysis, for it 
was the aim and intention of Winston Churchill, the only 
important front bench rebel against the bipartisan line, 
to arouse the sleeping lion of British imperial sentiment, 
as the only available means of breaking the solidarity of 
the parliamentary consensus over India. 
* * * * * * * * * *
Winston Churchill was, in the year between the Irwin 
declaration and the Round Table conference, politically a 
declining figure, looking for an issue with which to 
revive his career. He was unpopular with all sections of 
the Conservative party; with his colleagues in the shadow 
cabinet, with the MPs with the imperialists and the 
protectionists, and with the rank and file. His period as 
C h a n c e l l o r  of the E x c h e q u e r  in B a l d w i n ’s 1924-1929 
government had not endeared him to the party grassroots.31
30. Hugh Cecil to Irwin, 31 July 1930, ibid., f. 104a.
31. Bridgeman journal, volume 2, p. 215.
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That government had failed to produce the reductions in 
expenditure expected of it, and the derating scheme with 
which Churchill was strongly identified had been an 
e l e c t o r a l  failure. Above all, his p r e s e n c e  at the 
Treasury, as a committed free trader, was blamed for the 
lack of i n i t i a t i v e s  in s a f e g u a r d i n g  or protection. 
Conservative voters
complain that such Conservative measures as Extension 
of Safeguarding, House of Lords Reform, etc. were 
stopped by the Conservative Free Traders - Winston 
was always mentioned.
32
This b l o c k a g e  had not been r e m o v e d  by the general 
election, for throughout the next two years Churchill was 
still considered to be a barrier to imperial preference by 
its supporters. Thus Churchill was both blamed for the 
election defeat, and for splitting the party over tariffs 
in 1930.33 Amery advised Beaverbrook: "if you really
want to go for the weakening element there is only one 
real danger and that is Winston. He, and he alone, 
wrecked the last Government", while Cunliffe-Lister told 
Bayford that "he would never again work with Winston as
Chancellor - he defeated all Tariff p r o p o s a l s " . 34
32. Memo on Bromley by-elction, Campbell to Bowyer, 15 
September 1930, Baldwin MSS, volume 51, ff. 13-15.
33. Dixey to Baldwin, 8 September 1930, ibid., volume 
165, ff. 104-106; Croft to Beaverbrook, 5 November 
1930, Beaverbrook MSS, Cl 01.
34. Amery to Beaverbrook, I3 April 1930, ibid., C5; 
Bayford diary, 22 March 1931.
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In a d d i t i o n  to his anoraolous p o s i t i o n  as a 
Conservative but a free trader whilst tariff sentiment was 
once again enjoying a hey-day in the party, Churchill was 
widely mistrusted for two further reasons. The first of 
these was his c o a l i t i o n i s t  past, a sore spot w h i c h  
Churchill exacerbated by pushing the idea of alliance with 
Lloyd George after the 1929 election. Churchill was 
incapable of discretion, and was widely thought to be 
working hand-in-glove with Lloyd George, "obsessed with 
the idea of another Coalition", even by some who knew him 
well p e r s o n a l l y . 35 Whatever Churchill’s motivation, the 
concept was hardly practical politics in light of the 
attitude towards Lloyd George of the backbenchers, and the 
idea of any such arrangement "is not endearing him to most 
of our P a r t y " . 3 6 The second cause of C h u r c h i l l ’s 
unpopularity was the equally widely held - indeed almost 
synonymous - view of him as a self-seeking ambitious 
careerist, out to reach the top of the ’greasy p o l e ’ at 
whatever cost to party, policy, consistency, or loyalty; 
so that his conduct "continues to inspire doubt and anxiety 
instead of confidence".3? Thus was Churchill discredited.
35. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 11 December 1929, Halifax MSS,
India Office, Eur. C. 152/18/1/328; Beaverbrook to
Guest, 22 November 1929, Beaverbrook MSS C27.
36. Cunliffe-Lister to Irwin, 28 December 1929, Halifax
MSS, India Office, Eur. C. 152/18/1/344.
37. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 4 April 1 930, NC 1 8/ 1 /689 ; R.
R. James, jOhij£2 h _ i A  Stjjdy F ailure 1 900- 39( 1970) ,  passim.
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with "very little following" in the House, and "most 
unpopular in the country", a political giant in decline in 
1929, and indeed thought to be nearing the end of his
c a r e e r . 38 0 n top of t his, C h u r c h i l l  p e r f o r m e d
unsatisfactorily in the Commons in the summer of 1929, and 
revealed himself to be surprisingly poor at opposition, as 
well as being frequently absent from the c h a m b e r , 39 
Ch u r c h i l l  also s u f f e r e d  from being one of the most 
prominent targets of the campaign against the continued 
presence of the ’Old Gang’ of party leaders during 1930. 
Thus, despite having been Chancellor - though not second 
man in the leadership - for the previous five years, the 
period of opposition saw Winston Churchill at one of the 
l o w e s t  points of his career, " d e p r e s s e d  about his 
position", looking for something new to bring him out into 
the limelight.4®
The emergence of the tariff issue as the dominant 
theme in Conservative party politics from November 1929 
to November 1930 was a further problem for Churchill, for 
it was the one issue which he could not take up with 
credibility. At the height of the tariff crisis in 
September 1930 Churchill himself acknowledged that the 
growth of Beaverbrook’s influence was "almost exactly
38. Elibank to Beaverbrook, 18 June 1930, Beaverbrook 
MSS, C. 126.
39. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 28 July 1930, NC 19/1/663; 
Bridgeman journal, volume 2, p. 213.
40. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 21 January 1931, Halifax MSS, 
India Office, Eur. C. 15 2/19/1/211; Lockhart diary, 
23 January 1930.
335
proportionate to the diminution of mine."41 The ant i ­
tariff fight did not attract him, for it cast him in the 
role of a rebel not only against the leadership - which 
would not alone have prevented him - but also against the 
deeply e x p r e s s e d  aim s  and i n s t i n c t s  of the party 
grassroots. It would be a futile gesture, as well as 
politically suicidal, and Churchill had little desire to 
go into political wilderness. In fact, Churchill's heart 
had gone out of the defence of free trade, and, under 
pressure from the Crusade in his own Essex constituency,42 
he reluctantly acquiesced in each stage of the road back 
to a whole-hogging tariff policy, attempting only to 
retain some appearance of consistency with the young free 
trader of 1 903. Thus in February 1930 he "swallowed the 
half-way house of the Coliseum speech", and remained in 
the shadow cabinet despite coming to the very verge of 
quitting over the policy advances of October 1930.43 At 
the same time as Churchill finally gave up on free trade 
as a lost cause, he also relinquished his aspirations for 
an alliance with the Liberals, accepting that coalitionism 
was dead when in early 1930 Lloyd George aligned his party 
in support of the Labour administration.
41. Chu r c h i l l  to Be a v e r b r o o k ,  23 S e p t e m b e r  1930,
Beaverbrook MSS, C86.
42. The Times, 1 July 1930.
43. Tom Jones to E. Jones, 9 February 1930; Whitehall
Diary, Churchill to Baldwin, 14 October 1930, not 
sent, and 16 October 1930, Churchill MSS 2/572,
Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 191-194; N. Chamberlain Diary, 
19 October 1930, NC 2/22; The Times, 17 July 1930, 24 
February 1931.
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Between 1924 and 1930 Churchill had occupied a 
political half-way house between his radical past and his 
imperial instincts, a position in which the traditional 
role of the Chancellor as an objector to schemes rather 
than an initiator had fixed him for the duration of the 
Baldwin government. It was from 1930 onwards that 
Churchill began to concentrate his attention on the themes 
of Britain and the British empire’s position in the world. 
He sought a great imperial issue upon which he could rouse 
not merely the party, but also the nation, from the perils 
of weakness and decadence. In this path the greatest 
influence upon Churchill was his still-intact friendship 
and alliance with Lord Birkenhead, who brought out the 
Diehard in him on India in particular, and whose death in 
1930 left his friend fixed upon a course of confrontation, 
yet w i t h o u t  a s t e a d y i n g  influence. C h u r c h i l l  now 
developed the Diehard theme that dominated his career 
through the 1930’s:
My idea was that the Conservative Opposition should 
strongly confront the Labour Government on all great 
Imperial and National issues, should identify itself 
with the m a j e s t y  of Br i t a i n  ... and should not 
hesitate to face controversy,
44
The revolt over India, the support of King Edward VIII, 
and the campaign for rearmament were all of a piece with
44. Chu r c h i l l  R e c o l l e c t i o n s ,  Chu r c h i l l  MSS 4/113, 
Gilbert, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
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this strategy. Indeed, the first issue Churchill took up 
in this light was to oppose the terras of the London Naval 
Treaty negotiated in the spring of 1930, but this prologue 
was swiftly overshadowed by the question of India.
Winston Churchill was a curious and complex political 
character. It is too simple to say that he took up the 
India question in order to restore his party position, or 
that he did so only out of concern for the future of the 
British people. Both factors influenced his actions; 
first, his declining stature and his unpopularity with the 
C o n s e r v a t i v e  p a r t y  and his d e s i r e  to e v a d e  the 
difficulties of the tariff issue; and second the concerns 
for the empire. The truth lies in between, and the area 
of debate concerns how large a part each one played in 
making up the whole. There is no doubt that, tactically, 
C h u rc hill had mu c h  to gain and little to lose from 
rebellion - he was expected to be dropped from the next 
Conservative cabinet,45 Against this his only response 
was to improve his support within the party, and in raid- 
1930 the Diehards, alienated from Baldwin's leadership and 
in tune with Churchill's instincts, seemed to be natural 
allies. This does not mean he plotted to oust Baldwin as 
leader - his p o s i t i o n  was far too wea k  for such 
pretensions. It only meant that the ties which had bound 
him to the leadership had now all fallen away. Equally it
45. B e a v e r b r o o k  to C h u r c h i l l ,  19 J a n u a r y  1931, 
Beaverbrook MSS, C86.
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is evident that the prospects of empire, and above all of
India, s t i r r e d  his blood and i m a g i n a t i o n ,  and that
Churchill, far from being a cunning, patient intriguer,
was an impulsive romantic enthusiast, and thus reacted to
the imperial peril almost by instinct. Although his
imperialism did not find its expression as with other
Conservatives through the medium of a tariff preference
policy, it was as equally and ardently felt. Furthermore,
C h u r c h i l l  had a deep p e r s o n a l  sense of history, of
mission, and of destiny, and it was this part of his
character which identified with the British role in Indian
history. It struck a chord in the heart of his being,
with the result that any attempts apparently to weaken
this mission offended against all his instincts. In fact,
Churchill had been unhappy over the Montagu-Chelmsford
reforms, feeling strongly that self-government for India
was an impossible and dangerous d e l u s i o n . He accepted
the rhetoric of the imperial dimension of the national
crisis in 1929-1931» and was one of the few first-rank
politicians to place it above the domestic dimension in
importance.^? He talked the language of national revival:
after what occurred in Ireland ... and what is being 
done in Egypt ... I cannot reproach anyone in distant 
lands for feeling that they have no strong nation 
behind them, and that conciliation and compromise are 
a l m o s t  the only a g e n c i e s  at th e i r  dis p o s a l .  
Nevertheless, it is my conviction that upon the
46, P. Addison, "The P o l i t i c a l  B e l i e f s  of W i n s t o n  
Churchill", Royal Historical Society Transactions, 
Fifth Series, volume 30, 1980, pp. 40-41.
47. Churchill, speech to Dumbartonshire CA, The Times, 8 
September 1930.
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supreme issue of India the British Empire will arise 
in its old strength, and that ... strength will be 
given to us in proportion to our need .... I believe 
that once the evil elements realise that they are in 
contact with the will-power of Britain, our task will 
be rendered far less formidable.
48
Churchill’s political stance was clear. All that can be 
said with regard to motivation is to recognise the genuine 
element of concern over Indian policy, and the fact that 
in 1930, as opposed to 1921, Churchill was vulnerable and 
politically down, with little to lose, unconfined by any 
claims of collective responsibility or the attractions and 
preoccupations of high office, but was instead a man 
searching for a political r aison d ’etre. His fears 
over British policy in India thus c l a i m e d  his full 
attention and his crusading spirit, coinciding with his 
self-image as a man of destiny who could save the empire. 
If there was a tactical reason, tactics alone are not 
enough to explain completely Churchill’s conduct, for he 
had always beforehand risen through the approval of his 
leader - Asquith in 1908-1914, Lloyd George in 1917-1922, 
Baldwin in 1924 - and furthermore his previous experience 
at rebellion, against Balfour in 1902-1903, was not a
48. Churchill to Irwin, 1 January 1930, Halifax MSS, 
India Office, Eur. C. 152/19/1/1; speech at Thanet, 
The Times, 21 August 1930.
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happy augury of success. But, h o w e v e r  s i ncere the
impulse, however wholehearted the execution, there were
too many sceptics unconvinced by Churchill’s Diehard stand
to rally round him at once; suspicion of the careerist
remained strong. The p a r t y ’s most prominent imperial
standard-bearer, Araery, put the point acutely from the
public platform:
the fire of [Churchill’s] passion over India ... was 
not without its advantage in providing a smokescreen 
to cover his severance from the party and from the 
leaders in the r e a l l y  great issues before the 
country.
49
The various sectors of Conservative anxiety over 
India were numerous, but largely incompatible. Churchill 
proved to be only the most vocal of a spectrum of dissent 
r u nning across the party as a whole. A m o n g s t  the 
parliamentarians, serious concern was voiced from both 
leaders and followers. Within the leadership, protests 
came originally from three previous Conservative holders 
of the India Office; Birkenhead, Peel, and Austen 
Chamberlain. Of these, the former’s attack at the time of 
the Irwin d e c l a r a t i o n  was the most outspoken, but 
Birkenhead was even before his early death in 1930 a 
discredited and declining force. Austen Chamberlain was a 
more significant figure, and although more temperate in 
his criticism, was equally pessimistic and negative in 
outlook. "The Indian situation continues to cause me the
49. The Times, 21 March 1931.
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greatest anxiety ... the Viceroy has gone completely off 
the rails. Heaven help us all.", he wrote in July 1930, 
as the Round Table conference was about to c o n v e n e . ^0 
Ironically, Austen Chamberlain himself was debarred from 
leading the Conservative delegation to that conference, 
not because he was too rigid on India, but because of 
reservations dating from the Irish treaty of 1921, that he 
would concede too much. Ironically, this veto was applied 
by Salisbury, who was the most weighty of all those in the 
leadership who wished to maintain the status quo in India, 
Indeed, the conflict between his loyalty to the party 
leader, and his views over India, rather than the publicly 
announced reason of health, was the cause of Salisbury’s 
resignation as leader in the Lords in 1931.^1 Thus the 
party leadership fell broadly into three camps: a small
but politically significant group strongly opposed to 
I r w i n ’s policy, and restrained only by friendship for 
Irwin and loyalty to the party and its leader; a middle 
uncommitted group, the largest of the three, containing 
figures r a n g i n g  from the d o u b t - f i l l e d  H a i l s h a m  and 
D e r b y , 52 to those such as Cunliffe-Lister and Neville 
Chamberlain immersed in domestic matters; and the third
50. A. to Hilda Chamberlain, 28 July 1930, AC 5/1/509.
51. Draft resignation letter, June 1931, Salisbury MSS 
S(4) 140/98-102.
52. Derby to Croft, 20 February 1931, Croft MSS, CRFT 
1/10/De8.
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group of supporters of I r w i n ’s line, such as Davidson, 
Amer y and Hoare, to whose small number was added the 
compensating weight of Baldwin himself.
There was also considerable anxiety over Indian 
policy amongst the backbench MPs. This found a forum in 
the p arty’s own India Committee, despite the fact that 
this body was a i m e d  in fact as m u c h  at c o n t a i n i n g  
criticism as expressing it, for its chairman, Wardlaw- 
Milne, was a loyalist who sought to minimise party 
divisions by taking a middle path between Irwinism and the 
D i e h a r d s . 5 3  It was from the latter group that the most 
consistent rebellion came, though the danger could only 
become serious if this group of some forty to fifty MPs 
could swing the party centre to their way of thinking. 
Thus one prominent Diehard, Sir Robert Gower, claimed that 
"in giving expression to [his] views, he was representing 
the Conservative Party as a whole". His concept of 
Conservative policy was simple and clear: "It was the
duty of this country to rule India with justice and 
firmness", in the light of which Irwin’s negotiations with 
Gandhi were "an act of degeneracy on the part of the 
British race" which "would mean b l o o d s h e d " . 5 ^  The logic 
of the Diehard mind was more fully expressed by another 
MP, Admiral Beamish:
53. Wardlaw-Milne to Baldwin, 5 February 1931, Baldwin 
MSS, volume 104. ff. 179-182.
54. G o w e r ’s speech at Gillingham CA, AGM, March 1931, 
Gower MSS.
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I confess to an innate and strong feeling of racial 
difference and superiority in hearing and dealing 
with these people .... India left to itself would 
certainly dissolve into anarchy, bloodshed, and 
degradation, with its infinitely more varied races 
and religions. The Indian question to me resolves 
itself thus: We conquered it, we ruled and developed
it, and made w e a l t h  out of it and for it. We 
in t r o d u c e d  peace, c o n t e n t m e n t ,  progress, and, 
perhaps, some bad influences. On the whole our rule 
has been great and bénéficiant .... We have a right 
and duty to remain and to rule wisely and firmly. 
Let us do so, come what may. If only we had some 
great leader!
55
Parallel with the Diehard opposition, though not 
identical with it, were the fears expressed by many 
figures connected with the Indian services, many of whom, 
former Indian civil servants and array or police officers 
now retired and returned to England, formed the backbone 
of local Conservatism in the outer suburbs of London, the 
southern rural counties, and the prosperous seaside resort 
towns. The most prominent figures of this type, the 
former governors of the Indian provinces, provided a 
detailed experienced critique upon which was based the 
Conservative counterattack. Of all these, the most 
important figure was George Lloyd, former governor of
55. Notes on a meeting between Gandhi and a group of 
MPs, 23 September 1931» Beamish MSS, 3/3.
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Bengal, and already a Diehard martyr after his recall from 
the High C o m m i s s i o n e r s h i p  in Egypt by the Labour 
government in the summer of 1929. Lloyd was not a Diehard 
as such, and accepted that "one must face realities". His 
concern centred on the crucial question of safeguards: 
"My one fear is lest a n y t h i n g  should be done w h i c h  
should further weaken the central authority or anything 
w h ich should u n d e r m i n e  the posi t i o n  of the great 
s e r v i c e s " , 5^ Irwin’s declaration seemed to him to imperil 
this crucial need for security, and Lloyd thus began a 
forceful campaign, though under the umbrella of the party, 
to build up the forces of resistance. The result, as 
Dawson noted, was "a real cleavage in the Conservative 
Party on the subject of India" by March 1931.^?
This cleavage was supported by influential groups 
among the right-of-centre national press,and in certain 
areas of the party grassroots. Rothermere’s Daily M a i.1. 
was soon giving overt priority to the India issue over 
Empire free trade as "far more vital to the British 
Empire", and the Daily M£i^ had some influence amongst 
C o n s e r v a t i v e  voters in the home c o u n t i e s . 58 More 
seriously, both the Daily Telegraph, and even more 
strongly, the Morning Post, wavered towards the Diehard
56. Lloyd to Irwin, 31 July 1929, Halifax MSS, India 
Office, Eur. C. 152/28/8.
57. Dawson to Irwin, 13 March 1931, Dawson MSS.
58. Rotherraere to B e a v e r b r o o k ,  14 J a n uary 1931, 
Beaverbrook MSS, C285.
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stance; only The Ti^me^ could be said to be remotely 
enthusiastic for B a l d w i n ’s line. Equally anxious and 
equally hostile were the two great regional interest 
groups most economically identified with the Conservative 
party: the industrial textile interests of Lancashire,
and the financial concerns of the City. As a result,
the Conservative feeling has been hardening against 
Mr. B[aldwin] on the subject of India: Lancashire
and London have both helped to influence that feeling 
for commercial reasons.
59
L a n c a s h i r e  and the South East were key re g i o n s  of 
Conservative support, and the Diehard strategy was focused 
upon capturing these regions, as the means of stampeding 
the parliamentary p a r t y . ^0 In no sector of the party did 
the India rebels amount to a majority, nor yet were the 
issues clear upon which such divides might be taken one 
way or the other by the crucial silent majority in local 
associations and on the backbenches - the uncommitted 
moderates. Yet, taken as a whole, the India revolt 
consisted of a powerful combination of forces: amongst
the front benches, the senior backbench MPs, the old 
India hands, the Conservative press, the constituency
59. Hailey to Irwin, 6 March 1931» Halifax MSS, India 
Office, Eur. C. 152/19/1/253» Manchester CA, Res., NU 
Exec, 12 May 1931.
60. Conway Diary, 20 May 1931; Stuart to Cotton Spinners 
and Manufacturers Association, 7 May 1931, IES MSS 
Eng. Hist. C.609, f. 20.
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grassroots, and in the South East and North West more 
s p e c i f i c a l l y .  It w a s  a p o t e n t i a l l y  f o r m i d a b l e  
combination, but it remained to be seen if the India 
dissidents could overcome their loyalties and their 
differences to resist successfully the bipartisan line, 
and to succeed both in retaining their own conviction as 
well as convincing others that of the crises facing the 
nation, the imperial dimension took precedence over the 
domestic dimension. 
* * * * * * * * * *
The alarms over the Irwin declaration had subsided by 
May 1930 into a period of calm before the expected storms 
of the publication of the Simon Commission report, and the 
convening of the Round Table conference. In May Hoare 
noted of the party’s India Committee, "I do not find the 
members, although most of them are Diehards, are in a 
state of panic ... [but] they are most of them extremely 
suspicious of the Round Table C o n f e r e n c e . "^1 in this 
a t m o s p h e r e  the S i m o n  Report was looked upon as the 
p o t e n t i a l  f o u n d a t i o n  for a r e a s o n e d  c o n s e r v a t i v e  
resistance to dominion status. The report appeared at the 
end of June 1930 and at first appeared to fulfil this 
function; in fact, however, the acceptance of the report 
by Diehard opinion transformed it from a maximum forward 
position, into a minimal one. Instead of focusing the 
energies of resistance against the considerable advances
61. Hoare to Irwin, 17 May 1 930, Halifax MSS, India
Office, Eur. C. 152/19/1/61.
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advocated by the Commissioners, the right-wing seized 
gratefully on the fact that it stopped well short of 
Irwin’s declaration, and thus swallowed it w h o l e . ^2 This 
unconscious advance was to leave the Diehards in a poor 
t a c t i c a l  p o s i t i o n  when the Round Table c o n f e r e n c e  
convened. This weak position was further exacerbated by 
the involvement of a Conservative party delegation in the 
conference itself. This was originally conceived as being 
desirable by that section of the party uneasy or hostile 
over the sudden q u i c k e n i n g  of the pace, as being a 
potential brake on the progress of the conference and upon 
the government’s policy. Party feeling expressed through 
the backbench India Committee was "overwhelmingly in 
favour of our insisting upon an inter-party membership of 
the Conference". Otherwise, if "our people think that 
they will not be able to exercise a restraining influence 
with the Conference, they will certainly push matters 
further". Fears of exclusion had put the party into a 
mood of "nervous suspicion".^3
The inevitable result of such an involvement, given 
the careful composition of the Conservative delegation, 
which, while reflecting the range of opinion in the party 
excluded any out-and-out Diehard, and was dominated by 
Hoare, was to identify and involve the Conservative party
62. Orraesby-Gore to Irwin, 3 July 1930; Lane-Fox to 
Irwin, 25 June 1930, ibid., 91a, 87; Unionist India 
Committee, Res., The Times, 15 July 1930.
63. Hoare to Irwin, 15 July 1930, Halifax MSS, India 
Office, Eur. C. 152/19/1/100.
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in the d e c i s i o n s  and c o m p r o m i s e s  a r r ived at by the 
conference, and thus effectively curtailed its freedom to 
adopt any position of outright dissent. Hoare, although 
representative of ’the left of centre’, conducted himself 
deliberately in such a way as to contain the anxieties of 
the Diehards for as long and as far as p o s s i b l e . The 
policy Hoare backed to ensure that this latter aim need 
not be incompatible with support for Irwin, was a scheme 
of federalism, which would give responsible government in 
the Indian provinces, but not - and here was an essential 
difference from the Gladstonian Irish Home Rule precedent 
- at the centre, where the Viceroy would retain the all- 
important safeguards over ’impe r i a l ’ m a t t e r s , ^5 The 
merits of this cautious forward policy became apparent 
soon after the conference discussions began on 17 November 
1930. The decision of the most naturally conservative 
native element, the Indian princely states, to favour a 
federal c o n s t i t u t i o n  for all India, p r o d u c e d  a new 
solution, in which the Conservative party was already 
implicated. However, by knocking away one of the main 
props of the Diehard case, this rapid progress not only 
weakened their position, but also seriously alarmed them 
into feeling that specific and open resistance was now 
imperative on the part of British Conservatism due to the
64. Baldwin to Salisbury, 2 August 1930, Salisbury MSS, 
S(4) 198/29.
65. J. A. Cross, Sir Samuel Hoare (1977), pp. 132-133.
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collapse, or in their fears the sinister undermining, of 
Indian c o n s e r v a t i s m .  It was for this reason that 
dissension in the party was at the same time reduced in 
extent by the conference, and yet amongst the Diehards
increased in intensity to the point of becoming an open
rift, and the outbreak of the India revolt was a direct
result of the success of the bipartisan policy at the
Round Table conference.
Expressions of anxiety, though all far short of any 
party revolt, had been appearing throughout the second 
half of 1930, In July Lord Lloyd made his first public 
speech against the o f f i c i a l  p o l i c y , and not long 
afterwards a pressure group, the Indian Empire Society, 
was set up to co-ordinate the campaign, with former Indian 
governors prominent on its steering committee, and with 
Sir Louis Stuart as s e c r e t a r y . Churchill converged with 
this movement during the late summer, giving a critical 
speech on India on 20 August - symbolically delivered at 
Carson's home in Thanet. Churchill's reluctance to come 
to an open break was eroded by his increasing conviction 
that India was being a b a n d o n e d  due to w e a k n e s s  and 
appeasement, and by his increasing uncomfortableness with 
the moves forward on tariff policy in October. On the 
same day, 14 October, that Churchill almost resigned from 
the s h a d o w  c a b i n e t  on the tariff question, he also
66. The Times, 10 July 1930.
67. Indian Empire Society Meetings, The Times, 3 July, 5 
July, 1930.
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formally joined the Indian Empire Society. The pace of 
events at the Round Table c o n f e r e n c e  forced on the 
campaign against further devolution. Thus on 12 December 
1930 Churchill was the principal speaker at the first 
public meeting organised by the Indian Empire Society, 
where he set the keynote of their campaign by ascribing 
the present difficulties to a loss of British will to 
rule, thus leaving his audience to draw the conclusion 
that the r e m e d y  lay as much in a s s e r t i v e n e s s  at 
Westminster as in New D e l h i . ^8 By the closing of the 
first stage of the c o n f e r e n c e  on 19 January 1931, 
Churchill had established his credentials as the leading 
critic of Irwinism.^9
The following period was regarded on all sides as 
being of crucial importance. Whilst the conference was in 
suspense for consultation of opinion in India and the 
examination of the proposals produced thus far, and before 
its undetermined reconvening, the opponents of devolution 
sought to swing the British parliament to their approach, 
and thus block further progress. The first stage of this 
effort came in the House of C o m m o n s  debate on the 
conference held on 26 January 1931. Churchill opened with 
a vigorous and very successful speech, which for the first 
time attracted the approval of many doubtful backbenchers
68. Churchill's s p e e c h e s  at W a l t h a m  Abbey, Thanet, 
Woodford, and Indian Empire Society meeting at Cannon 
St. Hotel, London; reported in The Times, 14 July, 21 
August, 7 November, 12 December 1930.
69. Churchill, press statement, T h£ e_s, 21 January
1931.
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for a position which was essentially "an indictment of all 
advance in India".?® But it was Baldwin's response, even 
more than Churchill's speech, that provoked anxiety in the 
party over India. Baldwin abandoned the moderate and 
cautious line in which Hoare had been assiduously coaching 
him, and spoke instead on the spur of the moment, casting 
aside his notes and "following his own line of thought". 
In repudiating Churchill's views and in distancing himself 
from them, Baldwin veered dangerously to the left, and his 
speech, though "vigorously cheered by the Socialists", was 
met with "an ominous silence" from the Conservative 
benches.?  ^ The i m m e d i a t e  result of the debate was 
Churchill's withdrawal on 27 January from the shadow 
cabinet over Baldwin's India position - a resignation 
which began his long spell in the political wilderness 
during the 1 930's. The month of February 19 31 thus saw 
the party, whilst faced with the press lords' campaigns in 
the by- elections, seriously anxious over its India 
policy.?2
By coincidence, these problems were resolved at the 
same period, during March 1931. The worst low point on 
India came during the period of the East Islington by-
70. House of Commons, Debates, fifth series, volume 247, 
cols. 689-703, 744-748, 26 January 1931; Lane-Fox to 
Irwin, 28 January 1931, Halifax MSS, India Office, 
Eur. C. 152/19/1/221.
71. Ibid.; A. Chamberlain to Ivy Chamberlain, 2 February 
1931, AC 6/1/785.
72. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 4 February 1931, Beaverbrook 
MSS C155.
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election fight, when on 9 February Baldwin capped the 
damage done in the previous debate with a confused and 
unconvincing address to the party's India Committee. One 
MP present categorised it as "the poorest speech you could 
imagine; no one could say after the speech what the Party 
stood for in Indian a f f a i r s ",?3 The traumas of February 
were principally caused, however, by the decision of Irwin 
in India to release Gandhi from detention and to negotiate 
with him - an action which crystallised the nascent fears 
of British degeneracy. Baldwin himself acknowledged that 
these talks had put "the whole of my party ... in a state 
of great anxiety".?^ This reve a l e d  itself in the 
momentary crumbling of support for Irwin in the National 
Union. Churchill, significantly for the first time ever, 
attended the meeting of the Central Council fixed for 24 
February, and was favourably received by the delegates 
there. He seconded an Emergency Resolution carried 
u n a n i m o u s l y  by the Central Council - but it was a 
resolution of much apparent bark and little practical 
bite, aimed clearly at the Socialists, and thus accepted 
as non-divisive by the meeting. It declared "that the 
crisis in India is paramount in importance and this 
Council calls upon the Unionist Party to make a strong
73. Ibid., 9 February 1931.
74, Baldwin to MacDonald, copy, 2 March 1931, Baldwin 
MSS, volume 104, f. 216; Unionist India Committee, 
The Times, 17 February 1931.
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stand upon law and o r d e r " .?5 This resolution was to prove 
the high water mark of Churchillian influence in the 
p arty’s representative institutions, for never again 
during the ensuing five years’ campaign over India did the 
Diehards succeed in identifying themselves with the 
majority. They were subsequently always resisted and 
defeated, even if only by narrow margins.
In the spring of 1931 the danger was, however, more 
apparent than real. The tensions were not caused by 
ap p r o v a l  of Churchill, but by the r e a c t i o n  ag a i n s t  
B a l d w i n ’s line in the debate of 26 January. In fact, the 
party had not veered to the right, but had retained the 
central position which Baldwin himself seemed to have 
abandoned, Gwynne calculated "that 85% of the party is in 
favour of the Indian policy enunciated by Hoare".?® Thus 
to ease the position all that was required was for Baldwin 
to eradicate this unfortunate impression, and for Irwin’s 
tactics to produce some concrete success. When these 
needs were met, opposition melted away amongst the party 
centre during and after March 1931. B a l d w i n ’s meeting 
with the India Committee on 9 February had marked the 
painful beginnings of this process of reassurance, for 
then he had declared that the party was not committed to 
any specific plans, and endorsed the approach identified 
with Hoare. Support for Irwin became a more tenable
75. NU Council, 2 4 February 1931; The Times, 25 February 
1931.
76. Gwynne to Baldwin, 1 February 1931, Gwynne MSS.
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position with the news received on 4 March that his talks 
with Gandhi had proved successful, and further reassurance 
was offered by Baldwin in a public speech at Newton Abbot 
two days later.?? Before turning to India in this speech, 
Baldwin dealt with the topic of 'economy' in government 
spending, and with tariffs, in such a way as to align 
himself fully with rank and file opinion on these matters. 
The trilogy of themes was completed by India, on which 
Baldwin offered both negative and positive reassurances. 
N e g a t i v e l y  he p r o m i s e d  that he had no i n t e n t i o n  of 
supporting a policy of scuttle, assured his audience that 
the Simon Report, far from being ignored, had been the 
basis of every discussion at the Round Table conference, 
and pointed out that as no detailed constitutional plan 
for India had been proposed, it was impossible to come to 
any verdict upon the matter for or against, and that 
therefore the party was uncommitted in any direction. 
This he then s t i f f e n e d  by posi t i v e  r e a s s u r a n c e  for 
Conservatives. The rights of British traders with India 
would be safeguarded, and law and order in that country 
upheld. A contentious issue was the claim of the Indian 
nationalists for an enquiry into the conduct of the Indian 
police: a demand which, if conceded, not only would
outrage Conservative opinion, but which would also raise' 
grave fears for the morale of the police service. This
77. The Times, 7 March 1931.
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was a mark of the anxiety over the Irwin-Gandhi talks,?® 
for it was feared that the Viceroy would concede the 
enquiry. One of the elements in Baldwin’s reassertion of 
his Conservatism-without-reaction at Newton Abbot was his 
firm repudiation of any such enquiry, whilst he welcomed 
the talks t h e m s e l v e s  as the first fruit of the c o ­
operation of moderate men over India. At the close of his 
speech Baldwin demanded rhetorically:
Have I said enough to dissipate for once and for all 
the groundless charges that are being made against me 
on the subject of India?
He had, and the success of his strategy could be gauged 
from the fact that, without retreating from the spirit of 
his January declaration, Baldwin was able to present his 
position in such a manner as to find approval even from 
the Executive of the Indian Empire Society.?9
The third event was perhaps the most crucial: the
House of Commons debate on 12 March. Debating skill on 
the floor of the House was the f o u n d a t i o n  of any 
politician's political success, and counted almost for 
everything in the assessment of reputation or the struggle 
for promotion. Thus Churchill's success in January had 
"set everyone talking about him and raised his prestige to
78. Unionist India Committee, Th^ 17 February 
1931.
79. lES Exec., Greenway to Baldwin, 9 March 1931, Baldwin 
MSS, volume 104, ff. 230-232.
356
a higher level*',®® while Baldwin's ineffectiveness was a 
telling factor in the party crisis of February-March 1931.
The debate of 12 March decisively reversed this position, 
for it was Baldwin who produced an oratorial triumph, 
e l e v a t i n g  the d i s c u s s i o n  to a m oral level yet also 
providing a rare exhibition of knock-about debating skill.
The target for this was Churchill, who, much discomfited 
by Baldwin's quotation from his pro-devolution speeches of 
1920, in his turn produced a poor speech, and "fell very 
flat and frankly at the end was boring the House".® ^ 
Churchill persistently overstated his case, presenting his 
opponents' approach as being immediately, rather than in 
eventual implication, a policy of pure scuttle, and thus 
gave Baldwin the tactical room to manoeuvre in which he 
could both repudiate Churchill and yet at the same time 
strike a sufficiently Conservative note to carry the bulk 
of his party with him. This was the crucial difference 
between the debate of 26 January on the one hand, and the 
Newton Abbot speech and the debate of 12 March on the 
other. In the former, Churchill's successful speech had
left Baldwin isolated on the left of his party, sounding a
I
note which left most Conservatives unmoved. Now the 1Iposition was reversed, and it was Churchill who was left jI
80. N. to Hilda C h a m b e r l a i n ,  31 January 1931, N C j
18/1/724. j
81, Lane-Fox to Irwin, 12 March 1931, Halifax MSS, India I
Office, Eur. C. 15 2/19/1/266; Dawson to Irwin, 13 }
March 1931; T^e^ * 1 3 March 1931; House of j
Commons, Debates, fifth series, volume 249, cols. '
1417-1468, 12 March 1931. i
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isolated on the right - an isolation from which he was 
unable to escape.
The s t r a t e g y  of the India d i s s i d e n t s  in the 
Conservative party concentrated on resistance to further 
progress during the life of the Labour government, for 
that was the period during which they feared that the 
pass might be sold. Their unquestioned belief in the 
return of a Conservative government in the next election - 
a victory along the lines of 1924 being anticipated - was 
supported by the incorrect assumption that a Conservative 
majority in the House would be by definition extremely 
cautious on the question of India, and would emphasise the 
matter of safeguards more and the proposal of dominion 
status less, than the prevailing bipartisan approach.®^ 
In this they were to some extent correct, for the line 
that was followed from 1931 onwards bore the appearance of 
the moderate policy of Hoare in the letter, but in the 
spirit they were fatally mistaken. The error was the 
product of having underestimated, despite the speech of 12 
March 1931, the genuine commitment of the party leader to 
the policy he was following, as a result of confusing it 
with his temporary need to keep in harmony with the 
Liberal and Labour attitudes in order to preserve British 
p o l i t i c a l  unity. This was m a t c h e d  by two further 
underestimations; the first was the extent to which 
Baldwin could carry the centre of the party with him; and
82. Churchill at Thanet, The Times, 21 August 1930; at
Cannon St, Hotel, The Times, 12 December 1930.
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the second was the considerable augmentation of the left 
and centre of the party proportionately at the expense of 
the right wing in the composition of the parliamentary 
party after the recovery of the marginal seats lost in 
1929 that would be an essential element of any future 
electoral victory.
The period from the Irwin declaration in November 
1929 to the end of the first Round Table conference in 
January 1931 formed the prelude to the India revolt 
w i t h i n  the C o n s e r v a t i v e  party. The q u e s t i o n  was 
considered acute by the dissidents from the end of the 
conference on 19 January until the moment of its unfixed 
future reconvening. It was in this gap that the rebels 
sought to mobilise their forces. The Diehard manifesto 
and strategy were set out clearly in Churchill's press 
release on the day after the conference's adjournment:
It is not yet too late .... The key to Indian 
government is still in our hands .... Matters cannot 
stop w here they are. In a few m o n t h s  fresh 
conferences and negotiations will begin. It is the 
duty of those who care for the endurance of the 
British Empire and who believe that that supreme fact 
is intimately connected with our ability to discharge 
our mission in India, to rouse and organise public 
opinion in the short breathing space now accorded us.
83
83. Churchill, press release. The Times, 21 January 1931
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Thus the critical period for the united front on India was 
from the end of January 1931 onwards. After the setback 
of the debate of 12 March, the dissidents continued the 
struggle despite the odds against them, for they were 
convinced that they could strike a chord in the very heart 
of Conservatism. At the Albert Hall on 18 March Churchill 
redefined their aims:
they had against them at the moment the official 
machinery of all three great parties in the state. 
Their fight would be a hard one, but, win or lose, 
they must do their duty. ... [The conference would 
reconvene, but] by that time we shall be ready too. 
We shall not be taken by surprise, as we were at the 
[first] Round Table conference. We have behind us 
the growing strength of Conservative opinion. We 
have the sure prospect at no great distance of a 
Conservative victory, and by the time Mr. Gandhi has 
arrived here to receive the surrender of the Indian 
Empire the Conservative Party will not be so ready to 
have its name taken in vain.
84
In fact, however, their campaign failed to make an impact 
during these decisive months.
The reasons for this were partly structural. The 
position of the rebels was weak in a number of crucial 
areas, the first of which was in the matter of leadership. 
The Diehards themselves by their very nature tended to be 
a collection of long-serving but largely inarticulate 
backbenchers, of no ministerial experience and with little 
debating skill or platform oratory; hence their need to 
look outside their own immediate ranks for sympathetic 
leadership from more prominent figures in the party -
84. The Times, 19 March 1931.
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leaders and allies such as they had found in 1921-22, but 
were not to find in 1931-35. Churchill was not, at least 
for some time, an acceptable leader. His past political 
record, his suspected vaunting ambition, and his previous 
involvement with both Irish and Indian devolution rendered 
him a highly suspect figure to much of the Conservative 
party, with whom "he does not carry conviction ... he has 
d i s c l o s e d  too m a n y  s h i f t i n g  phases to expect to be 
r e g a r d e d  as i m m o v a b l e  now",®® Howe v e r ,  the other 
potential leaders for the Diehard stance on India were all 
ultimately unwilling to head a revolt against the leader. 
Hailsham and Austen Chamberlain swallowed their doubts by 
attempting to wield more influence within the party elite 
than without, whilst Salisbury, who resigned from the 
leadership of the Lords mainly over India, allowed his 
departure to cause no ripples on grounds of party and 
personal loyalty. The Diehards were thus left largely 
leaderless, and proved unable either to appeal to the 
party centre - which tended to see the rebels, rather than 
the leader, as the cause of faction - or even to unite 
with other sections of Conservatism in revolt against 
Baldwin. The India rebels and the Crusaders did not co­
ordinate their strategies, and indeed Beaverbrook was at 
best ambivalent towards Churchill's views on India, whilst 
actively resentful of the way in which Rothermere kicked 
over the traces and ran India as the principal issue at
85. Beaverbrook to Borden, 7 January 1931# Beaverbrook 
MSS,
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St. George's, Tariff reformers in general did not find 
the free trader Churchill a likely comrade-in-arms. The 
two campaigns were also out of synchronisation. The 
protectionist battle reached a high point of seriousness 
for Baldwin between June and October 1930 and was largely 
appeased by the concessions made in the later month. 
India, on the other hand, had flared up briefly as an 
issue in November 1929, was then relatively quiescent 
until December 1930 and only became a serious matter 
after the closing of the Conference on 19 January. It was 
true that this last stage coincided with Beaverbrook's 
forays at East Islington in February, and the loss of 
morale in the leadership of early March 1931; but, as has 
been demonstrated in Chapter 5, these challenges lacked 
the support of the grassroots, and were the self-defeating 
rampages of a political rogue elephant.
Thus the India Diehards were left to campaign alone, 
and, taking their political cue from the Daily M ail, made 
a series of tactical blunders throughout their rebellion. 
Even at the nadir of his Indian policy in February 1931, 
Baldwin's position had considerable latent strengths, the 
most important of which was the prestige and power of his 
position as party leader, and the appeal for trust and for 
loyalty which he could exploit. He could count on the 
hesitant support of the party centre, whom Churchill noted 
"are all afraid of being labelled disloyal",®® and the
86. Churchill to Rothermere, 3 February 1931, Churchill 
MSS 2/180, Gilbert, op. cit., p. 259.
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positive and vocal support of another group, not all 
associated with the left of the party, who went some way 
to ba l a n c e  the Diehards, P r o m i n e n t  a m o n g s t  these 
supporters were Amery, Geoffrey Dawson (the editor of The 
Times), Oliver Stanley, a rising young figure and one of 
the four delegates to the Round Table sessions, the 
Astors, a number of backbenchers such as Spender-Clay, 
Davidson, and Lane-Fox, and - rather more cautiously - 
Hoare.®?
Most significant of all, however, was the fact that 
the party grassroots, with the rarest of exceptions, was 
not yet disturbed over India. The low level of rank and 
file concern in the local Associations was in marked 
contrast to the energy expended on the question of empire 
free trade. Only one resolution critical of party policy 
was forwarded to the National Union, from the Mid- 
B e d f o r d s h i r e  A s s o c i a t i o n ;  two others more or less 
enthusiastically supported B a l d w i n ’s Newton Abbot line 
and a f f i r m e d  the n e c e s s i t y  of s e c u r i n g  adequ a t e  
safeguards.®® Amongst the sample of the surviving local 
Association minute books the quiescence over India is even 
more noticeable - as are the finer shades of opinion. The 
ar e a  of c o n c e r n  w a s  l i m i t e d  to the m a t t e r  of 
constitutional safeguards, and felt more acutely in
87. Baldwin to Gwynne, 3 February 1931, Gwynne MSS
/15 ; Lady Astor to Subbarayan, 9 April 1931, Astor
MSS 1416/1/1/1011.
88. Mid-Beds. CA, Res.; Manchester CA, Res.; Sussex Prov.
Div. Res., NU Exec., 12 May 1931.
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Lancashire due to the domestic difficulties of the cotton 
trade, from possible future Indian protectionism.®^ In 
two Associations Diehard opinion over India was given 
e x p r e s s i o n  to,but ex p o s e d  as a m i n o r i t y  v i e w p o i n t ,  
although both were strongly Conservative safe southern 
constituencies: at Chichester a Diehard resolution was 
voted down by forty-two votes to twenty in the Association 
E x e c u t i v e  in favour of a r e s o l u t i o n  s u p p o r t i n g  the 
Irwinite policy, and at Wells a hostile resolution on 
India could not find a seconder.^0 Elsewhere the topic 
was either simply not discussed at all, or the comments 
were pro-Baldwin and aroused no opposition. The state of 
party opinion over India in the aftermath of the events of 
March 1931 could be summed up by the balance of forcesi
exposed at Chichester and Wells, and the comments of the 
local MP at the Reigate Association annual gathering:
it was not possible today to hold India by force, but 
only through comradeship. He had the greatest of 
faith in Lord Irwin, who, he reminded them, was 
appointed by a Conservative Government. ,
91
or those echoed at Rushcliffe, that India "would never be
brought into the cauldron of party politics".9^ This was
89. Clitheroe CA , Exec., 15 April 1931; NO Council, 30
June 1931.
90. Chichester CA, Exec., 13 April 1931; Wells CA, Exec.,
17 March 1931.
91. Reigate CA, AGM, 18 Mdrch 1931.
92. Rushcliffe CA. AGM, 14 March 1931.
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reflected at the meeting of the parliamentary India 
Committee after the Commons debate of 12 March, where of 
the one hundred MPs present, only five irreconcilable 
Diehards voted against a resolution approving Baldwin's 
line.93
Despite the considerable unease after his speech in 
the debate of 26 January 1931» Baldwin's and Irwin's 
p o l i c y  held the line. One reason for this was the 
fact that the discussion during 1929-3 1» though it in 
reality settled firmly a number of crucial principles on 
party policy over India, nonetheless was not concerned 
with any specific legislation. The Diehards had nothing 
of detail or substance to chip away at; no bill was before 
p a r l i a m e n t ,  and pol i c y  still a p p e a r e d  to be as yet 
unformed, and thus the question not yet at the forefront 
of politics for many people. In fact the tone and cast of 
the debate had enormous implications for the future, for 
debate had become quantitative over the s a f e g u a r d s 9 %  
rather than a question a yea or nay on the principle at 
issue - and from this advance there could be no retreat, 
if only because of the importance attached to honouring 
Britain's word and pledges. The positive supports for the 
Baldwin/Irwin line should not be underestimated. Over and 
above the appeal of keeping India out of party politics, 
was the fact that the princes themselves had opted for 
federalism, making that policy both more attractive and 
93* Unionist India Committee, The Times, 17 March 1931.
94. Letter from lES, The Times, 7 January 1931.
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more respectable.95 Support for Irwin himself was a far 
from negligible factor. This was partly due to his 
personal standing and character,96 and even more to the 
general Conservative tendency to accept without question 
the wisdom of the man on the spot: "99 times out of 100
he is right".97 This factor was further reinforced by the 
support for Irwin's policy expressed by the currently 
serving governors of the Indian provinces, many of whom 
such as George Stanley, Goschen, Sykes and Jackson, had 
been prominent in the middle ranks of the parliamentary 
party before accepting positions in India. Above all, by 
placing the emphasis at Newton Abbot on 6 March on the 
necessity for safeguards, Baldwin first aligned himself 
with majority sentiment in his party, and then swept it 
forward with his oration in the Commons on 12 March. The 
two pronouncements together - not either one singly - are 
the true expression of Conservative policy over India in 
the early 1930's, balancing safeguards with the spirit of 
the Round Table conference, and acknowledging "that the 
Empire, if it is anything, is a living organism ... in a 
constant process of evolution."98
Not only did these structural themes and forces 
militate against the success of the Diehard revolt over
95. Bayford Diary, 22 March 1931.
96. Headlara Diary, 10 May 1930.
97. Stonehaven to Irwin, 17 March 1931. Halifax MSS,
India Office, Eur. C. 1522/19/1/271.
98. Baldwin, House of Commons Debates, fifth series,
volume 249, col. 1418, 12 March 1931.
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India, for political factors also undermined their efforts 
to maintain the primacy of the imperial dimension in the 
rhetoric of concern over national decline. , Distractions 
from the question of India abounded, and! due to the 
relative calm in that country after the Irwin-Gandhi pact, 
it slipped from the forefront of the public mind. The 
first d i s t r a c t i o n  from the Diehards' caimpaign was, 
ironically, the party's differences with the press lords 
in February and March 1931. and this was compounded by the 
fact that in the p r o c e s s  of r e s i s t i n g  the loss of 
confidence in his leadership Baldwin reasserted himself 
with "one of the greatest efforts of his parliamentary 
career" in the Commons debate of 12 March.99 This served 
the dual function of triumphing over both the challenges 
against him; over the despair of his colleagues by the 
success of the speech, and over the India dissidents by 
both oratory and content. Paradoxically, the restoration 
of order in Conservative politics in April 1931 did not 
provide any opportunity for the India agitation to take 
the centre of the stage. For the emphasis now was placed 
fairly and s q u a r e l y  on the need to get the Labour 
government out for reasons of domestic policy - and the 
cry for 'economy' held the ring from April to August 
1931.^^*^ Not only did this concern push both the tariff 
question (though the latter was now accepted party policy)
99. The Times, 13 March 1931; see Chapter 5.
100. It was placed first by Baldwin at Newton Abbot, for 
example; The Times, 7 March 1931.
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and the India question into the background, it also 
militated against any toleration of further intra-party 
faction. To some extent the long struggle over tariffs 
and the Empire Crusade had worn down party patience, but 
of more significance was the accepted priority of the need 
to restore 'sound' budgetary and taxation policy; thus the 
forces for sound g o v e r n m e n t  at home were not to be 
weakened by disputes of degree over sound government for 
India, or disagreements over the details of agricultural 
policy. These latter were all seen, in the last resort, 
as sectional interests, whilst the economy question was a 
national peril. The shock waves of the East Islington 
result had as many implications for dissidence over India 
as over protection or leadership.
The national 'peril' perceived in the spring and 
summer of 1931 produced logically the realignment of 
August 1931. By the end of that process, after the 
general election of October 1931 the pattern of policy 
over India was set. The rebels had m i s s e d  their 
opportunity to mould party policy against the spirit of 
the Round Table conference whilst it was still in a 
malleable form. All that was left to them now, isolated 
against the massed ranks of the new MPs of the National 
Government, was to turn to the last weapon in their 
locker. This unpromising last resort was to campaign from 
1931 to 1935 to attempt to capture the party grassroots 
via the National Union, turning it into the engine that 
would force the Conservative MPs to break with their
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leader's p o l i c y . ^^1 This was a herculean task indeed, 
swimming against the tide of ingrained party loyalties and 
traditions, and requiring ultimately that the normally 
deferential National Union adopt a role which it had never 
before achieved. As the experience of Beaverbrook's 
s i m i l a r  c a m p a i g n  of 1929-31 to ca p t u r e  the local 
Associations demonstrated, such a project was difficult 
enough in times when the party was defeated and restless 
under ineffective leadership. Against a party in office, 
successful beyond precedent at the polls, and without the 
demoralisation that results from weak leadership, it was 
to prove impossible. The large though minority votes 
achieved by the Diehards in the National Union Council and 
c o n f e r e n c e s  of 1 9 3 3-1935 should not o b s c u r e  these 
realities. There would always be, as there was even at 
the end of the parliament of 1929-31, a substantial and 
vocal e l e m e n t  of Diehardisra in the safer s o uthern 
s e a t s . 102 But it was always a minority, and even when 
Lancashire grew cautious over Indian trade, the fact 
remained that it was beyond the power of the rebels to 
obtain a majority in the party, contrary to the appeals of 
the leader. It was quite clear that, given the domestic 
peril, the party in the final analysis would not smash up 
the National Government over India,
101. Knox to Sydenham, 24 June 1931, I ES MSS, Eng. Hist. 
C. 620. f. 59.
102. Report of Irwin's meeting with the Unionist India 
Committee, in Hannon to Beaverbrook, 23 June 1931, 
Hannon MSS 18/3.
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In this sense it is valid to argue that the failure 
of the right wing to defeat Baldwin over India in the 
spring of 1931 was the decisive moment in the settlement 
of the future of India so far as British politics were 
concerned. Baldwin was never again to be in such a 
vulnerable position, and the verdict of March 1931 settled 
the issue against the rebels, despite all their efforts 
during the subsequent four years to appeal to a higher 
court. In settling the matter in this way, the primacy of 
the domestic dimension over the imperial in practice - if 
not in rhetoric - was established. It might logically be 
accepted that the acceptance of this primacy, albeit 
u n c o n s c i o u s l y ,  was the first stage of the g r adual 
accommodation of Conservatism to the eventual position 
under Macmillan thirty years later in which it could 
accept painlessly the dissolution of the old-style empire 
by its transformation into a modern association of self- 
governing units. Churchill and the Diehards were aptly 
categorised as imperialists of Queen Victoria’s first 
jubilee, but as Irwin acknowledged in March, 1931 "that 
conception of Imperialism is finished".103 Of course, 
other factors, principal amongst which was the exhaustion
103. Irwin to Davidson, 31 March 1931, Halifax MSS, India 
Office, Eur. C. 152/19/2/306. Another example of the 
primacy of the domestic dimension was the financial 
r e s t r a i n t s  on East A f rican d e v e l o p m e n t :  N.
Chamberlain to Walker, 15 December 1930, Walker MSS, 
Rhodes House library, AFR. S., 717/4/4, in Dean
thesis, pp. 341-342.
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caused by the second world war, were more Immediate causes 
of decolonisation. But in the search for its roots, the 
choice of political priorities made by the ostensible 
party of empire between November 1929 and March 1931 
must be a crucial landmark.
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CHAPTER 7
National Peril : (ii) The Domestic Dimension
The C o n s e r v a t i v e  party had. t r a d i t i o n a l l y  been 
associated with the landed, or agricultural, interest, a 
relationship perpetuated into the inter-war period. There 
was a close relationship with the National Farmers Union, 
and dependence for the bedrock of electoral support upon 
the rural county divisions. However, the character and 
concerns of the party were changing under the dual impact 
of the decline of the Liberal party and the rise of a 
Socialist party. The influx of business and financial 
interests - a tendency evident well before the first world 
war - was now tipping the balance within the House of 
Commons, and amongst the front bench leaders. The primacy 
of the business mentality had given concern for some time, 
being a particular source of comment during the post-war 
coalition parliament, but in reality neither group then 
had the upper hand. Indeed, they had not previously been 
opposed, for the appeal of a protectionist policy was 
potentially as attractive to agriculture as to industry. 
For both also, the primacy of anti-Socialisra assured not 
only unity, but active support, for the Conservative party 
during the elections of the early 1 920’s, and this went 
some way to e x p lain both the p o l a r i s a t i o n  of anti- 
Socialists behind Baldwin and the consequent decline of 
the Liberal right-of-centre. The period of tranquillity 
provided by Baldwin’s 1924-1929 government, however, had 
significantly reduced these fears and tensions, a process
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in which the defeat of the General Strike in 1926 had 
played a large part. By the general election of 1929 both 
'conservative* i nterest groups had r e asons to feel 
dissatisfied with, or apathetic towards, the Conservative 
party, an apathy which had contributed to its defeat.
Initially, the ru n n i n g  was made by the vocal 
dissatisfaction of the agricultural interest after the 
1929 election.1 Indeed, Beaverbrook’s Empire Crusade 
campaign was as much about domestic agriculture as 
imperial trade. His campaign had begun as an appeal to 
the farmers, and it was from those areas that he initially 
received grassroots support.^ The National Farmers Union 
itself came close to breaking its informal but extensive 
ties to the party in resentment at the absence of a 
suitable agricultural policy, and its alienation did not 
produce far-reaching consequences in the county divisions 
only because of the internal and tactical divisions within 
the Union itself, as it oscillated between affiliation to 
the Crusade and an ostensible ’above party' position. 
However, the frequently voiced suggestion within its 
predominantly conservative ranks to set up a separate 
agricultural party was a clear sign of the seriousness of
1. Eastern Area, Exec., 10 October 1929.
2. Beaverbrook to Elibank, 20 November 1929, Beaverbrook
MSS, C 1 2 6 ; to Chaplin, 26 November 1 929, ibid., B95;
National Farmers Union, Parliamentary Committee, 15 
July 1930, 16 September 1930.
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the loss of faith and confidence in this crucial element,  Iof Conservativism. j
1Whilst keeping one eye on the electoral barometer of 
public opinion, Baldwin moved carefully and cautiously 
during 1930 to appease the agriculturalists. The truce 
with the Crusade in March 1930 removed much of the direct 
pressure, and in the period before that truce collapsed 
Baldwin went some distance to present an agricultural 
programme by his speech of 9 June 1 930 at Gleraham Park.^ 
This policy was d e s i g n e d  to stop short of c o m p l e t e  
agricultural protection with its accompanying dear food 
connotations. The second stage of advance came with the 
policy brought forward in October 1930 which based itself 
not on tariffs, but on the quota system. This latter move
provided the facade on the edifice of a popular
Conservative agricultural policy. It had been the product 
of negotiations throughout the summer months with the NFU, 
conducted by Lord Wolraer, and the crucial point was that 
the quota system was favoured by the NFU leaders,^ The 
final stage in the conciliation of the farmers came in the 
winter of 1931, when their agitation against the ’dumping*
3. National Farmers Union, Parliamentary Committee, 
1929-193 1, passim., especially 17 December 1929, 17 
June 1930, 14 October 1930, 17 February 19 31. It can
hardly be coincidence that such sentiments surfaced
at the same points as the peaks of internal
dissatisfaction within the Conservative party,
4. See chapter 3.
5. For negotiations with the NFU, June 1 9 3 0 - February
1931, see copies in Baldwin MSS, volume 31, ff. 236- 
346; for NFU and quotas, Wolmer to Ball, 2 January 
1931, Selborne MSS, Eng. Hist., c. 998, ff. 3-5.
374
of r u i n o u s l y  cheap s u b s i d i s e d  f o o d s t u f f s  from the 
continent were met by the party’s adoption in that period 
of the now-popular proposal for an ’Emergency T a r i f f  
which would be imposed as soon as it returned to office as 
a holding operation.®
However, this process of appeasement could not hide 
the fact that by the end of 1930 the concerns of the 
agricultural interest were beginning to lose pride of 
place. Calls for further advances - under the code word 
of seeking further ’definition’ of policy - were seen as 
potentially divisive and no longer commanded the same 
degree of rank and file s u p p o r t , 7 By the summer of 1931 
the agricultural issue had been pushed into the background 
by the concerns of industry and finance with other aspects 
of economic affairs - and the concerns of the latter 
groups received priority even where they cut across the 
f o r m e r ’s. Thus Addison’s popular Agricultural Bill was 
s a c r i f i c e d  at the a l t a r  of r e d u c i n g  g o v e r n m e n t  
expenditure.® The shift of concern away from agriculture 
was evident in mid-summer 1931, when not one Conservative 
front bencher bothered to speak during a vote of censure 
debate on agricultural affairs on 20 July, and in all the 
speeches and statements of the new Conservative programme
6. Amery to Beaverbrook, 19 March 1931, Beaverbrook MSS, 
C6.
7. NU Council, 25 November 1930.
8. House of Commons Debates, volume 250, col. 944-951, 
31 March 1931.
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agriculture came in as the last-mentioned aspect, not the 
foremost, during 1931.^
This attitude was a reflection of the maturing 
changes in the composition of the party ^ the p re­
war period with the growing strength of the business 
element. The landed group in 1929 comprised only fifteen 
per cent of the MPs, whilst the business group were more 
than double that size, and, taken together with the 
professional men - mainly lawyers linked more to finance 
and urban life than to land and rural concerns - made up 
more than two-thirds of the parliamentary party. The 
l i n k s  w i t h  the o l d e r  a t m o s p h e r e  of the l a n d e d  
squirearchica 1 party of the 1 ate-Victorian era were 
passing; in 1930 only forty Conservative MPs had sat 
before 1914, and many of those forty represented not the 
old sectors but had been themselves harbingers of the new 
business ethos.1^ This development was further matched by 
the increasing role of business in providing the party 
funds, both locally and nationally.11 That the business 
group did not dominate the party in a more visible sense 
was due to the pre-eminence in the public eye of the 
c a r e e r  p o l i t i c i a n s ,  and to the c o r r e s p o n d i n g
Ibid., v o l u m e  255, col. 1141, 20 July 1931; N.
C h a m b e r l a i n ’s speech in London, Th£ Z i^ m e^_s , 2 7
February 1931, was typical of the low status and 
secondary interest of agriculture.
10. J. M. McEwen, thesis, pp. 304-307.
11. J. A. Ramsden, thesis, pp. 338-347.
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inarticulateness of the business sector, as well as the 
poor reputation of that part of it habitually referred to 
as the ’Forty Thieves’. This had contributed in 1 930 to 
the impression that the business block was being ignored 
and flouted, and that as a result it was thought to be a 
motive force behind the right-wing revolt.1^ In reality 
this was far from the case. Ce r t a i n l y  by the 1929 
election much of the enthusiasm for the Conservative 
government evident in 1924 amongst business circles had 
e v a p o r a t e d .  B a l d w i n  had r e f u s e d  to act as the 
representative of any sectional interest, and Churchill's 
budgets had also not provided the desired reductions in 
expenditure and taxation.1^ The result of this was both a 
mood of disinterest in the City, and the favourable 
reception, even feting, of Labour figures in 1929, when 
MacDonald was presented with the freedom of the City. 
However, the alienation from Conservatism was only 
superficial, and the product of apathy alone; the role of 
the business world during the Crusade campaign was for the 
most part of 1930 one of neutrality. Cunliffe-Owen 
reported the mood of the City in May to be "one of sulks" 
and that "there is not much chance of getting money in the 
City for political funds of any sort or kind".^^ However,
12. Remer to Taylor, copy, 31 October 1930, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 31, ff. 185-187.
13. Swire to Bowyer, 14 August 1931, ibid., volume 117, 
ff. 155-156.
14. C u n l i f f e - O w e n  to B e a v e r b r o o k ,  30 M a y  1930, 
Beaverbrook MSS, Cl 07.
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when this indifference began to evaporate during the 
second half of 1930, business in politics identified with 
the party leadership, quashing dissent and rebellion, in 
order to secure the party as a united force behind the 
banner of its own economic interests.
This return to political involvement was largely the 
product of factors external to Conservative politics. The 
first stage began with the hostility of the coal owners to 
the g o vernment’s Coal Bill of late 1929, although the 
party was always slightly reluctant to be tied to the 
chariot wheels of that particular interest g r o u p . 15 More 
significant were the actions of the Labour administration 
during 1930; the p r o p o s a l  at the e l e c t o r a l  r e f o r m  
conference to remove the business franchise and plural 
voting, and of more immediate consequence, the addition of 
six^pence to the income tax in the 1930 budget and the 
dismantling of the safeguarding duties which .had afforded 
certain industries a limited form of protection from 
overseas competition.1® But, above all, it was as a 
consequence of the economic recession that the business 
world returned with a renewed sense of urgency and concern 
to matters of domestic politics during the winter of 1930 
and the spring of 1931.1^ As a consequence pf the slump
15. C o r r e s p o n d e n c e  with Coal O w n e r s  As s o c i a t i o n ,  
November-December 1929, Steel-Maitland MSS, SRO GD 
193/437/ff. 7-12, 92-98.
16. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 20 April 1939, NC 18/1/692.
17. A. to Hilda Chamberlain, 21 March 1931, AC 5/1/535.
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throughout 1930 there had been a strong and continuously 
growing current of opinion in the direction of abandonment 
of free trade in favour of protection, so that the policy 
was for the first time becoming genuinely a popular asset 
and a rallying cry amongst supporters. The Bankers' 
Manifesto of July 1930 and the Associated Chambers of 
C o m m e r c e  in August 1 9 30 came out for e x t e n s i v e  
safeguarding, whilst in October 1930 the Federation of 
British Industries conducted an internal referendum which 
produced a ninety-six per cent vote for protection - even 
the Trades Union Congress were making favourable noises by 
the winter of 1930.1®
By January 1931 the dominant concern in the business 
sector was not, however, so much with protection, as with 
the belief that the principal cause of the slump and the 
main drag on any recovery of industry was the level of 
taxation and of local government rates. This had been the 
concern of finance and industry for many years, and had 
been the principal inspiration behind the derating policy 
of 1928-1929, but, as the central tenet of financial 
orthodoxy, it inevitably returned to the forefront of the 
political stage with the onset of the economic crisis 
being combined with a Labour government committed on 
principle to a high-level expenditure on the social 
services. These services had even in the most prosperous 
of times been considered in the Conservative frame of mind
18. L. S. Amery, My 1.i.^ i.££jL & ^ f ^ , volume 3 (1955), pp
31-32.
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to be items carried on the luxuries' ledger, and thus the 
first target for reducing the load in times of crisis. 
This attitude determined the decision to oppose, and to 
destroy in the House of Lords, the government's Education 
Bill in the spring of 1931; the bill was above all else, 
"financially r e c k l e s s " . 19 The real problem, however, was 
the Unemployment Fund, for as a result of the slump the 
number of the workforce needing support was overstraining 
the Fund, and was causing the financial community grave 
anxiety over the repeated borrowing for the: Fund beyond 
its means, which produced fears of an unbalanced budget 
and a large deficit by the end of 1931 - in other words, 
in the economic orthodoxy of the day, national bankruptcy.
Faced with this overriding peril, the business sector 
raised the twin standard of reduction of direct taxation, 
and 'economy' in government expenditure, as the only sure 
path to the recovery of business confidence and investment 
- a n d  t h e r e f o r e  e v e n t u a l l y  to the r e d u c t i o n  of 
unemployment and the return of p r o s p e r i t y . ^ O  In this 
protection, especially in the form of the emergency 
tariff on i m p o r t s ,  could play its part, but it was 
significant that for the remedy for massive unemployment - 
the issue admitted by all parties in the inter-war period
19. Memo on Education Bill, Salisbury MSS, S(4) 139/1; 
H a i l s h a m  to B e a v e r b r o o k ,  23 F e b r u a r y  1930, 
Beaverbrook MSS C180. Chamberlain to Hilton Young, 8 
November 1930, Kennet MSS 16/4.
20. Duke of B u c c l e u c h ,  G o v e r n o r  of Royal Bank of 
Scotland, address at Edinburgh, 26 November 1930 - 
Gleanings and Memoranda, January 1931, pp. 19-20.
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%to be the m o s t  s i g n i f i c a n t  social p r o b l e m  - the
Conservative party was perceptibly turning away from its
1923 platform that protection alone would suffice, to a
position by mid-summer 1931 where economy was placed even
above tariffs in the Conservative economic remedy. For
the party was not slow to respond to the mood of the
financial and industrial sectors, and already in September
1930 Neville Chamberlain had come out for the reduction of
direct taxation, whilst as early as February 1930 one City
financier and Conservative candidate had declared that
"the intolerable burden of taxation on Industry must be
removed by ruthless e c o n o m y " . This, the banner of the
City, was to become the foremost item in the Conservative
party programme by the summer of 1931, and came to
dominate Conservative politics.
The campaign for economy had in various guises been
an intermittent theme in Conservative politics for many
years. It had been frequently used by dissidents of the
Diehard wing as an issue upon which to arouse wider
support amongst Conservatives generally - such as during
the A n t i - W a s t e  c a m p a i g n  of 1 9 2 0-1922 - p r e c i s e l y
because the economy cry had an appeal far wider than any
sectional Diehard complaint could engender. For three
reasons the economy campaign was one which the leadership
moved rapidly to take up and make its own: first, as a
21. N. to Ida C h a m b e r l a i n ,  21 S e p t e m b e r  1930, NC 
18/1/742; Hulton to Beaverbrook, 23 February 1930, 
Beaverbrook MSS Cl 80. Memorandum, 'Causes of the 
Slump', prepared for the Conservaticve party by 
Hilton Young, 1931, Kennet MSS 81/1.
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result of their genuine community of interest and of 
economic thought with the circles of finance and industry; 
second, because the economy cry was too dangerously 
popular in the party to be ignored by the leadership; and 
third because, even more than tariffs, the economy issue 
could unite all sections of the party behind a potentially 
popular - in Conservative circles, that is - policy. Many 
of the Conservatives who flirted with the Crusade in the 
early part of 1930 had done so not just because it offered 
a vigorous lead on protection not provided by Baldwin, but 
also because whilst Baldwin had disappointed hopes for 
economy in his previous government, they had hopes, which 
Rothermere himself expressed, of turning Beaverbrook's 
movement into a campaign for other Diehard causes, above 
all for e c o n o m y . T h u s ,  as the anxiety over taxation and 
government expenditure came to the forefront during 1930, 
the party leaders responded with a rapidity and commitment 
which was in revealing contrast totheir attitude towards 
the advocates of protection in the previous year. In the 
press release which had announced the policy advance in 
response to Bennett at the Imperial Conference in October 
1930 it was noticeable that Neville Chamberlain, when 
drafting the leaders's statement "placed economy first, 
then the emergency tariff, then repeated the pledges 
already given to agriculture ... then came to Empire
22. Gisborough to Salisbury, 25 February 1930, Salisbury 
MSS, S(4) 133/ 175.
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T r a d e " . 23 B y  December 1930 Baldwin was echoing the other 
face of economy in his public speeches, declaring at 
Glasgow on 12 December, "It is of the greatest importance
O 2ithat we should be able to reduce taxation".
The main impact of any reductions must come, it was 
clear, in the spending on the social services. This would 
mean not only salary reductions for government employees 
and the c u t t i n g  of ca p i t a l  e x p e n d i t u r e  on b u i l d i n g  
projects, of roads, schools, hospitals, and so on; it 
would above all mean a reduction in both the level of the 
u n e m p l o y m e n t  dole, and of the n u m b e r  of r e c i p i e n t s  
e n t i t l e d  to it, for it was e v ident that it was the 
f i n a n c i n g  of this out l a y  that t h r e a t e n e d  more than 
anything else to unbalance the budget.2® It is revealing 
that such a programme was not considered by Conservative 
strategists to be an electoral liability, in a similar 
fashion to their pragmatic fears over food taxes. This 
was only partly due to the fact that a reduction of the 
unemployment relief would only affect a minority section 
of the working class, whereas food taxes would affect them 
all. It was more the product of three other factors. 
First, there was a case that after a decade of slight 
deflation, the dole was now worth more than it should be. 
This was allied to the second factor, which was the
23. N. Chamberlain diary, 19 October 1930, NC 2/22.
24. The Times, 13 December 1930.
25. C o n s e r v a t i v e  R e s e a r c h  D e p a r t m e n t  M e m o r a n d a  on 
Unemployment Insurance, CRD/6, CRD/9, in AC 49/1/6.
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c o n c u r r e n t  press c a m p a i g n  e x p o s i n g  the abuses and 
o c c a s i o n a l  s c a n d a l s  in the dole s y s tem, w h i c h  was 
p r o d u c i n g  an i n d i g n a n t  r e s p o n s e  from g r a s s r o o t s  
Conservatism.2® Third, and perhaps more important, was 
the widely shared belief that no section of society could 
be immune to the wage reductions and general economies of 
the past years. This was allied to the economic orthodoxy 
of the day, a c c e p t e d  i n s t i n c t i v e l y  on the level of 
'housewife economics', or as commonsense, by both the 
m i d d l e  and muc h  of the w o r k i n g  class, that their 
prosperity was bound up with the national prosperity, and 
that anything which undermined that must be avoided. All 
this was revealed by the anxiety over the danger of a 
budget deficit that the country, like any individual 
family, could not live beyond its means.2?
Economies were thus not seen in class terras, 
and though there was some Conservative anxiety on this 
question during the crisis of August 1931 when the scale 
of the economies needed became suddenly apparent, there 
was little such anxiety on the topic before that crisis 
period.28 The principal Conservative rallying cry to avoid 
the potential class antagonisms that dole and wage cuts 
might produce, was the widely accepted c o m m i t m e n t  to 
'equality of sacrifice', in which all parts of the nation,
26. R. Skidelsky, op. cit. p. 232; Hemel Hempstead CA, 
Exec., 25 July 1931.
27. Horne at Hawick, The Times, 21 February 1931; Neville 
Chamberlain at Birmingham, The Times, 9 January 1931.
28. N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 20 June 1931, NC 1/1/744.
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it was claimed, would do their patriotic duty. It was 
another facet of the economic crisis, and of the financial 
and national crisis of August 1931 that it was looked upon 
as both a national peril and also, with many parallels 
being drawn with the experience of the first world war, as 
a cause for national s o l i d a r i t y . 29 in any such atmosphere 
the Conservatives, with their self-image and public pose 
as the patriotic party, were bound to be the beneficiaries 
of the rally of national sentiment - even to be in danger 
of being swept away by it.
The e c o n o m y  issue had thus been p r e s e n t  in the 
background of the political contests of 1930 over imperial 
preference. It became the foremost issue after the 
effective settlement of the latter question by the policy 
advances of October 1930 and became acute during the 
winter of 1930 and spring of 1931. for "the position is 
considerably worse than it was last year, and last year it 
was bad e n o u g h  ».30 The r e a c t i o n  to the Labour 
g o v e r n m e n t ’s "squander mania" became acute in the first 
quarter of 1931, and even in the dark days of the internal 
party crisis of February 1931 Neville Chamberlain looked 
hopefully to the effect of "the policy of spending ... in 
the money market".®1 In January a Conservative MP with 
City connections urged that:
29. Hailsham at Exeter, The Times, 21 March 1931.
30. House of Commons Debates, fifth series, volume 250, 
col. 944, 31 March 1931.
31. N. to Hilda C h a m b e r l a i n ,  14 F e b r u a r y  1931, NC 18/ 1/7 2 6 .
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feeling is getting so strong in the country that we 
must not be afraid to go all out for real economy - 
rationing departments and tackling the dole
In short, that the party should "put Economy first with a 
capital E".®2 This atmosphere was reflected in the trend 
of speeches made by leading front benchers from January, 
1931 onwards. In that month Neville Chamberlain declared 
that "their first duty must be to devote themselves to the 
task of cutting down national expenditure and calling a 
halt to the extension of social services", a theme echoed 
by Baldwin a week later, and simultaneously taken up by 
other prominent figures,®® Significantly, when making his 
crucial speech at Newton Abbot on 6 March, Baldwin placed 
economy firmly in first place in the list of the "four 
essential points" of the Conservative programme.®^ This 
priority became even more markedly evident in the leader’s 
speeches in the months after the cessation of the Crusade 
campaign after the Stornoway house agreement; in major 
deliberations on party policy at Liverpool on 28 April, 
and at the National Union W o m e n ’s Conference rally, 
speaking to the delegates of the local constituency 
voluntary workers, at the Albert Hall on 15 May 1931.®^ 
The priorities outlined in this latter oration; economy
32. Smithers to Fry, 12 January 1931, Baldwin MSS, volume 
47, ff. 233- 235.
3 3. The T 3^ m ££, 9 January, 30 January, 4 February, 27
February, 5 March, 18 April 1931, et. al.
34. Ibid. , 7 March 1931.
35. Ibid., 29 April, 16 May 1931.
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foremost, the problem of foreign dumping and the solution 
in the shape of the emergency tariff second, followed by a 
vague promise to help agriculture, and no discussion of 
the imperial dimension at all; in fact was a hierarchy of 
issues e x a c t l y  in tune with the state of mind of 
grassroots Conservatism in the localities in the early 
summer of 1931.
The economy question had been taken up in the local 
associations even before becoming an issue with the 
parliamentarians,®® Their approach to the economic crisis 
was clear-cut; that "in view of the grave financial 
crisis" the r e m e d y  could be found in " i m m e n s e  and 
immediate reductions in public expenditure coupled with an 
emergency tariff on foreign manufactured articles so as to 
protect our industries" which "affords the only means of 
economic s a l v a t i o n " .®7 The remedy "aims at the relief of 
unemployment by a restoration of industry" through "a 
reduction in expenditure and taxation", backed up by 
safeguarding and the development of empire trade.®® The 
degree of rank and file concern was shown by the issuing 
of a circular letter to all Conservative Associations by 
the Esher constituency party, rousing the localities and 
calling for a chorus of resolutions on economy in February
36. Dulwich CA, Res., NU Exec., 13 January 1931.
37. Somerset Prov. Div., Council AGM, 13 February 1931.
38. Yorks Area, Ann. Report, Council, 24 January 1931;
Eastern Prov. Area, Res., NU Exec., 12 May 1931.
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1931*^^ In fact, the expenditure issue was the main item 
of comment within the local associations in all discussion 
of policy matters during 1931, and the message was clear 
that for them, economy took priority over all other 
p o l i c i e s . A f t e r  the acknowledgements of the seriousness 
of the position by the government, in particular after the 
budget debates of April 1931, the national peril was 
admitted. Votes of censure on economy were moved on 
several occasions by the Conservative front bench, and a 
national campaign for economy launched to act as an 
umbrella for both Conservatives and Liberals eager for 
reductions. By the early summer of 1931 the issue had 
become not less, but even more, crucial a concern, and the 
speeches of leading Conservatives were couched in the 
language of alarmism. In January Hailsham had warned that 
"if the burden placed on industry and property increased 
the w h o l e  e c o n o m i c  s t r u c t u r e  of the n a t i o n  m i g h t  
collapse".^1 This danger became the keyword of the 
speeches of the spring and summer months: that "the
39. Esher CA Circular, copy and resolution endorsing 
same, York CA, Exec., 9 March 1931; South Kensington 
CA, Exec., 19 February 1931.
40. Scottish Unionist Association, An. Conference, 
Resolution No. 1, 12 December 1930; Petersfield CA, 
Council AGM, 27 February 1931; Flintshire CA, AGM, 14 
March 1931; City of London CA, AGM, 13 February 1931; 
North Cornwall CA, AGM, 13 March 1931; West Dorset 
CA, Exec., 30 January 1931; Halifax CA, Res., NU 
Exec., 19 February 1931; Kettering CA, Res., ibid., 
12 May 1931; Wessex Area, Metropolitan Area, Res., 
ibid., 16 June 1931; Lancaster CA, An, Report, 1931.
41. The Times, 30 January 1931.
388
financial stability of the country was in danger, and 
unless we r e t r e n c h e d  we were h e a d i n g  s t r a i g h t  for 
bankruptcy and ruin".^^ This was the theme summed up by 
Neville Chamberlain’s speech at Newcastle on 13 June 1931» 
which warned ominously of "national bankruptcy".^3
Not unnaturally, such a serious situation produced 
considerable pressures for unity amongst Conservatives, 
exemplified in the public manifesto of support for Duff 
Cooper in the St. Geor g e ’s campaign issued by prominent 
businessmen and b a n k e r s . E c o n o m y  as the key issue 
pushed into the background both protectionism and the 
India question, and equally supressed a third, as yet 
undiscussed, area of internal party controversy; the 
revolt of the younger politicians against the domination 
of the party by the group described by the epithet ’the 
Old Gang'. This sentiment affected the younger generation 
in all p a r t i e s , ^5 g^d was one of the facets which, cutting 
across the party boundaries, symptomised the general 
political uncertainty and reappraisal of the 1929-1931 
period. Within the Conservative party, the peaks of the 
agitation of the younger men coincided with B a l d w i n ’s 
worst periods of parliamentary incompetence, policy 
vagueness, and personal aloofness - in brief, with the 
periods of lowest party morale: in November and December
42. Ibid., 7 March 1931.
43. Ibid., 15 June 1931.
44. Morning Post, 17 March 1931.
45. Observer, 2 November 1930.
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1929; the late summer of 1930; and February to March 
1931.^^ Baldwin's personal remoteness from the younger 
generation, and apparent reluctance to promote any of 
them, or dispense with any of his more elderly colleagues, 
was at the roots of the 'Old Gang' a g i t a t i o n . T h i s
Imaladroitness hid the fact that the young meri, apart from 
a small minority of a nascent Diehard orientation, were 
m a i n l y  s y m p a t h e t i c  to B a l d w i n ' s  line and style in 
politics. It was, in reality, his lack of vigour which 
was the problem, and which led the younger men to flirt 
with alliances with politicians they would not normally be 
in sympathy with, such as Lloyd George and Oswald Mosley, 
entirely due to their overriding frustration at the lack 
of energy in the Conservative front bench leadership, who 
were considered as "stale" and " w o o d e n " . -phe 'Old Gang' 
syndrome was a condemnation and a symbol of the lack of 
drive amongst the leadership in the eighteen months after 
the 1929 defeat: "the younger men of the Conservative
party can expect nothing either by way of courage or 
inspiration from our present leaders", declared one 
malcontent in November 1929.^^ One product of this was a 
willingness to applaud anyone who gave the appearance of
46. Memorandum of discussion of young MPs, by Macmillan, 
5 November 1929, copy in Beaverbrook MSS, C235; 
Whitehall diary, 26 October 1930.
47. Derby to N. Chamberlain, 9 March 1931, NC 8/10/25.
48. N. C h a m b e r l a i n  to B r i d g e m a n ,  18 N o v e m b e r  1930, 
Bridgeman MSS, SRO 3389/106.
49 . Hall Caine to B e a v e r b r o o k ,  20 N o v e m b e r  1 9 29 , 
Beaverbrook MSS, B94,
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energy, an instinct which led first to sympathy with 
Beaverbrook’s Crusade in its earlier stages,^0 and second 
to a community of feeling amongst the ’economic radicals’, 
d r a w i n g  t o g e t h e r  the C r u s a d e r s  w i t h  Lloyd George's 
platform and, above all, with the movements initiated by
the young man in politics P££ £2L££ ®,» M o s l e y . 5 1 In
!
fact, the tension between the attraction of vigour and the 
instincts of party loyalty, the confusion : over policy 
complicated by the frustrations of idle young men with 
abilities and ambitions, all combined t o< produce an 
atmosphere that was, paradoxically, both alarming for the 
party leadership, and yet ultimately i n e f f e c t i v e . 52 Much 
of the young men's movement was hot air: the compiling of
cabinets and cliques on the back of menu cards, the thrill 
of secret meetings with Lloyd George or with Mosley; and 
almost all of it evaporated in the cold atmosphere of 
political realities. If the Conservative young men looked 
to any individual as a leader amongst themselves, it was 
probably Walter E l l i o t t . 53 Yet when Elliott in a letter 
to The T ££ indicated sympathy with Mosley's ideas, he 
was quickly pulled back into line by Baldwin, and promptly
50. Mond to Beaverbrook, 20 March 1930, ibid., C244.
51. Beaverbrook to Mosley, 17 July 1930, ibid., 0254; Tom 
Jones to E. Jones, 3 March 1 930; Skidelsky, op. cit., 
pp. 276-277.
52. Dawson to Willingdon, 16 December 1930, Dawson MSS.
53. Jones to Moorhead, 20 January 193 1,Jones diary.
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dropped any plans for cross-party g r o u p i n g s . 5^ When 
Mosley broke away and formed his New Party, only one 
Conservative MP, the Ulster Unionist W. E. D. Allen, 
joined him, for the remainder were held back by the 
combination of personal distrust of Mosley and a pragmatic 
conformity to the established p a r t i e s . 55 Nonetheless, the 
mood of hostility to old party shibboleths was very 
marked, and represented something more significantly and 
widely felt than merely the rhetorical cloak of ambitious, 
rising figures, for it synchronised with the feeling that 
party politics were in the melting pot, and could and 
should be recast in the image of a younger generation. 
And it was in the guise of this general feeling - admitted 
to by the very members of the "Old Gang"* themselves - 
rather than the practical ineffectiveness of the young 
m e n ’s m o v e m e n t ,  that these s e n t i m e n t s  gave rise to 
considerable anxiety and discussion between the leaders in 
1930 and 1931.
As a result, in the period of settlement in October 
and November 1930, the party leadership moved to appease 
the "Old Gang" agitation, which was also being used now as 
a cover by the even older Diehards, by the circulation of 
a self-denying ordinance amongst the front benchers, which
54. C, Coote, A £om£_a£ i ^ o o £ u£ (1965), pp. 116-
118.
55. Allen to Beaverbrook, 28 May 1930, Beaverbrook MSS 
B 12 3 ; Allen to Baldwin, 9 March 1931, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 166, ff. 2-4; Lockhart diary, 13 February 
1931 .
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enabled Baldwin publicly to reassure the party that his 
hands were free to appoint whom he pleased on his return 
to o f f i c e . 56 This appeasement was a crucial factor in 
stemming the tide of Conservative dissatisfaction, so that 
when M o s l e y  f o r m e d  the New Party the young t u r k s ’ 
impotence was revealed. But there were also fundamental 
and structural reasons for the failure of the young men’s 
r evolt to m a t e r i a l i s e  into more c o n c r e t e  form. In 
reality, the idea of breaking away from the party was not 
as attractive as it had been to talk about. Fusion 
with the l i k e - m i n d e d  of other p a r t i e s  did not seem 
practicable in details, and joining any of the other 
parties was not an enticing prospect; Mosley’s venture was 
admired only from a f a r . 5? The young m e n ’s clique was 
small in number, but comprised rising talents such as 
Oliver Stanley and Anthony Eden, who already had their 
feet on the ladder of party patronage and promotion, and 
had too much to risk by disloyalty. Apart from such 
expediency, many of the young men on the left of the 
party, such as Duff Cooper, were determined to continue 
the struggle for the soul of the Conservative party as 
B a l d w i n ’s aids a g a i n s t  reaction, and w h i l s t  their 
protectionism separated them from his policy in mid-1930, 
by and large India reunited them with him in 1931. In
56. Bridgeman to Baldwin, 15 November, 26 November 1930, 
Baldwin MSS, volume 165, ff. 35-39; N. Chamberlain to 
Bridgeman, 1 November 1930, NC 8/10/16c; NU Council, 
25 November 1930.
57. Harold Nicholson Diary, 30 May 1931.
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addition, the primacy of the ’economy’ cry and the reality 
of the slump washed away the ’n e w ’ ideas, for these had 
always been vague in concept, aspirations rather than 
blueprints, and the majority of the young men accepted 
both the national peril and the need for unity, and the 
deflationary economic strategy. The young m e n ’s ideas and 
movement existed through its very vagueness; if defined it 
would have only disunited its proponents, and so it could 
only be pinned down to hostility to the continued control 
of the pre-war generation.58 The young m e n ’s clique was 
not coherent in policy or in principles; it contained 
Diehards who were anti-Baldwin at the second Caxton Hall 
meeting like Marjoribanks but also semi-socialists like 
Macmillan; out-and-out tariff reformers, and neo-free 
traders such as Elliott and Hartington; financiers, but 
also agriculturalists like Lymington. Any coherence the 
group had was the accidental result of the link of youth, 
and of party circumstance and a sense of frustration - the 
p r o d u c t  of the g e n e r a t i o n  gap and a wide b r e a c h  of 
sympathy with the pragmatism and caution of the leaders. 
Once that breach was mended by early 1931, and the younger 
MPs reassured of their prospects, the bulk of them settled 
down, in the atmosphere of patriotism, unity, and national 
emergency, to work for victory at the next election 
without having restructured the party or its policy.
58. Whitehall diary, 26 October 1930.
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The r e s t o r a t i o n  of o r d e r  and u n i t y  in the 
Conservative ranks first pushed into the background the 
divisive issues within the party which were separating the 
anti-Socia 1 ist forces, and second propelled it towards 
alliance with the Liberal right. One immediate product of 
the economy campaign was to foster a reconsideration of 
the thorny question of relations with the Liberal party, 
which held the parliamentary balance - and thus the life 
and death of the Labour government - in itsihands. This 
contrasted sharply with the attitude of hostility to the 
Liberals typical of the early months of opposition, a 
hostility which many Conservatives found difficult to 
overcome even when, due to the overriding necessity of the 
n a t i o n a l  crisis, c o - o p e r a t i o n  and c o a l i t i o n  b e c a m e  
necessary. Hostility to the Liberals was based more on 
the events of the 1920's than upon the pre-1914 party 
divides. Anti-coalitionist feeling was still running very 
high in the party, as were s u s p i c i o n s  of the e x ­
coal itioni st s.59 This was matched by the antipathy to 
Lloyd George, for his coalition past, for his role in the 
1929 election, for his support of the Labour government, 
but a b o v e  all, for his s u p p o s e d  u n p r i n c i p l e d  
u n t r u s t w o r t h i n e s s :  "he is the p o l i t i c a l  e n e m y  of
everything we think and want to do", wrote Horne in
59. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 11 December 1929, Halifax MSS, 
India Office, Eur. C. 152/18/1/328.
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January 19 31: "I think he is playing his game with a
cynical unconcern for national i n t e r e s t s " .^0 The rank and 
file of the party blamed the Liberals for the loss of the 
1929 election with a peculiar bitterness, both for their 
intervention in such a large number of contests, and their 
election promises. MPs spoke of "our betrayal by the 
Liberals". The moral was clear: co-operation with Lloyd
George and his followers was a political impossibility in 
the p o s t - e l e c t i o n  a t m o s p h e r e . ^ 1 This f e e ling was 
r e i n f o r c e d  by the Liberals' support for the Labour 
government in the division lobbies on decisive issues such 
as the Coal Bill of D e c e m b e r  19 2 9.^^ H owever, the 
principal issue which kept Conservatives and Liberals 
apart during 1930, and tied the Liberals to Labour, was 
the electoral reform conference, to whose provisions the 
L i b e r a l s  looked for the s a l v a t i o n  of p r o p o r t i o n a l  
representation, but by whose reforms the Conservatives 
stood only to lose their advantages of better finance, 
plural voting, and the University representation.
Some Conservatives suggested attempting a deal with 
the Liberals in the electoral reform conference, as their 
identification of Labour as the greater danger became
60. Horne to Beaverbrook, 23 January 1931, Beaverbrook 
MSS, C178.
61. Crichton-Stuart to Baldwin, 3 June 1929; Colfox to 
Baldwin, 1 June 1929; O'Connor to Baldwin, 5 June 
1929, et. al.; Baldwin MSS, volume 3 6 , ff. 218-269; 
volume 37, ff. 60-155 ; see also chapter 1.
62. Lane-Fox to Irwin, 22 December 1929, Halifax MSS, 
Eur. C. 15 2/18/1/333; Balfour, op. cit., p. 71.
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f i r m e r . 53 C e r t a i n l y  the p r i n c i p a l  c o n c e r n  of the 
Conservative delegation, led by Hoare, was to try and 
prevent any further consolidation of the Lib-Lab front, an 
endeavour in which, by an adroit exploitation of tactics 
and of divisions on details between the other two parties, 
he was largely successful, so that the conference in the |
A 21end d i s s o l v e d . I n  1930 dealing with Lloyd George was |1ruled out by party sentiment and by practicalities; the a
Liberal MPs themselves were uninterested, and Lloyd |I
George "could not d e l i v e r  the g o o d s " .  ^ The party 
preferred to await the oft-anticipated collapse of the 
Labour government, or to work towards an accommodation 
with the right-wing of the Liberals that would not involve 
either alliance with Lloyd George, or concessions on 
tariffs or electoral reform. Co-operation with other 
groups was made absolutely conditional upon the fact that
it must not water down the protectionist policy arrived atI
in October 1930, a c o m m i t m e n t  made public by Baldwin in 
December in the knowledge that it ruled out alliance with 
the L i b e r a l s . 55 This latter standpoint reflected the 
fact that by January 1931 the Liberals had entered into
63. Hugh Cecil to Baldwin, 28 July 1930, copy, Salisbury 
MSS, S(4) 136/85.
64. Hoare's memoranda on electoral reform conference;
Templewood MSS, VI/2, Salisbury MSS, S(4) 136/62-63,
Baldwin MSS, volume 52.
65. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 22 March 1 930, NCj 18/ 1/686; to 
Baldwin, 19 April 1930, Baldwin MSS, volume 31, ff.
89-90.
66. The Times, 18 December 1930.
397
j
a
something akin to a coalition with the Labour govenment, 
and were thus principally responsible for its continued 
existence throughout 1931. The period of the Lib-Lab 
'pact' denoted the peak of Conservative-Liberal hostility; 
the Liberals "had allowed themselves to be so tied up with 
the Government ... that the Liberal Party was neither 
fish, flesh, fowl, nor good red herring", was only one 
example of the torrent of abuse rained down upon Liberal 
heads by Conservative speakers during 1931.^?
This picture of feeling in early 1931 did not seem to
present much likelihood of a Conservative arrangement with
the official Liberal party, unless a section of Liberals
made themselves more amenable, or a national disaster
should stampede the Conservatives into a government of
national unity. In fact, both phenomena occurred; the
former in early 1931, the latter in August. The events of
1931 moved together both the Conservatives, and the right
wing of the Liberal party headed by Sir Johri Simon. Due
both to electoral anxiety for their seats, and a genuine
community of viewpoint over the economic consequences of
the continued existence of the Labour government, the
Simonites moved closer to the Conservative position at the
same time as the overriding rhetoric of 'economy' made the
latter more desirous of such an alliance. The crucial
point, however, was the public acceptance by the Simonite
Liberals in slow stages during 1931 of both the rhetoric
67. A. Chamberlain at Chester, The T £ m e s , 31 January
1931; Gower at Gillingham Conservative Club, 14 
November, Gower MSS,
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of economy, and their consequent abandonment of free trade 
for the emergency t a r i f f . 58 As a result of these public 
moves over economy and protection the Simonites became 
politically acceptable allies for Conservatism without 
provoking internal party complaint, principally because 
Simon himself was seen as "rapidly coming our w a y " . 5 9  
Simon was already a respected figure in Conservative 
circles, for his India Commission Report of 1930, his 
distancing himself from requests for electoral reform, and 
his repudiation not only of the Lib-Lab pact but also of 
Lloyd George himself - culminating in his resignation of 
the L i b e r a l  W h i p  on 26 Ju n e  1931. As a r e s u l t  
Conservatives drew a distinguishing line between the 
section of Lloyd George and Samuel who moved closer to the 
government, and Simon's group, to whom they held out a 
hand in public:
Conservatives were proud to fight side by side with 
such men as Sir John Simon, and they could honestly 
say to him and his friends that their programme was 
broad-based upon the national needs, and that there 
was no reason why they should not work together to 
carry it out.
70
This p r o g r a m m e  was, of course, the b u s i n e s s  and
C o n s e r v a t i v e  one of l i m i t e d  insular p r o t e c t i o n  and
58. 3 0 January; 14 February; 4 March; 15 May,
1931; N. Chamberlain diary, 5 December 1930, NC 2/22.
69. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 10 June 1931, Hannon MSS 18/3; 
N. to Ida Chamberlain, 5 December 1930,' NC 18/1/719; 
The Times, 12 December, 15 December 1930.
70. Hoare at Chelsea, The Times, 21 April 1931; ibid., 15 
May, 29 June 1931.
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rigorous economy, and Liberals who accepted this becan^e 
the 'best type' of 'patriotic' Liberals, with whom as a 
consequent result of this common ground a deal on seats at 
the next election became not a sordid intrigue but an 
honest alliance, with parallels frequently drawn to the 
late nineteenth-century Liberal-Unionist arrangement.^^ 
The negotiations on seats which progressed intermittently 
from March 1931 were the first product of Simon's p r o ­
tariff and economy Manchester speech of 3 March, and were 
dependent upon the fiscal acceptability of the Simonite 
manifesto's political content.?2 The second product of 
this realignment of the anti-Socialist forces behind the 
Conservative banner would be, it was hoped, the fall of 
the Labour government when the House of Commons reconvened 
after the summer recess of 1931, and the third result 
would be the avoidance of splits in the anti-Socialist 
vote at the e n s u i n g  ge n e r a l  e l e c t i o n  by a m u t u a l  
withdrawal of candidates. This model paralleled and 
reflected - but was not the sole cause of - the optimism 
prevailing in Conservative circles by mid-summer 1931 in 
regard to both the imminence of a dissolution, and the 
prospects for a Conservative victory and return to power 
that this now offered. 
* * * * * * * * * *
71 . Ibid. , 7 March 1931 .
72. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 7 March 1931, NC 18/1/729: 
ibid., 18 April 1931, NC 18/1/734.
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Although the Internal condition of the party had been
essentially healthier since the accommodation of the
leadership with the grassroots in October and November
1930 the restoration of order followed on most evidently
from the crisis of March 1931. The Stornoway House pact
with Beaverbrook, and the clearing of the air in the
shadow cabinet at the end of that month had begun the
p r o c e s s . 1^ 3 H o w e v e r ,  of mor e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  were the
consistent and increasing pressures for party unity, which
had made themselves felt since the period of the East
Islington contest and the growing primacy of the 'economy’
agitation, for it was as a result of these pressures that
the internal party settlement of March 1931 was not only
arrived at, but preserved intact. In contrast to the
previous shortlived restorations of control in November
1929 and March, June, and even October, 1930, the unity
achieved in the spring of 1931 endured, as a result of the
new-found stability in Conservative politics. In this
r e s t o r a t i o n  of order one factor was the ad v a n c e  of
northern and free trade opinion to, for perhaps the first
time, an acceptance and even an eagerness for protection.
The main pressure for unity, however, was the accepted
primacy and urgency of anti-Socia 1isra, of defeating the
Labour government at the earliest possible opportunity.
This was clearly the message from the constituencies; "it
would be a calamity if, at a time when we have the Labour
73 . N. Chamberlain to Cunliffe-Lister, 26 March 19 3 1, 
Swinton MSS, SWIN I (174) 2/1.
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party on their knees, there should occur any serious rift 
which would divide the Conservative forces."?^ This 
co n c e r n  was acute in 1931, in a sense in which, 
notwithstanding normal party antagonism, it had not been 
during 1929 and 1930. By the spring of 1931 the existence 
of the Labour government was regarded as a national 
calamity, and its continued existence generally held by 
Conservatives to be a national peril. The Diehard MP 
Gower told his local association annual meeting
that he desired to emphasise with all the force that 
he could the imperative necessity there was for all 
Conservatives ... to unite and fight under one banner 
at the coming election in order to dismiss the 
Socialist [government] .... Questions of party 
leadership or of details of policy or programme were 
really of minor importance when compared to the 
importance which existed for turning the present 
government out ... if through dissensions in the 
C o n s e r v a t i v e  Party the S o c i a l i s t s  did obtain a 
renewal of their lease of office it would spell the 
ruin of this old country and of all classes of its 
community.
75
In this atmosphere unity was prized above all else, and, 
as the extent of the pressure for unity was directly 
proportional to the degree of anxiety felt about the 
na t i o n a l  situa t i o n ,  so these forces i n c r e a s e d  in 
effectiveness during the summer months of 1931. The
74. White (leader of the party in Liverpool) to Derby, 6 
February 1931, Derby MSS, 920 DER (17) 6/33; Reigate 
CA, AGM, 18 March 1931; SUA, Eastern Divisional 
Council, 25 March 1931.
75. Gillingham CA, AGM, report dated 25 March 1931, Gower 
MSS.
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catchword was 'closing the ranks', and closing the ranks 
inevitably meant a drawing together around the position 
taken by the leader, with dissidents shifting their ground 
towards his, thereby reducing any need for the leader to 
move to accommodate them. The very way in which the words 
were used indicated the power of the leader's position and 
the pressure, perhaps unconscious, for conformity. This 
was apparent, significantly, even over the question of 
India w here B a l dwin's p o s i t i o n  least r e s e m b l e d  a 
consensual nexus; at the meeting of the party's India 
Committee on 22 June, after Irwin himself had attended and 
presented his apologia, the pressure for unity overcame 
the doubters, and "a strong appeal" was made "that every 
effort should now be made to close up the ranks in order 
that the Conservative Party might show a united f r o n t " . ?5 
Even Churchill was responsive to this mood, and, although 
still concentrating on the India issue, promised that "he 
would take no factional attitude".??
Closing the ranks was more than just an exercise in 
papering over fundamental rifts. The concerns of party 
policy by mid-summer 1931 reflected a new position of 
consensus within the party, possibly to a greater degree 
than at any time since 1918. This was especially true in 
the case of tariff reform, a policy that had consistently
76. Unionist India Committee, The Times, 23 June 1931.
77. The Times, 13 July 1931.
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divided the party, most obviously on a regional north- 
south / u r b a n -r u r a 1 basis, since its formulation in 1903. 
At that time Joseph Chamberlain had looked to a serious 
depression in the free trade economy to turn opinion to 
tariff reform, and with the economic blizzard of 1930- 
1931, that was indeed what finally occurred, uniting all 
sections of the party behind the policy. This development 
was exemplified by the Commons resolution tabled by Page 
Croft on 29 June 1931, and to which all the Conservative 
backbench MPs except six attached their names; this 
represented a degree of party unity behind the tariff case 
that had never previously been attained.
Tariffs, however, although in the forefront of the 
party programme, were not the foremost concern. Indeed, 
there was an attempt by Baldwin in his presentations of 
policy in summer, 1931 to defuse the dangerous immediacy 
of the food tax element, in the interests of securing the 
n e c e s s a r y  m o d e r a t e  votes at the next election, by 
producing the idea that tariffs would be devised and 
formulated by an above-party Royal C o m m i s s i o n . This was 
made acceptable by the fact that in the interim, the 
emergency tariff would be imposed. This would protect 
domestic industries, but avoided much of the implications 
of a whole-hogger imperial preference position. It was 
revealing that this apparent watering down of the policy
78. House of Commons Debates, fifth series, volume 254,
col, 1454; Lord Croft, My ££f£ ££ ££££££ (1949), p. 
183.
79. The Times, 18 July 1931.
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by Baldwin did not, on this occasion, produce howls of 
outrage. Partly this was because the emergency tariff 
gave most Conservatives what they urgently sought in the 
domestic dimension, whilst the commitment to call an 
imperial conference and set up the tariff commission 
appeared to be a firm promise for the future in the 
imperial dimension. It was also, however, because in the 
political atmosphere of mid-summer 1931 the issues which 
had dominated the party's attention in the previous two 
years had been displaced by other concerns, and because of 
the overriding impulse for unity. On the two key areas of 
protection and India, Baldwin provided a policy in mid- 
1931 which, although it did not satisfy the faddists of 
either position, was adequate for the broad majority of 
the party. Just as the emergency tariff was an acceptable 
consensus in one area, so were Baldwin's publicly stated 
c o m m i t m e n t s  to s p e c i f i c  s a f e g u a r d s  in any Indian 
constitution in the other, sufficient to secure unity on 
his own terras.88
Other issues drew the party together in opposition to 
the Labour government during this period. The provisions 
in the 1931 budget for a tax on land values revived 
memories of the party's long-standing opposition to such 
policies throughout the late-Victorian and Edwardian eras, 
and drew all sections together. So also did another 
partisan question from the more recent past: the attempt
80. Ibid., 19 June 1931.
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of the Labour government to reverse the industrial verdict 
of 1926 by repealing the Trades Disputes Act of 1927. Tha 
measure had been perhaps the most popular product of thqt 
Baldwin administration in the eyes of the party rank and 
file, and they were determined that the party should fight 
tooth and nail to forestall what they viewed as the 
government's surrender to the sectional interests of the 
TUG, and to prevent the legalisation of general strikes. 
The fervour, passion, and bitterness of feeling this issue 
aroused amongst the party rank and file can hardly be 
over-estimated, and, coming as it did from all regions, it 
acted as a powerful spur both to unity and to invigorating 
the parliamentary opposK'i’on.^l
Economy was the issue which, above all others, had 
come to hold by general agreement pride of place in the 
party manifesto by June 1931 and to receive the foremost 
a t t e n t i o n  in the s p e e c h e s  of the leader, in those 
definitions of policy given by Baldwin at Hull on 17 July 
and Knole Park on 25 J u l y . 52 The practical product of the 
economy question was the adoption of the proposal of the 
me a n s  test to r e g u l a t e  the dole, and the e f f e c t i v e  
decision that the level of benefit must be reduced, 
although this was to some extent disguised by Neville 
Chamberlain, who sought:
81. Resolutions from East Midlands, Lancashire and 
Cheshire, and Northern Counties Areas, NU Exec., 19 
February 1931; from Somerset Prov. Division and the 
Metropolitan Area, ibid., 10 March 1931.
82. The Times, 18, 27 July 1931.
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from the political point of view to shift the issue 
f r o m  ’the T o r i e s  w i l l  cut y o u r  dole' to a 
constructive scheme of a more attractive kind ... it 
would be a much better plan from the social point of 
view.
83
Although in this way the effective consequences of the 
economy policy were relegated to the vague background, the 
advantages of the policy were not. The whole point about 
the 'economy* issue was that it was much more than just a 
negative standpoint. Because the depression was seen as 
being the result of the loss of business confidence and 
incentive, principally due to the high level of rates and 
taxes, so it was believed that by the very action of a 
Conservative government coming into office committed to 
cutting such taxes and safeguarding industries, there 
would be an "instantaneous revival of confidence in every 
walk of British life" .5^ Worthington-Evans had made this 
point the keynote of the vote of censure debate on economy 
only days before his death in February, speaking from the 
opposition front bench. For the City, he declared:
the most rigid economy is the greatest need of the 
nation. The Government persist in their policy, 
although there are clear signs that it is creating a 
want of confidence both at home and abroad. Without 
confidence there can be no enterprise, and without 
enterprise there can be no revival of employment.
83. N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 20 June 1930, NC 18/1/744
84. The Times, 21 April 1931.
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If the government were turned out:
the psychological effect will be immediate. The 
first step would have been taken. Confidence would 
be restored, employment would speedily improve.
85
Agriculture still received frequent mentions in the 
programmatic speeches of mid-1931, but its prominence had 
waned compared to 1929. Not only was it usually relegated 
to a low position on the list of urgent t o p i c s ,  5& but it 
was also usually referred to in passing in the studiously 
vague terms of ’help' for agriculture - which could be 
taken to mean almost anything, or almost nothing. This 
contrasted with the fact that the concerns of industry and 
finance received specific and prominent attention, a fact 
which reflected the evolving nature and ethos of the 
Conservative party in the inter-war years. Reduction of 
expenditure was placed in the vanguard, and a pledge 
given to specifically impose an immediate emergency 
tariff, which would mark at least the end of 'Cobdenism'. 
Party policy was uniformly presented in a four point 
programme in the summer of 1931, reflecting the extent to 
which agriculture, and imperial concerns, had been pushed 
to the bottom of the list when compared to the question of 
domestic finance:
85. House of Commons Debates, fifth series, volume 248, 
col. 427, 11 February 1931.
86. The Times, 27 July 1931.
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The Conservative Party had a policy ... it had been 
summarised under four headings; economy, protection 
for our home industries, help for agriculture, and 
the development of Imperial Trade and Imperial Unity. 
The nation’s finances had now reached a point when it 
was absolutely essential that there should be some 
reduction in national expenditure.
87
W i t h  unity e s t a b l i s h e d  arou n d  that f o u r - p o i n t  
programme, and with the pressures to maintain that unity 
effective throughout 1931, the internal condition of the 
party showed a marked improvement over the first two 
months of the year. There was "a general feeling of 
renewed courage and determination" which could be seen in 
the improved morale and the improved level of attendance 
of Conservative MPs.58 Neville Chamberlain’s conduct of 
the opposition to the 1931 budget was a particular 
success, and marked the final stage of his emergence as 
the second figure in the party - an emergence which had, 
in fact, a steadying force of its o w n . 59 The improved 
performance of the opposition front bench in attack during 
the summer of 1931 also served to cloak what remained of 
Baldwin's deficiencies as an opposition leader, but even 
in this department there was improvement, partly as a 
result of the 'clearing the air' in the shadow cabinet in 
March, but mainly as a result of Baldwin's conclusion that
87. Ibid., 16 June 1931; 16 May, 15 June, 24 July 1931.
88. M oore to N. C h a m b e r l a i n ,  31 M a r c h  1931, NC 
7/11/24/24; The Times, 24 June 1931.
89. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 18 April 1931, NC 18/1/734; N. 
to Hilda Chamberlain, 2 May 1931, NC 18/1/736.
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public opinion had swung to a sufficient extent to make
vigorous attack a safe and sensible option.
The improved internal condition of the party was also
revealed by the minimal concern shown over the occasional
rumblings of dissatisfaction from Beaverbrook after the
Stornoway pact. These partly concerned the difficulties
over the position of the Crusade MP sitting for South
P a d d i n g t o n ,  but w e r e  p r i n c i p a l l y  the r e s u l t  of
Beaverbrook's suspicion that Baldwin was welshing on the
agreed policy, especially over a g r i c u l t u r e . in fact,
one b y - p r o d u c t  of the s h e l v i n g  of the a g r i c u l t u r a l
interest during 1931 was Be averbrook’s progress towards
b asing his c a m p a i g n  on the d i s s a t i s f i e d  s e ction of
agriculturalists. This was not because he had.given up
the concept of empire free trade, though by the time of
the Stornoway pact of 1931 he had come to realise the
difficulties posed by dominion reluctance, but it was, at
least at first, a tactical move to increase pressure.
Beaverbrook well knew that his propaganda was not a
powerful force on its own, but that it needed to mobilise
and vocalise a real dissatisfaction amongst rank and file
Conservatives. By April 1931 the only group available
were the farmers, with whom Beaverbrook had begun and
ended in alliance from Lewes in 1929 to Stornoway House in
1931. Single-issue pressure group campaigns were always
Beaverbrook's political metier, and thus it was hardly
90. On S o u t h  P a d d i n g t o n ,  see NC 8 / 1 1 / 2 4 - 7 5 ;  on 
agriculture in particular, NC 8/11/70-71.
410
either surprising or illogical that his Crusade evolved 
during 1931 into the Agricultural Party; food taxes were 
the common ground for both.9  ^ This latter venture never 
had the appeal or success that the Crusade had possessed. 
Apart from an i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  e l e m e n t  in Norfolk, 
Lincolnshire, and some parts of rural East Scotland, the 
campaign could not attract grassroots s u p p o r t . 92 The 
r e a s o n s  for this i n c l u d e d  the a c c e p t a n c e  by m a n y  
Conservatives after the East Islington and St. Geo r g e ’s 
by-elections of Baldwin’s strictures upon the press lords. 
But the reason above all others for the failure of this 
venture was the pressure for party unity so strongly felt 
during the growing national financial crisis of 1931, from 
February until after the August smash. It was not just 
the simple fact that the concerns of finance and industry 
had shouldered aside the economically weaker farming 
interest, but also that the a g r i c u l t u r a l i s t s  were 
themselves possessed of the same economic ideas, and were 
thus as receptive as any other group to the cry for 
e c o n o m y . 93 Indeed, in one sense this could be portrayed 
as being the long-standing campaign of the counties over
91. Beaverbrook to Rothermere, 12 January 1931; to Dykes,
4 J u l y  1931; to P i n c k a r d ,  20 J u l y  19 3 1;
correspondence with J. H. Macdonald, January-December 
1931; Beaverbrook MSS, C285, B194, B203, B201.
92. Observer, 25 January 1931.
93. National Farmers Union, Parliamentary Committee, 17
March 1931; Eastern Provincial Area, AGM, 5 February 
1930 .
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eighty years to secure reductions not merely in national 
expenditure but in the ’burden’ of local taxation.9^ Thus 
’e c o n o m y ’, of all the available range of issues, was the 
best rallying-cry for the forces of anti-Socia 1ism , and as 
it was allied only to the less objectionable ’revenue’ or 
’e m e r g e n c y ’ tariff, it posed no barrier to drawing into 
the fold the ’p a t r i o t i c ’ Liberal element. The party 
programme enunciated in July 1931 was therefore in tune 
with the electoral and tactical concerns of the party, 
designed both to eject the Socialist government and 
restore a new national consensus. As the by-product of 
this process, both the unique s e c t i o n a l  c l a i m s  of 
agriculture, of the Indian trade, and of the imperial 
federationists, were relegated to the background of the 
political stage.
There could be little doubt by the end of July 1931 
that the course of British politics was moving perceptibly 
in the direction of a Conservative government returning to 
power in the near future. All the indicators suggested 
both that the Labour government had not long to live, and 
that the Conservatives and their Simonite allies would win 
the following general election. The shift of opinion in 
favour of the Conservative economic policy was gathering 
pace into a veritable landslide, Neville Chamberlain was 
reliably informed by a local figure in May 1931 that "we 
should s w e e p  L a n c a s h i r e  and Y o r k s h i r e  at the next
94. A. Offer, £ £.£ p e £jty and ££ 1, ££ i.££j. 1^2.8-_1_££_4 , pp. 16 1- 
400.
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election",95 The by-election results of April to July 
1931 confirmed this impression. An early harbinger was 
the Conservative gain at Ashton-under-Ly ae on 30 April, 
but the lesson was driven home by three by-elections in 
June 1931, which proved in the event to be the last of 
that parliament: Gateshead on 8 June; Manchester Ardwick
on 22 June; and Liverpool Waver tree on 23 June. Though 
none of these changed hands, the scale of the swing to the 
Conservatives was enormous, being calculated as: fourteen
per c ent, ten per c e n t ,  and e l e v e n  per c e n t  
respectively.96 The crucial significance of these results 
was their geographical location, for they indicated to 
Balwin that his pragmatic strategy was bearing fruit, and 
that in the c o m i n g  e l e c t i o n  the ground lost in the 
industrial north in 1929 would be regained - and with it, 
command of the House of Commons. Of all the results, that 
at Gateshead was the most encouraging, for, as Baldwin 
himself remarked, it was "the first one in which there has 
been a real swing of votes in an industrial area." 97 
Hannon noted that "the G a t e s h e a d  e l e c t i o n  has had 
considerable stimulating effect in the House of Commons", 
and that Conservative MPs "have become quite bright and
95. N. Chamberlain to Hilda Chamberlain, 2 May 1931, NC 
18/1/736.
96. C. Cook and J. Ramsden, eds., By-Elections in British 
Politics (1973), p. 78.
97. The Times, 19 June 1931; ibid., 2 May 1931.
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c h e e r  f u i " . 98 Experienced electoral strategists were 
convinced that the party was now headed for ;a victory on 
the lines and scale of that after the previous Labour 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  in 1924, and w ould have agreed with 
B a l d w i n ’s claim of 28 June that "there was not a seat in
England that could not be w o n ".99
This optimism over the electoral position went hand- 
in-hand with pessimism over the national situation to 
produce unity. These pressures did not lead to the 
bitterness that can be engendered by futile opposition - 
as had perhaps partly occurred during the early period of 
Liberal-Labour alliance in February 1931 - because by June 
the by-elections demonstrated unmistakably "that the whole 
position has begun to slide away from under the present
g o v e r n m e n t " . TOO The electoral position looked promising,
as did the state of party policy, and this was matched by 
the improvement in the tactical position during 1931. 
Outside p a r l i a m e n t ,  the S t o r n o w a y  House pact with 
Beaverbrook on one hand and the arrangements arrived at 
with the Siraonites on the other, reduced the likelihood of 
any splits reducing the ma x i m u m  potential of the anti- 
Socialist vote. The apathy so remarked upon in 1 929 and
98. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 10 June 1931» Hannon MSS, 
18/3.
99. Baldwin at Himley Park, Th£ 29 June 1931;
Bridgeman journal, volume 2, note after p. 243; A.
C h a m b e r l a i n  to A r m s t r o n g ,  6 N o v e m b e r  1931, AC
39/3/41; Lord Londonderry, The 15 June 1931;
for local parallel, Denbighshire C A , Annual Report, 
1931 .
100. The Times, 29 June 1931.
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until early 1930 had vanished as the mist before the dawn 
of the national financial crisis, and, as a result of the 
frequent scares over the possible fall of the government, 
the local associations were prepared for an election at 
any time. Inside parliament, secure in the knowledge of 
the swing of public opinion, the Conservative party began 
for the first time to use its hold in the House of Lords 
to wreck controversial government legislation, in a 
deliberate attempt to force a dissolution. In the Commons 
it was anticipated that, as a result of the G o v e r n m e n t ’s 
own internal weaknesses, that if it lasted to the recess 
it would fall on the re-opening of parliament in autumn 
1931. The result of all these factors coming together was 
first the restoration of order in the party, and second 
the imminent anticipation of victory:
there has been a complete change in the outlook of 
Conservative members and in almost every buzz of 
conversation one heard Conservative members declaring 
that in the altered circumstances they did not care 
how soon a General Election came upon us.
1 0 1
The dominating theme of the period from the winter of 
1930 until the crisis of August 1931 was the increasingly 
evident fact that the internal party crisis had become 
overshadowed by a national crisis. Given the self-image 
of Conservative politicians and their conception of the 
role of their party as the defender of the realm when in 
peril, such a realisation caused the supercession of the
101. Hannon to Beaverbrook, 1 April 1931. Hannon MSS 17/1.
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debate over the future path of the party. Thus the 
politics of Conservatism were fundamentally reordered from 
the posture of 1929-1930. Primacy was now placed upon 
party unity. It was one face of that unity that further 
internal assaults to change party policy - on empire trade 
or on India - were now counted out. It was the other face 
which dictated that equally in order to maintain and 
preserve that united front the policy advances of 1929- 
1930 should and must be retained as the basis of any 
Conservative programme. Thus the impact of the financial 
crisis of 1931 was to fossilise the evolutionary process 
in Conservative party policy for the foreseeable future, 
in the two senses of both a r r e s t i n g  any further 
development, and of preserving in tablets of stone the 
existing attitudes and remedies arrived at by July 1931. 
All of these policies, fossilised as they were, provided 
the bedrock of Conservatism in the National Government 
formed in August 19 3 1: the c o mmitment to the economic
policy summed up by the term 'economy', to the emergency 
tariff, and to the Irwinite line on India.
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CHAPTER 8
Na t ional ^£li.£^£ 5£££r.£™£II^ Th^ 2£AZLi.£&££Sacrifice of Party, August 1931
The f o r m a t i o n  of the n a t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t  of 
August 1931 has proved to be a crisis of e n d u r i n g  
fascination for historians. The effects of the events of 
the last week of August 1931 and the transition made 
between that time and the formation of a permanent 
National Ministry after the general election of October 
1931 had profound consequences for the political history 
of Britain during the ensuing fourteen years, if not 
longer. As a result of the significance of the events of 
August 1931 much attention has been directed towards the 
question as to whether and to what degree such an outcome 
was a l r e a d y  in the m i n d s  of p o l i t i c i a n s  bef o r e  the 
financial crisis broke upon them. As a result, too much 
weight has been given to those few and scattered occasions 
when Ramsay MacDonald acknowledged the minority position 
of his party in the Commons with references to the House 
acting more in the capacity of a Council of State, and to 
those occasional and unavoidable contacts between the 
party leaders over membership and attendance of the 
v a rious o f f i c i a l  and s e m i - o f f i c i a l  c o n f e r e n c e s  and 
commissions. The old theory of a plot between MacDonald 
and Baldwin is now surely exploded, and certainly there is 
nothing in the contacts or correspondence between them to 
suggest anything more sinister than the fact that they did 
not d i slike or d e s p i s e  each other. H o w e v e r ,  other
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theories remain, suggesting either that general sentiment 
in favour of a national government as superior to party 
g o v e r n m e n t  p e r m e a t e d  the p o l i t i c a l  atmosphere with 
increasing effect in 1931»^ or that the formation of the 
government, though no conspiracy, was the result of "a 
Conservative party bid for power", in which "[Neville] 
Chamberlain pursued a strategy that ensured the downfall 
of Labour and prepared the way for a National Government 
under Conservative control".  ^ In fact, the actions of the 
Conservative opposition were not so purposeful during the 
August crisis, which buffeted their party and blew it off
course at least as much as it did the Labour party. The
strategy the Conservatives followed concentrated not upon 
the destruction of the Labour ministry or of the Labour 
party, but upon the one issue which they had already come
by the beginning of August 1931 to make the foremost on
their agenda; reduction of government expenditure and of 
the 'burdens' of taxation. C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of the 
'national interest', of 'patriotism' and of 'duty' 
evidently affected the attitudes of Labour leaders; what 
has been less remarked upon is that they equally, if not 
more, affected the decisions taken by the Conservative 
leaders, who believed, with some justification, that in
1. R. Dare, "British Labour, the National Government,
and the 'National Interest', 19 3 1". in H istor i c a 1 
Studies, volume 18. 1978-79.
2. J. D. Fair, "The C o n s e r v a t i v e  Basis for the 
formation of the National Government of 1931". i n
££ » volume 19. number 2,
1980, p. 143.
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the August crisis they had put the national interest 
before party. In fact, although the Conservative party 
joined the national cabinet formed on 24 August 1931» and 
although that eventual decision was approved at the 
meetings of the party's representative institutions four 
days later, this outcome was not one which they welcomed 
or desired; indeed, it was simply accepted, first as the 
only solution to the crisis, and second as their patriotic 
'duty'.
* * * * * * * * * *
The Conservative party had not looked favourably upon 
the concept of a national government when that idea was 
occasionally floated in the press in 1930 and 1931. Most 
of these suggestions came from figures, of a more or less 
maverick nature, mainly on the fringes of political life, 
and were not taken seriously by senior politicians. Too 
much s i g n i f i c a n c e  can be put upon the p r o - n a t i o n a l  
propaganda of such figures as Sir Warden Chilcott, simply 
because the results of the crisis seemed to have endorsed 
their viewpoint. Chilcott, the most outspoken critic of 
the party system, had been a Conservative MP until 1 929» 
but carried no weight in British public life. Chilcott's 
a n a l y s i s  verged on the fascist, and the e x a m p l e  of 
Mussolini was frequently cited by him with approbation. 
Such ideas had little appeal, and little s e e m i n g  
relevance, to the politics of winter 1930-1931» when they
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a p p e a r e d  in the W h^_t e^ h a__l !_ Ê£££ÈÈ£'  ^  The idea of a 
national government was periodically invoked by Garvin in 
the 0_b£££_v£r^ during the same period, and taken up and 
echoed by the retired politician Lord Mottistone.^ None 
of these initiatives bore fruit, but taken together with 
the occasional suppositions and rumours then current about 
the position of MacDonald in particular, they required 
some reaction from the Conservative leaders. The rumours 
and hints concerning MacDonald were in fact the result of 
his characteristic method of relaxing by painting a dire 
picture of his position and difficulties in an appeal for 
the sympathy of his audience, who, as a result of the 
social circle MacDonald habituated, were frequently 
Conservatives or City figures who passed on his table talk 
to the Conservative leaders, believing themselves to have 
been selected as political go-betweens. The Conservative 
party’s reaction to these public and private floatings of 
the n a t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t  idea was c o n s i s t e n t l y  and 
continually to dismiss it. Baldwin twice in December 1930 
went out of his way in public speeches to discount the 
possibility. Party co-operation was ruled out because of 
the fundamental divides over the issue of protection 
versus free trade, and the only kind of party co-operation 
the Conservatives would consider would have to be on the
3. » December 1930; February, March,
April 1931; reprinted in W . Chilcott, Political 
Salvation 1930-32.
4, Lane-Fox to Irwin, 3 December 1930, Halifax MSS, 
India Office, Eur. C. 152/19/1/180.
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basis of accepting the need for tariff reform. Between 
free traders and protectionists "there is a gulf that 
cannot be surmounted. Therefore, to talk of any kind of 
unity between us is ridiculous. From our point of view it 
is selling the pass".  ^ This view only hardened during the 
following eight months as the movement of public and 
e c o n o m i c  o p i n i o n  a w a y  from t r a d i t i o n a l  free trade 
accelerated visibly. Conservatives looked upon their own 
party as the embodiment of national unity, and believed 
that such unity was attainable not by their joining other 
parties, but by drawing into the Conservative ranks all 
those who sympathised with its outlook, seeing it as "the 
greatest unity of individuals in the country", comprising 
a complete political spectrum from left to right within 
itself, and this, Baldwin insisted, was the only basis 
upon which "we can form, and we hope to form, a national 
p a r t y " . G This r e m a i n e d  the public a t t i t u d e  of the 
Conservative party consistently through to the final 
pronouncements of party policy in July 1931. Thus, in his 
major speech at Hull on 17 July Baldwin dismissed the idea 
that a parallel situation existed with the wartime 
e m e r g e n c y  of 1914-1918, d e c l a r i n g  that a n a t i o n a l  
coalition was neither "possible or necessary for the tasks 
of the present time", though he held out a hand to the 
Simon group of Liberal rebels who were moving closer to 
accepting the Conservative economic remedy.
5. The Times, 13 and 18 December 1930.
6. Ibid., 18 December 1930.
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Neville Chamberlain's reaction to apparent feelers 
f r o m  M a c D o n a l d  r e l a y e d  t h r o u g h  S t o n e h a v e n ,  the 
Conservative party chairman, in early July 1931 was 
i n s p i r e d  by the same a p p r e c i a t i o n  of the idea of 
coalition. Stonehaven agreed that such a move would in 
fact split the Conservatives "from top to bottom", and 
C h a m b e r l a i n  d i s m i s s e d  it as "only an e x p r e s s i o n  of 
[Mac D o n a l d ' s ]  w e a r i n e s s  with an an x i o u s  and trying 
position", for if meant seriously he "must have got a long 
way off realities, for such a combination is clearly 
im p o s s ible."^ C h a m b e r l a i n  d i s c u s s e d  the idea with 
Baldwin, and significantly both agreed "that our party 
w o u l d  not s t a n d  it for a m o m e n t " . ^  T h i n k i n g  
the matter over later in the month, Chamberlain sketched 
possible circumstances, which in fact were very close to 
those which occurred in August, in which he projected that
with perhaps a crisis in the City, unemployment 
soaring up to 3 millions, and the prospect of jtlOO 
millions deficit in the Budget you might get a very 
powerful movement ... for a national government which 
would change the aspect very materially.
He considered that it would produce a Diehard right-wing 
revolt, and that the component sections of this national 
a l l i a n c e  w o u l d  find they had little c o m m o n  ground. 
Chamberlain noted: "I myself hate the idea and hope it
7. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 11 July 1931, NC 18/1/747.
8. N. Chamberlain diary, 6 July 1931, NC 2/22.
422
won't come to p a s s . "9 There was at the end of July so 
much talk on the question of national government, however, 
that the Conservative leaders discussed the question; none 
wanted a coalition and all sought to avoid it, although it 
was realised that under the pressure of a crisis or a 
panic in the City it "might be very hard to refuse". 
Baldwin had also been considering the tactics of such a 
possible dilemma in late July, and had requested advice 
from his colleagues. Stee1- M a i t 1a n d 's reply clearly
echoed Baldwin’s own appreciation, and is worth quoting at 
some length ^ ^ ;
The question you put to us was 'What did we think you 
should do if they ask you to join in f o r m i n g  a 
National Government under Ramsay MacDonald?' My own 
opinion is that you should refuse unhesitatingly, 
but offer to give them all support. The position is
entirely unlike the war ...  I believe that joining
a national government would mean entanglement with 
the Socialists and that it would be very difficult 
later to disengage. Bad in any case, it will be made 
infinitely worse by the presence of Lloyd George ....
If, however, you refuse to join a National Government 
under MacDonald - and I gather this is also you own 
view - it is necessary to consider what would happen 
next;
(1) The Government might carry on with the promise 
of your support .... The country would have 
learned the lesson that even a S o c i a l i s t  
Government must have sound finance ....
9. N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 18 May 1931, NC 1/1/748.
10. N. Chamberlain, diary, 24 July 1931, NC 2/22; N. to 
Hilda Chamberlain, 2 August 1931, NC 18/1/750.
11. Steel-Maitland to Baldwin, 28 July 1931, copy, Steel- 
Maitland MSS, SRO.GD. 193/94/2, ff. 179-181.
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(2) They might decide to dissolve or resign 
result in either case - a general Election 
super-added [sic] to the crisis. I am sure you 
would win ....
(3) The p r e s s u r e  of public o p i n i o n  to form a 
National Government might grow so strong that 
you would find it difficult, despite your own 
views, to persist in refusing .... In this 
event, I think you would stipulate ... for a
moratorium for all measures other than those
directly dealing with the crisis. When the 
crisis was s u r m o u n t e d  ... the party could 
disengage; an election would almost certainly 
follow, and you would come by your own.
This was to be almost the blueprint of Baldwin's strategy
during the August crisis, as he was forced slowly from the
first, to the second, and finally and reluctantly to the
third, of Steel-Maitland's tactical alternatives.
Ironically, as the crisis was about to break, the 
C o n s e r v a t i v e  p a r t y  l e a d e r s h i p  w e r e  s t r e n u o u s l y  
endeavouring to encourage the 'friendly' press to dampen 
down the discussion of national government, after Th e 
^3d again raised the spectre in its leader of 7 
A u g u s t . Although August, as a holiday month, was
normally almost devoid of political speech-making, those 
speeches which were given by prominent Conservatives, by 
Hailsham on 15 August and Orm sby-Gore at the height of 
the crisis on 20 August, both r e j e c t e d  the idea of 
n a t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t ,  the latter d e c l a r i n g  that his 
a u d i e n c e  "could put out of their m i n d s  all idea of 
coalition or so-called National Govenment. Once bitten,
12. N. to Ida Chamberlain, 9 August 1931, NC 18/1/751; 
The Times, 7 August 1931.
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t w i c e  s h y . "18 Thus, tho u g h  the idea of a n a t i o n a l  
government had been in the air for over a year, on the 
very eve of the cris i s  it was r e j e c t e d  as a viable 
combination by all the leaders of the Conservative party.
The reasons were simple and pragmatic, and far outweighed 
any dubious gains such an alliance might have brought. 
Electorally the party had nothing to gain from such a 
strategy, for it was clearly headed for a victory parallel 'Î
to that of 1924, and a full term of office as majority 
single party. Also opposed were the Conservative party's 
instincts; the perennial one of avoiding all party splits, 
and the newer one dating from the events of 19 18-1922, 
hostile to c o a l i t i o n s  due to the b e l i e f  that they 
necessarily involved compromising the purity of party 
principles. Hence the ruling out of any combination not 
based upon the common ground of the Conservative economic 
policy. Finally, the national peril, though acknowledged
as considerable, did not have the immediate and urgent
impact or seriousness of degree that it was believed to 
have developed by the end of August 1931 when it stampeded
the Conservatives into actions not entirely of their own
free choice. Their posture before the crisis unfolded 
requires to be outlined and underlined, because it is only 
in relation to this background that the steps which 
actually led to the formation of such a national ministry 
can be properly understood. 
* * * * * * * * * *
13. The Times, 17 and 21 August 1931.
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The financial crisis which broke in mid-August 1931 
was the product of two distinct problems: a banking
crisis which had its origins in central Europe and which 
had left the position of London exposed and vulnerable, 
and the budget deficit of one hundred and twenty million 
pounds for the financial year 1931-32 revealed by the 
report of the May Committee, published the day ater 
parliament rose for the summer recess, on 3 1 July 19 3 1. 
Both of these factors combined to produce a serious run on
the pound, and the situation could only be saved in the
I
short terra by propping up its parity througjh loans to be 
secured from financiers in Paris and New York. The 
experts of the Bank of England advised the government that 
these would not be forthcoming, unless the Labour cabinet
set its house in order, and restored overseas confidence
iby showing its determination to balance the budget by 
reducing expenditure, in particular in the Unemployment 
fund, the cause of much of the original imbalance. In 
other words, the crisis had become as much political as 
financial. It is not the concern of this thesis to 
di s c u s s  the d e b a t e s  and d i f f i c u l t i e s  of the Labour 
government when faced with this problem, but only to 
examine the role of the Conservative party in the events 
surrounding the collapse of the second Labour government, 
and the formation of the national government; thus events 
are v i e w e d  e n t i r e l y  from the p e r s p e c t i v e  of the 
Conservative party. In order to produce clarity into a 
complex series of events and influences, the phases of the
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crisis as they affected the Conservatives will first
be narrated factually, and then analysed thematically.
In so far as it affected the Conservative party, the
crisis of August 1931 occurred in four distinct phases.
The first of these, from 11 to 13 August, began with the
banking experts' request to MacDonald on 11 August that
they be allowed to inform the leaders of the other two
parties of the serious implications of the accelerating
flight from the pound, to which the government agreed. As
a result of the bankers' warnings, Baldwin was summoned
back from his holiday in France, and Neville Chamberlain
came down from his Perthshire retreat, both men arriving
in London early on 13 August. At 10:30 they met Horne,
one of the party's leading financial experts, who declared
that "the only thing that could restore confidence would
be a determined effort by the Government to put its house
in order".1^ Baldwin took Chamberlain with him to his
interview with MacDonald and Snowden, the Chancellor of
the Exchequer, at 10 Downing Street at 2:00 p.m. The
government leaders wanted to secure opposition approval
for their proposals to balance the budget, as they could
not rely upon all their own MPs for such a vote, and thus
they proposed to ask both Conservatives and Liberals to
approve their proposals, which they hoped to have ready on
18 August. At this preliminary stage, Chamberlain asked
if the total amount of the deficit to be met by economies
14, Memo, 'The Financial Crisis', N. to A. Chamberlain, 
14 August 1931» AC 39/3/26, hereafter referred to as 
'The Financial Crisis'.
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would equal the May Committee's recommendation of ninety- 
six and a half million pounds, and Snowden, warning that 
the deficit was even larger than May had predicted, agreed 
this point. Chamberlain declared this amount to be 
"adequate" but went on to say that "what might be much 
more difficult for us was approval of the proposals for 
new taxation", and it became clear that, on the doctrine 
of e q u a l i t y  of s a c r i f i c e  from all s e c t i o n s  of the 
community, approval would be sought for the complete 
government p a c k a g e . N o  conclusions were arrived at in 
this exploratory phase, but MacDonald indicated that "if 
he could obtain our ge n e r a l  support he w ould call 
parliament together in the first fortnight of September to 
pass (1) a supplementary budget (2) an Economy Bill."^^ 
I m m e d i a t e l y  a f t e r  t h i s  i n t e r v i e w ,  the t w o  
Conservative leaders met the Bank of England officials, 
who shook them further by warning that "the situation 
could not be more serious".1? After this Baldwin, sensing 
perhaps instinctively that the party's position would i
become difficult if it became too involved in the crisis, 
devolved the responsibility for meeting the government in i
15. Loo. cit.; N. Chamberlain, diary, 22 August 1931» NC 2/22.
16. 'The Financial Crisis'; N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 16 
August 1931» NC 18/1/752,
17. N. Chamberlain diary, 22 August 1931, NC 2/22.
428
the next week to Ne v i l l e  C h a m b e r l a i n ,  giv i n g  him a 
watching brief. B a l d w i n ’s attitude was to "get away as 
soon as ever p o s s i b l e  lest I should be d r a w n  into 
s o m e t h i n g " . 18 T h e  mood of the party after this first 
phase was clearly against too close an involvement in the 
government's problems. Neville Chamberlain assured Gwynne 
that there was "no suggestion of a National Government" 
and that they were only asked for "our general support", 
and he evidently expected the ministry to survive the 
c r i s i s . 19 The C o n s e r v a t i v e s  sited their d e f e n s i v e  
position, as they had f o r e s h a d o w e d ,  around their 
distinctive policy of the emergency tariff, Horne urged 
this on Baldwin on 15 August, and on the same day the 
party leader instructed Neville Chamberlain to bring it 
forward at the meeting with the government ministers the 
next week, as a tactic to distance the Conservatives from 
Labour and their Liberal allies, whom Baldwin held jointly 
responsible for the overspending, and who thus should be 
responsible for solving the c r i s i s . 20 Baldwin's fears of 
being entrapped were echoed by Bridgeman, who advised 
forcing acceptance of the tariff in view of the fact that
18. 'The Financial Crisis'.
19. N. Chamberlain to Gwynne, 13 August 1931, Gwynne MSS
17; to Cunliffe-Lister, 15 August 1931, Swinton MSS,
SWIN I (174) 2/1/ff. 11-12.
20. Horne to Baldwin, 15 August 1931, Baldwin MSS, volume 
44, ff. 22-24; Horne to N, Chamberlain, 15 August
1931, copy, ibid., ff. 2 5-3 4 ; B a l d w i n  to N.
Chamberlain, 15 August 1931, NC 7/11/24/1.
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the Conservative party "have the strongest hand" and "must 
not be prevented from taking advantage of it".2^ This 
p a r a l l e l e d  N e v i l l e  C h a m b e r l a i n ' s  p r o j e c t i o n  of the 
probable results of the crisis, a dissolution and election 
"in conditions offering us the utmost advantage" in which 
the party would "concentrate on tariffs and imperial 
preference as the restorers of prosperity".22 At the end 
of this first phase Baldwin crossed again to France, and 
Chamberlain temporarily returned to Scotland.
The second stage opened on Thursday, 20 August, and 
lasted until the agreement on a path of action to be 
followed by the Labour cabinet appeared to have been 
successfully concluded on 22 August. MacDonald and 
Snowden had been unable to draw up their proposals for a 
m e e t i n g  on 18 August, as p r e v i o u s l y  proposed, and 
postponed the three-party conference until 20 August. 
With Baldwin away, Neville Chamberlain asked Sir Samuel 
H o a r e  to a c c o m p a n y  h i m  to the m e e t i n g  for the 
Conservatives; Sir Herbert Samuel and Sir Donald MacLean 
represented the Liberals, and the Prime Minister and the 
C h a n c e l l o r  the g o v e r n m e n t .  S n o w d e n  put before the 
opposition leaders plans for economies of seventy-eight 
and a half million pounds, which at first Chamberlain 
thought "was not too bad", until Snowden revealed that the 
budget deficit was now ' projected as one hundred and
21. Bridgeman to Baldwin, 16 August 1931, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 44, ff. 35-38.
22. N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 16 August 1931, NC 18/1/752.
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seventy million pounds - with the implication that the 
remaining figure of over ninety million pounds would have 
to be found by new t a x a t i o n . 23 in light of this 
Chamberlain reverted to his original proposition that the 
economies must be the larger part, not less than the 
ninety-six million recommended by May, and must include 
more than merely cosmetic cuts in the unemployment 
allocation. MacDonald and Snowden indicated sympathy with 
this line, and sought to use this stand of the opposition 
as a lever with which to return to the Labour cabinet and 
pressurise it into accepting a higher figure as the price 
of political survival; they arranged to see the opposition 
parties again after the cabinet had discussed the matter 
further.2^ After this three-party meeting, later on 20 
August, Chamberlain and Hoare had three further meetings. 
The first was with the bankers, "who were very pleased 
with the stand we had taken",25 who "at the same time
impressed on us that the sands were rapidly running 
out".26 The second meeting was with other members of the 
C o n s e r v a t i v e  front b ench then a v a i l a b l e  in London; 
Hailsham, Cunliffe-Lister, Kingsley Wood, and the chief
23. N. Chamberlain, diary, 22 August 1931, NC 2/22.
24. Loc. cit.; N. to Ida Chamberlain, 23 August 1931, NC 
18/1/753.
25. N. to Anne Chamberlain, 21 August 1931, NC 1/26/446.
26. N. Chamberlain diary, 22 August 1931, NC 2/22.
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whip, Eyres-Monsell, all of whom agreed with Chamberlain 
"that retrenchment was the vital thing".2^ The third and 
final meeting was an impromtu rendezvous with the two 
Liberal leaders, who "agreed generally with our view" on 
the scale of the economies, though they considered that 
eighty-five million pounds, as half of the one hundred and 
seventy million deficit, would be acceptable.28
At 3:00 p.m. on the next day, 21 August, the four 
opposition representatives were summoned back to Downing 
Street to meet Snowden and MacDonald again, and to be told 
that the cabinet would only swallow economies of fifty-six 
million pounds. MacDonald in weary disillusion seemed 
to wash his hands of the responsibility; it was all he 
could get, and if it did not restore confidence then the 
result would be "the deluge". For the Conservatives, 
Hoare vigorously protested at both the small amount of the 
e c o n o m i e s  and M a c D o n a l d ' s  c o n c e p t i o n  of his 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s  as n a t i o n a l  leader, and in reply 
MacDonald made his famous remark, delivered "in a serai- 
jocular way, 'Well, are you prepared to join the Board of 
Directors?', to which [Hoare] replied that if seriously 
made that was a proposition which would demand serious 
consideration."29 This comment has been much over-rated 
and misunderstood, for it was the throwaway retort of a
27. N. to Anne Chamberlain, 21 August 1931, NC 1/26/446.
28. N. Chamberlain diary, 22 August 1931, NC 2/22.
29 . Loc. cit.
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weary man at his wits' end. More importantly, Hoare's 
r e s p o n s e  was not one of approval, but a c l a s s i c  
politicians' manoeuvre to evade commitment on a question 
where it is difficult to refuse point blank, and his 
reply, far from opening up the topic, quite clearly ended 
all discussion of such an eventuality at that time. Far 
from coalescing with MacDonald, the two opposition groups 
withdrew to an upper room at Number 10 to consult each 
other, and the conclusions they drew were that first, a 
crash must be avoided at all costs; second, that the 
government must face up to their responsibilities; and 
third, that the way to make them do so was by threatening 
to oust them - not by any offer of a helping hand.30 
After leaving Downing Street once again to inform their 
waiting Conservative colleagues of events, Chamberlain and 
Hoare returned to the second three-party meeting of that 
day, at 9:30 p.m. Here the strategy earlier agreed with 
the Liberals of threatening the government was put into 
effect. Nothing was said on the topic of a national 
government, but in fact the Conservative position had 
begun to change under the pressure of the seriousness of 
the crisis, and they no longer completely excluded the 
possibility. MacDonald, after a lengthy digression on his 
own position, determined to try to carry his cabinet once 
again the next day. As the four opposition politicians 
were about to leave Number 10 that evening, the two
30 . Loc. cit.
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Liberals were summoned back for a private session with 
MacDonald, and indeed it was the Liberals, the former 
u n o f f i c i a l  all i e s  of the g o v e r n m e n t ,  and not the 
Conservatives, who were on the inside track with the 
Labour leaders. Chamberlain and Hoare thus departed 
alone, to another meeting with their colleagues and with 
Harvey, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England.
At the next meeting of the party leaders, at 12:30 
p.m. on Saturday, 23 August, a solution to the crisis 
a p p e a r e d  to be at hand. This was not any sort of 
coalition, but a proposal from MacDonald to suggest 
economies of sixty-eight and a half million pounds which 
included a ten per cent cut in dole benefits, and to save 
a further fifty million pounds through suspending the 
payment to the Sinking Fund for the National Debt. The 
Conservatives agreed to this on two provisos: firstly,
and obviously, that the cabinet accept this plan; and 
secondly, and more importantly, that the bankers approve 
the economies as sufficient for their purposes; and that 
in this event if "the 60m cut would enable them to get 
the money, we were not going to be 'more Royalist than the 
King', and on that ground our difficulties would be at an 
end".3^ Neville Chamberlain believed that the financial 
and political problems had both been resolved, and he 
continued to think so until 3:00 p.m. on the following 
day, August 23, interpreting the fact that MacDonald was 
to see the King that day as merely "part of Ramsay's game
31. Loc. cit., second entry for 22 August 1931.
434
game to put pressure on his Cabinet. My belief is that 
they will accept" and thus "the crisis is over and I 
should be able to go north tomorrow".32 However, the 
solution arrived at by the end of this second stage 
collapsed due to MacDonald's inability to win his cabinet 
for economies which included a cut in unemployment 
benefits.
The third stage of the drama opened on Sunday 23 
August with the return to London of the two principal 
actors in the events which led to the formation of the 
National Cabinet, respectively Baldwin, who arrived in the 
evening of 22 August, and King George V, who returned at 
8:00 a.m. on the morning of 23 August. At 10:30 the King 
saw MacDonald, who informed him that as several of his 
cabinet were resigning it was impossible for him to carry 
on, and so he advised the King to see the leaders of the 
other two parties, Baldwin for the Conservatives, and 
Samuel, acting leader of the Liberal party whilst Lloyd 
George was in hospital. Meanwhile, Baldwin had gone to 
see his advisor and friend Dawson, the editor of T]i e_ 
T^rae^, and lunched with him at the Travellers Club, 
discussing the crisis. Dawson advocated supporting Labour 
in carrying out the economies, and to this Baldwin agreed, 
although it was clear that he thought it more likely that 
the Labour cabinet would dissolve and that he would be 
sent for to construct a Conservative administration, and
32. N. to Anne Chamberlain, 3:00 p.m. 2 3 August 1931, NC î
1/26/447. !
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they discussed its personnel.33 As a result of being 
unable to trace Baldwin immediately, the K i n g ’s private 
secretary summoned Samuel to the Palace first, where he 
saw the King at noon, and s t r o n g l y  r e i n f o r c e d  his 
disposition to favour the idea of a national government.3% 
It was as a consequence of this that when Baldwin was 
a d m i t t e d  to the royal p r e s e n c e  at 3:00 p.m. that 
afternoon, the King opened the interview by asking him 
outright if he would serve under MacDonald in a crisis 
national ministry - a request which Baldwin could hardly 
refuse. He considered this promise unlikely to be taken 
up, for the King then told him that, though MacDonald was 
to make one last effort with his cabinet that evening, if 
he failed Baldwin would be sent for next day to receive 
the royal commission to form a ministry.35 After leaving 
the Palace on the afternoon of 23 August Baldwin conveyed 
this news to Neville Chamberlain, and they debated their 
strategy. C h a m b e r l a i n  urged that as, due to the 
parliamentary balance of power, Baldwin would have to make 
some offer to the Liberal leaders to join him, and thus 
could no longer hope to construct a purely Conservative 
government, he should also try to get MacDonald and
33. Memo, 'Events of Sunday 23rd August', Dawson MSS.
34. Memo by Wigram in RAK 2330, quoted in H, Nicolson, 
King George V (1952), p. 461.
35. Loc. cit.; N. to Anne Chamberlain, 2 3 August 1931, NC 
1/26/447.
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Snowden to serve under him; Baldwin reluctantly accepted 
these constraints and agreed with Chamberlain’s i d e a , 36
On the e v e n i n g  of Sun d a y  23 August the Labour 
government held its last cabinet meeting, breaking up at 
10:00 p.m. with the refusal of almost half the cabinet to 
accept the economy proposals, and MacDonald left at once 
for Buckingham Palace, declaring he was going to throw in 
his hand. However, the King persuaded him to sleep on it, 
and, more importantly, told him first that "he was the
only man to lead the country through this crisis" and
asked him to "reconsider the situation", and second "His 
Majesty told him that the Conservatives and the Liberals 
would support him in restoring ... the financial stability 
of the c o u n t r y " . 37 In reply to this MacDonald asked the 
King to preside next morning over a meeting of the leaders 
of the three political parties, to which the King readily 
assented. On his return to Downing Street MacDonald |
summoned the Conservative and Liberal leaders to see him |I
at 11:00 p.m. on the night of 23 August. MacDonald then 
told them that "he could not go on ... and had told the 
King so", and that "it would be of no use for him to join 
a government". It was at this late stage, and in the 
context of his discussion with Baldwin that afternoon, 
that C h a m b e r l a i n  m a d e  his appeal to M a c D o n a l d  to
36. N. Chamberlain diary, 23 August 1931, NC 2/22.
37. Wigrara’s memo of audience of 23 August 1931, RAK
2330, Nicolson, op. cit., p. 464.
437
.3
reconsider the latter part of his decision, and give 
support not from outside, but within, the new government. 
Though Samuel supported this plea, Baldwin "maintained 
silence and we did not pursue the matter further".38 Thus 
were matters left at the end of the third stage of the 
crisis, at midnight on 23 August, with MacDonald expected 
next day to withdraw, and Baldwin to be invited at the 
meeting arranged at the Palace to form a government, a 
government which MacDonald was thought unlikely to j o i n . 39 
Dawson at Th£ ^^d written the next d a y ’s leader
column "on the assumption that he had handed the baby to 
Baldwin".
The fourth and final stage, the events of Monday 24 
August, produced the unexpected reversal of this position, 
and directly produced the national government formed on 
that day. That outcome, it must be emphasised, was not 
anticipated or specifically sought by the Conservative 
leaders at any stage of the crisis. At the meeting of 
MacDonald, Samuel and Baldwin at 10:00 a.m. that morning 
at Buckingham Palace it had been the King who had both 
opened the discussion and dominated events by setting the 
tone for a national ministry, specifically saying "that he 
trusted that there was no question of the Prime Minister’s
38. N. Chamberlain diary, 23 August 1931, NC 2/22; N. to
Anne Chamberlain, 24 August 1931, NC 1/26/448.
39. Cunliffe-Lister to his wife, 24 August 1931, Swinton
MSS, SWIN III (313) 1/5.
40. Dawson to Astor, 25 August 1931, Dawson MSS.
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r e s i g n a t i o n ” and h o p i n g  he would form a n a t i o n a l  
g o v e r n m e n t  " s u p p o r t e d  by the C o n s e r v a t i v e s  and the 
Liberals”. The King also placed the three politicians 
under the considerable pressures of his own prestige, and 
of time, insisting that a decision be hammered out there 
and then at the Palace for immediate release to the press. 
Having for over half an hour put the case for a national 
government, and gained agreement from Samuel and - with 
his promise of the previous day fresh in his memory - from 
Baldwin to serve under MacDonald, the King withdrew, 
l e aving the three only "to settle the d e tails 
MacDonald was swayed and flattered into reversing his 
decision of the previous night, and Baldwin was left 
without any respectable opportunity to block a national 
coalition, and thus the decision to form a national 
government was taken.
The ’d e t a i l s ’ were then settled in a s i x - p o i n t  
memorandum :
(1) National Government to be formed to deal with 
the present financial emergency.
(2) It will not be a Coalition in the ordinary sense 
of the term, but co-operation of individuals,
(3) W h e n  the e m e r g e n c y  is d e a l t  w i t h ,  the 
G o v e r n m e n t ’s work will have finished and the 
Parties will return to their ordinary position.
(4) The e c o n o m i e s  and [new t a x a t i o n ]  shall be 
equitable ....
41. W i g r a m ’s memo of Buckingham Palace conference, 24 
August 1931, RAK 2 3 3 0 , op. cit., Nicolson, pp. 465- 
466.
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(5) [legislation other than routine would not be 
proposed]
(6 ) The Cabinet shall be reduced to a minimum.
42
Many of the key provisions of this document reflected 
B a l d w i n ’s reluctance, and were included above all to 
satisfy the demands of the Conservative party, rather than 
of the other parties. In particular two statements, that 
it was not a coalition and that the government was only to 
deal with the financial crisis after which the parties 
would resume their respective positions, were clearly 
aimed at assuaging Conservative anxieties. The former 
referred to the experience of the Lloyd George coalition, 
and the latter offered reassurance that the tariff policy 
had not been abandoned, but only suspended temporarily. 
The new cabinet of ten, with six free traders (four Labour 
and two Liberals) and four protectionists, could hardly be 
c o n s i d e r e d  a f a v o u r a b l e  a r r a n g e m e n t  for the party 
committed to the emergency tariff. However, under the 
combined pressures of the parliamentary position, the 
royal pressure for national unity, and the b a n k e r s ’ 
clamour that national ruin was only hours away, the 
Conservative leaders more or less reluctantly acquiesced
in a fait accom pli.^ 3
42. Memorandum, quoted in full in H. Berkeley, The M y^h 
That Will Not Die (.1978) , pp. 90-91.
43. N. Chamberlain diary, 24 August 1931, NC 2/22; A. to 
Ivy C h a m b e r l a i n ,  24 August 1931» AC 6/1/800; 
Cunliffe-Lister to his wife, 24 August 1931» Swinton 
MSS; Page-Croft’s speech. The Times, 29 August 1931.
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The attitude of the Conservative leadership to the 
qu e s t i o n  of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  in a n a t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t  
appeared to have been transformed by the events of August 
1931. In fact this was more apparent than real, for many 
of the party's considerations and aims had remained 
consistent, although the means of reaching these ends had 
evolved by 2 4 August to include the possibility - but not 
necessarily the desirability - of a coalition. The 
process by which this occurred has been narrated, but 
analysis of the principal factors affecting the conduct of 
the Conservative party reveals a number of crucially 
significant themes explaining the actions taken and 
o p t i o n s  chosen by them. One of the mos t  i m p o r t a n t  
pressures upon the Conservatives had been the combination 
of the sudden eruption of the crisis, and the crucial 
pressure of apparently having only hours in which to stave 
off national catastrophe. During July the Conservatives 
had been proceeding slowly with their strategy of seeking 
alliance with the Simonite Liberals in the Commons on the 
basis of acceptance of protection, in order to defeat the 
government in October, and as late as 10 August one 
Conservative MP told his constituency executive that "he 
saw no prospects of a sudden election” or change of 
m i n i s t r y . T h e s e  plans and assumptions were "overtaken 
by the dramatic and overwhelming march of events in the
44. Maidstone CA, Exec,, 10 August 1931.
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autumn of 1931"-^^ As Bridgeman commented, "the August 
crisis was very sudden", catching the party during the 
holiday period, and taking even its financial experts 
unawares by the suddenness of its eruption. As Neville 
Chamberlain wrote on 16 August, "things suddenly boiled up 
in the City".^^ Added to this was the pressure of time, 
as the fact that it was, in The^ words, "a matter of
hours" was widely accepted, and changed the attitude of 
some Conservatives, such as Davidson, on the expediency of 
co-operation.^7 The firm ruling out of coalition was thus 
eroded, partly also as a result of the fact that a new 
common ground had emerged between the parties - one more 
important than tariff reform - the question of economy. 
A s a  result, in view of the emergency, the party could 
without sacrifice of principle unite for this purpose only 
with other parties. The c o n s e n s u s  could only be 
temporary, for once the economies were achieved, the 
tariff question would again come to the forefront of 
Conservative politics. To have reached such a position, 
whereby late on 21 August national government was no 
longer being excluded, was certainly a change in the 
party's position, but it was not indicative of any desire 
for such a government - only the dawning realisation that 
the pressure of time and circumstances might force it on,
45. James, ed., op. cit., pp. 373-373.
46. Bridgeman journal, August 1931» volume II, p. 237; N. 
to Hilda Chamberlain, 16 August 1931» NC 18/1/752.
47. The T^me^ leader, 21 August 1931; James, ed. op. 
cit., pp. 365-367.
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especially as parliament was not in session. On 24 August 
Austen Chamberlain acknowledged that "it has been 
perhaps still is - a question of hours between this 
country and 'the d e l u g e
In this belief, and in all their other consequent 
ac t i o n s  and choices, the C o n s e r v a t i v e  l e a d e r s  were 
dominated by their unquestioned belief in, and support of, 
the position of the bankers and of the City. Horne spoke 
for the City when placing the situation before Baldwin, 
and in particular in directing attention to the need for 
economies on unemployment.^^ In the same way, Neville 
Chamberlain had at the end of the parliamentary session in 
July held his fire in an economy debate, and passed up the 
chance of party advantage, due to the anxiety of the 
City lest he should paint too strong a picture.^0 Indeed, 
it was as a r e s u l t  of the bankers' i n i t i a t i v e  that 
Chamberlain and Baldwin were requested to return to London 
and became involved in the first p l a c e . F r o m  that point 
the party came close to being the echo of the City, and it 
comes as no surprise that the financiers approved of their 
conduct on 20 August, and were i n v o l v e d  in the 
consultations of the party's leaders on the following day.
48. A, to Ivy Chamberlain, 3:00 p.m. 24 August 1931» AC 
6/1/800.
49. Horne to Baldwin, 15 August 1931» Balwin MSS, volume 
44, ff. 22-24.
50. N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 2 August 1931» NC 18/1/750.
51. Lloyd to Cunliffe-Lister, 14 August 1931» Swinton 
MSS, SWIN 1(174), 2/1/f. 26.
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The role of the bankers was not the sinister one of 
attempting to destroy the Labour government; it was 
nothing so subtle. The bankers were desperately anxious 
over their own professional arena of finance, and were 
simply seeking to impress upon all parties the gravity of 
that position in order to arrive at some solution. Thus 
the Conservatives were willing to follow their guidelines 
in the matter of the amount of economies required, and in 
muting their hostility to new taxation, and of a piece 
with this was their acceptance also of the b a n k e r s ’ 
declaration of 22 August that financially they could only 
hold out for four days. One consequence of this was that 
all other possible solutions to the crisis, several of 
them more attractive to the party grassroots, were ruled 
out. Amery questioned the need for immediate action, and 
the wisdom of placing economy before protection, declaring 
that "in these matters I think we are all too inclined to 
take the bankers at their word".^^ Against the policy of 
deflation Amery set the alternative of a highi wages policy 
as a result of vigorous empire d e v e l o p m e n t . ^3 Another 
possibility was pointed out by Beaverbrook, a figure whose 
v i e w s  c a r r i e d  som e  weight, not just for his recent 
i n v o l v e m e n t  in C o n s e r v a t i v e  politics, but also as
52. Amery to Gwynne, 8 September 1931» Gwynne MSS 14; 
Amery diary in L. S. Amery, My P £ 1. i,;t ^ c £ 3^ ( 1 955), 
volume III, pp. 61-62.
53. Amery to Beaverbrook, 26 August 1931» Beaverbrook 
MSS, C6.
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an able and successful financier in his own right - that 
the s i m p l e  fact of the a c c e s s i o n  to offi c e  of a 
Conservative government would have been enough to restore 
confidence and secure the l o a n s , T h e  final choice was 
also ruled out by the bankers: the idea, first raised by
Neville Chamberlain, for a capital levy which would be 
used to reduce the national debt, and thereby removing the 
need for one hundred million pounds per annum in debt 
charges. The disapproval of the bankers when this idea 
was put to them, partly because they feared that it would 
cause a flight from the pound, was so strong that 
Chamberlain swiftly dropped the idea.^^
The l a r g e - s c a l e  e c o n o m i e s  d e s i r e d  by both the 
financial interests and the Conservative party were not 
without their political complications: first, in the
question of the role of new taxation in making up the 
deficit remaining, and second in the matter of their 
possible electoral unpopularity. Economies on the scale 
sought were accepted as impossible without being matched 
by some new taxation, but it was the concern of both City 
and party to keep the latter at a mi n i m u m  and the former 
at a maximum. For this purpose the Conservatives insisted 
upon the doctrine of equality of sacrifice, and it was 
established at the very first meeting with MacDonald and 
Snowden on 13 August that the budget must be balanced in
54. Lockhart diary, 31 August 1931.
55. N. Chamberlain diary, 27 August, 3 September 1931, NC 2/22.
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accordance with this principle. This was the only method 
by which the Labour leaders could be committed to the 
principle that economies should provide at least half the 
re q u i r e d  amount. The cr u c i a l  point is that the 
Conservatives were more concerned with the avoidance of 
further burdens of taxation, and thus placed the emphasis 
on the role of economy. The doctrine of equality of 
sacrifice was not a magnanimous gesture on the part of the 
better off to share the burdens of the financial crisis in 
the same sense as was the later gesture of the royal 
family to cut one hundred thousand pounds from the Civil 
List. On the contrary, it was designed for the reverse 
purpose. In part it was a consequence of fears that a 
Labour government would be tempted to revert to a soak- 
the-rich 'people’s budget’. This was considered a danger 
for three reasons: the first was the instinct of self-
preservation in that it would hit hardest the Conservative 
interest groups; the second was the genuinely held belief 
in these circles that the slump was due to over-burdening 
local and national taxation, sapping domestic confidence 
and investment; and third, the related fact that, as the 
overseas bankers held the same economic world-view, that 
the needed loans would not be forthcoming if a high- 
t a x a t i o n  p o l i c y  was adopted. As both Horne and 
Chamberlain declared, it was not simply a question of 
somehow wiping off the deficit; the budget had to be
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balanced In the right way.^G Equality of sacrifice was in 
fact designed to ensure that the government could not meet 
their target without a real cut in the unemployment 
benefit, and that the unemployed could not be considered 
as a special case immune from the financial debacle. Thus 
it was as much a political doctrine as a financial one. 
It was for this reason that C h a m b e r l a i n  strove to 
preserve the freedom of action of his party in the matter 
of approving proposals for new taxation in the agreement 
concluded at the mid-day meeting on 22 August, which he 
b e l i e v e d  had r e s o l v e d  the crisis. This was the 
explanation of his willingness to approve a plan which, 
whilst committing the Labour government to proposing real 
e c o n o m i e s  when p a r l i a m e n t  r e c o n v e n e d ,  left the 
Conservatives free to propose and carry with Liberal 
support amendments both to increase the economies and 
limit the new taxation. It was not a subtle ploy to split 
the Labour party, but a determined effort to simply 
minimise the ’b u r d e n ’ of new direct t a x a t i o n . 5? Once 
MacDonald and Snowden had accepted these principles, it
56. N. Chamberlain diary, 22 August 1931, NC 2/22; Horne 
to N. Chamberlain, 15 August 1931, copy, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 44, ff. 25-34; speech of Ormesby-Gore, j[h£ 
T_ira££, 21 August 1931; Middleton to Salisbury, 19 
August 1931, Salisbury MSS, S(4) 141/142.
57. N. C h a m b e r l a i n  diary, 22 August 1931, NC 2/22, 
Chamberlain ascertained that once the House was in 
Committee on the proposed Economy Bill an amendment 
to increase the dole cut from ten per cent to twenty 
per cent would be treated by the government as a 
matter for resignation; but this was not his concern, 
and by implication a simple reduction of direct 
taxation amendment would not be taken as an issue of 
con fidence.
447
increasingly became a vested interest on the part of 
Conservatives to maintain in office these Labour figures, 
as their conceptions of a fiscal policy were increasingly 
coming to coincide. The final solution arrived at, 
although it had involved accepting the continuation of 
MacDonald as Prime Minister, was economically acceptable 
to Conservatism. The amount raised by taxation could be 
kept to a minimum, and in addition with the changed 
attitude both of Labour figures such as MacDonald and 
Thomas, and of Liberals such as Simon and Runciraan, to the 
concept of the revenue tariff, there was a good prospect 
that such taxation as had to be imposed would be indirect
duties, not income tax or super-tax increases.
Having thus got the key Labour figures of Snowden and 
MacDonald to face the need for economies, the logical 
consequence was to seek to involve them prominently in the 
passing of these m e a s u r e s . ^8 This was reinforced by the 
considerable anxieties felt by Conservative politicians 
over the possible electoral unpopularity of such measures 
if passed by an ’upper cl a s s ’ government, as opposed to 
the reception of proposals which had the approval of the 
leaders of Labour opinion.^9 The scenario Conservatives
feared was that if they alone a t t e m p t e d  to i m p o s e
economies before a dissolution of parliament, they would
58. Cunliffe-Lister to his wife, 24 August 1931, Swinton
MSS, SWIN III (313) 1/5; memo, ’Events of Sunday
August 23rd’, Dawson MSS.
59. Dawson to Salisbury, 5 September 1931, Salisbury MSS
S(4) 141/64; A. to Ivy Chamberlain, 24 August 1931,
AC 6/1/800.
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make themselves vulnerable.^® Having appeased the demands 
of supporters who had pressed for economy, the party could 
find itself left alone to withstand the electoral backlash 
from the victims of those same economies. Instead of 
being in opposition attacking a weak and discredited 
government, the safe harbour of opposition would have been 
relinquished to Labour, and as a result the Conservatives 
might end up actually losing an election they had seemed 
destined to win. This fear was not completely allayed by 
the formation of the national cabinet, although it was a 
good argument for retaining MacDonald and Snowden in their 
present offices, and this anxiety was not completely laid 
to rest until public opinion had been established by the 
general election in October 1931. It was a particular 
anxiety of those who placed tariffs before economies, but 
it also s e r i o u s l y  w o r r i e d  C o n s e r v a t i v e  p r o s p e c t i v e  
c a n d i d a t e s  for the n o r t h e r n  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  w here 
unemployment was at its highest l e v e l s . T h e  election 
eventually demonstrated that popular reaction to the 
national government had not developed along these lines, 
but that does not negate the fact that this scenario 
exercised the minds of Conservative strategists in late 
August. The rationale behind the desire to involve some
60. Bridgeman to Baldwin, 16 August 1931, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 44, ff. 35-38; Hilton Young to his wife, 24 
August 1931, Kennet MSS 107/3.
61. Amery to Beaverbrook, 26 August 1931, Beaverbrook 
MSS, C6 ; Beaverbrook to Elliott, 6 September 1931, 
ibid., C129; Headlam diary, 24 August 1931.
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Labour figures in the new government under Baldwin - which 
had been expected until the last moment to be the most 
logical development - was not principally a Machivellian 
ploy to split the Labour party, but was a simpler device 
to spread the load of u n p o p u l a r i t y  on as many n o n - 
Conservative shoulders as possible. It was, perhaps, only 
a short step from this attitude to accepting that if the 
premiership was the only post MacDonald would take, that 
this was not, after all, too high a price in the short 
term.^2 No one expected the new government, and therefore 
MacDonald’s continued presence at No. 10, to be other than 
a temporary expedient.
The Conservative party sacrificed much in the short 
term tactical dimension, and endangered much in the long 
term electoral dimension, by its actions during the crisis 
of August 1931. Where it gained, it gained in policy - 
though in only one half of its policy, economies but not 
tariffs, but at least in the foremost element. This gain 
in the fiscal sphere was the prize for w h i c h  the
Conservative party joined the national government. In one |
!sense, e s p e c i a l l y  in vie w  of its a c c e p t a n c e  of the I
b a n k e r s ’ v i e w s  on the u r g e n c y  of the position, and .■Itherefore of the limitations to its freedom of action, 
being forced to act hastily with parliament adjourned, it 
could almost be argued that the Conservative party were 
more than any other party the v i c t i m  of a b a n k e r s ’
62. Cunliffe-Lister to his wife, 21 August 1931, Swinton
MSS, SWIN III (313) 1/5.
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’ramp', albeit a genuine one. Neville C h a m b e r l a i n ’s 
favouring of the idea of a Labour presence in the new 
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n  r e f l e c t e d  n o t  h i s  p o l i t i c a l  
sophistication, but his connection with, and greater 
responsiveness to, City opinion. To suggest that any 
Conservatives were principally motivated during the August 
crisis by cunning notions of destroying the Labour party 
is p a t e n t l y  absurd, not least b e c a u s e  they c l e a r l y  
recognised that MacDonald and Snowden would attract very 
few followers from the Labour party, although they might 
have some standing in the country. The Conservative 
leaders were worried and anxious men themselves, concerned 
primarily with two things, the situation of the pound and 
the relationship thereto of the economy proposals, against 
which was balanced the desire to avoid increases in direct 
taxation. At that altar they risked sacrificing the 
political interests of their own party as much as any 
other, although they did so partly in keeping with their 
accepted notions of patriotism and duty. Any damaging 
side effects on the Labour party only came into the 
picture as an added bonus to the principal concern. 
Joining a national government was not the gain made by 
Conservatives in August 1931 but it was the means to 
achieving the end they sought: a reversal of the trends
in the spheres of government expenditure and bureaucracy, 
of the role of government social action, and of direct 
taxation, both national and local. Thus, at the height of
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the crisis on 21 August, the party leaders a g r e e d " t h a t  
retrenchment was the vital thing and that we must 
concentrate entirely on t h a t ",^8
The role of Neville Chamberlain in the crisis has 
been categorised as that of being the architect of the 
national government, who "checkmated MacDonald and made 
certain the Labour Party’s fall from power", who had
"foreseen every contingency", and who was "clearly in 
command of the s i t u a t i o n " . T h e  latter Chamberlain was 
not; he acted in an advisory capacity to Baldwin, and was 
not present at the two crucial audiences at Buckingham 
Palace on 23 and 24 August, at which the situation had 
been completely transformed. During Baldwin’s absence his 
position had been that of observer, not of executive, and 
as soon as matters became serious he both sent for his 
leader and called his colleagues into consultation with 
h i m . S u c h  decisions as were taken to join a coalition 
m i n i s t r y  were taken i n i t i a l l y  by B a l d w i n ,  and then 
approved by the collective party leadership. The casting 
of Chamberlain as planner of the national government is 
also inherently unsatisfactory because it is based on the 
dubious assumption that of all the politicians only
Neville Chamberlain was unaffected by the panic of the 
crisis, the pressures and alarms of the City, and the
63. N . to Anne Chamberlain, 21 August 1931, NC 1/26/446.
64. Fair, op. cit., p. 154.
65. Lloyd to Cun 1 i f f e - Lister, 14 August 1931, Swinton
MSS, SWIN I (174) 2/1, ff. 26-28.
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atmosphere of the sacrifice of party interest for the sake 
of national interest. It was not C h a m b e r l a i n ’s appeals 
w h i c h  ’s e d u c e d ’ M a c D o n a l d  into joining the national 
government, for, although they were not completely without 
effect, they were a minor contributory factor. MacDonald 
w a s  a w a r e  of C h a m b e r l a i n  as a h i g h l y  p a r t i s a n  
Conservative, and was too experienced a politician to 
accept his advice as disinterested, and he was even less 
likely to be moved by an appeal that was visibly not 
supported by C h a m b e r l a i n ’s leader, a man for whom he had 
much more liking and respect. It was in fact the King who 
carried enough weight, and yet was believed to be acting 
pure l y  in the ’n a t i o n a l  i n t e r e s t ’, who both urged 
MacDonald to remain as premier and Baldwin to serve under 
him; no one else had the prestige or respect which would 
have been necessary to sway either politician into such a 
course of action.
Chamberlain was concerned with the financial position 
much more than with the political one.^8 On 20 August he 
told Hoare that the essential problem they had to face 
"was to restore foreign confidence in British credit", 
which would only be achieved by such a cut in annual 
expenditure that would show "we had sufficient courage to 
tackle the situation".^7 Chamberlain had nailed his flag
6 6 . The press statement released by Chamberlain after the 
meeting of 13 August was entirely concerned with the 
financial position; for example. The ££m£S, 14 August 
1931.
67. N. Chamberlain diary, 22 August 1931, NC 2/22.
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to the economy mast during the previous year, and now felt 
that
to secure such a measure of relief and to do it 
t h r o u g h  a S o c i a l i s t  g o v e r n m e n t  s e e m s  to me so 
important in the national interest that we MUST give 
it our support, provided the proposals for ’equal 
sacrifice’ do not imperil British credit or brazenly 
affront ordinary rules of justice.
68
In the latter sense he was aware that "the danger from our 
point of view is the ’sacrifice’ by the R e n t i e r  ".^9 % f ,
however, the government "do mean business at last" and 
will "face the issue", Chamberlain wrote that "in such 
circumstances our duty seems to me plain enough. We must 
give the assurances [of support] and hope that we shall 
not as a party suffer for it",7® Chamberlain sought to 
associate Labour with the economies in order to increase 
the chances of their acceptance, and his early moves were 
designed to aid MacDonald in carrying his cabinet for a 
larger sum. The Conservative position tactically evolved 
on a day-to-day basis, but it was always founded upon 
these aims. Thus, Neville C h a m b e r l a i n ’s urgings to 
MacDonald late at night on 23 A u g u s t  in r e a l i t y  
represented the final fling of his favoured plan that the 
Labour government should accept responsibility for their
68. N. to Hilda Chamberlain, 16 August 1931, NC 18/1/752.
69. Lloyd to Cunliffe-Lister, 14 August 1931, Swinton 
MSS, SWIN I (174) 2/1, ff. 26-28.
70. Memo ’The Financial Crisis’, N. to A. Chamberlain, 14 
August 1931, AC 39/3/26.
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own overspending. This last-minute idea appeared the only 
way left, after the Labour cabinet had broken up only two 
hours before, to get some kind of Labour involvement 
with the dole cuts, and it should not be misread as part 
of a strategy for a national government. Chamberlain came 
to favour a temporary all-party coalition, not for its 
impact on domestic politics, but in part for the very 
reason he gave MacDonald - that his name carried weight 
overseas and his presence would increase the chances of 
restoring overseas confidence.71 C h a m b e r l a i n ’s ideas
ibecome even clearer by the evidence of theione occasion 
when he did appear to consider the political- consequences 
of his policy in the party context. At thie meeting of 
12:30 on 22 August he toyed with the a d o p t i o n  of a 
partisan role by the Conservative party - bujt through the 
medium of remaining as uncommitted as possible, not by 
entering into coalitions. Looking back on an arrangement 
which on 22 August he believed had resolved the crisis, 
Chamberlain detected as a by-product of the plan for 
Labour to meet parliament with their economy proposals for 
discussion in the Commons that "we have got the Govt, into 
a most difficult position and by concentrating on economy 
have preserved our rights on taxation completely".72 This 
idea swiftly fell by the wayside, not just because the 
Labour cabinet disintegrated, but because the bankers made
71. N. Chamberlain diary, 23 August 1931, NC 2/22.
72. N. to Anne Chamberlain, 23 August 1931, NC 1/26/447*
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it clear that the constraints of time would not permit 
such a delayed resolution to the crisis. The incident 
demonstrated, however, that what partisan instincts 
Chamberlain had were to keep a weak Labour government in 
office and to retain the safe ground of opposition, until 
the anticipated dissolution.
B a l d w i n ’s views paralleled these, and he was even 
more hostile to the idea of becoming involved in another 
c o a l i t i o n . 73 % n the first phase of the crisis his
demeanour was "bouncy" as he thought the government about 
to collapse, and expected to replace MacDonald as Prime 
Minister at any moment, and indeed as late as the evening 
of 23 August he was planning the composition of his 
i n t e n d e d  c a b i n e t , 7^ It was b e c a u s e  he feared that 
involvement might prevent this outcome that he sought to 
d i s t a n c e  h i m s e l f ;  d e s p i t e  his e n d e a v o u r s ,  h o w e v e r ,  
coalition became inescapable. In part this was because 
Baldwin, too, accepted the ba n k e r s ’ view of both the 
seriousness and urgency of the crisis, and of the solution 
required. Nevertheless, as he arrived at Buckingham 
Palace at 10:00 a.m. on 24 August, he expected to become 
the next Prime Minister, even if his government was not to 
be purely Conservative. The fact that he did not do so 
was because he gave in, though with reluctance, to the 
appeals of the King, and to the £a.i.;t accompli with which
73. James, ed., op. cit., p. 367.
74. Balwin’s speech at Kingsway Hall, 28 August 1931. The 
Times, 29 August 1931.
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he was p r e s e n t e d  by the fact that, at George V ’s 
persuasion, not only had MacDonald not resigned, but that 
he was now w i l l i n g  to r e m a i n  and lead a n a t i o n a l  
government. Given that both the King and Samuel - who 
controlled the balance with the Liberal MPs in the House - 
were keen to support this idea, and given the hypothetical 
promise Baldwin had made the previous day - and he was not 
a man to break pledges, especially those given to his King 
- and given the attitude of the City that hours were of 
vital concern, so Baldwin had lost that tactical freedom 
of manoeuvre which by disengagement he had throughout the 
crisis tried to maintain.75 Despite all the press talk of 
national government during the previous twelve months, it 
was not until King George V, a c c o r d i n g  to his own 
conception of the monarch's constitutional role as the 
guardian and spokesman of the 'national interest', put 
Baldwin squarely on the spot of 'duty' and 'patriotism', 
that the question became a live one.75 The role of the 
King was not necessarily unconstitutional, but it was a 
crucial factor, as a result of his taking the initiative 
on the subject of national government in his interview 
with Baldwin on 23 August, and in putting the party 
leaders under the double pressure of his personal appeal 
for co-operation and his insistence on an immediate 
solution.' It was at his m o n a r c h ’s request that Baldwin, 
7 5. Loc. cit.
76. W i g r a m ’s m emo, 11 July 1931» RAM 2329/2, in 
Middlemas, K. and Barnes, J., B a ]^ d w (1969)» p. 602.
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in the words of the King's secretary, was willing "to risk
party interests for the sake of the Country".7?
In the decision to form the national government,
Samuel and the Liberals played a role second only to that
of the King himself, and certainly one more significant
than Baldwin, who was carried along by events, unable to
shape their course. The idea was urged on the King by
Samuel, and of all the three parties only the Liberals
stood to gain from it. Naturally, they preferred to
retain as Prime Minister and Chancellor figures who were
not only free traders, but also with whom they had been
dealing for two years. Furthermore, the formation of a
coalition might postpone the election until the Liberals
were better able to withstand the expected Conservative
landslide - which it could be argued in fact they largely
avoided in October. The Liberals would also gain office
and find new prestige as well as a badly needed role,
whilst also gaining their policy aims by playing one party
off against the other. Economies would be achieved under
Conservative pressure, but tariffs avoided by a free trade
L i b e r a l - L a b o u r  block. A l l i a n c e  with the d o g m a t i c
Gladstonian Snowden established and confirmed at the
Exchequer was hardly an advance on the road to protection
along which Conservatives wanted to travel, but it suited
the L i b e r a l s  well. The f o r m a t i o n  of the n a t i o n a l
government was in fact a victory for Samuel, for the
77. Wigram's memo, 23 August 1931, RAK 2330, in Nicolson, 
op. cit., p. 462.
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bankers, and for the King in the sense that his view of 
the role and strengths of the British constitution was 
confirmed, but for no one e l s e . 78
The rhetoric of the 'national interest' has elsewhere 
been examined in its influence upon the actions of the 
Labour leaders, but it should be pointed out that its 
influence was even greater upon the Conservative mind.79 
The Conservative party as a whole reacted to the formation 
of the national government as a consequence of its self­
perceived patriotic duty, and as a result of its belief 
that the nation was in acute peril, as serious and real as 
dur i n g  the first w o r l d  war.®® The party c h a i r m a n ,  
Stonehaven, declared that "the Industrial, Social and 
E c o n o m i c  O r d e r  w a s  at s t a k e " , ® 1  and e l s e w h e r e  
Conservatives accepted that the events were "unparalleled 
in the history of the Country".®^ In such circumstances 
Baldwin expressed the view of the Conservative mind in 
accepting it as being their "bounden duty" to "put aside 
party differences for the time being in the national 
interests", an a t t i t u d e  w h i c h  D a w s o n  in Th_e Ti^m ££
78. Wigram's memo, 24 August 1931. RAK 2330, ibid., p. 
466; Hilton Young to his wife, 24 August 1931, Kennet 
MSS 107/3.
79. Dare, op. cit., passim.
80. As tor to Munday, 5 S e p t e m b e r  1931, Astor MSS, 
1416/1/1/1040.
81. West Midlands Area, Exec., 18 September 1931.
82. SUA, Western Div. Council, 9 September 1931.
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commended for its "patriotic spirit".®^ Conservatives, 
even at the apex of the party, held c o m p a r a t i v e l y  
unsophisticated conceptions of the proper role of both 
government and opposition during periods of national 
crisis; "it was [the Prime Minister's] duty to avoid that 
catastrophe and ours to do all we could to help him".®^ 
In accordance with this, if the government did its duty. 
Conservatives promised to refrain from exploiting the 
o p p o r t u n i t y  for party gain, and wo u l d  act e q u a l l y  
responsibly. This was no small gesture, for the party was 
knowingly endangering its present position of being 
poised to win an election victory on the scale of 1924; 
that, in the w o r d s  of one p r o s p e c t i v e  C o n s e r v a t i v e  
candidate, "Mr. Baldwin sacrificed probably the greatest 
political advantages that anyone ever had - the glorious 
prospect of an immense Conservative majority".®® In the 
light of the patriotic sacrifice of party, and the fact 
this did not lead, as was expected, to d i m i n i s h e d  
popularity, should not obscure the rationale behind the 
party's response of 22 to 28 August.
The measure of Baldwin's reluctant acquiescence can 
be found in the document hammered out at the Buckingham 
Palace conference of 24 August, for of all the party
83. Baldwin in The Times, 24 August 1931.
84. N. to Anne Chamberlain, 23 August 1931, NC 1/26/44?.
85. Bath CA, Special Meeting, 9 October 1931; Hail sham 
speech, Th£ 1 7 August 1931; N . to A, 
Chamberlain, 14 August 1931, AC 39/3/26; D. Marquand, 
" 1924-1932" in D. Butler, ed,, £o£ l^ £_t££££ i^ £
Politics, pp. 61-62.
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leade rs B a l d w i n  was the most c o n c e r n e d  to avoid 
entanglement in a c o a l i t i o n .  This r e s u l t e d  in the 
emphasis not only upon the temporary and limited nature of 
the government, but in the explicit disavowal that it was 
"not a coalition but co-operation".®® Baldwin placed much 
emphasis on the conception of the government as being the 
co-operation of certain individuals, and the declaration 
that "there is no question of any permanent coalition" was 
in fact all the more believable coming from the lips of 
the man most associated with the repudiation of the 
coalition in 1922.®? Indeed, it required all of Baldwin's 
trustworthiness to soothe the instinctive first reactions 
of a party for whom during the previous nine years the 
belief that 'England does not love coalitions' had become 
an article of faith. The inclusion of Labour figures was
not the p r o b l e m ,  for their p r e s e n c e  was d e s i r a b l e  ÏIpsychologically, and their willingness to consider a |
1revenue tariff suspected; however, coalition with such |
Liberals as Samuel and Lloyd George, who were deeply 1
loathed by the Conservative party, was a more difficult 
pill to swallow.®® For the same reasons Baldwin was keen
86. A. to Ivy Chamberlain, 24 August 1931, AC 6/1/800;
Baldwin to Hilton Young, 27 August 1931, Kennet MSS 
4/8.
87. Baldwin's press statement, 24 August 1931, The Times,
25 August 1931.
88. Ormesby-Gore to Baldwin, 24 August 1931, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 44, f. 50; Horne to N. Chamberlain, 15 August 
1931, copy, ibid., ff.\ 25-34; Bridgeman to Salisbury,
9 October 1931, Salisbury MSS S(4) 141/112; The
Times, 21 August 1931. That Lloyd George was out of 
a c t i o n  due to i l l n e s s  s e e m s  t o h a v e  m a d e  
comparatively little difference to this feeling.
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to keep the cabinet limited to only ten persons, for that 
again marked "the temporary and emergency character of the 
a r r a n g e m e n t " ,  as one of the e x c l u d e d  C o n s e r v a t i v e s
acknowledged.®9
In selecting his colleagues to fill the other three 
of the four Conservative cabinet places, Baldwin offered 
his party further reassurance that the gains of the past 
year had not been surrendered. This he did over three 
crucial areas; tariffs, India, and the agitation against 
the 'Old Gang'. Two of his choices symbolised the tariff 
policy: Neville Chamberlain, a known protectionist and
the architect both of the advances of October I93O and of 
the Stornoway House agreement, and Cunliffe-Lister, who 
had overseen the drawing up of detailed tariff plans by 
the Research Department. The appointment of the third 
figure. Sir Samuel Hoare, to the India Office was a 
c r u c i a l  e l e m e n t ,  it b e i n g  i n s i s t e d  t h a t  o n l y  a 
Conservative could fill this post without causing party 
u n r e s t . 9® All three symbolised the promotion of younger 
men in the leadership at the expense of the 'Old Gang'. 
The omission of certain Conservatives from the national 
government has been perhaps given undue significance due 
to its later permanence. Several of the figures on the 
sidelines: Amery, Austen Chamberlain, Hailsham, and
perhaps even Churchill, might have been included in the
89. A. to Ivy Chamberlain, 2 4 August 1931, AC 6/1/801.
90. Ibid., AC 6/ 1 /802; Hilton Young to his wife, 26
August 1931, Kennet MSS 107/3.
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less restricted confines of a Conservative government. 
The dispensation of August 1931 was only intended to be 
temporary, and the reason for their omission was not so 
much any political unorthodoxy as the need to maintain 
inter-party consensus by demonstrating that the 'Old Gang' 
would not be allowed to dominate the next Conservative 
cabinet, a priority which even eased aside figures such as 
Peel and Hailsham. That this exclusion was not permanent,
but only temporary, was a theme Baldwin took great care in
hammering home in his speech to the party meeting on 28 
August, appeasing the excluded.
The theme of Conservative presentation of the new 
government revolved around the restrictions placed upon 
it: that it was temporary, that the parties would return
to their previous positions, that it was limited only to
dealing with the financial measures, that it did not
compromise other policies, and above all, that it would 
swiftly lead to a general election. The emphasis on the 
temporary nature of the arrangements ran through all these 
aspects as a connecting theme. The limitation to enacting 
only an Economies Bill and passing a budget was crucial in 
the light of the Conservative tariff p o l i c y , 91 whilst Lord 
Lloyd publicly warned that the government "had no mandate 
to decide anything on India".92 fact, the formation of
the government was the result of the party having placed
91. Peel to Salisbury, 11 September 1931» Salisbury MSS 
S(4) 141/68; The Times, 25 August 1931.
92. Bowyer to Fry, 27 August 1931, Baldwin MSS, volume 
105, ff. 63-67.
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economy first over tariffs in its programme since the 
spring of 1 9 3 1 , as those who were u n e a s y  over this 
priority were well aware, but the view that "first and 
foremost you must have drastic economy" which "alone will 
save the situation", and that the tariff battle would be 
fought afterwards, was held by an overwhelming majority of 
the party, and acquiesced in by the minority.93 Party 
unity was maintained by the explicit assurance that the 
tariff p o s i t i o n  had not been c o m p r o m i s e d ,  that the 
government would in a matter of weeks dissolve parliament 
for an election, and that nothing would be allowed to 
prevent this. This was important due to the widely held 
view in the party that, whilst economies were the short­
term solution to the n a t i o n ’s financial problems, only a 
tariff policy could restore long-term prosperity. Thus it 
was far more than merely a party shibboleth, but was seen 
and believed to be the other essential element in any 
national recovery. Moreoever, the crisis of August 1931 
had served to add to the urgency of protection, for "we 
cannot recover any revenue or any industry now without a 
tariff" and so it was all the more necessary that the 
opportunity should not be lost now that public opinion had 
come around to the point where "we can carry Protection in
93. Cunliffe-Li Ster to his wife, 21 August 1931» Swinton 
MSS, SWIN III (313) 1/5; ’Diary of Events during
Crisis 1931’, Steel-Maitland MSS, SRO GD. 193/120/3, 
ff, 443-448; Gwynne to Beaverbrook, 4 September 1931, 
Gwynne MSS, 14.
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the country at an early general e l e c t i o n " . 9^ Page Croft 
vocalised this powerful sentiment, speaking for many 
backbenchers in his conditional approval of the formation 
of the national government, and writing to Baldwin on 25 
August ;
to congratulate you on the course you have taken in 
the national interest which I am sure is wise so long 
as the National Government confines its activities to 
carrying the Emergency Budget, and a dissolution 
takes place immediately the Budget is carried. I am 
personally of the opinion that there is no solution 
of our problem without an emergency tariff, and in 
giving my support to the government I do so only on 
the distinct understanding that a mandate is sought 
from the country for a tariff policy directly the 
immediate financial problem is solved.
95
An emergency session of the party’s protectionist pressure 
group, the Empire Industries Association, of which Croft 
was chairman, had been summoned to meet on 27 August, 
and before addressing the meeting he requested from 
Baldwin, and received, "an assurance that nothing will be 
done to compromise the position of the party with regard 
to Protection and Preference".9&
* * * * * * » * * *
It is clear that acceptance of the formation of the 
national government by the Conservative party was far from
94. Orm sby-Gore to Baldwin, 24 August 1931, Baldwin MSS, 
volume 44, f. 50; this view carried all the more 
force for the fact that Orm .sby-Gore was if anything 
associated with the free trade wing of the party; 
Gretton to Baldwin, 27 August 1931» ibid., ff. 60-61.
95. Croft to Baldwin, 25 August 1931, Croft MSS, CRFT 
1/2/BA9.
96. Loc. cit.; Baldwin to Croft, 26 August 1931, ibid., 
BA10.
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a u t o m a t i c ,  but d e p e n d e n d  very d i r e c t l y  on these 
conditional factors, in particular that the government was 
not to develop into a coalition, but was only a temporary 
expedient limited in action to one area of policy only, 
and that it would not only produce shortly a general 
election, but that in that contest the parties would 
return to their previous positions and fight independently 
for their own p r o g r a m m e s . 97 The national government was 
accepted by the party for two reasons; first, because of 
the repeated unequivocal reassurances given on all the 
above points by the party leaders - reassurance embodied 
in every point of the foundation document of the new 
ministry - and because the rank and file were swept along 
as much as their leaders by the extraordinary atmosphere 
of the crisis weeks, in a wave of patriotic sacrifice in 
the national interests. These two factors were the 
pa r a l l e l  h a l l m a r k s  of the r e s p o n s e  of the rank and 
file, both in the formal meetings of 27-28 August, and in 
the reaction of Conservatism in the local Associations, to 
produce "a strong current of popular opinion in favour of 
unquestioned support of the National G o v e r n m e n t " , 98 % n
being s w a y e d  by the p r e s s u r e s  of the crisis, the 
suddenness and scale of the run on sterling, the appeals 
for unity in the national interest, the party leadership 
reflected, rather than created, the mood amongst their
97. A. to Ivy Chamberlain, 2 4 August 1931. AC 6/1/800.
98. McCurdy to Beaverbrook, 3 September 1931, Beaverbrook 
MSS, C229.
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followers, and as a result the entry into the national 
government did not produce a rift between leaders and led, 
but almost a new PPJ[lo£hem£n_t. Ironically, by being
forced to sacrifice the party’s interests Baldwin’s stock 
rose dramatically in the eyes of his supporters, an 
approval of his statesmanship which went far to obliterate 
memories of his weaknesses as party leader in opposition 
during the previous two and a half years, and completed 
triumphantly the process of rehabilitation begun in the 
spring of 1931. The explanation of this was that on this 
occasion Baldwin’s failure to act as a partisan leader for 
once accorded with the conceptions of the grassroots, 
rather than as previously conflicting with them.
Within days the m o m e n t u m  of approval had gathered 
irresistible force, as was demonstrated in the three 
meetings of the party’s representative institutions at the 
end of the week, which had opened with the formation of 
the n a t i o n a l  g o v e r n m e n t .  The E m p i r e  I n d u s t r i e s
Association met first, on 2? August, expressing their fear
that the emergency government might "put off the day when
our constructive policy could be brought into b e i n g " . 99 
Croft attended, and "with B a l d w i n ’s letter in my pocket" 
he gave his " w h o l e h e a r t e d  a p p r o v a l  to the n a t i o n a l
g o v e r n m e n t " , 100 after some rambling discussion the
A s s o c i a t i o n  a g r e e d  on "a s i m p l e  r e s o l u t i o n  of
99. Report of meeting, Bowyer to Fry, 27 August 1931,
Baldwin MSS, volume 105, ff. 63-67.
100. Croft, op. cit., pp. 190-191.
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c o n f i d e n c e  ".101 On the next day the official party 
m e e t i n g s  took place; an e m e r g e n c y  se s s i o n  of the 
Executive Committee of the National Union, and a party 
meeting of MPs, peers and candidates at the Kingsway Hall 
to be addresed by Baldwin. At the former meeting the 
chairman of the National Union, Kings ley W o o d , stressed 
again the t e m p o r a r y  and e m e r g e n c y  nature  of the 
government, and concentrated their attention on the 
i m m i n e n t  ge n e r a l  election, for w h i c h  the party 
organisation must accelerate its preparations, and the 
tariff policy "strongly pressed home in the constituencies 
before the General Election took place" by continuing 
propaganda. Having been soothed by these assurances, the 
resolution moved by Derby approving the leader's action 
was passed u n a n i m o u s l y . 1^2 The mood here matched that of 
the party meeti n g ,  w h i c h  was "very dull and pur e l y  
f o r m a l " . 103 Baldwin's speech candidly explained the 
events of the previous weekend;
I reached London on Saturday evening. I heard all 
that had passed, and late that night it seemed quite 
possible in the situation that then existed that we 
might be asked to form a government. I do not wish 
to say any more about that at this moment. On the 
Monday morning the crisis in the situation was 
literally a matter of hours .... It was in those 
circumstances that I was asked to meet the King with 
the Prime Minister and the acting leader of the 
Liberal Party. In the circumstances of that meeting 
and at that time there was nothing for anyone in my
101. 'Diary of Events During Crisis 1931’, Steel-Maitland 
MSS, SRO GD 193/210/3. ff. 443-448.
102. NU Exec,, Emergency Meeting, 28 August 1931.
103. Conway diary, 28 August 1931, Add. 7676/463.
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position to do but promise full co-operation to tide 
over this crisis.
104
Thus did Baldwin account for not having held out for a 
Conservative government, making it clear that the eventual 
decision for a national ministry, though accepted by him, 
had been n e i t h e r  his d e s i r e  nor suggeistion. TheI
reassurances were then once more produced: j
when the economies are carried and t'he budget is 
b a l a n c e d  you will then have a str,aight fight 
on tariffs and against the Socialist Party.
Those not included in the new government were; assured that 
this "will not prejudice their position in the future" 
Conservative government, and Baldwin closed with a typical 
appeal to the instincts of loyalty and unity: "Let us
pull together .... We shall, I believe, succeed in saving 
the pound sterling. Meantime our p a r t y ’s position and 
programme on the tariff question remains intact." The 
r e s o l u t i o n  of s u p p o r t  was m o v e d  by three f i gures 
associated with the anti-Baldwinite right wing: Gretton,
Hailsham, and Page Croft, All set their seal of approval 
on the new government, although none welcomed it. Gretton 
warned that even the modest amounts of new taxation would 
be " g r i e v o u s  to us all" and must be "a t e m p o r a r y  i
sacrifice" until the revenue tariff could come to the
104. The Times, 29 August 1931.
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rescue in relief both of taxes and of the number of 
unemployed. Croft noted that the new cabinet had a free 
trade majority, but accepted with Hailsham that due to 
lack of time there was "not a possible alternative". The 
mood of the party was evident in the reactions from the 
floor of the meeting, where "everyone present appeared to 
approve entirely of [ B a l d w i n ’s] line of a c t  i o n " , 1^5 a n d  
"at the end there was round after round of cheering and 
then someone in the hall started ’God Save the King’ and 
it was sung i m p r e s s i v e l y " . 1 ^ 6  What was being cheered, 
however, was not a party victory, but the patriotic 
sacrifice of party in the national interest, for, as Croft 
noted at the meeting, many MPs "were much disgruntled 
that Conservatives should have been jockeyed out of their
certain v i c t o r y " . 1^7
The mood of the party expressed at the Kingsway Hall
was consistent with the reactions of the grassroots of
the party throughout the country, both north and south,
rural and urban. Baldwin had "justified the trust in him
by putting country before party in the present c r i s i s " . 1^8
Both the imperative circumstances and the electoral risks
were acknowledged:
While admitting that Mr. Baldwin and his colleagues 
could not, in the interests of the Country, have done
105. Headlara diary, 28 August 1931.
106. A. to Ivy Chamberlain, 28 August 1931, AC 6/1/806.
107. Croft, op. cit., p. 192.
108. Waterloo CA, Council, 4 September 1931.
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...■ . . r
o t h e r w i s e ,  the C h a i r m a n  said he felt that the 
Unionist party might be in danger of being blamed for 
the economies which had to be effected as the result 
of the mismanagement of the late government.
109
The reaction of the grassroots was sometimes unconsciously 
inconsistent, declaring at the same time that "we must 
think of the nation" and that "we [must] not deviate from 
tariffs", but approval of the decision was unanimous.11  ^
* * * * * * * * * *
The dynamic of the events during the short life of 
the first national government was contained within these 
assumptions made at its inception, above all that it would 
lead to an early election where nothing would be allowed 
to obstruct the party campaigning for a ’free han d ’ on 
tariffs. The national government could only exist so long 
as it accommodated these internal requirements of its 
dominant constituent element, as it proceeded to do in 
stages from September 1931 until September 1932. It was 
only as a result of this process that the government which 
on its initial formation in August 1931 was a development 
unfavourable to the Conservative party, and thus intended 
o n l y  to be a t e m p o r a r y  n e c e s s i t y ,  b e c a m e  a
109. Glasgow Unionist Association, 7 September 1931.
110. Peterborough CA, Exec., 3 October 1931; SUA, Western 
Div. Council, 9 September 1931; Ealing CA, Exec., 31 
August 1931; Lewes CA, 21 September 1931; Melton CA, 
Exec., 3 October 1931; Uxbridge CA, Council, 12 
S e p t e m b e r  1931; York CA, Annual Report T931; 
P e t e r s f i e l d  CA, 13 O c t o b e r  1931; A b i n g d o n  CA, 
Council, 26 S e p t e m b e r  19 3 1; Bath CA, Exec., 8 
S e p t e m b e r  1931; East M i d l a n d s  Area, Exec., 22 
September 19 31.
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c o n f i g u r a t i o n  of more u t i l i t y  than liability. This 
reduced the incentive to terminate the new alliance. 
Once the national government had been pressurised and 
moulded to the extent that it became based upon not one, 
but both pillars of the Conservative economic policy, of 
economies and protection, it became acceptable to the 
party. At the same time the results of the 1931 general 
election heralded a new political consensus powerful 
enough to dominate British politics for the following 
decade, and thus the o b j e c t i o n s  of both poli c y  and 
pragmatism evident in the last week of August evaporated. 
It is for this reason that the explanation and origins of 
the radical restructuring of British politics after 1931 
lie not in the events of 20 to 28 August, but in the 
changing attitudes during September and October. When 
formed the government was genuinely intended by Baldwin to 
be temporary. By nature an optimist in politics, and 
certainly not immune to the appeals of patriotism in the 
national interest, he appears to have assumed that the 
future course of events was guaranteed by the conditions 
which had been written into the founding agreement of 24 
August. In the event, it proved more and more difficult 
for the national alliance to break up, as the prospect of 
the parties returning to their respective positions 
receded, and Baldwin found himself entering the election 
as part of the national coalition with MacDonald as 
premier. One consequence of this was the political
472
i m p o s s i b i l i t y  of r e s h a p i n g  the s e c o n d  n a t i o n a l  
government in the image of its backbench supporters, 
although by November Baldwin had probably ceased to wish 
to do so, f i n d i n g  the new a r r a n g e m e n t  i n c r e a s i n g l y  
congenial, both in p e r s o n a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  and in the 
political concerns not only of protection but also of 
India. Nonetheless, if after October 1931 Baldwin became 
reconciled to the position of second figure in a national 
administration, it is equally evident that he had been 
opposed to this idea in August. The new two-grouping 
system of national coalition versus a purged Labour party, 
which replaced the unstable three-party politics of the 
1920*8, was forged after the actual formation of the 
national government on 24 August 1931. As the attractions 
of the alliance began to displace the notion of a return 
to previous positions, and as the pressure of events with 
the c o l l a p s e  of the gold s t a n d a r d  and the r e n e w e d  
political attack of the Labour party set the conditions 
whereby an election as a referendum for the national 
government became necessary, so the arrangement developed 
from the e m e r g e n c y  stage to b e c o m e  the p e r m a n e n t  
'national' coalition of the 1930's.
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CONCLUSION
Power and Authority in Conservative Politics 
It is the principal argument of this thesis that the 
political crises of the early 19 30*8 transformed the 
composition and position of each of the British political 
parties and their relationship with each other and with 
the public at large. In particular, it is suggested that 
in the specific case of the Conservative party, the 
crucial period in which incipient transformations in 
direction and outlook became crystallised into the pattern 
in which they remained set until the aftermath of the 
second w o r l d  war, if not longer, was the p e r i o d  of 
internal crisis whilst in opposition to the second Labour 
govenment of June 1929 to August 1931; the only time 
between the end of the first world war and the end of the 
second that the Conservatives were not the largest party 
in the House of C o m m o n s .  As a res u l t  of these 
d e v e l o p m e n t s  d u r i n g  the period of o p p o s i t i o n ,  the 
formation of the national coalition - an event seen 
initially as a temporary divergence from normality - found 
the Conservative party united around certain policies, 
specific attitudes, and particular leaders, having already 
ev o l v e d  a p o l i t i c a l  p o s t u r e  for the issues of the 
foreseeable future. In the process of examining this 
principal concern, it is necessary to examine and explain 
the nature of Conservative political activity - its 
conventions and morality - the structure of the party, the 
distribution of power within it and the pressures which
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could be brought to bear upon it from below or without. 
The Conservative party has always been as much a matter of 
men as of measures in its essential character, and thus 
against the mechanics of policy formulation and the 
identification of the roles of different elements in the 
hierarchy, must be set the p o l i t i c a l  i n f l u e n c e  and 
therefore the political fortunes of the party leadership, 
and above all, of the leader. These a s p e c t s  will 
therefore be briefly reviewed, as the necessary structural 
and narrative backgrounds to the evolution of Conservatism 
from the erratic and uncertain position of the period from 
the Edwardian era to the later 1 920’s, to the secure and 
confident dominance of the British political scene which 
it had established in the late 1930's, and from which it 
could be argued that only the cataclysm of war cast it 
down .
* * * * * * * * * *
The first background theme to emerge from this study 
concerns the position of the party leader. This is 
revealed as possessing considerable institutional powers, 
and considerable political resources. The leader alone 
and individually had the widest discretion, both in the 
d i r e c t i o n  of p a r t y  p o l i c y ,  w h i c h  o n l y  he c o u l d  
authoritatively pronounce, and in the selection of persons 
to fill key posts in the party hierarchy. Furthermore, 
the party leader was well placed to ex p l o i t  the 
traditional claims of loyalty, and was able to exploit to
475
his personal political advantage the parity's natural 
instinct for unity. This latter tended normally to 
manifest itself in a closing of the ranks around the 
leader's chosen position, thus having the effect of 
putting the onus for causing disunity on any dissident 
elements. This in turn was reinforced by the fact that 
during times of crisis, or when the party was under 
outside attack, the luxury of internal dispute tended to 
be swiftly abandoned in favour of a united front. In 
general, then, the leader of the Conservative party 
possessed in this period an immensely powerful position, 
either for creative initiation, or as a strong defensive 
position. Nevertheless, the party leader was by no means 
immune from internal criticism or even direct attack, nor
Iwas he isolated from the pressures and demands of external 
forces and events. The leader of the partyiwas expected 
to fulfil three requirements: first, to give an adequate
lead on the floor of the House of C o m m o n s  to the 
parliamentary party - a role in which he could be assisted 
but not substituted for by other leading front benchers; 
second, to satisfy the party supporters in general by 
accommodating the policy of the party to at least a 
minimum level that accorded with their continued adherence 
- the one way in which the leader could be portrayed as 
divisive was in failing in this area; arid third, to 
provide some prospect of leading the party to victory at 
the polls. To be secure, the party leader needed to 
perform satisfactorily in at least two of these areas, and
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his position would become untenable if he failed on two or 
all three for anything beyond a short period.
The third Marquis of Salisbury, although Prime 
Minister in the Lords, had most successfully filled all 
these roles, whilst Balfour, though successful in the 
first area, fell down on both the second and the third in 
the last stage of his l eadership. Bonar Law was 
satisfactory in the electional arena, and was always 
careful to accommodate the grassroots on policy, but was 
always weakened by his failure in the first aspect; whilst 
Austen Chamberlain fell in 1922 because, notwithstanding 
all the strengths of the leader’s position, he markedly 
failed in all three; in particular, as a result of his 
decision not to lead the Conservatives to the expected 
election as an independent force. Baldwin as leader from 
1923 to 1929 had usually been adequate in the House of 
Commons, with his occasional oratorical triumphs and the 
abilities of his front bench colleagues to some extent 
masking a certain erratic quality to his performances, and 
he was also until the period immediately before the 1929 
election satisfactory in his definition of policy. This 
in particular helped him to survive the 1923 defeat 
relatively easily, for apart from the problem of there 
being no suitable alternative figure, the defeat had been 
the result of the policy which the party rank and file 
endorsed. However, after the 1929 election this was not 
the case, and Baldwin’s position became seriously exposed.
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The longer spell in opposition revealed clearly his 
weaknesses as parliamentary leader, whilst both his choice 
of platform in the election, and his definitions of policy 
from the election until October 1930 were significantly 
out of tune with a large element, although not except 
perhaps at the peak of crisis in September 1930 a majority 
element, of his followers in the Commons and in the 
constituency associations. The influence ,of the third 
area - the prospect of electoral victory! - was more 
complicated. On the one hand B a l d w i n ’s limited policy 
before October 1930 was unacceptable to the tariff whole- 
hoggers who believed that only a vigorous policy could 
attract votes, whilst on the other hand it was widely 
accepted that Baldwin, despite all his faults, was an 
electoral asset with the voters at large, for whom there 
existed no suitable replacement figure. There can, 
however, be no doubt that the party crisis, though it was 
caused by dissatisfaction over the first two areas - of 
parliamentary performance and of party policy - was first 
exacerbated by the frustrations of the electoral situation 
from May 1929 to March 1931. during which for the first 
p a r t  the p a r t y  t r a i l e d  b e h i n d  a p o p u l a r  L a b o u r  
administration, and then during the second part seemed to 
be unable to gain any a d v a n t a g e  from the g r o w i n g  
unpopularity of that government. Then, by precisely the 
same process, the party crisis was dampened down by the 
visible swing back of support to the Conservatives from 
February 1931 onwards; which culminated in the soothing
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influence of the 'whiff of victory’ scented in the by- 
elections of June 1931. This combined with the fact that 
since October 1930 the party policy in the most crucial 
areas had become acceptable; in the solution of the tariff 
question, the primacy of the economy issue, and, even 
after a period of anxiety in late 1930 and early 19 3 1, 
over India provided the promised safeguards were secured. 
It was this situation which brought about the isolation of 
the press lords’ campaign, and the restoration of order in 
the party, Baldwin’s position had certainly come close to 
a collapse of the confidence without which no leader could 
successfully function, but on each occasion it had been 
staved off, so that the end of the period under study 
found him in a position as strong as that he had held in 
1924 to 1 926, and probably stronger than that of 1 927 to 
1929, when he had frequently been out of step with the 
political concerns of his rank and file.
There is no simple explanation of B a l d w i n ’s success 
in maintaining his position during the serious phases of 
the party crisis, in particular between November 1929 and 
N o v e m b e r  1930. This was rather the p r o d u c t  of the 
interplay of a number of factors. Defensively, Baldwin 
had made good use of the loyalty card, whilst at the same 
time he had endeavoured to accommodate the party policy to 
the twin - and at first conflicting - demands of party 
opinion and public opinion. Baldwin was malleable on 
policy for two reasons; first, he sought the path of
479
least potential disunity within the party; and second, his 
negativism was not rooted in himself as the result of 
o b j e c t i o n s  of pr i n c i p l e ,  but as the e x p r e s s i o n  of 
electoral pragmatism was directly related to the state of
public opinion in the key regions of the Midlands and the
i
North where the party had to regain seats in order to win 
an election. He had also exploited the weaknesses of his
critics; their disunity, and the tactical j^eaknesses ofItheir methods, as well as the fact that the pragmatists in
nhappy about 
he matter of
the party, who were the majority, were u
adopting extremist or Diehard positions. I
political methods was especially important, and it was in 
this area that Baldwin had succeeded in altering the 
substantive issue from ends to means, and carried the day 
by playing the constitutional card, and as a result split 
the protectionists against each other from June 1930 
onwards,
Many of B a l d w i n ’s problems were, consciously or 
otherwise, of his own making. In policy the choice to 
resist empire free trade was partly deliberate electoral 
pragm^ism, and partly the reluctance of an experienced 
statesman to become tied to a policy which he believed 
could not be put into practice. But the strains set up in 
denying the instincts of many of his more vocal followers 
were exacerbated by his personal failures. Baldwin’s own 
mood during the party crisis was a mixture of nervousness 
and complacency, irresolution and sudden counterattack. 
These are conflicting descriptions, but they represent a
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complex and often contradictory personality, whose moods 
and conduct were widely variable, and who for much of the 
period under discussion was under considerable political 
stress. He was most often criticised for his complacency, 
although its cause may have been instinctive appreciation 
of the latent strengths of his position as much as any 
lack of appreciation of the difficulties in which he found 
himself. The combination of complacency and indecision 
was the pr o d u c t  of his r e l i a n c e  on his skill in 
understanding and creating a political ’atmosphere', and 
of the conflicting signals which this was sending at 
different times and from different regions. Baldwin opted 
for safety first in his timing of policy advances, and if 
there was any error, it was on the side of delay. This 
was certainly a political weakness in Baldwin’s character, 
and there were others that contributed to his difficulties 
b e t w e n  1929 and 1931. He l a c k e d  t a c t  and w a s  
uncommunicative in his personal handling of both his 
principal colleagues, and of his backbenchers. He hung on 
d a n g e r o u s l y  to c e r t a i n  i n d i v i d u a l s  who were d e e p l y  
unpopular in the party, first Davidson and later Irwin, 
out of a sense of p e r s o n a l  loyalty. His p e r s o n a l  
preference for the ’Old Gang’, and consequent frustration 
of a rising clique of younger MPs, was another source of 
weakness, for few of the young MPs were antagonistic to 
his policies. Most important of all, however, was his 
personal failure to fill the accepted role of leader of
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the opposition in the normal, partisan, sense - a failure 
which left many of his followers feeling that the party 
had lost both its policies and its sense of purpose. In 
the event it proved that these weaknesses of B a l d w i n ’s 
position, though they did strain internal relationships in 
the Conservative party, and thus in part contributed to 
the existence of a leadership crisis as well as a policy 
crisis, were not so great or so l o n g - l a s t i n g  as to 
outweigh the strengths of his position. Baldwin survived 
as leader by exploiting these, by his often underestimated 
skills of timing, by his occasional but crucial oratorical 
successes, by the d i s u n i t y  and lack of p o l i t i c a l  
respectability of his opponents outside the party, by the 
general loyalty of his colleagues and the majority of 
MPs, by the hamstrung position of those within the party 
on the occasions when they sought to move against him, and 
by a certain amount of luck. 
* * * * * *  * * * *
The events of the period in opposition during 1929 to 
1931 also illuminate the practical process of formulating 
party policy. This could be described as the process of 
arriving at an equation acceptable to the widest possible 
range of party opinion and of public opinion; to balance 
the considerations of electoral pragmatism with the need 
to keep the flame of party spirit burning brightly. Of 
course, it would not always be true to posit a direct 
contradiction between party opinion and public opinion, 
for after all both are affected by the same social and
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économie factors, and party opinion is only an element in 
the wider area of public o p i n i o n  generally. The 
d i s t i n c t i o n  is more u s u a l l y  one of degree, and is 
significant only where the party opinion is central to the 
partisans’ d ’et r e , and yet conflicts with the
majority or consensual public attitude on the question in 
focus. Thus party opinion could become in tune with 
public opinion in one area, such as tariffs or economy, 
yet out of tune at the same time in another area, such as 
disarmament and the role of the League of Nations, or the 
proper functions of the House of Lords. This affected the 
political position of the party in relation to the issues 
in the limelight of public attention. On this criterion 
the C o n s e r v a t i v e  party was out of tune with public 
opinion, especially on the most important economic issue, 
at the time of the 1929 general election, and remained so 
until the end of that year. During 1930 the two moved 
independently onto a converging course, so that by 1931 
party and public were broadly of the same mind on what 
both saw as the foremost crisis of the day. This position 
was created before the August 1931 financial crisis, but 
that crisis and the events of August to October 1931 
further increased the degree of affinity, so that the 
election of 1931 produced a victory at the polls of a 
greater scale even than that which the party had been 
looking forward to before the crisis broke.
Party policy was the result of four elements of 
party opinion. The party leader was influenced by his
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need to retain a c o n s e n s u s  a m o n g s t  the front bench 
leadership; the requirement to maintain the morale, 
confidence, and unity of the parliamentary forces; the 
pressures expressed generally from the sectors and classes 
amongst whom the party found its support; and the specific 
expressions of these from the grassroots, through the 
representative institutions of the local associations and 
of the National Union, and through their local Member of 
Parliament. Public opinion was a more amorphous concept, 
but attention was specifically directed to the state of 
opinion in the marginal regions, and to the results of by- 
elections. The evolution of party policy was clearly the 
result of attempting the most satisfactory compromise 
solution. However, as all the individuals or groups 
involved were located in and involved with the concerns of 
one specific area, the reception of the policy solution 
varied widely. It was these concerns as much, if not 
more, than any simplistic left-to-right linear spectrum of 
political position within the framework of Conservatism, 
that created the political 'atmosphere'.
In the case of party opinion, the significant factors 
were the gradual products of the trend from being a party j
based on a landed interest, to a party based upon business |
or commercial concerns, and the operation in parallel with I
this of the growing insularity of political concern which |1
was leading to the primacy of domestic issues over those |
Iof Britain's imperial status. In the case of public |
!opinion, the s l u m p  p r o d u c e d  a s w i n g  in favour of |1
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protection, which also reduced the popularity of the 
Labour government. The latter had been generally welcomed 
as a change on its e l e c t i o n  in May 1 9 29, but was 
increasingly seen to be ineffective, in particular in 
dealing with the economic and unemployment problems. 
Specific Conservative policies were directly related to 
these shifts in opinion. The tariff issue reflected the 
failure of 'safety first' to secure public support in the 
election, and the pressure of other sectors of business, 
such as iron and steel, that the existing policy of 
safeguarding should be much extended in its application. 
The aspect of imperial preference, however, was soon being 
set aside in the interests of domestic interest groups. 
Of these, agriculture was the less successful, partly 
because the balance of power in the party had shifted to 
the world of industry and finance, and partly because 
public opinion was less likely to accept a tariff on cheap 
food imports. The question of India failed to achieve 
primacy due to the emphasis on insular politics, whilst 
the issue of economy outstripped both tariffs and India in 
the party rhetoric of 1931 precisely because it was the 
one area where party opinion and public opinion seemed to 
be closest. The national peril had secured the centre of 
the political stage, but its influence had not yet peaked, 
for the idea of any coalition was still vigorously ruled 
out on the eve of the financial crisis in August 1931.
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The interplay of these policies and of the roles of 
the leader and the rank and file, of party and of public 
opinion, have all been followed through the six stages of 
the p o l i t i c s  of the C o n s e r v a t i v e  party's period in 
opposition to the second Labour government, and have 
provided the framework for their categorisation and 
examination. The first phase, from the election defeat of 
May 1929 to the s u m m e r  recess in August 1929 was 
categorised by successful caution on the part of the 
leadership over policy as a result of the wide divergence 
between public opinion and party opinion. In the case of 
the latter, a critique of both the causes of the election 
defeat and the defects of current policy began to put 
pressure on the party leadership during the second stage, 
from September 1929 to February 1930, for some advance of 
party policy to protection of industry at least, if not 
also of agriculture. This pressure was vocalised by 
Beaverbrook's Empire Crusade campaign, but had its roots 
in the party rank and file of southern England. During 
this phase the party leadership strove to concede as 
little as possible as slowly as possible, for very good 
reasons of electoral pragmatism. The party itself was by 
no means completely favourable to protection, and in the 
Northern urban areas in particular it was unpopular with 
both party and with public opinion. Thus the advances 
made by the p arty leader, in s p e e c h e s  at the 19 2 9 
conference, at the Coliseum, and at the Hotel Cecil, were 
all of rhetoric rather than substance, and the key policy
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to agriculture was repeatedly postponed. Nonetheless, 
throughout the period, but with increasing force from 
early 1930 onwards, business opinion and public opinion, 
even in former free trade strongholds, was moving towards 
protection - a movement which by the end of the 1 930's had 
become such a landslide that even food taxes no longer 
provoked the same hostile response. Thus adjustments of 
policy b e c a m e  possible, and the c a u t i o u s  first of 
these, at the Hotel Cecil, enabled a truce to be made with 
the press campaign which reduced the effectiveness of the 
rank and file movement; and this third phase, March to 
June 1930, gave the leadership a breathingIspace to set
I
their house in order. This was achieved, partly through 
unveiling a popular agricultural policy, partly through 
dropping the highly unpopular party chairman! Davidson and 
replacing him with Neville Chamberlain, and partly through 
exploiting the growing tactical rift on means which was 
opening up between the press lords and their sympathisers 
at all levels of the party. Thus, when the truce 
collapsed, the party leadership were able during the 
fourth phase, June to October 1930, to counterattack with 
the cry of loyalty and play the constitutional card 
against press power. The first party m e e t i n g  was 
summoned by the leaders to register approval of the 
changes of June 1 930 and was swung by an assault on 
Rothermere into doing so. This restoration of control 
could not last, for it had not satisfied the real causes
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of unrest, either on policy or by providing a proper forum 
for discussion.
Thus the most acute phase of crisis occurred in 
September 1930 as a result of the fact that the rift 
between the leader's position and that of the rank and 
file was at its widest. Baldwin appeared to be failing in 
all three aspects of leadership: his Commons performances
were visibly unsatisfactory, his policy was unpopular, and 
he provided no prospect of electoral victory. In addition 
he was losing control over party opinion, amongst his 
colleagues, amongst the MPs, and more broadly in the 
country as a whole, where perhaps for the only time in his 
career the l o y a l t y  of the c h a i r m a n  of the local 
associations and of moderate majority opinion in them 
wavered. R e c o v e r y  was a c h i e v e d  in Oc t o b e r  1930 by 
accommodating grassroots pressure on policy, as a response 
not to the Crusade but to the imperial conference. Thus 
the fifth phase, November 1930 to March 1931, saw the 
first stage of the restoration of control, with the second 
Caxton Hall meeting confirming the appeasement of internal 
opinion, whilst the advance of public opinion made such 
appeasement possible. However, during this fifth phase 
doubts over the India policy, and over Baldwin's personal 
capacity, produced a renewed but less dangerous atmosphere 
of leadership crisis in February and March 1931. This 
Baldwin dealt with by adjusting his policy, and above all, 
by r e - e s t a b l i s h i n g  his p e r s o n a l  m a s t e r y  over the 
parliamentary party with the speech of his career on 12
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March 1931, a more important event than the turning of the 
party against the press attacks after the debacle of East 
Islington, which manifested itself in Duff Cooper’s 
victory at the concurrent St. George's by-election. In 
the sixth and final phase, March to August 1931, the
restoration of order was completed by the fact that the
leadership, party opinion, the attitudes of the party 
support groups, and public opinion had found common ground 
in placing foremost on their agenda the danger of national 
bankruptcy, to which the solution was to be economy. On
this policy and this ordering of the four-point programme
there was no disunity, and the encouraging signals of the 
by-elections of summer 1931 denoted that Baldwin was once 
more proving satisfactory in all three of the lead e r ’s 
roles, vis a vis parliament, policy, and the public. 
* * * * * * * * * *
The role of the press in a parliamentary democracy 
provides the third area of structural investigation,and 
the events of 1929-1931 were commonly, but mistakenly, 
held to illustrate first an attempt at press dictatorship, 
and then the defeat of that a t t e m p t  at the the St. 
George’s by-election. In reality, the relationship 
between party and press, and the political role of the 
press, was much more complicated than such a simiplistic 
m o d e l  w ould suggest. The C o n s e r v a t i v e  press in 
general, not just the press lords’ mass circulation 
papers, but also the more prestigious metropolitan papers
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such as The Times, the M orning Post, the Daily Telegraph, 
and the Observer, and the varied range of majjor provincial
i
papers such as the Glasgow Herald and the Yorkshire Post,
acted as a forum for the development and presentation ofI
issues of policy within the party, Theirj role was to 
vocalise both public opinion, as did Th je Zi™. ® ^  i n its 
espousal of national government during the financial 
crisis, and party opinion, as did Beaver brook's and 
Bother mere's papers over empire free trade, and later 
India. The press was not a creative factojr in its own 
right, but was a medium of expression for o|pinion formed 
elsewhere, and a sounding board for the formal, in its 
columns, or informal, in discussion with its owners and 
editors, debating of party policy and strategy. The role 
of men such as Dawson, Garvin and Gwynne, no less than 
Beaverbrook, was as crucial in their private activities as 
confidants, advisors and mediators, as it was in their 
public printed leaders. The Conservative press had no 
institutionally defined relationship with the party 
structure or with the leader, for it was largely a matter 
of p e r s o n a l  i n t e r a c t i o n ,  but it is clear that they 
possessed an important if informal role, somewhere between 
the significance of front bench and back bench MPs, but 
all the more important for their possession, in their 
newspapers, of a certain independent power base, and thus 
a certain freedom of comment, action, and opinion. Viewed 
in this light, the Conservative press is a linear spectrum 
of lesser or greater affinity with the party's given
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po l i c i e s  in w h i c h  D a w s o n  w ould be found cl o s e s t  to 
Baldwin's position, Garvin on tariffs and Gwynne on India 
rather less so, and Beaverbrook and Bother mere simply 
further removed still. Various Conservative newspapers at 
different points in the party's history had attempted to 
marshall and vocalise rank and file resentment against the 
official position, and the activities of Beaverbrook and 
Bothermere were novel only in their scale of activity, not 
in their intention.
The strength of the Empire Crusade was not in the
large circulation of the newspapers which supported it,
though there is no doubt that their initial advocacy 
helped to get it started in a spectacular fashion, but in 
the fact that it was able to mobilise a significant 
proportion of disaffected Conservatives at the lowest 
levels of the party and amongst the general public. It 
was these people who gave substance to the newspapers' 
shadow army, and it was the MPs who reflected their views, 
either from sympathy or from simple necessity, who gave 
the dissatisfaction its parliamentary dimension. The 
E mpire C r u s a d e , h o w e v e r ,  as B e a v e r b r o o k  h i m s e l f  
acknowledged, was based not on the backbenchers, but on
the constituencies of the Conservative strongholds of the
southern half of England, Beaver brook's campaign also 
suffered from a number of weaknesses, principal amongst 
which was its dependence on the one-man-band dynamism of 
its principal promoter. The loneliness of his position.
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and the mistaken belief that press circulation was the 
cutting edge of the Crusade, led Beaverbrook to his 
alliance with Rothermere, but this alliance was itself a 
tactical weakness. Initially, until the South Paddington 
election, the validity of Beaverbrook's publicising role 
was widely accepted - in February and March 1 930 by 
Baldwin himself - and even for some months after the 
collapse of the truce and the first Caxton Hall meeting in 
June 1930 many Conservatives drew a distinction between 
the political respectability of the two press lords.
There was a t e n d e n c y  to p o l a r i s e  all the o d i u m  on 
Rothermere, and all the tolerance on Beaverbrook. The 
a l l i a n c e  with R o t h e r m e r e  was thus the b a rrier to 
successive attempts to come to terms after June 1930. The 
picture changed radically after October 1930 for once the 
difference on policy largely disappeared, so did the 
continued justification for the Crusade’s pressure - as 
was r e c o g n i s e d  by M e l c h e t t  and El i b a n k  by their 
withdrawal. The motive could now be condemned as one of 
personality - not a respectable cause - and Beaverbrook 
could be placed in the dock as the instigator, of party 
disunity. The by-election strategy after South Paddington 
backfired - and it was above all in his reckless attempts
iat East Islington that Beaverbrook, already isolated, lost
1the last shreds of support. This was the situation which |
Baldwin confirmed - but did not create - in March 1931 by Ijhis e m p h a s i s  on the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  q u e s t i o n  at St. fj
G eorge’s. The verdict at St. George’s was firstly a %
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condemnation of the conduct and the result of the East 
Islington by-election, and secondly reflected the fact 
that the issue of economy was already beginning to take 
precedence over the issue of protection, which had been 
settled to the satisfaction of all but an unimportant 
minority by the policy advance to the 'free hand' in 
October 1 930. Thus the press campaign blew hot and cold 
in direct relation to only one factor - the degree of 
Conservative grassroots support which it vocalised. The 
pressure of the Crusade was built on this foundation, and 
manifested itself not through the newspapers which 
promoted it, but through the orthodox political actions of 
r e c r u i t i n g  m e m b e r s ,  r a i s i n g  funds, and r u n n i n g  or 
threatening to run candidates at by-elections or at the 
general election. It is for this reason that the history 
of the Empire Crusade belongs with the history of pressure 
groups, and not with the history of journalism. 
* * * * * *  * * * *
Although the Conservative party was unexpectedly and 
unintentionally directed by the pressure of circumstances 
- of public opinion, of the royal intervention, and by the 
emotions and rhetoric of the 'national interest', into 
forming the national government in August 19 31, the 
evolution of that government after its initial crisis 
phase, from October 1931 onwards, was consistent with the 
position to which Conservatism had evolved by July 19 3 1. 
This was the basic reason for the continued success of the
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national government, and the absence of any rebellion 
along parallel lines to that which had occurred in 1921- 
1922 against the Lloyd George coalition. The national 
government was also preserved because it was seen to be 
the only solution to the economic problem, and because of 
its electoral viability. But the Conservative party rank 
and file would have been restless - far more so than they 
ever b e c a m e  over India - had they not found it 
satisfactory on political essentials, and these, by the 
early 1930's, were domestic, not imperial.
The policy outlook of the national government of 1931 
to 1935 was formed by the Conservative party during 1930 
and 1931. Economy, and the deflationary solution to the 
slump, were placed in the f o r e m o s t  position. The 
reduction of taxation and the reduction of expenditure, 
especially on the 'luxury' area of social services, were 
the specific means of a policy designed to revitalise 
investment and thus employment. Hand-in-hand with this, 
although in second place, was the commitment to the tariff 
barrier and protection of industries as the long-term 
solution. This was now approached in the spirit of 
insular protection, not by way of empire unity. Above 
all, the crucial political decisions about the future 
c o n s t i t u t i o n  of I n d i a ,  and the a t t i t u d e  of the 
Conservative party towards that measure, had already been 
taken before the national government was formed, although 
this fact was not yet apparent to the Diehards and to the 
rank and file. The long drawn out debate over India
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between 1932 and 1935, although important enough to cause 
much concern in the party, demonstrated first the fact 
that the majority of the party were already committed to 
devolution in principle; second, the new consensus and 
control established by Baldwin after March 1931*, and 
third the factor on which that consensus was based - that 
domestic issues came first and that in the last resort the 
Conservative party would neither reject its leader nor 
smash the national government for the sake of disputes 
over India .
The c h a n g e s  w h i c h  c a m e  to f r u i t i o n  in the 
Conservative party during the period in opposition formed 
the image of Conservatism in the 1 930's, an image in which 
the dominance of the party by the concerns of business led 
it into political options not always in its own best 
interests, and left a political legacy in the popular 
image of Conservatism which contributed significantly 
to the rejection of the party in the general election of 
1945. This was seen in the area of unemployment policy; 
in the pay and dole cuts of 1931, the introduction of the 
Me a n s  Test, and the p o l i c i e s  a s s o c i a t e d  with the 
Unemployment Assistance Board; and the decline of the 
prosperity of the 'special areas'. It was seen in the 
relationship of the party to the coal owners' interest 
again evident in 1937. But above all it was associated 
with the failures to re-arm; the refusal to organise or 
compel industry in any way; the dilemma over the question
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of legitimate profits; and the debacle of ;the National 
Defence Con b%"-i but ion of 1937.^ Finally, tlhe result of 
this atmosphere produced the unhappy period of 'phoney 
war' in 1939-1940. |
The character and composition of the Conservative 
leadership in the 1930's was also forged during 1929-1931. 
The continued dominance of Baldwin, who was jnot seriously 
challenged again, was the less important aspect of this. 
More significant was the elevation of the gifoup who were 
to dominate Conservative politics during the following 
decade. These included figures who had cjome into the 
front rank in the period of opposition, such as Irwin, 
Cunliffe-Lister, Kingsley Wood, and of the younger men 
Duff Cooper, Oliver Stanley, and Orm , sby-Gore. Above all, 
the period 1929-1931 saw the emergence of the triumvirate 
who came to dominate the party after the departure of 
B ald win, if not before: Simon, Hoare and N e ville
Chamberlain. Chamberlain rose from a position of some 
importance to the position of undisputed deputy during the 
period 1929 to 1931. The Research Department, and much 
more the tenure of the party Chairmanship, were the 
foundations for the first stage of this progression, and 
they e n abled him to d e c i s i v e l y  i n f l u e n c e  events in 
October 1930 and in March 1931. His return to a new 
position of prestige on the front bench after March 1931 
and in particular his successful lead in the attack on the
1 . R. P. Shay, Br itish Thirties:
Politics and Profits (1977), pp. 92-93, 246-263.
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government from the debates over the 1931 budget onwards, 
completed his rise. The events of 1931 also set one 
crucial limit upon it: that as Baldwin's crown prince, he
would have to bide his time until Baldwin chose to retire, 
an event for which he had to wait another six years. 
No n e t h e l e s s ,  as C h a n c e l l o r  of the E x c h e q u e r  in the 
national government from November 1931 onwards, Neville 
Chamberlain was marked as the political strong-raan of the 
administration. This was emphasised by the exclusion, 
either c o m p l e t e l y  in the case of Amery, Horne and 
Churchill, or partially but effectively, in the case of 
Hailshara and Austen Chamberlain, of other potential 
leaders. In fact the events of 1929-1931 produced, below 
the position of Baldwin himself, a complete restructuring 
of the Conservative leadership, which marked the second 
stage of development of the leadership which had been 
established in 1922 upon the ruins of the Lloyd George 
coalition. The changes of 1929-1931, which replaced new 
extremists such as Amery and Churchill, with new forces 
for stability such as Simon and Runciraan, confirmed the 
political verdict of 1922. The leadership which emerged 
in the period of opposition, the policies upon which their 
control and consensus were based, and the political and 
organisational structures upon which they depended, proved 
durable until the cataclysm of war in 1940 upset the 
political equilibrium established in 1931.
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